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The Introduction to the Technique of Programming, published 
in 1955 and constituting the initial volume in the series entitled 
" Analyses and Projections of Economic Development is 
now followed by this analysis of the economic development 
of Brazil, which is the first of the country studies. This is 
in accordance with the recommendations of the General 
Assembly appearing in resolution 627 (VII) and with those 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America adopted 
at different sessions (resolutions 7 (IV and 49 (V)). 
This study originated from a request of the Brazilian Banco 
do Desenvolvimento Económico, with whom the secretariat 
concluded an agreement in April 1953 providing for a joint 
study of the. elements required to prepare a programme 
using the basic procedure suggested in Volume I of the series. 
The application of this method is fundamentally based upon 
resolution 48 (V) which was adopted by the Commission at 
its fifth session held in Brazil during 1953. 
Research into the economic development of individual 
countries is carried out with the co-operation of the govern-
ment agencies or departments concerned, and fulfils a dual 
purpose : 
(a) To collect and analyse information in order to measure 
the rate of economic growth in the immediate past; and 
(ib) To establish projections of series on the different sectors 
of the economy, with the aim of assisting governments by 
providing them with the background data and bases required 
to draw up an over-all programme of economic development. 
The programme for Brazil is the outcome of the co-opera-
tion between economists of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and those of the Brazilian Development Bank, 
who together formed the joint working group created in 
April 1953. 
The technique of projection, whose broad outlines were 
sketched in the preliminary document presented to the fifth 
session (Rio de Janeiro, April 1953), is basically a method 
of analysis designed to provide an integrated and dynamic 
picture of the economic process and an approximate estímate 
of the consequences of adopting—of or failing to adopt— 
certain measures at the opportune moment. From the point 
of view of the secretariat, the present study constitutes a step 
towards transforming the technique of projection into a 
practical instrument for the formulation of economic policy. 
The valué of the technique as a method of analysis can be 
gauged from the experience acquired during a study of the 
interesting and complex problems that the development of 
the Brazilian economy at present displays. Proof has also 
been provided of the degree of feasibility—within the frame-
work of available statistics—of a system of projections to be 
used in programming. 
The fundamental interest of the study for the secretariat is 
methodological, but this does not preclude its intrinsic prac-
tical valué for the Administration of the BNDE in the for-
mulation of an investment policy. During the organization 
and execution of the work, due consideration was given to 
the anxiety of the BNDE to find practical instruments with 
which to incorpórate its investment programme into the 
general picture of the development of the Brazilian economy. 
This task could not have been accomplished within the 
time available without the enthusiastic and unwavering 
collaboration of the Bank's Administration or without the 
active interest of the personnel of its Department of Economics. 
The ECLA secretariat owes a debt of gratitude both to the 
staff concerned and to die directors of the institution. The 
praiseworthy studies previously carried out by the Joint 
Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission— 
in many instances with the direct collaboration of the present 
directors and personnel of the BNDE—constituted, on more 
than one occasion, the bases for the present research. 
The technique of projection is no more than the first phase 
of programming economic development. In this, as in any 
other specific case, at a subsequent stage a critical study would 
have to be undertaken of the measures available to the autho-
riti.es whereby the economy could be induced to attain those 
targets which the projections had helped to establish. Not 
less important and urgent, within the general framework 
of projections by activity groups, are special studies, such as 
that undertaken on transport, whose fuidings are included 
in Part Two.1 Without these it would be impossible to give 
direct assistance where it is needed. 
The wide interest at present shown in Brazil in the problems 
of programming economic development is an encouraging 
sign that the efforts initiated in the present study may be 
followed up in the future. 
1 See chapter III. 
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cases of unemployment arising from inadequate demand are 
excluded. It is true that other factors, such as a reduction of 
capital productivity, can inhibit saving. But this stability— 
an expression of the relatively consistent efforts towards 
development—nevertheless exists and may be considered 
the starting-point in an examination of the effects on economic 
growth of the other strategic factors. 
Thus, hypothetical, economic patterns can be inferred from 
an integrated analysis of the really significant factors. These 
latter indicate merely the degree of probability in a forecast 
of events. The assumptions must be revised in so far as the 
elements involved undergo a transformation. At all events, 
it is clear that the efforts required to attain any definite target 
can be organized only on the basis of the most probable 
hypothesis as to the future behaviour of the forces in play. 
Nowadays, development is accepted almost everywhere 
as an aim of economic policy. Whether individually, or 
collectively under the aegis of the United Nations, the great 
majority of governments acknowledge, with as much vigour 
as the principie of full employment was defended a few years 
ago, that development is one of the central objectives of eco-
nomic policy in those countries which are at present under-
developed. The Government of Brazil, through its repre-
sentatives in the United Nations and in repeated official 
statements, has been one of the first national authorities to 
recognize economic development as a general principie of 
domestic and foreign policy. 
In chapter II of Part One, an attempt has been made to 
define the scope and targets of a development policy for the 
Brazilian economy during the next few years. This chapter 
gives an ihdication of the practicability of the different targets, 
taking account of the probable behaviour of the economy's 
salient factors and strategic elements. 
To judge by the medium-term trends up to the first half 
of 1955, the most likely annual rate of growth of per capita 
income until 1962 will be barely 1.5 per cent. This rate 
compares very unfavourably with that of 3 per cent registered 
for the period 1940-54, and even more unfavourably with 
that of the last decade. What are the possibilities of intensi-
fying this rate of growth, or better, of preventing it from 
deteriorating in the way described ? 
The probable effects of raising the rate of saving from 11 
to 13 per cent are pointed out in chapter II. Such an increase 
might be one of the objectives of a programme. Similarly, 
an attempt is made to assess the results of persistent efforts 
to improve the degree of utilization of existing and future 
productive capacity. The part which could be played by 
a sizeable inflow of external resources is also examined. A 
conjunction of favourable hypotheses on the foregoing factors 
might conceivably raise the 1.5 per cent rate to something 
like 4 per cent. A simultaneous fulfilment of all the most 
propitious hypotheses would appear to be somewhat artificial, 
even if each individual assumption is entirely reahstic. Only 
consistent and co-ordinated action affecting the system as 
a whole could create such a combination of factors favourable 
to development. 
A continuance of the rate of growth of the Brazilian economy 
during the last ten years would thus appear to be too ambitious 
a goal as far as the immediate future is concerned. As an 
illustration, a very much lower target of 2 per cent per annum 
has been adopted in this study. But even so this rate is 25 per 
cent higher than that which would result should present 
trends prevail. The choice of a somewhat modest rate has 
at least the advantage of defining the minimum effort at 
co-ordination required by the adoption of a programme. 
Many stages have yet to be accomplished before the Bra-
zilian economy is in a position to undertake an intensive 
programme, although advances have been made during 
recent years. Awareness of the need to intensify investment 
in the basic sectors has taken the form of plans for the develop-
ment of coal, petroleum and electric energy production. 
The Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico is 
making efforts to remove the barriers to the development 
of railway transport. The technique of budgeting foreign 
exchange has been developed—an instrument of considerable 
range in the implementation of programmes. Some progress 
has been made in reforming the federal budget, so that it 
may be more adaptable to governmental action in the eco-
nomic sphere. There is a growing conviction, manifest 
in the numerous measures of the Superintendencia da Moeda 
e do Crédito, of the need for concerted action to modify the 
banking system—a pre-requisite for the clear definition of 
objectives within a credit policy. 
Despite this progress, intensive programming would 
undoubtedly require more thorough and up-to date economic 
knowledge than has yet been attained in Brazil. In addition, 
it would cali for the adaptation of existing governmental 
instruments for guiding economic activity, a process which 
in itself would take some time to achieve results. If the target 
set is a more modest one, such considerations lose significance. 
Moreover, the effort required might help to show where the 
economy is most in need of improvement. 
What conclusión can be reached about this modest target 
of 2 per cent as the annual rate of growth of per capita income ? 
It might seem surprising that the first inference to be drawn 
would be that so low a rate would necessitate greater structural 
modifications than those accompanying the much more 
intensive growth of the last decade. This will be seen to be 
the case when the problem of import replacement is broached. 
For a better understanding of what a target of 2 per cent 
implies in the context of a programme, its most important 
consequences are summarized from three different standpoints : 
{a) the probable development of exports ; (b) import replace-
ment requírements; and (c) the internal productive effort 
which must be made in the principal sectors, including those 
of transport and energy. 
The capacity to import forms an autonomous element 
in a development programme. Whether or not an over-all 
programme exists—and apart from extra-economic consi-
derations—the objective must be to increase this capacity 
to the máximum. Chapter IV of Part One analyses Brazilian 
experience in this field during the last fifteen years. If 
Brazil has managed to maintain its share in world trade, 
and even to improve on its pre-war position, this has been 
entirely due to the increase in the relative prices of its exports. 
Nevertheless, during the period 1948-53, Brazil's share 
actually fell, despite the exceptional rise in coffee prices. 
Thus it may be concluded that during the last five years 
Brazil lost more from the reduction in the volume of its 
exports than it gained from the higher coffee prices. 
An analysis of the problem in terms of future prospects 
requires an examination of two cardinal points. The first 
INTRODUCTION 
After a decade of exceptionally intensive growth, in 1955 
Brazil was faced with the need to discover new incentives 
to counteract the weakening of those which had permitted 
the recent acceleration of the rate of development. 
Brazil, in common with the other countries of Latin America, 
was provided, during the first five post-war years, with an 
extremely satisfactory world market in process of rapid 
recovery and registering relatively high prices for raw mate-
rials. The foreign exchange reserves accumulated during 
the period of hostilities increased this sense of prosperity by 
enabling imports to continué their expansión for some time 
after exports had lost their Ímpetus. 
In 1949, no sooner did the incentives that were linked 
direcdy with the recovery disappear and the country begin 
to experience increasing balance-of-payments difficulties, 
than there was a sharp rise in coffee quotations. After twenty 
years of depression, the price of this commodity—which 
traditionally represents more than half of BraziTs exports— 
recovered almost at once. Thus the Brazilian economy 
entered upon a second five-year period of exceptional pros-
perity. 
Although the part played by external elements during 
these two periods of intensive growth is of basic importance, 
the role of internal factors—particularly industrial invest-
ment—should not be overlooked. Without the expansionist 
forcé of the latter, external incentives would not have provoked 
the tremendous growth which took place. The large-scale 
investment in the industrial sector would be difficult to account 
for without the complex of favourable conditions constituted 
by an increase in the capacity to import, an improvement 
in the terms of trade, the exchange rate stabilization policy 
(whose repercussions in other sectors were note equally favour-
able), import selection designed to intensify industrializaron, 
etc. Only thus was it possible to import increasing quantities 
of equipment and raw materials at relatively stable prices, 
at a time when domestic prices were rising. When competitive 
imports were eliminated by means of selective control, 
decreasing relative costs of equipment were combined with 
a growing effective demand. 
From an estímate of the per capita rate of growth of income 
over the last decade, an average annual rate of expansión of 
approximately 5 per cent was calculated. This is more than 
double the historical rate of development in the industrialized 
countries. In Brazil, average per capita income, which had 
been $162 (at 1952 prices) in 1945, reached $246 in 1954. 
If this rate of growth were to continué over another decade, 
Brazil, with a per capita income of nearly $400 and a popu-
lation of 71.5 millions would constitute a market comparable 
in size with that of Western Germany today. 
One of the most important conclusions to be drawn from 
the present study is that the rate of growth which prevailed 
during the last ten years is most unlikely to continué in the 
immediate future. It should be borne in mind that the terms 
of trade, whose improvement provided Brazil with several 
billions of dollars in the last five years, are beginning to deterió-
rate and that prospects for the near future are not bright; 
that the period of drawing on reserves ánd accumulating 
external debts is now being followed by yet another of heavy 
foreign commitments; and that the real valué of depreciation 
reserves accumulated in recent years is being reduced owing 
to an increase in the prices of imported equipment. Henee 
it may well be asked whether or not the period of exceptionally 
favourable conditions that is now drawing to a cióse will 
be followed by a phase which would be less propitious in 
every respect. 
From a careful study of the trends and present behaviour 
of the factors playing a strategic role in development, it is 
possible—even within the limitations of economic forecasts— 
to define the probable extent and scope of future development. 
The process of identifying these strategic elements iíof twofold 
interest, since it not only provides some knowledge of present 
trends but also enables a policy for accelerating development 
to be formulated. 
To facilítate analysis and projection, the strategic factors 
determining the rate of growth of Brazil's economy are 
summarized as the three following variables : {a) domestic 
saving; (b) fluctuations in the terms of trade; and (c) the 
net inflow of foreign resources. These three factors are 
interconnected, and their individual behaviour could not 
easily be explained without reference to the others. O f 
particular interest is the relationship between the rate of 
saving and the fluctuations in the terms of trade. In certain 
sectors, improvements in the terms of trade imply real capital 
gains. Thus there is a dynamic re-distribution of income in 
favour of the entrepreneurial sector, which determines a 
greater relative saving, without requiring additional effort 
from the economy—that is, without a prior reduction of 
consumption. 
These analytical instruments have been used to establish 
various hypotheses of the probable rate of growth of the 
Brazilian economy during the next few years. It is impossible, 
from both the theoretical and the practical point of view, 
to dogmatize about possible developments in the terms of 
trade. However, meticulous study will provide a clear 
indication of their probable movements and—what is vitally 
important in the Brazilian context—the possible consequences 
of a movement in this or that direction. 
Fundamental importance may also attach to the inflow and 
outflow of resources. One of these movements (remittances 
abroad for the servicing of capital) is of vital interest as a 
balance-of-payments problem. Another (that of long-term 
capital) merits special emphasis on account of its potential 
significance. A serious deterioration in the terms of trade— 
for example, a return to the 1928 level—would have conse-
quences on income and growth that could not be offset by 
an inflow of long-term capital of less than $500 million, even 
on the assumption that the servicing of the capital in question 
would create no immediate balance-of-payments problem. 
The rate of saving seems relatively stable; even its short-term 
fluctuations he within fairly narrow limits, at least if those 
22 
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on an average, exceed 150,000 cruzeiros, at the beginning of 
the period 1955-62 demand—excluding that for freight 
vehicles—would not be less than 50,000 units, rising ultima-
tely to 80,000. 
A special study on the demand for fuels appears in Part 
Two.4 According to this study, if the economy developed in 
the way described, the consumption of refined petroleum 
products would increase from 7.6 to 15.3 million tons between 
1954 and 1962. The most intensive growth would take place in 
aviation petrol and the least in fuel oil. Imports were projected 
in accordance with a hypothetical development of domestic 
production, which is an extremely modest one in view of 
certain official statements made in Brazil after the discovery 
of the Nova Olinda oilfield in Amazonas. This hypothesis 
is contingent upon a production of slightly more than 3.5 mil-
lion tons and a refining capacity of about 10 million. If 
these targets are attained, in 1962 fuel imports will absorb 
approximately the same proportion of the capacity to import 
as they did in 1953—namely, about 18 per cent. 
An analysis of replacement possibilities permitted a definition 
of the effort required from domestic production in the prin-
cipal groups of consumer goods. But its usefulness does 
not end here. As soon as an idea is obtained of that proportion 
of the capacity to import absorbed by consumer goods and 
fuels, there will be no difficulty in assessing the capcaity to 
import capital goods. In reality, once the hypotheses on the 
replacement of consumer-goods imports are accepted, it can 
be inferred that capital-goods imports will increase by 60 per 
cent over the 1954 level. According to the final section of 
chapter V of Part One, this intensive increase in the capacity 
to import capital goods is an indication of the low level to 
which these imports had fallen in 1954. In relation to 1951, 
the increment will not exceed 14 per cent. 
As regards the production of capital goods, it was considered 
advisable, as a general principie, to maintain and prolong 
the trend towards a more intensive replacement of semi-
manufactured goods—building materials and industrial metáis. 
Special projections were established of the demand for the 
most important commodities—cement and ferrous metáis. 
Steel ingot production, which reached nearly 1.2 million tons 
in 1954, must rise to 2.5 million in 1962 if it is to meet aggregate 
demand, excluding that for special steels. To reach this target 
of self-sufficiency, the share of domestic production in total 
supply, which rose from 40 to 80 per cent in the post-war 
period, must merely continué its present trend. The report 
gives an account of the main projects which are either at the 
planning stage or actually under way. These would indicate 
that autarky can be achieved, provided that investment 
4 See chapter IV. 
continúes to receive the stimulus that was given to it in the 
past. 
The projection of the demand for cement postulates that 
consumption will reach 4.5 million tons, which is equivalent 
to a rise of 63 per cent in relation to 1954. It may be expected 
that domestic production will also be able to satisfy the 
country's over-all requirements, since the projects under way 
would indicate that the intensive rate of growth of production, 
which was doubled between 1949 and 1954, will continué 
for some time to come. In 1954, imports formed barely 
12 per cent of domestic supply. 
The intensive increase in the production of semi-manufac-
tured goods will make possible a greater expansión of imports 
of equipment. Nevertheless, a greater effort will be needed 
if production is to increase by approximately 90 per cent 
between 1954 and 1962. This will imply the maintenance 
of the post-war rate of expansión. 
If the details are set aside and attention concentrated on the 
productive effort as a whole, it will be appreciated that such an 
effort is on a fairly large scale, given the modest nature of the 
targets set for growth and economic welfare. For example, the 
rate of growth required for agriculture (3.7 per cent annually) 
is well above that of the period 1940-54 (2.3 per cent) and even 
greater than that of the last five years (3.5 per cent). This 
can be well understood if it is recalled that throughout the 
entire period 1940-54 production for export remained sta-
tionary, and it would therefore be essential to promote the 
recovery of this sector. The growth of aggregate manufac-
turing production would attain an annual rate of 6 per cent 
(5 per cent in consumer-goods industries and 8 per cent in 
those of capital goods). On the face of it, this would seem 
lower than the rate of 7.9 per cent at which industrial pro-
duction increased during the last five years. However, in 
the light of the effects of the recent exchange reform on the 
capacity of industries to finance their own undertakings, 
as great an effort would have to be made in the future as in 
the past. 
Finally, in the strategic sectors of energy and transport, 
there is still much ground to be covered. If the effort of 
recent years to re-equip the railways is maintained, there 
is every hope that the target of an annual increase of 6 per cent 
in freight transported will be attained. Should this not be 
the case, then it must be assumed that deficient transport 
will continué to obstruct the expansión of domestic production, 
particularly that of agriculture. An annual increase of 7.2 per 
cent is the target for electric energy production. This is 
more or less in conformity with the objectives of theBrazilian 
Government's electrification plan, funds for the implemen-
tation of which have already been partially approved by 
Congress. In this instance, therefore, the problem is to put 
the existing plans into operation. 
17 The Economic Development of Braz il 
refers to the trend of coffee prices, the main aspects of which 
are discussed in Part Two.1 As a working hypothesis, it 
was assumed that prices would be stabilized around the levels 
prevailing between 1949 and 1952. The second point is 
related to the recovery of the quantum of other Brazilian 
exports. 
In 1954, the first steps were taken towards achieving this 
recovery, which forms one of the main objectives of current 
exchange policy. If the quantum of exports were to grow 
at an annual rate of 6.5 per cent between 1955 and 1960, 
by the latter year the 1946 level (which was virtually the 
same as that of 1939) would have been regained. These 
figures give a clear idea of how much ground has been lost. 
A great effort must therefore be made in the sphere of export 
recovery and might well be considered as one of the chief 
targets of a programme. If, between 1955 and 1960, an annual 
rate of increase of 6.5 per cent were attained, and if the terms 
of trade were barely to regain their 1952 level, in 1956 the 
capacity to import—given the country's financial commit-
ments at that time—would still be 10.5 per cent lower than 
in 1954 and 31.2 per cent lower than in 1951. By 1962, 
the capacity to import would have exceeded the 1954 level 
by 23.3 per cent, but even then would not have recovered 
that of 1951. In this way, the share of imports in community 
expenditure, which stood at 14 per cent during the period 
1947-53, would have to be reduced to about 10 per cent 
in 1962, notwithstanding the modest rate of growth of income 
which was set as a target in a programme of minimum 
development. 
These elements are the basic points of reference in estimating 
the effort required to achieve the necessary import repla-
cement. If the share of imports in over-all expenditure 
should fall from 14 to 10 per cent, then their growth would 
be 30 per cent less than expenditure. To measure the real 
degree of replacement, the income-elasticity of demand for 
staple imports must be assessed. Since it is known empirically 
that this elasticity is not less than unity, it may be concluded 
that the minimum degree of replacement would be about 
30 per cent. With an income-elasticity coefficient of 1.5, 
replacement would exceed 50 per cent. If it is remembered 
that during the last five years the share of imports in total 
domestic supply remained at the pre-war level,2 it may 
be inferred that the degree of replacement required in the 
future will be rather higher than that which accompanied 
the intensive income growth during the last decade. 
Chapter IV attempts to show to what extent such a degree 
of replacement would be compatible with national conditions. 
By means of preliminary research into the income-elasticity 
of demand for consumer goods, it was possible to forecast 
the probable modifications in the structure of such demand 
as per capita income rises. An endeavour was made to assess 
the degree of replacement required in the principal sectors 
on the basis of the present share of imports of each main group 
of commodities. In this, as in other aspects of programming, 
some general criteria must be established. These criteria 
emerge from an acceptance of various broad principies and 
from observation of the changing situation. Among such 
principies, the following deserve special mention : the expe-
diency of achieving a relative intensification of manufactured 
capital goods imports—that is, of those commodities by 
means of which the techniques of more highly developed 
countries are disseminated; and the need to take account of 
the requirements of stricdy bilateral trade. Imports that 
cannot easily be replaced, such as those of petroleum, were 
projected in terms of a probable increase in domestic produc-
tion ; on the other hand, imports of consumer manufactures 
were estimated in the context of an intensive replacement 
policy. 
How would this problem present itself in practice ? During 
the period 1947-54, the share of imports in the domestic 
supply of foodstuffs stood at 8.4 per cent. The aggregate 
projections show that demand for foodstuffs will probably 
expand by approximately 30 per cent between 1954 and 1962. 
Such an increase is greater than the 23-per-cent expansión 
estimated for the capacity to import. If the phenomenon is 
viewed over a longer term, there is evidence of a contínual 
contraction in the share of imports in the domestic supply 
of foodstuffs—from barely 20 per cent in 1925 to 12.4 per cent 
in 1939 and to an average of less than 9 per cent in the post-war 
period. Thus one of the targets of a programme might be 
the reduction of this share to something like 7 per cent. This 
would imply stabilizing foodstuffs at the 1954 level. Given 
this general objective, its feasibility should be ascertained 
through a study of the principal groups of imported foodstuffs. 
By means of such an examination it would be possible, on 
the one hand, to discover how far the replacement targets 
are attainable, and, on the other, to establish the required 
level of domestic production in the strategic sectors. A study 
of this type has been undertaken in the case of wheat.3 
The consumer manufactures sector plays a basic role in 
the question of replacement. Its share in imports fell from 
20 per cent in 1939 to 17 per cent and 14 per cent in 1949 
and 1954, respectively. Nevertheless, this rate of replacement 
is likely to prove inadequate in the future. It is pointed out 
in chapter IV that, under such conditions, imports would 
increase by approximately 3o per cent between 1954 and 1962, 
notwithstanding the substantial slackening of demand for 
these commodities owing to the fall in the rate of income 
growth. Once this need to intensify replacement had been 
conceded, a study was undertaken of the principal groups 
of manufactures. During the last five years, there was evi-
dently no replacement of certain non-durable goods imports; 
quite the reverse was true of pulp and paper and pharmaceutical 
products. The feasibility of reversing these trends was mani-
fest, and in 1955 this actually took place in the case of the 
commodities mentioned. As the relevant data clearly 
demónstrate, it will be easy to intensify replacement in this 
sector, given a policy to guide and stimulate those groups 
of industries which were left at a certain disadvantage after 
the recent exchange reform. 
As regards durable goods, special attention has been given 
to the motor vehicle industry, whose development is depen-
dent upon incentives of a more conclusive and far-reaching 
nature. The size of the motor vehicle market is to a large 
extent governed by the sales price of the arricie. In a preli-
minary estimate, it was calculated that if this price did not, 
1 See chapter II. 
2 Both at constant prices. 
3 The study, which was planned as part of this report, will be published 
separately at an early date. 
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Table 1. Brazil : gross product, gross income and available goods and services 













1939 2 0 0 . 3 — 2 1 . 4 178 .9 — 2 . 7 1 7 6 . 2 
1940 2 0 0 . 3 — 2 0 . 0 180 .3 — 0 . 9 179 .4 
1941 2 1 0 . 0 — 1 4 . 7 195 .3 — 5 . 3 1 9 0 . 0 
1942 2 0 3 . 5 — 1 4 . 7 188 .8 — 9 . 3 1 7 9 . 5 
1943 2 0 9 . 0 — 1 7 . 5 191 .5 — 8 . 6 182 .9 
1944 2 1 9 . 4 — 1 3 . 7 205 .7 — 8 . 4 197 .3 
1945 2 3 4 . 6 — 1 3 . 1 2 2 1 . 5 — 1 0 . 4 2 1 1 . 1 
1946 2 5 7 . 7 — 1 2 . 2 2 4 5 . 5 — 9 . 1 2 3 6 . 4 
1947 2 7 8 . 3 — 6 . 1 2 7 2 . 2 3 . 8 2 7 6 . 0 
1948 294 .1 — 1 1 . 5 2 8 2 . 6 — 1 . 4 2 8 1 . 2 
1949 302 .1 — 8 . 1 2 9 4 . 0 0 . 6 2 9 4 . 6 
1950 3 2 4 . 1 5 . 5 3 2 9 . 6 — 6 . 3 3 2 3 . 3 
1951 3 4 6 . 5 1 . 0 3 4 7 . 5 8 . 7 3 5 6 . 2 
1952 3 6 0 . 9 — 3 6 0 . 9 16 .6 3 7 7 . 5 
1953 376 .1 3 . 3 3 7 9 . 4 — 5 . 3 3 7 4 . 1 
1954 a 4 0 9 . 2 7 . 0 416 .2 — 3 . 0 4 1 3 . 2 
Sources : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and Economic Commissioa for I^atin America, Joint Commission. 
NOTE.—The production series, at 1952 prices, was obtained by using the índex of real production (see table 8) and the 1952 
valué of gross income at market prices. Gross income, at the prices of a given year, is equal to production at the prices of the 
same year plus or minus the changes in the real valué of production caused by variations in the terms of trade. If the part not 
utilized in the country is subtracted from gross income, and external resources (including capital inflow) are added, the available 
goods and services will be obtained. 
® Preliminary estimates. 
The period under study consists of three very distinct 
phases : the first corresponds to the war years (1939-45), 
the second to the post-war recovery (1945-49), and the third 
to recent years (1950-54), during which the high level of 
coffee prices was registered. The first and second periods are 
clearly abnormal, in the sense that the rate of growth was 
extremely low and extremely high, respectively. For purposes 
of analysis, it has therefore been considered more accura;te 
to deal with the period 1940-49 as a whole. If the rate of 
growth of the per capita supply of goods and services which 
prevailed in this decade is compared with that of the most 
recent quinquennium, it will be found that the former rate 
is half as great. The increase in available goods and services 
which took place in the period under study resulted as much 
from the expansión of domestic production as from the action 
of external factors. 
In order to estimate the relative shares of domestic production 
and external factors, recourse will again be had to the data 
in table 1 for calculating the effect of the terms of trade with 
1939 as the base year. The index of the terms of trade rose 
to 270 in 1954,3 the effect of this improvement amounting 
to 49.3 billion cruzeiros.4 If a further calculation of available 
goods and services is made on the basis of these new valúes 
for the effect ,of the terms of trade—zero in 1939 and 49.3 
billion in 1954—the following valúes will be obtained for the 
first and last years of the series : 197.6 and 455.5 billion cruzei-
ros respectively. The difference between these two valúes— 
257.9 billion—represents the increase in available goods and 
8 See table II o f the Statistical Appendix to Part One o f this study. 
4 The quantum o f exports, at 1952 prices, decreased from 39.4 billion 
to 29 billion cruzeiros. (See again table II of the Statistical Appendix.) 
An increase of 170 per cent in the terms of trade pre-supposes the addition 
o f 49.3 billion cruzeiros to the real valué of the 29 billion exported in 1954. 
services. A comparison of this figure with the sum corres-
ponding to the effects of the improvement in the terms of 
trade will confirm that the share of the latter rose to 19.1 
per cent. 
As can be deduced from table 1, the cumulative result 
of the improvement in the terms of trade rose to 156.8 billion 
cruzeiros over the whole period—that is, to approximately 
$5.3 billion at 1952 prices. The net outflow of resources 
reached 41 billion cruzeiros ($1.4 billion). The cumulative 
share of external factors must therefore have increased to 
116 billion cruzeiros ($3.9 billion). 
The discrepancy between the rate of growth of the product 
and that of available goods and services is a very obvious 
one which reflects the favourable action of external factors. 
(See table 2.) 
Table 2. Brazil : annual average per capita rates of growth 
(Percentages) 
Available goods 
Period Product and services 
1940-45 0 . 3 0 . 7 
1946-49 4 . 0 6 . 2 
1950-54 3 . 8 4 . 5 
1940-49 1 . 9 2 . 8 
1940-54 2 . 4 3 . 4 
Source : Table 1. Data on population used to compute these rates were supplied 
by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e IJstatistica (Brazilian Institute of Geo-
graphy and Statistics). 
This discrepancy is of major importance in a study on the 
development trends of the Brazilian economy during the 
next few years. The deterioration in the terms of trade, 
already strongly manifest in 1955, as well as the burden of 
Chapter I 
MACRO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1939 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The development of a national economy is based on the 
increase in the physical productivity of its labour forcé. 
This increment, in turn, is made possible by the accumulation 
of capital and by technical progress. 
At the present time, the under-developed countries have 
at their'disposal the technical knowledge accumulated by the 
more advanced economies, and therefore changes in technology 
do not constitute a factor limiting their development.1 Thus, 
in the specific case that will be considered, the accumulation 
of capital represents the corner-stone of development. 
The accumulation of capital is the process whereby, during 
a given period, a proportion of the goods and services available 
in an economy is incorporated into that economy's productive 
capacity. This process has two fundamental aspects : it may 
be considered, on the one hand, as a deferment of the enjoyment 
of the fruits of labour and, on the other, as an increase in 
productive capacity. The problems of saving and of invest-
ment can be brought into focus by an examination of each 
of these two aspects, respectively. 
However, the key to an explanation of the whole develop-
ment mechanism of an economy such as Brazil's is not to 
be discovered here. There are other factors, unconnected 
with productive effort, which may play a decisive role. 
These are the elements that influence the level of aggregate 
domestic supply, without any prior alteration in productive 
capacity,2—namely, changes in the terms of trade and the 
net inflow of foreign resources. 
These two factors directly influence available goods and 
services, independently of the process of accumulation—that 
is, without the pre-requisite of the creation of productive 
capacity. In the case of a net inflow of resources, the efFect 
is concentrated in investment, entering into direct contact 
with the process of accumulation. As regards an improvement 
in the terms of trade, the repercussions are more complex : 
according to the sector in which the increase in real income 
is concentrated, there will be a greater or lesser re-distribution 
of such income and therefore a greater or lesser change in 
the savings coefficient. Even on the assumption that this latter 
remains constant, there will always be an increase in saving 
1 For an analysis of another aspect of this problem, see Problemas Fécricos. 
y Prácticos del Crecimiento Económico. In this study, attention is drawn 
to the fact that the techniques available to the under-developed countries 
do not always correspond to their real needs, which arise from their degree 
of development. Furthermore, it should always be borne in mind that 
the assimilation of techniques in certain under-developed areas creates 
a series of problems whose elucidation exceeds the limits of economic 
analysis. 
2 Problems related to the variations in the level of utilization of produc-
tive capacity will not be considered here. Purely from the point of view 
of analysing projections, in a preliminary approximation, cyclical factors 
may be considered as exogenous elements. 
in so far as real income expands. As the level of saving rises, 
the volume of investment will also increase, thus accelerating 
the process of accumulation. 
Finally, it is pertinent to consider a problem specific to 
under-developed economies—namely, that of the possibility 
of transforming saving into real investment. It is well known 
that in a developed economy saving does not necessarily 
imply growth, since in this case it is the level of effective 
demand that conditions the process of accumulation. Simi-
larly (but for other reasons), saving in an under-developed 
economy is not always an effective cause of growth. There 
must also be the possibility of converting this saving into 
real investment—a possibility dependent, to a varying degree, 
upon the capacity to import. As the domestic production 
of capital goods increases, this dependence will tend to wane, 
the importance of foreign trade in the process of accumulation 
thus being reduced, without detriment to the part it plays 
in the general process of development and as one of the factors 
determining the level of effective demand. 
In the present chapter, an analysis will be made in macro-
economic terms of the development of the Brazilian economy 
since 1939. This analysis is centred on the following points : 
(a) Available goods and services and expenditure; factors 
determining the level of supply and composition of expen-
diture; share of the public sector; 
(b) The process of accumulation; strategic factors conditioning 
the rate of growth; 
(c) The production process; production for domestic and 
foreign markets; agricultural and manufacturing production; 
(d) The capacity to import; quantum of exports and the 
terms of trade; 
(e) Utilization of the capacity to import; the role of imports 
in consumption and accumulation; 
(/) The inflationary process; consequences for the public and 
private sectors. 
2 . AVAILABLE GOODS AND SERVICES AND EXPENDITURE 
(a) Production and external factors 
The growth of domestically available goods and services 
depends fundamentally on three factors : (1) domestic pro-
duction; (2) the effect of the terms of trade on real income; 
(3) the net inflow of external resources. 
Table 1 gives a calculation of available goods and services 
during the period 1939-54, at 1952 prices. This supply rose 
from 176.2 to 413.2 billion cruzeiros, that is, at a cumulative 
annual rate of 5.9 per cent. Since the annual average growth 
of the population was 2.4 per cent, it may be concluded that 
the per capita supply increased by 3.4 per cent per annum, 
during the period in question. Given the length of the period, 
this represents a relatively intensive rate. 
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Governmental action, from the economic point of view, 
is taken at two levels : (a) it renders direct and indirect services 
to the population; and (b) it contracts labour, and purchases 
the goods and services destined for the maintenance, operation 
and expansión of organizations rendering these services. 
Current governmental expenditure, aimed at providing 
such services as security, defence, education, health, etc., 
from the point of view of the community as a whole, repre-
sents expenditure on consumption. On the other hand, 
public expenditure made for the purpose of increasing the 
capacity to render such services—the construction of barracks, 
schools, hospitals, etc.—, as well as the expenditure destined 
to increase the productive capacity of the economy as a whole 
—roads, ports, etc.—, is classified as investment. In addition 
to this current and capital outlay, the state authorities also 
effect expenditure of another type, the final destination of 
which it is not easy to define. This expenditure consists of 
transfer payments within the private sector. Through them 
the government alters the structure of private sector expendi-
ture and occasionally the composition—though not the level 
—of total expenditure. 
Table 5 shows the distribution of expenditure between the 
private and public sectors, including, in the latter instance, 
all transfers made by governmental authorities. 
There is an obvious tendency on the part of the public 
sector to increase its share in total expenditure. However, 
this increase did not take place regularly, since it was concen-
trated in the period 1948-49 and in 1953. From 1949 to 1952, 
there was a relative stability of the public sector's share in 
aggregate expenditure. 
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Table 5. Brazil : distribution of expenditure between 
the private and public sectors 
(Billions of cruzeiros) 
Public sector 
expenditure as a, 
Private Public percentage 
Year Expenditure sector sector of total 
1947 171 .5 142 .30 2 9 . 2 0 1 7 . 0 
1948 190 .7 155 .69 3 5 . 0 1 1 8 . 4 
1949 2 1 8 . 2 172.85 4 5 . 3 5 2 0 . 8 
1950 2 4 7 . 2 193 .06 5 4 . 1 4 2 1 . 9 
1951 3 1 4 . 6 2 5 2 . 0 3 6 2 . 5 7 2 0 . 0 
1952 3 7 7 . 5 300 .21 7 7 . 2 9 2 0 . 5 
1953 4 1 5 . 8 314 .78 9 7 . 8 0 2 3 . 5 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
An increased participation by the public sector can occasion 
a relative increase of consumption expenditure or of invest-
ment, according to which type of expenditure grows the 
faster. Table 6 gives some details of the composition of public 
expenditure in the period under consideration. 
Approximately one-quarter of public sector expenditure 
is composed of transfers—that is, funds collected for the 
purpose of subsidizing private sector activities. Although 
many of these activities are government-owned-railways, 
shipping companies, etc.—such enterprises operate as private 
organizations, even when directly aided by the public autho-
rities. 
Table 6. Brazil : composition of public expenditure 
Expenditure on goods Expenditure on 
Year and services capital account Transfers Total 
(A) (B) 
1947 15,801 5 4 . 1 
1948 18,805 . 5 3 . 7 
1949 22 ,766 5 0 . 1 
1950 2 7 , 4 0 9 5 0 . 6 
1951 31 ,816 5 0 . 9 
1952 3 9 , 1 5 4 5 0 . 7 
1 9 5 3 a 4 7 , 7 0 0 4 8 . 8 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) 
5 ,858 2 0 . 1 7 , 5 0 4 2 5 . 8 2 9 , 1 9 9 
8 ,221 2 3 . 5 7 , 9 6 3 2 2 . 8 3 5 , 0 0 9 
11 ,686 2 5 . 8 10 ,902 2 4 . 1 45 ,354 
14,321 2 6 . 5 12 ,412 2 2 . 9 5 4 , 1 4 2 
15 ,628 2 5 . 0 15 .121 2 4 . 1 65 ,565 
19 ,876 2 5 . 7 18 ,257 2 3 . 6 7 7 , 2 8 7 
2 4 , 5 0 0 25 .1 2 5 , 6 0 0 2 5 . 6 9 7 , 8 0 0 
Source : Statistical Appendix. 
NOTE.—(A) = Millions of cruzeiros. (B) = Percentage of total. 
ft Preliminary estimates. 
Table 7. Brazil : share of the public sector in capital formation and in consumer expenditure 
(Billions of cruzeiros) 
Aggregate (B) as a Total Governmental (D) as a 
gross Public percentage consumer current percentage 
Yea* investment investment of (A) expenditure expenditure of (C) 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1947 2 6 . 5 5 . 8 6 2 2 . 1 145 .0 2 3 . 3 4 16 .1 
1948 2 5 . 9 8 . 2 2 3 1 . 7 164.8 2 6 . 7 9 1 6 . 3 
1949 3 3 . 6 11 .69 3 4 . 8 184 .6 3 3 . 6 7 1 8 . 2 
1950 3 6 . 7 14 .32 3 9 . 0 2 1 0 . 5 3 9 . 8 2 1 8 . 9 
1951 5 2 . 8 15 .63 2 9 . 6 2 6 1 . 8 4 6 . 9 4 1 7 . 9 
1952 6 5 . 6 19 .88 3 0 . 3 3 1 1 . 9 5 7 . 1 4 1 8 . 3 
1953 6 4 . 0 2 5 . 6 0 4 0 . 0 3 5 1 . 8 7 3 . 3 0 2 0 . 8 
Source : Statistical Appendix. 
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recent financial obligations, can reverse this trend in such 
a way that available goods and services will grow less rapidly 
than production. This gives some indication that in the imme-
diate future it will not be easy to maintain the rate of growdi 
preváiling over die last five years, unless measures are adopted 
to counteract the changing tendency of external factors. 
(b) The structure of expenditure 
Aii examination should now be made of the way in which 
available goods and services were utilized. A proportion, 
corresponding tó net investment, was used to increase pro-
ductive capacity; another part was destined to replace the 
stock of capital; and yet another to meet the Cómmuriity's 
consumption needs. Estimates are given for eách of thésé 
items in table 3. The data demónstrate the great stability 
of the consumption-expenditure ratio. Variatioñs are encoun-
tered which range from 90.4 to 82.6 per cent—the extremes 
to be observed in the years 1945 and 1952, respectively. 
Modifications in the volume of expenditure oii consumption 
are primarily a function of changes in the commuiiity's level 
Table 3. Brazil : distribution of expenditure between investment and consumption 
(Billions o f cru2eiros at 1952 prices) 
Consumption as 
Net a percentage of 
Year Expenditure Depreciation investment Consumption expenditure 
Í939 1 7 6 . 2 1 2 . 0 1 0 . 7 1 5 3 . 5 8 7 . 1 
1940 . . 1 7 9 . 4 1 2 . 2 1 0 . 4 1 5 6 . 8 8 7 . 4 
1941 1 9 0 . 0 1 2 . 5 1 1 . 6 1 6 5 . 9 8 7 . 3 
1942 1 7 9 . 5 1 2 , 9 6 . 7 1 5 9 . 9 8 9 . 1 
1943 182 .9 1 3 . 1 7 . 2 1 6 2 . 6 8 8 . 9 
1944 1 9 7 . 3 1 3 . 4 1 0 . 8 173 .1 8 7 . 7 
1945 ¡ 2 1 1 . 1 1 3 . 6 6 . 7 190 .8 9 0 . 4 
1946 2 3 6 . 4 1 3 . 8 1 5 . 7 2 0 6 . 9 8 7 . 5 
1947 2 7 6 . 0 1 4 . 3 2 4 . 8 2 3 6 . 9 8 5 . 8 
1948 2 8 1 . 2 15 ,1 2 0 . 2 2 4 5 . 9 8 7 . 4 
1949 2 9 4 . 6 1 6 . 3 3 0 . 3 2 4 8 . 0 8 4 . 2 
1950 3 2 3 . 3 1 7 . 2 3 4 . 5 2 7 1 . 6 8 4 . 0 
1951 3 5 6 . 2 1 8 . 2 4 1 . 7 2 9 6 . 3 8 3 . 2 
1952 3 7 7 . 5 1 9 . 3 4 6 . 3 3 1 1 . 9 8 2 . 6 
1953 3 7 4 . 1 2 0 . 5 3 7 . 2 3 1 6 . 4 8 4 . 6 
1954 a 4 1 3 . 2 2 1 . 8 3 7 . 2 3 5 4 . 2 8 5 . 7 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
NOTE.—The series óf expenditure is that which áppeárs in table 1 as " availáble góods and services 
• Preliminary estimates. 
of income. The increase that took place in expenditure 
during the period under consideration resulted not only 
from the growth of domestic production, but also from the 
improvement in the terms of trade, both of which are deter-
minants of the level of income. Given this more rapid 
growth of income than of production, the logical outcome 
was for consumption to outstrip the latter as well, which 
in fact it did. 
Table 4. Brazil : annual average per capita rates of growth 
(Percentages) 
Period Income Consumption 
1940-45 1 . 2 1 . 3 
1946-49 4 . 8 4 . 3 
1950-54 4 . 7 4 . 9 
1940-49 2 . 6 2 . 4 
1940-54 3 . 3 3 . 2 
Sources : Tables 1 and 3. 
Although the margin of error may be wide, there is an evi-
dent affinity between the rates shown in table 4. Thus, 
during the entire period 1940-54, the rate of growth 
of production was 2.4 per cent, that of consumption 3.2 per 
cent, that of income 3.3 per cent, and that of available goods 
and services or expenditure 3.4 per cent. The difference 
between the growth of consumption and the increase in 
production is particularly apparent. For a better under-
standing of this discrepancy, it should be recalled that, as 
shown in table 1, the absolute increase in the product during 
1939-54 was 208.9 billion cruzeiros. Since the absolute 
increase in consumption reached 201.4 billions (see again 
table 3), it may be inferred that the conditions created by 
external factors were so favourable that consumption was 
able to absorb the entire benefit of the increased productive 
effort, without any reduction in the rate of saving. 
The statement made in the preceding paragraph brings 
to light another factor of basic importance in projecting the 
development of the Brazilian economy, namely, that the 
intensive growth during 1939-54 took place at a time when 
consumption was increasing with greater intensity than the 
product measüred in terms of hours worked and physical 
productivity. 
(c) Share of the public sector in expenditure 
The data available on the pubhc sector do not permit from 
1939 onwards, an analysis such as that outlined for the economy 
as a whole. In this case the period under review must be 
restricted, and consequendy will begin with the year 1947. 
Table 8. Brazil : Índices of the geographic product 
(1939 - 100) 
Sector 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 194Q 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Agriculture 9 4 . 7 100 .3 9 3 . 9 9 8 . 4 9 8 . 7 9 7 . 7 1 0 7 . 5 1 0 8 . 0 1 1 3 . 6 1 1 9 . 7 1 2 5 . 2 1 2 5 . 0 1 3 1 . 0 131 .1 1 4 0 . 7 
Industry 1 0 5 . 1 116.1 1 1 2 . 0 1 2 5 . 0 130 .1 137 .1 1 6 0 . 2 1 6 7 . 2 1 8 3 . 1 194.2: 2 1 6 . 1 2 3 3 . 6 2 4 9 . 1 2 6 5 . 6 2 8 4 . 5 
Commerce 9 4 . 8 100 .8 9 1 . 6 9 8 . 5 1 0 3 . 9 1 0 6 . 6 1 2 0 . 9 1 3 4 . 9 1 3 7 . 0 1 3 1 . 2 1 5 4 . 5 1 7 4 . 5 1 7 5 . 3 1 7 0 . 7 
Transport 1 0 7 . 3 115 .4 1 1 1 . 6 1 1 5 . 9 1 2 4 . 2 1 2 5 . 9 1 2 8 . 2 136 .5 1 5 4 . 5 1 6 5 . 0 1 8 0 . 0 1 9 8 . 8 2 1 1 . 6 2 3 2 . 6 
Housing 1 0 2 . 0 105 .0 1 0 8 . 0 1 1 0 . 0 1 1 4 . 0 1 1 8 . 0 1 2 5 . 0 1 3 2 . 0 1 3 8 . 1 1 4 3 . 1 1 4 9 . 1 1 5 6 . 1 1 6 5 . 1 1 7 6 . 1 
Government 1 0 0 . 0 9 6 . 9 9 6 . 9 8 4 . 4 8 7 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 6 . 3 9 6 . 9 1 0 9 . 4 1.15.6 1 2 8 . 1 1 3 4 . 4 1 3 1 . 3 
Other services 1 0 0 . 0 102 .7 102 .7 102 .7 113 .5 137 .8 154.0! 1 9 4 . 6 1 9 7 . 3 1 9 1 . 9 1 9 4 . 6 2 2 9 . 7 2 1 8 . 1 
Total 1 0 0 . 1 104 .9 101 .6 1 0 4 . 4 1 0 9 . 6 1 1 7 . 1 1 2 8 . 6 1 3 8 . 9 1 4 6 . 8 1 5 0 . 8 1 6 1 . 9 1 7 3 . 0 1 8 0 . 2 1 8 7 . 7 » 2 0 1 . 2 * 
Sources : Banco do Desenvolvimento Económico and Economic Commission for Latín America, 
Joint Commission. 
NOTE. — (1) Basic data from the Funda^ao Getúlio Vargas and the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvi-
mento Económico. 
(2) The aggregate Índices by sector were prepared according to the " Laspeyres " formula. The total, 
índex follows the " Paasche " formula, with the series of real valué weighted in each year by the price index, 
which was obtained. by dividing the index of valué for each sector by the corresponding quantum index. 
(3) The housing index shows the fluctuations in the stock of dwellings, on the assumption that these 
represen! the real services rendered by them. 
(4) The commerce index was obtained by the aggregation of the series, at 1949 prices, of industrial 
production, agricultura! production and imports. 
* Provisional data. 
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" Expenditure on goods and services " constitutes the item 
that may strictly be considered as the direct rendering of 
services to the community. Its share in the total expenditure 
of the public sector declined from 54.1 to 48.8 per cent. 
This decrease took place precisely in those periods (1947-49 
and 1953) during which the share of the public sector -in 
expenditure grew. This demonstrates the fact that it was 
mainly public investment which accounted for the expansión 
in the government sector. 
In table 7 the growth of governmental current expenditure 
(including transfers) is compared with the community's 
consumption expenditure, and public investment with aggre-
gate investment. 
3 . T H E PROCESS OF ACCUMULATION 
Provided there is always an adequate level of ' effective 
demand, the possibility of growth in an under-developed' 
economy depends directly on the supply of resources for 
accumulation.6 Given the existence of potential natural 
resources, of an elastic labour supply, and of an entrepreneurial 
class in the process of formation (as in the case of Brazil), 
the intensification of development becomés a problem of 
increasing the volume of resources destined for accumulation.6 
Such resources emanate mainly from; the flow of income 
generated in the country. Experience demonstrates that the 
level of income is the principal determinant of the level of 
consumption and therefore of the level of saving. It also 
indicates that when there is no unemployment of factors 
due to inadequacy of effective demand, the community tends 
to consume a relatively stable part of its income. When 
income is reduced through insufficiency of such demand, 
consumption tends to contract less than proportionately. 
These observations are of great importance in an analysis 
of the process of accumulation. They demónstrate that the 
volume of resources destined for investment is only a residual 
element and that, under conditions of spontaneous develop-
ment, the growth of income is a pre-requisite for an increase 
in these resources. Since the growth of income, in turn, 
pre-supposes investment, it is easy to perceive that, when 
the supply of labour and technical skill is elastic, development 
tends to take place at a uniform rate,7 provided that the 
product-capital ratio remains stable and that other factors, 
such as those determining cyclical fluctuations, do not 
intervene. 
However, in the case of the under-developed economies, 
the action of certain factors which occasionally attains a funda-
5 The problem of the capacity to import will be considered in section 5 
of this chapter. 
6 It is not proposed that there should be discussed here the problem of 
the limits to the capacity to absorb new capital, which are generally 
assumed to be narrow in under-developed economies. However, this 
supposition is based on empirical and isolated observations, and has no 
more logical foundation. The capacity to absorb capital is, in fact, very 
great in an under-developed economy, given the elasticity of the supply 
of labour which characterizes such economies. The problem therefore 
lies in preventing the demand for consumer goods from growing dispro-
portionately to the supply, and this is not an easy problem to solve. 
7 The historical growth series of free-enterprise economies point to the 
existence o f this stable rate; in the United States, for example, the historical 
rate of growth per capita was 1.9 per cent per annum. An identical 
phenomenon has been observed in other countries. See An Introduction 
to the Technique of Programming, which formed volume I of this series of 
studies. 
mental importance should not be overlooked. For example, 
it should always be borne in mind that resources not used 
within the country are destined as much for investment as 
for the fulfdment of external commitments. Thus the supply 
of resources for accumulation depends as much on domestic 
saving as on the volume of the net outflow of resources. 
As will be seen later, the irregularity of this flow of resources 
abroad accounts to a large extent for fluctuations in the rate 
of investment. 
Once the strategic factors determining the rate of growth— 
towards which the economy tends spontaneously—are 
identified, the time is ripe to estabhsh a hypothesis on the 
most probable pattern of development in the immediate 
future and to endeavour to influence these strategic factors 
so that development may be accelerated. 
In the course of this study,8 an attempt will be made to 
, postúlate, the r development of the Brazilian economy during 
the period 1955-62. To estabhsh the basis of this hypothesis, 
an analysis will now be made of the behaviour of the principal 
factors determining the rate of accumulation during the 
period 1939-54. 
4 . T h e PRODUCTION PROCESS 
As was rioted earlier, the level of income is the principal 
determinant of accumulation. The rate of investment— 
notwithstanding the effect of external factors—fluctuates 
around the rate of saving, which is a function of the level 
of income. The same may be said of the relationship between 
the growth of income and that of the product. It is well 
known that variations in the terms of trade also influence 
the level of income. However, the latter fluctuates around 
the level of the geographic product. 
The influence of external factors makes itself felt, therefore, 
oh two planes : first, on the level of income (terms of trade) 
and, secondly, on the level of accumulation (net outflow of 
resources). 
From the first viewpoint, the production process can be 
examined. Table 8 shows the Índices of the geographic 
product and its principal components, while table 9 summa-
rizes the behaviour of these Índices. 
To facilitate a better understanding of these data it must 
be borne in mind that the product is destined both to satisfy 
domestic demand and to swell the flow of exports. These 
latter, i f measured by their quantum, remained statdonary, 
or even declined, during the period under consideration, 
while domestic demand grew as a function of the increase 
in income. 
If the quantum of exports is compared with the gross product 
(see table 10), it can be ascertained that the share of the former 
in the latter was reduced from 19.7 per cent in 1939 to less 
than 10 per cent in 1952-54. This explains why production 
for the domestic market grew at an annual per capita rate 
of 3.0 per cent, during the period 1940-54, while the rate 
for the product as a whole was 2.4 per cent. 
However, the rapid growth of production for the internal 
market does not mean that imports have lost ground. They 
grew with practically the same intensityas domestic production, 
maintaining their share in the supply of goods and services. 
8 See chapter II of Part One. 
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Table 13. Brazil : Índices of foreign trade 
1945 1949 1954 1954 
(1939 = 100) (1949 = 100)_ 
7 4 . 0 8 0 . 1 
2 6 9 . 5 158 .2 
2 3 1 . 2 148 .9 
2 1 6 . 4 139.1 
2 3 4 . 9 140 .5 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
has grown so rapidly, what then is the explanation for the 
tendency towards permanent disequilibrium in the balance 
of payments, characteristic of the whole post-war period ? 
This tendency is directly related to the disparíty between the 
prices of production for the domestic market and those of 
imports. A phenomenon of vital importance which took 
place during this period was the strong rise in the prices of 
exports over those of imports. The result of this divergence 
was an improvement in the country's terms of trade, which 
made itself apparent in the acceleration of the growth of income 
in relation to that of the product. Given the characteristics 
of the Brazilian economy, a rise in export prices could not 
easily be prevented from spreading to production for the 
domestic market, particularly in the agricultural sector. In 
certain areas, some competition for factors has been observed 
between the two branches of production. A rise in agricul-
tural prices would necessarily tend to have its repercussions 
on the general price level and to spread to the other sectors. 
Part of such a rise was absorbed by industry and services, 
resulting in a relative increase in the income of farmers. 
However, the rise in the general price level was very great, 
the relation between the prices of commodities for the domestic 
market and the prices of imports being substantially modified. 
The data in table 14 give a clear demonstration of these dis-
crepancies in the evolution of prices. 
Table 14. Brazil : comparison of some price Índices 
1945 1949 1953 1953 
(1939 = 100) (1949 = 100) 
Exports 2 3 4 . 6 4 0 7 . 7 7 0 7 . 6 173 .4 
Agricultural production 
for export 2 3 3 . 5 4 3 4 . 8 9 3 8 . 2 215 .8 
Agricultural production 
for the domestic market 2 3 7 . 9 3 6 5 . 5 6 0 1 . 0 1 6 4 . 4 
Industrial production for 
the domestic market . 2 1 3 . 6 3 3 3 . 2 4 3 1 . 8 129 .6 
General domestic price 
level • 214 .1 3 3 7 . 4 5 0 5 . 0 149.7 
Prices o f imports 186 .5 2 4 1 . 0 2 7 3 . 0 113 .5 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
The disequilibrium between domestic prices and those 
of imports gave rise to a persistent and growing pressure on 
the capacity for external payment. In failing to adopt a 
system of múltiple exchange rates, Brazil found itself in the 
following dilemma : if the currency were devalued, the terms 
of trade would deteriórate; if, on the other hand, there were 
no devaluation, a growing pressure on the balance of payments 
wóuld be created. The application of the second alternative 
until the end of 1953 resulted in an.aggravation of the external 
disequilibrium. 
6 . U M I Z A T I O N OF THE CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
Since the capacity to import grew parallel with income, 
it was to be expected that imports of consumer goods would 
increase in the same proportion as consumption. Moreover, 
as the prices of national agricultural commodities rose more 
rapidly than those of domestically produced manufactures 
(other factors being constant) it was likely that imports of 
agricultural products would increase with especial intensity. 
Table 15. Brazil : Índices of consumer goods imports 
and of total consumption 
1945 1949 1954 . 1954 
(1939 = 100) (1949 =. 100) 
Consumer goods 94 139 216 155 
Foodstuffs 120 104 184 177 
Fuels 74 188 368 196 
Chemical products 87 . 203 373 184 
Pulp and paper 103 116 257 222 
Finar manufactured goods. . 51 199 154 78 
Total consumption 124 162 206 128 
Sources: Statistical Appendix and the special studies which form Part I I of 
this work. 
The strong Ímpetus given to consumer-goods imports, 
owing to the movement of relative prices, was par tially. offset 
by the barríer which a selective import control attempted 
to establish. This control made itself felt more rigorously 
in the final manufactured goods sector, creating, as an indirect 
consequence, a stimulus to investment in domestic industrial 
production. 
The situation which aróse may be summarized as follows : 
on the one hand, income expanded and this determined a large 
increase in the demand for manufactured goods, the income-
elasticity of which is notoriously high; on the other, imports 
of manufactured consumer goods were severely restricted. 
The combination of these two factors was bound to result in 
a great stimulus to investment in the country's manufacturing 
industry. To realize such investment it was necessary to have 
equipment, the demand for which had to grow even more 
rapidly than that for manufactured consumer goods, owing 
to the well-known accelerator mechanism. It was here that 
the increase in the capacity to import played a fundamental 
role in accelerating growth. The share of capital goods 
imports in the valué of investment rose from 27 per cent 
in 1939^1 to an average of 34 per cent in the period 1945-54. 
This phenomenon is apparent from the data in table 16. 
The decline in the capacity to import, which became manifest 
in 1953,9 necessarily had a more adverse effect on imports 
of capital goods than on those of consumer goods, since 
items of great rigidity, such as raw materials and fuel, weigh 
heavily among the latter. Repercussions on the economy *s 
9 The reduction in imports, which began in 1953, reflects not exactly 
a decline in the capacity to import, but rather the burden of financial com-
mitments accumulated in 1951 and 1952. It was not until 1955 that the 
depressive effect of a combination of the two factors was to become 
apparent. 
Quantum of exports . . 8 6 . 7 9 1 . 8 
Terms o f trade 135 .3 170 .4 
Capacity for external 
payment 116.7 155 .6 
Quantum of imports . . . 9 7 . 7 155 .6 
Available goods and 
services 119 .8 1 6 7 . 2 
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Table 9. Brafcil : annual rates of growth of production 
Sector 1940-54 1940-45 1940-49 1950-54 
Agriculture 2 . 3 0 . 4 1 . 8 3 . 3 
Industry 7 . 2 5 . 4 6 . 9 7 . 9 
Services 4 . 7 2 . 7 4 . 0 6 . 2 
Source: Table 8. 
Table 10. Brazil : distribution of the product between 
the domestic and foreign markets 





for the domestic 
market 
Exports 
as a percentaje 
of the product 
1939 . . . . . 2 0 0 . 3 3 9 , 4 170 .9 19.7 
1940 . . . . . 2 0 0 . 3 3 2 . 5 167 .8 1 6 . 2 
1941 . . . . . 2 1 0 . 0 2 5 . 7 1 8 4 . 3 1 2 . 2 
1942 . . . . . 2 0 3 . 5 2 8 . 1 175 .4 1 3 . 8 
1943 . . . . . 2 0 9 . 0 2 8 . 9 180 .1 1 3 . 8 
1944 . . . . . 2 1 9 . 4 3 1 . 7 187 .7 1 4 . 4 
1945 . . . . . 2 3 4 . 6 3 4 . 1 2 0 0 . 5 1 4 . 5 
1946 . . . . . 2 5 7 . 7 4 2 . 2 2 1 5 . 5 Í 6 . 4 
1947 . . . . . 2 7 8 . 3 3 9 . 8 2 3 8 . 5 1 4 . 3 
1948 . . . . . 2 9 4 . 1 4 0 . 1 2 5 4 . 0 1 3 . 6 
1949 . . . . . 3 0 2 ; 1 3 6 . 1 2 6 6 . 0 1 1 . 9 
1950 . . . . . 3 2 4 . 1 3 1 . 7 2 9 2 . 4 9 . 8 
1951 . . . . . 3 4 6 . 5 3 4 . 9 3 1 1 . 6 10 ,1 
1952 . . . . . 3 6 0 . 9 26 .1 3 3 4 . 8 7 . 2 
1953 . . . . . 3 7 6 . 1 3 0 . 9 3 4 5 . 2 8 . 2 
1954 . . . . . 4 0 9 . 9 2 9 . 0 3 8 0 . 9 7 . 1 
Year In gross producta In gross income b 
1939 3 9 . 3 3 2 . 7 
1945 3 4 . 2 3 1 . 5 
1949 3 2 . 7 2 9 . 5 
1953 2 9 . 5 3 0 . 6 
The data in table 11 illustrate the behaviour of the agricultural 
sector with respect to the product and to income. 
The increase in production for the domestic market took 
place both in the industrial sector and in the agricultural. 
In table 12, total supply is divided into industrial and agri-
cultural products, domestic production being separated from 
imports. The agricultural production destined for the 
domestic market increased by 84 per cent between 1939 
and 1954, that is, at an annual per capita rate of 1.7 per cent. 
Table 12. Brazil : growth in the supply of agricultural 
and manufactured products in the domestic market 
(1939 = 100) 
Year 
Agricultural products Manufacturad producís 
Domestic produCtión Imports Domestic produCtión Impotts 
1945 125 120 137 87 
1949 153 104 194 182 
1950 166 139 216 183 
1951 167 160 234 290 
1952 168 147 249 ¿52 
1953 180 176 266 177 
1954 a • 184 184 285 233 
Soúré¿s ; Table 1 ánd the Statistical Appendix. 
NOTB.—The series of geographic product is that of table 1. Data oü exports 
are based on an index of the quantum at 1948 prices. The seríes of production 
for the domestic market is residual. 
The relative decline in production for the foreign market 
provoked perceptible changes in the structure of Brazilian 
production. Measured at constant prices, the share of agri-
cultural output, which represented 39.3 per cent of the total 
in 1939, had declined to 29.5 per cent in 1953. In die mean-
time, industry's share had grown from 14.4 to 22.0 per cent. 
However, these structural changes are not apparent when 
current valúes are observed. The growth in the relative 
prices of agricultural products was sufficient to offset the loss 
caused by the relative lag in that sector. This phenomenon 
is intimately linked with the improvement in the terms of 
trade. As was to be expected, the relative rise in export 
prices caused a relative increase in agricultural prices within 
the country, thus enlarging the share of agriculture in income. 
Table 11. Brazil : the share of agricultural production 
(Percentages) 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
a At 1952 prices. 
b At current prices. 
Sóurce : Statistical Appendix. 
* Preliminar^ estímate. 
The fact that production for the domestic market kept 
pace with the growth of foodstuffs imports is of particular 
significance, considering that the latter were practically 
unrestricted and, in addition, received the benefit of a hidden 
exchange subsidy. The minimum conclusión that can be 
drawn from these facts is that domestic production respond-
ed to the needs of rising demand. Consequently, the relative 
decline in agricultural production, mentioned earlier, reflects 
purely and simply the stagnation of the foreign sector, the 
relative importance of which diminished throughout the 
period under review. 
The supply of manufactured products of domestic origin 
grew, between 1939 and 1954, at an annual average per capita 
rate of 4.7 per cent. In this sector also, imports maintained 
their share, at least until 1952. 
The data presented afford one more conclusión of importance 
in preparing a hypothesis of short-term development trends— 
namely, that the rapid growth of income in the period as 
a whole coincided with an expansión in the quantum of imports 
both in agriculture and in manufacturing industry. In other 
words, the import-replacement effort required from the 
Brazilian economy was minimum in the phase of growth 
under consideration, although the composition of imports 
had had to undergo a radical change. 
5 . T H E CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
This exceptional growth of imports was made possible 
by an unusual improvement in the terms of trade. Although 
the quantum of exports remained stationary, or even declined, 
the terms of trade rose by nearly 170 per cent between 1939 
and 1954. (See table 13.) 
It has already been observed that in an under-developed 
economy the capacity to import plays a fundamental role 
in the process of accumulation. But if the capacity to import 
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(3) That thé increase in mónetary income óf the export 
sector was concentrated over a short period of time and in 
specific areas; -
(4) That a heavy pressure on the balance of payments, 
which had been felt beforehand, brought about an inten-
sification of exchange control. This occurréd simultáneously 
with the rise in export prices and had the áim of utilizing 
thé increased foreign exchange to sétde pending financial 
commitments; 
(5) That a clear preoccupation with maintaining a high 
rate of growth found outlet in a policy restricting imports 
of consumer goods in favour of capital goods. 
The rise in the level of export prices in relation to that of 
import prices meant a gain in real income and is not, therefore, 
a phenomenon of an inflationary nature. It is, however, 
a potentially inflationary phenomenon, whose effect cannot 
easily be neutralized. The causes of this situation are of great 
significance. The large majority of Brazilian exports consistí 
of articles which are also sold on the domestic market. ThuS* 
when export prices rise, the domestic consumer has to pay 
more for these commodities. This second rise in prices is 
a typically inflationary phenomenon; in othér words, it is 
an attempt to re-distribute real income in favour of the groups 
producing and trading in these goods. 
But this is not the principal aspect of the problem. The 
relative rise in éxpórt prices is hot in itself añ inflationary 
phenomenon, since the increase in mónetary income is offset 
by an equally large increase in the capacity to import, which 
it is presumed will be uséd áütómaticálly. Büt this ihereaSé 
in supply may be barely nominal. Here the time factor 
plays a fundamental role. Between the increase in mónetary 
income and that in real supply, there elapses a period of time 
of considerable inflationary potentiality, which can reach a 
high degree if the economy is undergoing a phase of intensive 
activity and therefore operating with a reduced level óf 
stocks. If a situation of open inflation already exists when 
mónetary income expands, this potentiality is automatically 
converted into a new inflationary impulse. 
In table 17, it was seen that the price level had already risen 
in the period that preceded the large increase in mónetary 
income of the export sector. This implies that domestic 
supply had already lost its ability to absorb increases in 
demand, by the mobilization of inventories or by a short-term 
intensification of the utilization of productive capacity. In 
such a situation, an increase in the mónetary income of the 
export sector must necessarily accelerate the rise in the general 
price level. 
This rise in the general price level does not imply that the 
sector where the expansión began will lose all the initial 
Table 18. Brazil : price Índices of the principal sectors 
(1947 = 100) 



















improvement. In the economic system there are elements 
of inertia which prevent the recovery of the relative positions 
of all groups. Certain data will enable an examination to 
be made of the behaviour of the internal terms of trade as 
between the principal sectors. (See table 18.) 
It can be seen that in the period under review there was 
a large re-distribution of income in favour of the agricultural 
sector. If the three Índices shown in table 18 are compáréd 
with those of table 17, it is possible to verify the existence of 
certain phenomena which are óf great significance in a study 
of the recent inflation : 
(1) The index of prices of industrial products rose with 
less intensity than the general price level. This demonstrates 
that income had been re-distribüted to the detriment of the 
industrial sector;10 
(2) The services sector more or less mainfáined its positíón, 
althóugh it lost some ground during the period 1951-52, 
which was characterized by a recrudescence of inflation; 
(3) Throughout the entire period, the index of agricultutal 
prices tose more rapidly than the general level, and álsó 
increased with greater intensity than did export prices. 
The third observation offers confirmatión óf the first. The 
agricultural sector, and of course the export sector as a whole, 
managed tó fétain the béñefits accruing from the improvertiént 
in thé térms of tráde; moreover, they were successful in prcn 
voking an additiónal ré-distributioii óf incómé in their favour. 
The secóñd f é-distribution apparently resulted from the rise in 
the domestic prices of export products and from the relative 
increase in prices of agricultural productión for the domestic 
market. This latter wás a result of pressure created by compé-
tition for factors of production, owing to the rapid risé in 
the profitability of export agriculture. 
(b) Consequences for the public sector 
The observations made bring to light the profound disequi-
librium introduced into the economy by the export sector. 
Some óf its consequences should now be examined. In the 
first place, consideration must be given to the impact on the 
public sector. 
The way in which BraziTs agricultural production is orga-
nized keeps this important activity relatively far from the 
reach of the fiscal system. A large increase in income concen-
trated mainly in the agricultural sector almost inevitably 
creates difficulties for the public sector. This is because an 
increase of activity in rural areas requires greater public 
investment, particularly in transport, whereas public revenue 
does not tend to grow with income, owing to the relative 
tax exemption of agriculture. In attemptmg to increase 
taxation in ordér to find an adequate means of financing the 
new expenditure, the Government tends to increase the pressure 
on the other sectors. Thus these sectors may be exposed 
to two convergent pressures—on the one hand, that of the 
re-distribution of income caused by inflation; and on the 
other, that of the relative increase in the tax burden, which 
becomes another form of income re-distribution. 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
1 0 If the analysis were extended to cover a longer period, it would be 
seen that in the earlier period, which was characterized by a relatively 
great scarcity o f manufactured goods, the contrary occurréd. In actual 
fact, the industrial sector merely surrendered what it had gained in the 
period 1939-46. 
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Table 16. Brazil : share of imports in capital formation 














of the total 
1939 . . . . 2 2 . 7 6 . 8 1 5 . 9 3 0 . 0 
1940 . . . . 2 2 . 6 5 . 5 17 .1 2 4 . 3 
1941 . . . . . . . . 2 4 . 1 6 . 3 1 7 . 8 26.1-
1942 . . . . 1 9 . 6 3 . 4 16 .2 1 7 . 3 
1943 . . . . 2 0 . 3 4 . 4 1 5 . 9 2 1 . 7 
1944 . . . . 2 4 . 2 6 . 2 1 8 . 0 2 5 . 6 
1945 . . . . . . . . 2 0 . 3 7 . 4 1 2 . 9 3 6 . 5 
1946 . . . . 2 9 . 5 12 .1 1 7 . 4 4 1 . 0 
1947 . . . 3 9 . 1 1 7 . 9 2 1 . 2 4 5 . 8 
1948 . . . 3 5 . 3 1 4 . 3 2 1 . 0 4 0 . 5 
1949 . . . 4 6 . 6 1 3 . 9 . 3 2 . 7 2 9 . 8 
1950 . . . 5 1 . 7 1 3 . 0 3 8 . 7 2 5 . 1 
1951 . . . . . . . . 5 9 . 9 2 2 . 4 3 7 . 5 3 7 . 4 
1952 . . . . 6 5 . 6 2 0 . 5 4 5 . 1 3 1 . 3 -
1953 . . . 1 2 . 0 4 5 . 7 2 0 . 8 
1954 . 5 9 . 0 1 6 . 0 4 3 . 0 2 7 . 1 
Source: Statistical Appendix. 
rate of growth will immediately be felt, creating new problems 
for development. However, difíiculties of this type, which 
can give rise to structural modifications in the economy, 
always have positive aspects, to which careful attention should 
be paid. 
. It is well known that the protection afforded to the industrial 
sector by the post-war exchange policy was concentrated 
in the production of final consumer goods as well as of some 
producer goods, such as iron and steel, which had been the 
object of special planning. As regards the other manufactured 
products, especially those of the heavy engineering and 
precision-tool industry, not only were these unprotected, but 
investment in their domestic production was strongly discou-
raged, owing to the circumstances created by the exchange 
pohcy. The domestic engineering industry found itself in 
an extremely unfavourable competitive situation, especially 
after the devaluation of the pound sterling and other European 
currencies. The same may be said of some semi-manufactured 
goods—pulp, caustic soda, etc.—imports of which were 
guaranteed. 
As a result of this state of aflairs, important industries, parti-
cularly in the mechanical sector, began to operate below 
capacity, despite their having been able to take advantage of 
the favourable exchange situation to renovate and even 
expand their equipment. There is every indication that 
modifxcations of exchange pohcy, which took place at the end 
of 1953, substantially affected the position of these industries 
and that, given a continual increase in the supply of iron 
and steel, the engineering industry will find opportunities 
for rapid expansión. 
7 . T H E INFLATIONARY PROCESS 
(a) Definition of the problem 
The period under consideration was characterized throughout 
by the existence of a process of open inflation, although 
various types of disequilibria predominated at different stages. 
No attempt is made, ñor would it be of much interest for the 
accomplishment of the desired aims, to analyse all these disequi-
libria. All that is required is a description of the recent 
inflationary process—namely, that which commenced in 1950 
and which, to all appearances, reached its climax in 1954. 
As a consequence of this inflation, in the latter year the 
Brazilian economy was characterized by a series of distortions 
and disequilibria on various levels, the correction of which 
must evidendy form a subject of study in the context of a 
development programme. While such distortions remain 
acute, the work of programming will inevitably prove much 
more arduous. If it is already difficult to make any analysis 
of future trends during a period of accelerated inflation, it 
will be even more difficult to do so during the period of 
readjustment which precedes the restoration of stability. 
However, it should not be inferred that such a task cannot 
be accomplished. 
Open inflation manifests itself through a rise in die general 
price level. The cause of the underlying disequilibrium is 
generally the attempt by an economic group or sector to 
increase its share in the distribution of real income. If the 
various groups come into conflict, each clinging obstinately 
to its demands, the initial disequilibrium will tend to degene-
rate into an inflationary spiral. Table 17 indicates the way 
in which prices behave. 
Table 17. Brazil : evolution of price Índices 
during the period 1947-54 
(1947 - 100) 





















Source: Statistical Appendix. 
The data on the general price level give a clear picture 
of the phenomenon of accelerated inflation from 1951 onwards. 
Between 1949 and 1950, the rise in the general price level 
was 3.4 per cent, and in the following year, 15.4 per cent. 
This abrupt acceleration of the rise in the general level was 
preceded by an even sharper rise in export prices. The rate 
of increase of the latter grew from 6 to 40 per cent between 
1948-49 and 1949-50. Another observation on the data 
in table 17 is that import prices remained practically stable 
during the entire period; moreover, it was precisely when 
the most abrupt rise of export prices took place (1949-50) 
that import prices fell by 13 per cent. 
Was the rise in export prices bound to have repercussions 
on the general price level ? The answer is certainly no. But 
the rise in prices could hardly have been prevented from spread-
ing, in view of the following considerations : 
(1) That the system was already operating under inflationary 
pressure; 
(2) That the agricultural sector producing for export 
competes in the market for factors of production—albeit 
to a limited extent—with the agricultural sector producing for 
the domestic market; 
Chapter II 
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to present a system of projections 
of Brazilian economic development. The recent trends of 
such development having been observed and the country's 
potentialities taken into consideration, an attempt "will now 
be made to forecast the alternatives which will present them-
selves in the near future and which will constitute the basis 
upon which to elabórate a policy designed to accelerate growth. 
There is nothing to indicate that the Brazilian economy will 
stagnate during the next few years. The abundance of its 
unutilized natural resources, the rapid population growth, 
the acknowledged dynamism of its entrepreneurial class, 
and the enormous amount of scientific and technical know-
ledge accumulated in more highly developed countries to 
which it has access—these are all elements contributing to 
the Brazilian economy's ability to reach and maintain spon-
taneously an appreciable rate of growth, despite factors of 
instability. 
The initial problem is not whether the Brazilian economy 
will or will not develop in the next few years. The factors 
at present favouring its development will continué to operate 
in the future. Unless phenomena of a non-economic order 
radically change the nature of the problem, it may be assumed, 
with a considerable degree of certainty, that the country's 
per capita income will continué to rise in the next few years. 
However, this rise may take place at very different rates; 
that is, within ten years the per capita income of Brazil will 
exceed the present level by 60 per cent, although it is equally 
probable that the increase will be one-quarter as great. 
An attempt will be made in the following pages to demarcate 
the limits for the probable rate of growth of Brazil's economy 
in the near future, or in fact up to 1962. Subsequently, 
there will be an endeavour to identify the factors that must 
operate if a consistent and reasonably high rate of growth 
is to be maintained. 
2 . PROJECTIONS OF PRODUCTION, INCOME AND CONSUMPTION 
To project the economic development of a country or región 
implies, in the final instance, the establishment of various 
hypotheses on the future supply of goods and services which 
will be available to the population of that country or región 
during a given period. Such a volume is governed by the 
level of the product and by the action of external factors. 
As a beginning, it would be advisable to consider the problem 
of the level of the product. What are the basic factors 
determining its rate of growth ? An analysis of this problem 
has already been fully discussed in another volume of this 
series of studies;1 suffice it to recall here that the level of the 
product is determined by the economy's productive capacity 
. 1 See Analyses and Projections of Economic Development. I. An Introduction 
to the Technique of Programming. 
and by the degree of utilization of this capacity. Thus, 
as long as máximum utilization of installed capacity is postu-
lated from the outset, it may be assumed that an expansión 
in productive capacity is the only prerequisite for the growth 
of the product. But such an expansión in productive capacity 
is a function of the accumulation of capital and of technical 
progress.2 Consequently, the problem consists in projecting 
capital accumulation and in determining the effect of this 
new capital (and the technical knowledge brought in its train) 
on the economy's productive capacity. 
The intensity of capital accumulation is a function of the 
rate of investment, or of that proportion of net income which 
is converted into new capital within a given period. On the 
other hand, the effect of this new capital (and of the technical 
knowledge incorporated with it) on the productive capacity 
of the system can be measured with the aid of the marginal 
product-capital ratio. Thus, given a hypothesis on the 
average productivity of new investment during a certain 
period, the rate of growth of the product will be determined 
by the proportion of income destined for investment. 
(a) Product-capital ratio 
If the gross product is related to the volume of the country's 
stock of reproducible capital, it will be possible to obtain 
a coefficient reflecting the average productivity of this capital, 
provided that this latter is not unemployed owing to lack 
of effective demand. Similarly, if the volume of net invest-
ment realized in a productive period is related to the increment 
in the product observed in the subsequent period, a coefficient 
of productivity of the new capital will be obtained, or, in 
other words, a marginal product-capital ratio. If the second 
coefficient is calculated for a series of years—or of productive 
periods—it tends to approach the first, since total reproducible 
capital is nothing more than the sum of net depreciated 
investment effected in the past. There would therefore be 
no difference in working with either of these coefficients, 
provided that the marginal ratio for a series of years charac-
terized by a uniform capital utilization can be calculated. 
Despite the unreliability of the basic data, an attempt was 
made to estimate the average and marginal product-capital 
ratios of the Brazilian economy. To obtain the average ratio, 
an estimate was computed of the country's real stock of repro-
ducible capital. The 1940 census3 enabled this calculation 
to be made for the year 1939. With the data on net investment 
over the period 1939-53, a series of real reproducible capital 
was obtained for these years. Table 23 shows the average 
product-capital ratio derived from the series in question and 
2 On the implicit assumption that the supply of labour is elastic, given 
that there exists surplus labour which will be progressively absorbed by 
development. 
3 The data of the 1950 census are much more difficult to use, since the 
declarations o f enterprises show the historical valué of their fixed capital, 
which is of little significance during a period of price inflation. 
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In the period 1947-50 a sharp decline is noticeable in the 
surplus on the Government's current account. This surplus 
is the principal source for the non-inflationary financing 
of public investment. As the Government does not have 
access to the community1s voluntary saving, the decline 
in the surplus on its current account will residí either in a 
reduction of public investment or in inflationary forms of 
financing that investment. In a phase of development and 
of strong demand for government assistance in overcoming 
the obstacles to this development, it is not strange that déficit 
financing is adopted as the line of least resistance. The data 
presented in table 19 help to achieve a better understanding 
of this problem. 
It may be observed diat in the period 1949-50—precisely 
Table 19. Brazil : surplus on the current account and déficit on the capital account 
of the public sector 
(Millions o f cruzeiros) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
(A) Public revenue on current account . . , . 2 8 , 8 3 4 3 3 , 8 2 6 4 0 , 4 7 0 46 ,459 6 2 , 1 5 8 7 0 , 2 3 3 
(B) Surplus on current account . 6 , 9 5 9 7 , 9 8 4 8 , 1 7 6 7 , 7 4 7 16 ,832 14 ,525 
(C) (B) as a percentage of (A) . 2 4 . 1 2 3 . 6 2 0 . 2 1 6 . 7 2 7 . 1 2 0 . 7 
(D) Expenditure on capital account a . . . 7 , 3 2 4 9 , 1 6 8 13 ,060 15 ,430 17 ,238 21 ,579 
(E) Déficit on capital account 360 1 , 0 2 5 4 , 7 9 6 7 , 6 3 3 385 6 , 8 8 0 
(F) (E) as a percentage of (D) 4 . 9 1 1 . 2 3 6 . 7 4 9 . 5 2 . 2 3 1 . 9 
Source : Statistical Appendix. a Including financial investments. 
when the export sector introduced a strong disequilibrium 
into the economy—the Government was confronted with 
a sharp relative reduction in its surplus on current account. 
This possibly caused it to resort to inflationary sources for the 
financing of its investments. In 1950, virtual]y one-half 
of the resources earmarked for investment were of this origin. 
A considerable effort towards restoring equilibrium was 
initiated in 1951, but this was of short duration, since it did 
not even extend into 1952. Being unsuccessful in achieving 
adequate means for financing its expenditure, the public 
sector began to take part in the creation of inflationary 
pressure. 
The following question should now be asked : What type 
of income re-distribution provokes the inflation originating 
in the public sector ? In the case of an economy such as 
BraziTs, which is characterized by an elastic labour supply, 
an increase in public expenditure does not necessarily imply 
the withdrawing of factors of production from other activities. 
By financing the déficit of transport companies and by 
expanding public works, the Government provokes a re-
distribution of income in favour of certain groups of the 
population. This phenomenon may possibly be responsible 
for the apparent stability of the internal terms of trade of the 
services sector. Most probably, certain groups of services 
have suffered heavy losses, which are concealed by the increase 
in income of governmental origin. 
(c) Consequences for the prívate sector 
The consequences of inflation for the private sector are more 
difficult to identify, especially as available statistics do not 
permit a break-down of the income generated in agricultural 
activities, where the most intensive re-distribution apparently 
took place. However, the data relating to the non-agricultural 
sectors afford a preliminary estímate, which may serve as 
a basis for conjecture. Table 20 contains certain significant 
data on the behaviour of consumption during the period 
1947-53. 
These data reveal a relative decline in the consumption of 
the wage-earning classes during 1951-52, a period which 
witnessed an acceleration of the inflationary process. However, 
by 1953 a reversal of the trend had already begun, although 
this was accentuated in the private wage-earning sector.11 
1 1 In 1954, this reversal will certainly have been sharpened in the private 
sector, with the large rise in the minimum wage. 
Table 20. Brazil : share of income of the wage-earning sector in total consumption 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Income of the wage-earning sector * Private wage-earnings » 
Total As a percentage As a percentage 
Year consumption Total of consumption Total of consumption 
1947 1 2 9 . 2 4 4 . 1 3 4 . 1 3 4 . 5 2 6 . 7 
1948 1 4 6 . 0 5 0 . 0 3 4 . 2 3 8 . 4 2 6 . 3 
1949 161 .8 5 8 . 6 3 6 . 2 4 4 . 9 2 7 . 8 
1950 183 .1 6 6 . 5 3 6 . 3 5 0 . 4 2 7 . 5 
1951 2 3 0 . 0 7 6 . 8 3 3 . 4 5 8 . 0 2 5 . 2 
1952 2 7 2 . 7 9 1 . 4 3 3 . 5 7 0 . 4 2 5 . 8 
1953 3 0 4 . 1 105 .3 3 4 . 6 7 9 . 3 2 6 . 1 
Sources: For total consumption: Statistical Appendix; /or income in the wage-earning sector: Fundado Getúlio Vargas. 
* Excluding agricultural wages. 
32 
The Economic Development of Braz il 
The relative reduction of consumption may have been oífset 
by an increase of consumption among agricultural workers 
rather than among the non-wage-eárning urban population. 
It would be advisable to discover to what extent the contrary 
may prove to be true. In table 21 the savings of the private 
sector are compared with the income of the non-agricultural 
capitalist and entrepreneurial groups. Unfortunately, the 
data relating to private saving include the saving of the 
agricultural population, since statistics do not permit the 
separation of the two series. However, as the income of the 
agricultural sector—particularly that of entrepreneurs— 
grew with greater intensity than total income, it is logical 
to assume that agricultural saving increased more than that 
of non-agricultural entrepreneurs. Consequendy, the saving 
of the private non-agricultural sector would in reality be less 
than that to be inferred from the figures. 
Table 21. Brazil : consumption and saving 
of the higher income sector 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Private saving „ 
Income of ConsumpHon of 
capitalist and As a capitalist and 
entrepreneurial percentage entrepreneurial Year sector» Total of income sector 
1947 4 1 . 1 18 .3 4 4 . 5 2 2 . 8 
1948 4 2 . 9 17 .7 4 1 . 3 2 5 . 2 
1949 4 8 . 2 2 1 . 4 4 4 . 4 2 6 . 8 
1950 5 6 . 1 2 7 . 3 4 8 . 7 2 8 . 8 
1951 7 2 . 9 2 9 . 6 4 0 . 6 4 3 . 3 
1952 7 6 . 4 2 9 . 0 3 8 . 0 4 7 . 4 
1953 9 0 . 7 4 4 . 2 4 8 . 7 4 6 . 5 
Sources : For prívate saving : Statistical Appendix; for income of the capitalist 
and entrepreneurial sector: Fundado Getúlio Vargas. 
» Including profits, income of managers of firms, interest and rent. 
The first observation to be made on the data in table 21 
concerns the low savings coefficient of the upper income 
groups. If it is borne in mind that the figures include the 
saving of the agricultural sector, it may be inferred that the 
savings coefficient of the capitalist and entrepreneurial groups 
represents little more than 30 per cent of their income. If 
account is also taken of the fact that the data refer to gross 
saving—that is, including funds destined to replace the stock 
of capital, it may be concluded that the real savings coefficient 
will not be much above 20 per cent. 
The second observation is that the savings coefficient under-
went strong fluctuations, but without showing any definite 
trend. Thus an unusual growth in the income of the capitalist 
and entrepreneurial sector, as in the period 1947-53, was not 
expressed as an acceleration of the process of accumulation. 
In other words, the increase in consumption attained the same 
proportions as that of income. 
If the data are examined more carefully, it will be seen that 
the consumption of the capitalist-entrepreneurial sector 
received an exceptional Ímpetus during the period of infla-
tionary acceleration—that is, in 1951-52. This is perhaps 
due more to the freeing of imports than to the recrudescence 
of inflation. As is well known, imports constitute a means 
for the diversification of luxury consumption in Brazil. 
Since there is no possibility of importing certain commodities, 
alternative uses of income are found in the consumption of 
certain services and in the construction of luxury dwellings. 
On either of these two assumptions, the utilization of income 
tends to create a flow of wages. Thus it can be explained 
that in the period of unrestricted imports the volume of 
wages grew relatively less and the consumption of the higher 
income-groups grew relatively more. The Índices given in 
table 22 illustrate this phenomenon. 
Table 22. Brazil : Índices of the growth of consumption 
(1949 = 100) 
Prívate Public Capitalist and Imports of 
Total wage-earning wa%e-earning entrepreneurial durable 
Year consumption sector sector sector consumer goods 
1950 114 112 118 107 85 
1951 142 129 137 162 108 
1952 169 • 157 153 176 121 
1953 188 177 190 173 35 
Source: Previous tables. 
The difference between the index of total consumption and 
the other índices give an idea of the behaviour of rural con-
sumption, which apparendy grew more than the total of the 
three sectors examined. Since these three sectors represent ap-
proximately the urban population, it is to be concluded that 
the relative rise in agricultural income found expression in an 
effective improvement in consumption in rural communities. 
Given the validity of the data upon which the analysis is 
based, it would appear that the great concentration of income 
existing in Brazil does not constitute a motive forcé for 
development. This degree of concentration becomes clearly 
apparent when it is noted that, in the period 1947-53, the 
level of income of capitalists and entrepreneurs varied between 
85 and 100 per cent of the total income of private and public 
wage-earners. It is commonly assumed that, in view of the 
high marginal savings coefficient of the upper income groups, 
this concentration is an efficient driving forcé for accumulation 
in periods of rapid income increase. Experience would 
appear to indicate, however, that the behaviour of the higher 
income groups may be identical with that of the lower income 
groups, the marginal coefficient of saving levelling off with, 
and under certain conditions, even exceeding, the average 
coefficient. 
Since this mechanism of spontaneous accumulation does 
not function, the question arises as to whether it would be 
indispensable to resort to fiscal action if advantage is to be 
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from that of the product presented in the previous chapter. 
With regard to the period as a whole, the average product-
capital ratio is expressed by the coefficient 0.52. This coefficient 
seems to have risen by about 12 per cent between the pre-war 
period and the most recent years. But conclusions of great 
validity cannot be drawn in this instance, owing to the un-
reliability of investment data, particularly as regards the war 
years. Nevertheless, the more intensive utilization of the 
factors of production employed in agriculture—a result of 
the marked improvement in the profitability of agricultural 
enterprises—probably had a favourable effect on the average 
productivity of capital invested in this sector. The same may 
be said of the reclamation of good arable land which was 
undertaken during the last five years. Finally, since the increase 
in electric energy consumption by manufacturing industries 
is greater than the expansión of their installed capacity, it 
would appear that industrial equipment is being used more 
intensively. 
Table 23. Brazil : calculation of the average productivity 
coefficient of reproducible capital 
Capital Product 
Year (Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) Product-capital ratio 
1939 410 2 0 0 . 3 0 . 4 9 
1940 421 2 0 0 . 3 0 . 4 8 
1941 432 2 1 0 . 0 0 . 4 9 
1942 443 2 0 3 . 5 0 . 4 6 
1943 451 2 0 9 . 0 0 . 4 6 
1944 458 2 1 9 . 4 0 . 4 8 
1945 470 2 3 4 . 6 0 . 5 0 
1946 477 2 5 7 . 7 0 . 5 4 
1947 492 2 7 8 . 3 0 . 5 7 
1948 519 2 9 4 . 1 0 . 5 7 
1949 561 3 0 2 . 1 0 . 5 4 
1950 593 324 .1 0 . 5 5 
1951 627 3 4 6 . 5 0 . 5 5 
1952 667 3 6 0 . 9 0 . 5 4 
1953 713 3 7 6 . 1 0 . 5 3 
Sources : Data presented in chapter I and the Statistical Appendix. 
The marginal product-capital ratio is subject to much 
sharper fluctuations than the average ratio. Since an increase 
in production is determined not only by new investment 
but also by the degree of utilization of the stock of capital— 
which substantially exceeds annual net investment—any 
variation in the degree of utilization of capital will necessarily 
appear in a magnified form in the marginal product-capital 
ratio. This ratio was calculated with the most accurate data 
available for the period 1947-53. The two extremes reached 
by the product-capital ratio were 0.73 (1950) and 0.34 (1952). 
The average of these two extremes gives a coefficient of 0.514, 
which is fairly cióse to that of the average ratio mentioned 
earlier. 
What will be the pattern of the product-capital ratio during 
the next five or ten years ? It is fairly improbable that this 
ratio will depart significantly from the average reached 
during the last decade. It may be assumed, as a possibility, 
that part of the improvement in the average productivity 
of capital invested in agriculture will be retained, even though 
the prospects for coffee export prices are unfavourable. On 
the other hand, account must be taken of the fact that the 
substitution of domestic production for imports will have to 
be intensified during the next decade, since there is no reason 
to foresee an increase in the capacity to import comparable 
with that of the recent past. In the case of Brazil, an inten-
sification of the process of import replacement is accompanied 
by greater capital requirements per unit of product, since it 
implies, in the final analysis, the domestic production of manu-
factures which were formerly traded for extensively produced 
primary agricultural commodities. Evidently, it is thus 
impossible to measure the future action of all these factors, 
although it should not be forgotten that the product-capital 
ratio is extremely stable in a specific economy. The experience 
of other countries, for which there exist far more extensive 
series, confirms this observation. 
(b) Rate of investment 
Given one or several hypotheses on the product-capital ratio, 
the projection of development will depend upon the probable 
behaviour of the net investment rate. During the period 
1939-53, this rate underwent considerable fluctuations, which 
ranged from 3.2 per cent (1945) to 13.6 per cent (1952). 
The average for the period as a whole was 7.9 per cent. 
What factors are responsible for fluctuations in the rate of 
investment ? In a period characterized throughout by infla-
tionary pressure—that is, when there was no factor un-
employment due to a deficiency in effective demand—the 
rate of investment could be expected to demónstrate a greater 
stability. For a better understanding of this problem, the 
two principal components of the rate of investment in the 
Brazilian economy—the rate of saving and the net inflow 
of external resources—will be considered separately. 
Given the absence of factor unemployment through deficient 
effective demand, it is a current observation that the rate of 
saving remains relatively stable.4 The data relating to Brazilian 
experience indicate that, in 1939-53, this rate fluctuated 
within relatively narrow limits around an average valué 
of 9.4 per cent. The range of fluctuation was from 1 to 1.9, 
but if the two extreme valúes (those for 1940 and 1952) are 
eliminated it is merely from 1 to 1.3. 
This stability of the rate of saving is still more significant 
if account is taken of the heterogeneity of the period under 
study. By dividing the period into five-year phases, it can 
be seen that the rate of saving tends to rise slightly. The 
movement is from an average of 8.4 in 1939-43 to 9.0 in 1944-
48, and to 10.9 in 1949-53. This point will be dealt with at 
a later stage. 
Some of the resources not allocated to consumption5 
are destined to meet foreign commitments. It is true that 
the outflow of resources, whether in the form of an export 
4 The reasoning implicit is the following: given a certain level of 
income, the population determines the volume of consumption; and, 
as long as there is no unemployment and no abrupt changes take place 
in the level o f employment, the relation between consumption and income 
is relatively stable. Since saving constitutes the residual o f income (income 
less consumption), its share in income—i.e., the rate of saving—is also 
stable. 
5 Resources not allocated to consumption represent saving, within the 
system o f national accounts. But as regards " geographic " data, it should 
be borne in mind that part of these resources can take the form o f remit-
tances abroad o f interest and dividends on foreign capital. Although not 
computed in national income, such resources are part of geographic 
income. Whenever the ouflow o f resources, in the form o f capital or 
its servicing, exceeds the inflow, there will be a proportion o f " resources 
not allocated to consumption " which does not necessarily constitute 
3 
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of capital, in its strict sense, or of a remittance of interest and 
dividends, may be offset by an inflow of other resources. There 
is no other reason for referring to a net inflow of resources. 
The important point is that this item is subject to strong 
fluctuations, which are independent of the rate of saving. 
The fluctuations of the two variables, to which reference 
has just been made, determine the changes in the rate of 
investment. From an examination of table 24, it is easy 
to see that such changes are governed mainly by the behaviour 
of the second variable. 
Table 24. Brazil : determinants of the fluctuations in the rate of investment 
Net Net inflow 
geographic of external Net (gj as a 
. ^ving » resources investment Raie o} Rate of percentage 
Year Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices savingb investment0 of (A) 
(A) (B) 
1939 13 .3 — 2 . 7 
1940 1 1 . 4 — 0 . 9 
1941 1 6 . 8 — 5 . 3 
1942 1 6 . 0 — 9 . 3 
1943 1 5 . 8 — 8 . 6 
1944 1 9 . 2 — 8 . 4 
1945 17 .1 — 1 0 . 4 
1946 2 4 . 8 — 9 . 1 
1947 2 1 . 0 + 3 . 8 
1948 2 1 . 6 — 1 . 4 
1949 2 9 . 7 + 0 . 6 
1950 4 0 . 8 — 6 . 3 
1951 3 3 . 1 + 8 . 7 
1952 2 9 . 7 + 1 6 . 6 
1953 4 2 . 5 — 5 . 3 
1954 4 0 . 2 — 3 . 0 
(C) 
1 0 . 6 8 . 0 6 . 4 — 2 0 . 3 
10 .5 6 . 8 6 . 2 — 7 . 8 
1 1 . 5 9 . 2 6 . 3 — 3 1 . 5 
6 . 7 9 . 1 3 . 8 — 5 8 . 1 
7 . 2 8 . 9 4 . 0 — 5 4 . 4 
1 0 . 8 1 0 . 0 5 . 6 — 4 3 . 8 
6 . 7 8 . 2 3 . 2 — 6 0 . 8 
1 5 . 7 1 0 . 7 6 . 8 — 3 6 . 7 
2 4 . 8 8 . 1 9 . 6 + 1 8 . 1 
2 0 . 2 . 8 . 1 7 . 6 — 6 . 5 
3 0 . 3 10 .7 1 0 . 9 + 2 . 0 
3 4 . 5 13 .1 1 1 . 0 — 1 5 . 4 
4 1 . 8 1 0 . 0 1 2 . 7 + 2 6 . 3 
4 6 . 3 8 . 7 1 3 . 6 + 5 5 . 9 
3 7 . 2 1 1 . 8 1 0 . 4 — 1 2 . 5 
3 7 . 2 1 0 . 2 9 . 4 — 7 . 5 
Sources : Data presented in chapter I and the Statistical Appendix. 
a See footnote 5 for the definition of this concept. 
b Saving less depreciation over net income. 
c Gross investment less depreciation over net income. 
During the period 1939-53, sharp fluctuations took place 
in the net inflow of external resources. The limits to these 
variations were reached in 1945 and 1952. In the former year, 
not less than 60.8 per cent or the net resources not allocated 
to consumption were diverted abroad, while in 1952 there 
was an inflow of resources corresponding to 55.9 per cent 
of savings. These large-scale variations can be explained, 
on the one hand, by the involuntary accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves during the war years and, on the other, 
by the substantial trade indebtedness contracted in 1951-52. 
The fact that large-scale variations in the net inflow of 
resources do not seem to have any perceptible influence 
on the rate of saving is of fundamental interest for the technique 
of projection. According to available information, the com-
munity has always tended to consume a stable share of its 
income, independently of the possible destination of the 
resources it abstained from consuming. When these resources 
could not be invested, they remained immobilized in idle 
foreign exchange reserves (short-term export of capital). On 
the other hand, when the inflow of resources exceeded the 
outflow, the rate of investment rose without any inevitable 
reduction in saving. For example, the rate of saving rose in 
the period 1949-53, when more resources entered the country 
than left it. 
Footnote 5 (continued) 
saving, in the normal sense of the word. Thus the concept of " resources 
not allocated to consumption " or " geographic saving " used in the 
present study can be defined as the difference between geographic income 
and consumption within the country. 
The general background data should now be reconsidered. 
It has been seen that the rate of growth of the product is a 
function of the product-capital ratio and the rate of net 
investment. Given the stability of the product-capital ratio, 
the rate of investment becomes the solé strategic variable. 
This rate of investment is determined by that of saving and 
by the net inflow of resources. Since the rate of saving is 
a function of the level of income, it can be inférred that the 
changes in the item " net inflow of resources " are a variable 
of fundamental importance in determining the rate of growth. 
But the rate of investment governs the rate of growth 
of the product as distinct from that of income, since the latter 
is also influenced by changes in the terms of trade. If it is 
recalled that these changes affect the distribution of income, 
it can be assumed that they influence savings at two levels : 
directly, by altering the level of income, and indirectly, by alter-
ing its distribution. The conclusión can therefore be drawn 
that, provided there is no deñciency of effective demand, 
the rate of investment is determined by the net inflow of 
resources and by fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
An understanding of the probable future behaviour of the 
" net inflow of resources " and of the terms of trade is therefore 
of great importance for any projection. This second variable 
calis for careful study, since the task of projection always 
pre-supposes one or more hypotheses on its future behaviour 
pattern. This point will be examined later. For the moment 
it will be sufficient to examine the main components of this 
item. In the first place, there is the voluntary or involuntary 
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accumulation of international reserves (foreign exchange 
and gold). Involuntary accumulation—such as that which 
took place during the war—must be considered as an abnormal 
and unpredictable phenomenon. Voluntary accumulation, 
either for purposes of anti-cyclical pohcy or for the financing 
of an investment plan, will be included within the framework 
of a general programme and is therefore not the subject of 
forecast. 
Apart from the accumulation of reserves, four other sub-
groups should be considered : (a) servicing of the public debt; 
(b) interest and dividends on private capital directly invested 
in the country (a net figure); (c) net inflow of directly invested 
long-term private capital; (d) short-term capital movements. 
The data relating to the servicing of the public debt present 
no difficulties, since all the commitments are known. This 
group includes the loans granted to governments, as well 
as to private enterprise with a governmental guarantee, or 
to those conceded to private enterprise by the Export-Import 
Bank of Washington without the guarantee of the Brazilian 
Government. 
The series consisting of interest and dividends on directly 
invested private capital is difficult to project. The volume 
of interest and dividends remitted abroad depends not only 
on the level of economic activity, but also on the exchange 
situation. The same applies to the inflow of long-term capital. 
Table 25 presents data for these two sub-groups and a compa-
rison of their total with net geographic saving for the period 
1939-53. Dollars were converted into cruzeiros at the moving 
exchange rate shown in table VI of the Statistical Appendix. 
The sum of cruzeiros used to purchase exchange remitted 
overseas thus differed from that in the table. However, the 
assumption preferred was that the interested parties fixed 
the net sum of the remittance in dollars and that the exchange 
rate, which was artificially high (during the initial years) or 
low (during recent years) resulted in a capital gain or loss. 
























1939 . . . — 1 1 . 7 — 0 . 3 — 1 2 . 0 — 1 5 8 . 4 3 . 5 4 . 5 
1940 . . . — 2 6 . 8 — 2 9 . 4 — 5 6 . 2 — 7 7 5 . 6 3 . 1 2 5 . 0 
1941 . . . — 3 4 . 4 — 3 5 . 2 — 6 9 . 6 — 9 3 9 . 6 4 . 7 2 0 . 0 
1942 . . . — 4 0 . 8 — 2 9 . 3 — 7 0 . 1 — 9 7 4 . 4 5 . 4 1 8 . 0 
1943 . . . — 5 3 . 7 + 5 0 . 2 — 3 . 5 — 57 .1 7 . 1 0 . 8 
1944 . . . — 6 8 . 5 + 1 9 . 6 — 4 8 . 9 — 9 3 4 . 0 1 0 . 5 8 . 9 
1945 . . . — 6 2 . 5 — 1 6 . 0 — 7 8 . 5 — 1 , 5 7 7 . 9 9 . 5 1 6 . 6 
1946 . . . — 6 4 . 6 + 2 4 . 8 — 3 9 . 8 — 8 4 7 . 7 1 5 . 9 5 . 3 
1947 . . . — 5 1 . 4 + 2 1 . 0 — 3 0 . 4 — 6 7 1 . 8 1 4 . 8 4 . 5 
1948 . . . — 9 6 . 9 + 4 7 . 7 — 4 9 . 2 — 1 , 1 0 2 . 1 1 4 . 8 7 . 4 
1949 . . . — 9 1 . 9 + 3 4 . 6 — 5 7 . 3 — 1 , 4 2 1 . 0 2 1 . 4 6 . 6 
1950 . . . — 9 0 . 2 + 1 7 . 1 — 7 3 . 1 — 1 , 8 2 7 . 5 2 9 . 6 6 . 2 
1951 . . . — 8 0 . 1 — 1 3 . 1 — 9 3 . 2 — 2 , 4 8 8 . 4 2 9 . 2 8 . 5 
1952 . . . — 3 3 . 4 + 5 . 4 — 2 8 . 0 — 8 2 8 . 8 2 9 . 7 2 . 8 
1953 . . . — 4 3 . 6 + 8 . 0 — 3 5 . 0 — 1 , 1 4 1 . 0 4 7 . 1 2 . 4 
Sources : Data presented in chapter I aad balance-oí-payments statistics from the Superinténdencia da Moeda y do Crédito. 
During the period as a whole, the balance of the two 
sub-groups absorbed 8.7 per cent of the resources which were 
not allocated to consumption. However, in more recent 
years, a pronounced decline can be observed in this percentage, 
reaching an average of 4.8 during the last six years, 1949-54.6 
Finally, the inflow of short-term capital should be considered. 
These resources consist either of speculative capital, which 
arrives and departs according to the business situation, or 
of the accumulation of short-term trade debts. The latter 
constitute an anomaly which does not exist when there is 
a deliberate control of the exchange situation. The same 
.may be said of capital for speculation, the action of which 
is limited as much as possible. 
In brief, the rate of investment is determined by the rate of 
saving and by the net inflow of resources. On the assumption 
that the first of these two factors is stable, it would be pertinent 
6 For 1954, a valué identical with that of the previous year was assumed. 
to discover what determines the second. As has already been 
seen, these elements are the servicing of the public debt, 
the flow of private capital and the servicing of the latter. 
The first of these elements can easily be pre-determined. 
The second comprises the income from direct investments 
of foreign capital and the net inflow of new long-term private 
capital. The net balance of these two sub-groups, although 
not of great relative importance, is subject to fluctuations 
which must be observed with care. 
The strong variations in the rate of investment registered 
during the period 1939-53 were largely determined by 
short-term capital movements : involuntary accumulation of 
reserves in the first stage and liquidation of these reserves with 
the formation of commercial arrears in the second. Once 
the influence of such capital movements is removed—an 
influence which is controllable when not the result of entirely 
abnormal situations—a hypothesis can be formulated on the 
probable behaviour of the rate of investment. This assumption 
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will be based on observation of (a) the rate of savings; (b) the 
servicing of the foreign public debt and (c) the balance of the 
item " income from direct investment and inflow of long-term 
c a p i t a l T h i s rate of investment must be calculated from 
year to year, since at least one of its governing factors—the 
servicing of the foreign public debt—is subject to strictly 
foreseeable variations. 
3 . PROJECTION OF PRESENT TRENDS 
With the elements described in previous sections, a projection 
can now be made of the over-all development of the Brazilian 
economy. At the outset, this projection will be limited 
in scope, presenting a hypothesis on probable short-term 
development—that is, a hypothesis which gives expression 
to present trends. Each of the pertinent factors will then be 
considered individually. 
(i) Product-capital ratio. It has already been noted that the 
average product-capital ratio for 1 9 3 9 - 5 3 was 0 . 5 2 . During 
the period, this coefficient showed an upward trend. However, 
the highest point was reached in 1 9 4 7 - 4 8 , after which there 
was a decline. It will be assumed that this decline will come 
to an end in 1956 and the ratio will be stabilized at an average 
valué of 0.52. 
(ii) Terms of trade. This factor was of fundamental impor-
tance during the whole fifteen-year period under review. 
The year 1954 witnessed the turning point in the upswing 
of coffee prices. The future price pattern of this commodity 
will depend upon a series of factors, one of the most outstand-
ing being Brazil's export policy. This matter will be studied 
in greater detail in Part Two,7 but for the moment, the for-
mulation of three working hypotheses is justifiable. The first 
assumes the recovery of the terms of trade prevailing at the 
end of 1954; the second postulates the re-establishment of 
the 1952 terms of trade, that is, a return to the situation which 
prevailed before the great frost of 1953; and the third pre-
supposes the loss of all the margins of profit gained since 
the end of 1949—that is, a return of the terms of trade to the 
level prevailing before the rise in coffee prices, which was 
a result of the exhaustion of the stocks held by the Brazilian 
Government. The second hypothesis seems to be the most 
reasonable for a projection of the type mentioned above. 
At a later stage, an illustrative alternative based on the third 
hypothesis will be presented. 
(iii) Rate of saving. The stability of this rate constitutes 
ones of the fundamental elements in the technique of pro-
jection. The slight rise observed during the fifteen-year 
period which began in 1939 was probably due to variations 
in income distribution, motivated either by inflation or by 
changes in the terms of trade. As it is improbable that any 
large-scale movement in the opposite direction will take 
place (it has already been assumed that the terms of trade will 
not fall below the 1952 level), it can be accepted, as a preli-
minary estimate, that the rate of saving will not stray far from 
the average of the five-year period, 1 9 4 9 - 5 3 . 
(iv) Income from direct investment of private capital and net 
inflow of long-term capital. This item absorbed a relatively 
insignificant volume of the resources not allocated to consump-
tion, at least during the post-war years. The average for 
1 9 3 9 - 5 4 is not entirely representad ve, since the war years 
7 See chapter II. 
represent an abnormal period. The average for the post-war 
years exceeds 5 per cent, but is characterized by a downward 
trend. The first projection will take the percentage of 4.8, 
which was registered in the period 1 9 4 9 - 5 4 . 
Table I of the annex to this chapter shows a projection of 
present trends. The data indicate that, if the trends manifest 
in 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 continué for the next few years, the Brazilian 
economy's rate of growth will be appreciably reduced. The 
annual rate of growth of the per capita product, which reached 
2 . 1 per cent in 1 9 3 9 - 5 3 , 8 fell to 1 . 7 per cent. The greatest 
effect may be observed in consumption, the rate of which 
will decline from 2.8 to 1.2 per cent, as may be seen in table 26. 
Table 26. Brazil : annual per capita rates of growth 
1939-53 1949-53 1954-62 
Production 2 . 1 3 . 1 1 . 7 
3 . 0 4 . 1 1 . 5 
Consumption 2 . 8 3 . 8 1 . 2 
The relatively high rate of growth in the product during 
the period 1 9 3 9 - 5 3 fundamentally aróse from the increase 
in the rate of net investment from an average of 6.3 
in 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 to 1 1 . 7 during the five-year period 1 9 4 9 - 5 3 , 
reaching the peak of 13.6 in 1952. This rise was caused 
principally by the radical changes in the item " net inflow 
of external resources While this item absorbed an annual 
average of 20 per cent of resources not allocated to consumption 
in the period 1 9 3 9 - 4 1 , it helped to increase these resources 
by 1 1 . 3 per cent in the five-year period 1 9 4 9 - 5 3 . 
The data under analysis are the basis for a hypothesis with 
the highest possible degree of objectivity, in that it endeavours 
to reflect present trends. However, some of these trends 
are not clearly defined. The most important case to be con-
sidered is undoubtedly that of the terms of trade. It has been 
assumed that the index of the terms of trade will continué 
to decline (a tendency in evidence since the latter half of 1 9 5 4 ) , 
but will be stabilized at the 1952 level. It is, however, con-
ceivable that the decline in coffee prices will be even more 
precipitate and that the index will return to the 1948 level. 
The effect of this loss on the rate of growth of production 
will be relatively small, provided that the rate of saving is 
maintained. The annual per capita rate of growth will decline 
from 1.7 to 1.6 per cent. However, the effect on the growth 
of income will be rather more accentuated, the rate being 
lowered from 1.5 to 0.9 per cent. The same is true of con-
sumption, the rate of which will decline from 1.2 to 0.8 per 
cent. The development of this alternative hypothesis appears 
in table II of the annex to this chapter. The data included 
therein show that, if the present trend towards a deterioration 
in the terms of trade continúes, there will probably be little 
significant change in the consumption levels of the Brazilian 
population during the period 1 9 5 5 - 6 2 . 
4 . BASIC ELEMENTS OF A DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
Observations refer so far merely to hypothetical development 
in the period 1 9 5 5 - 6 2 . The valué of such a hypothesis lies 
8 Owing to the unreliability of some of the estimates made for 1954, 
the projections were constructed mainly on the basis of data relating to 
the period 1939-53. 
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in its role as a starting-point from which to formúlate a 
development pohcy. The identification of unfavourable 
trends does not necessarily imply a reduction in the rate of 
growth, but simply forecasts what might occur if the necessary 
measures to neutralize the effects of retarding factors are not 
taken. It is now pertinent to define these measures. 
(a) Increase in the average productivity of capital 
The product-capital ratio reflects the average (physical) 
productivity of capital accumulated by the productive system. 
If this productivity can be increased, an acceleration of growth 
will be obtained. Available information indicates that the 
improvement which took place between the pre-war era and 
the present was apparently due to a more intensive utilization 
of industrial equipment and to a more systematic use of 
fixed capital in agriculture, pardcularly in coffee plantations. 
In the case of Brazil, the best way of raising the productivity 
of the economy as a whole is by an increase in exportable 
production,9 which almost always means die incorporation 
of unused natural resources into the economy. If, for example, 
there is an expansión of meat production, pastures are incor-
porated into the economy that were probably not utilized 
before. Similar considerations apply to increments in the 
production of wood, of bananas (in the coastal areas of Santos 
and Rio de Janeiro), of rice (in central Brazil), etc. Thus, 
a definite pohcy of stimulating exports may be one of the most 
effective methods of obtaining an increase in the average 
productivity of the economy. 
The introduction of more efficient production techniques 
by means of small-scale investment is another way of increasing 
the average productivity of capital. The progress of agri-
culture achieved by the more widespread use of hybrid seeds, 
artificial insemination, insectiádes and weed-killers, etc., 
provides the best example of technical improvements of this 
kind. 
The most important measures likely to increase the average 
productivity of capital result from the adoption and imple-
mentation of a development programme. Sectorial disequi-
libria, manifest in so-called bottle-necks, are the principal 
causes of the periodic declines in the productivity of capital. 
Such declines are more clearly perceptible in the marginal 
ratio. Deficient transport and storage facilities may substan-
tially reduce the productivity of capital employed in agricul-
ture, just as an energy shortage may similarly affect industry. 
No less serious, although less apparent, is the over-investment 
that sometimes takes place in certain sectors. Studies under-
taken on the Sao Paulo metallurgical and engineering industries 
bring to light numerous cases of over-investment, particularly 
in equipment. Sometimes this apparent excess of productive 
capacity is simply the counterpart of a shortage either of energy 
or of certain raw materials. At other times, it is a cloak for 
speculative activities, which are related to the uncertainty 
of the exchange situation or to other disturbing factors. 
Up to a certain point, sectorial disequilibria are perfectly 
normal phenomena in a spontaneously developing economy. 
In those sectors in which the optimum size of the productive 
unit is large, it is usually impossible to avoid such disequilibria 
without incurring losses through the establishment of units 
of an uneconomic size. On the other hand, since the individual 
entrepreneur is not fully informed of market prospects or 
9 In the case of coffee, this statement is valid only under certain conditions. 
of the plans of his fellow entrepreneurs, there is in many 
cases an inevitable duplication of effort, with the consequent 
waste of the community's resources. 
The execution of a programme will tend to correct omissions 
and duplications, since it will help to provide entrepreneurs 
with a more precise idea of the future market and with a 
fuller knowledge of all the advances being made in the prin-
cipal sectors. But it is mainly through the encouragement 
afforded by credit, complemented by direct state action, that 
a programme makes its decisive contribution to the prevention 
of sectorial disequilibria. The mere introduction of some 
discipline into an investment pohcy can therefore play a signi-
ficant part in increasing the average productivity of capital. 
(b) The terms of trade 
The efforts made to improve the physical productivity 
of capital may be neutralized by a deterioration in the terms 
of trade, since this causes a decline in the economic productivity 
of the system as a whole. Generally, the fluctuations in the 
terms of trade are independent of any domestic measures 
adopted. A fall in cotton prices, due to action taken by the 
principal exporter, on a fall in wheat prices as a result of good 
harvests in the exporting countries, are factors that will 
influence Brazil's terms of trade in contrasting ways, without 
reference to any action or decisión taken within the country. 
Nevertheless, fluctuations in world coffee prices—the 
principal determinant of Brazil's terms of trade—are pro-
foundly influenced by the country's economic pohcy. For 
this reason, Brazil is in a very special position as regards the 
possibílities of defending its own terms of trade. This problem 
will be exaniined in detail in one of the studies forming Part 
Two of the present report.10 At this stage, the maintenance of 
the terms of trade at their 1952 level may be advanced as a 
favourable hypothesis, or rather as an objective to be reached. 
(c) The rate of saving 
The economy's real effort towards growth is reflected in 
the rate of saving. So long as there is no unemployment 
caused by an insufficiency of effective demand, this effort 
is relatively stable, since the community tends to consume 
a proportion of its income which varies only when there 
are substantial changes in income distribution. Nevertheless, 
it is in the possibility of increasing the rate of saving that a 
development programme finds its principal justification. 
By increasing its share in income and by draining off a 
growing proportion of revenue for purposes of capital for-
mation, the State can, within certain limits, raise the rate of 
saving. The same effect is obtained if the State, without 
enlarging its share in income, reduces its current expenditure 
in favour of investment. Heavier taxation is not in itself 
suflicient to raise the rate of saving. The revenue accruing 
from the additional taxes may be used to cover current expen-
diture. Moreover, an increase in the tax burden may result 
in a reduction of private saving. It is therefore conceivable 
that higher taxation may cause a decline in the rate of saving. 
If an increased rate of saving is established as one of the 
objectives of a programme, it will be necessary to specify 
which population groups must reduce their consumption. 
10 See chapter II. 
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Broadly speaking, indirect taxation is the most effective 
instrument for reducing consumption in the lower income 
brackets. However, in the middle and upper income groups 
its effect is to reduce saving rather than consumption. This 
explains why an increase in the tax on essential goods, such 
as food and clothing, may lead to a falling-off in consumption, 
whereas the main consequences of a rise in the tax on luxury 
goods may be a curtailment of private saving. Direct taxation, 
whose incidence is almost exclusively on the middle and 
upper income groups, principally results in a reduction of 
private saving. 
Thus, it may be concluded that it is no easy task to increase 
the rate of saving by the use of fiscal instruments. Direct 
taxes on enterprises constitute a special case. Apparently, 
such taxation is simply a method of transferring savings from 
the private to the public sector. However, it may prove 
a way of obliging firms to cut down the distribution of 
dividends in order to carry out their plans for expansión. 
The same may be said of fiscal instruments discouraging the 
transfer of profits to shareholders, since these profits, once 
retained, are transformed wholly into savings, while if distri-
buted, they are partially consumed. 
The foregoing observations give some idea of the difficulties 
encountered in practice in increasing the rate of saving, always 
provided that the possibility of a reduction in the consumption 
of the lower income groups is discarded. Such a reduction 
cannot be the aim of a development policy; in fact, if carried 
to certain extremes, it will tend actually to retard development. 
The consumption of the upper income groups must be 
considered from two points of view : on the one hand, it 
constitutes the margin which may effectively be reduced 
without affecting the social aims of development; on the 
other, it represents an element exerting permanent pressure 
on the balance of payments. This second aspect is not, 
strictly speaking, linked with the problem of the rate of 
saving, but must be taken into account in the elaboration of 
a fiscal policy designed to raise that rate. 
The difficulties which obstruct a policy with this objective 
arise, in the final instance, from the interdependence existing 
between the pattern of income distribution and the way in 
which the income in question is utilized. In those cases where 
the government participates in highly lucrative enterprises, 
it is possible to channel a large volume of resources towards 
investment without detriment to private saving. However, 
it is difficult to achieve the same objectives by taxing private 
sector income either directly in firms or once in the hands 
of the public. 
The data relating to the period 1939-53 demónstrate that 
the rate of saving shows great stability, although with a slight 
upward trend. This latter was probably due to inflationary 
pressure and to the steady improvement in the terms of trade. 
It may also be assumed that the increase in the public sectores 
share in expenditure, noticeable in recent years, influenced 
the rise in the rate of saving. Unfortunately, data on this 
share are not available after 1947. It was less dian 18 per cent 
in 1947-48, but exceeded 20 per cent in the period 1950-52. 
Moreover, in the same period government investment enlarged 
its share in the public sector, rising from 21.8 to 25.8 per cent. 
Perhaps a combination of these two trends had something 
to do with the rise in the rate of saving from 8.1 per cent 
in 1947-48 to 10.9 in 1949-52. 
The available information indicates that the rate of saving 
fluctuated in the post-war period between 8.1 and 13.1 per 
cent. Even when account is taken of the margin of error 
of this data, particularly as regards annual variations, it may 
be asserted that the present structure of the economy would 
be able to support a rate of saving higher than that prevailing 
today. If the system had already spontaneously reached a 
rate of 13 per cent, it is fairly certain that this rate would be 
compatible with present conditions. One of the central 
objectives of a development policy might therefore be the 
recovery and maintenance of this 13 per cent rate of saving. 
As a first step in this direction, an effort should be made 
to increase investment within the public sector. If, by means 
of a strict development programme, the Government were 
to succeed in channelling towards investment a significant 
proportion, say two-thirds, of the increment in public 
revenue, its investments would grow more than proportio-
nately. As an example, the assumption is made that 30 per cent 
of public expenditure is devoted to investment and that 
the volume of this expenditure is growing at .an annual rate 
of 6 per cent. If two-thirds of this increment are destined 
for investment, the latter will increase at a rate of 12 per cent 
per annum. Meanwhile, current expenditure will have 
increased by 2.9 per cent, which signifies a more intensive 
growth than that of population. If, on the other hand, it is 
assumed that public investment constitutes 30 per cent of 
aggregate capital formation and that private investment is 
growing at an annual rate of 6 per cent, it may be inferred 
that the share of the public sector in investment will be 
35 per cent at the end of five years. In this case, there will 
be an increase in the rate of saving from 11 to 12 per cent. 
A definite fiscal policy can therefore raise the rate of saving 
without discouraging the private sector, as would occur if 
there were a persistent attempt to reduce popular consumption 
by increasing indirect taxation. However to appreciate the 
firmness and consistency required from governmental action 
in order to achieve such an increment in the rate of saving, 
it suffices to take into account the previous observations. 
(d) Net inflow of external resources 
The behaviour of this variable is of fundamental importance 
for development. The larger the volume of resources flowing 
abroad, the smaller will be the investment effected in the coun-
try. Mutatis mutandis, the greater the inflow of foreign 
capital, the greater will be the volume of investment. Histo-
rical experience in Brazil indicates that the contribution of 
foreign capital to a higher rate of investment has been small 
and intermittent. Balance-of-trade statistics show that the 
inflow of real goods and services has never exceeded the out-
flow in any one decade of the last half-century.11 There is 
nothing to indicate that past trends will be reversed in the 
near future. On the contrary, the data on public financial 
commitments show that large sums will have to flow abroad 
in coming years. The earlier projection shows that the 
remittance of resources overseas absorbs 22.4 per cent of all 
savings in 1955, reaching an average of 14.4 per cent in the 
five-year period extending to 1959. For this reason, in no 
one year of the period does the rate of net investment reach 
11 The valué of technical services rendered to the country by foreign 
companies is not known. But this valué cannot easily offset, in a series 
of years, the déficit in the balance of trade. 
Part One—Chapter II. The basic elements of a development programme 29 
10 per cent, even on the assumption of a rate of saving of 
11 per cent. 
The largest share of die resources to be remitted abroad 
consists of the servicing of government indebtedness or of 
debts guaranteed by the Government. This item cannot 
be modified by domestic exchange or taxation measures. 
The other item, interest and dividends on direct capital 
investment, is influenced to a certain extent by such measures. 
However, measures adopted in this sector may have contra-
dictory effects, since, if they deter the remittance of interest 
and dividends on the capital, they often discourage an inflow 
of new capital. It is thus diflicult to assume that this item will 
be useful in exerting a significant influence on the rate of 
growth. 
The same reasoning does not apply to the first item. It is 
highly probable that the Government will reach an agreement 
with its creditors, such as occurred in 1954, and will thus 
postpone the effort that would otherwise have to be made 
in toto during the next five years. This hypothesis is perfectly 
conceivable, since much of the Brazilian public debt is on a 
medium-term basis. It is also possible that international 
credit organizations will provide Brazil with resources of 
real importance for its development. The adoption of a 
well-conceived programme will certainly contribute to this 
end. 
5 . DEFINITION OF GENERAL AIMS 
The projection of current trends indicated that a rate of 
growth, comparable with that of the recent past, could 
probably not be achieved during the period 1955-62. This 
conclusión was reached without the introduction of pessimistic 
hypotheses as to the behaviour of the factors determining 
growth. But, on the assumption that Brazil will lose, during 
the next five years, all the improvement in the terms of trade 
that characterized the previous five years (1949-54), the 
economy's rate of growth would be even slower. (See 
table 27.) 
Table 27. Brazil : comparison of different hypotheses 
of growth during the period 1955-62 
Production Income Consumption 
(Annual per capita rates of growth) 
1. Initial projection 1 . 7 1 . 5 1 . 2 
2. Deterioration in the terms o f 
trade 1 . 6 0 . 9 0 . 8 
3. Inflow of $ 5 0 0 milliona . . . . 1 . 9 1 . 8 1 . 6 
4. Combination of 2 and 3 . . . . 1 . 8 1 . 3 1 . 2 
5. Rise in the rate o f saving to 
13 per cent 2 . 0 2 . 0 1 . 6 
6. Rise in the product-capital ratio 
to 0 . 5 7 3 . 1 2 . 8 2 . 8 
7. Combination of 5 and 6 . . . . 3 . 9 3 . 6 3 . 2 
8. Combination o f 3, 5 and 6 . 4 . 0 3 . 8 3 . 4 
9. Experience during the period 
1939-53 2 . 1 3 . 0 2 . 8 
10. Experience during the period 
1949-53 3 . 1 4 . 1 3 . 8 
4 Most favourable hypothesis (total reinvestment of the increase in income). 
The adoption of a definite development programme may 
succeed in counteracting the effect of certain retarding elements 
which are at present manifest and in creating other stimuli 
to growth. The action of these new encouragements must 
be expressed either by a rise in the rate of investment or by 
an improvement in the average productivity of capital. 
As a beginning, it will be assumed that Brazil, with the aim 
of increasing its investment, will obtain aid to the valué of 
$500 million, from international credit institutions. The sum 
will be paid in annual instalments of $100 million, as from 1955. 
This inflow of external resources will permit a rise in the rate 
of net investment, during the five-year period 1955-59, 
from 9.4 to 10.1 per cent. Consequently, the annual per 
capita rate of growth of income will increase from 1.5 to 
1.7 and that of consumption from 1.2 to 1.5. A net inflow 
of $500 million under these conditions—other factors being 
constant—would cause per capita consumption to increase 
by 12.5 per cent until 1962, or an increment of almost 30 per 
cent above that of the initial projection. 
In the foregoing calculation, the same treatment was afforded 
to new foreign capital as that normally given to capital of 
domestic formation. However, it may be assumed that the 
entire increment in income brought about by this new capital 
will be reinvested. This hypothesis will be within the bounds 
of possibility if it deals with government-channelled capital. 
In this case, the increase in the rate of saving will be to 10.4 
instead of 10.1 per cent and the increment in per capita consump-
tion will reach 13.2 per cent in the period 1955-62, as against 
12.5 per cent postulated previously. 
The positive effect of this inflow of external resources may, 
however, be nulhfied by the negative action or odier factors. 
Let is be assumed, for example, that, as these foreign resources 
enter the country, the terms of trade deteriórate in the manner 
already indicated—namely, that they return to the 1948 level. 
The two effects would then be counterbalanced. The annual 
rate of growth of per capita consumption will be about 
1.2 per cent; exactly as in the initial projection. 
It is now pertinent to examine the other factor determining 
the rate of investment—namely, the rate of saving. This 
entails the adoption of the previous hypothesis,12 which 
assumes that the rate of saving will rise to 13 per cent 
and that the other factors will be treated in the same way as 
in the initial projection. In this case, there would be an appre-
ciable rise in the rate of investment, from 8.5 in 1955 to 12.2 
in 1962. The average for the period as a whole will be 11.1 
per cent, comparable, therefore, with that of the period 
1949-53 (11.7 per cent). The rate of growth of per capita 
income will reach 2 per cent and that of consumption 1.6 per 
cent. The effect will thus be identical to that of the inflow 
of $500 million under the most favourable hypothesis, accord-
ing to which the higher income caused by the inflow of external 
resources will be fully invested. 
Once these various possibilities as to the rate of investment 
have been presented, the effects of possible changes in the 
average productivity of capital should be examined. One 
objective of a programme might perhaps be a rise in the 
average productivity of capital to 0.57, a level already spon-
taneously reached in the past. Even if this increase were 
obtained gradually between 1955 and 1959, it would have a 
considerable effect on the economy's rate of growth. The 
annual rate of growth of per capita consumption would reach 
2.8 per cent—that is, more than double the rate anticipated in 
the initial projection and equal to that of the period 1939-53. 
12 See page 28. 
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These data emphasize the magnitude of the effort to ratio-
nalize the production process. In addition, they give an idea 
of the vital significance of a programme in accelerating 
development, since it seeks to co-ordinate investments in 
order to avoid the bottle-necks that reduce the average pro-
ductivity of capital. 
What are the possible effects of a combination of some of 
these hypotheses ? In the first place, consideration should 
be given to the two hypotheses direcdy related to programming 
and strictly dependent on domestic decisions—a rise in the 
rate of saving and an improvement in the productivity of 
capital. A combination of the two most favourable hypotheses 
on these factors would raise the rate of growth of consumption 
to 3.2 per cent. If the effect of an inflow of $500 million 
is added to these two hypotheses, the rate would rise to 3.4 
per cent. In other words, it would approach the level reached 
during the period 1949-53, under the extremely favourable 
influence of an improvement in the terms of trade. Table 27 
provides the data relating to these different hypotheses. 
A series of possibilities therefore appear, representing 
different rates of development and calling for various degrees 
of effort on the part of the economy. It has been seen, for 
example, that the inflow of $500 million of foreign capital 
would have a similar effect on the rate of growth as a rise 
in the rate of saving from 11 to 13 per cent. However, this 
rise could be achieved only through a reduction in the rate 
of growth of consumption during the period 1956-58. 
(See tables III and V of the annex to this chapter.) However, 
it is not by the effort implicit in this reduction of consumption 
that the major difficulties for this hypothesis can be assessed, 
but rather by the complexity and multiplicity of the 
measures required for such a reduction. 
The elaboration of a programme pre-supposes far-reaching 
decisions of economic pólicy. It is evident that such decisions 
or directives must be based on hypotheses consistent with 
the possibilities of the economic system and with its institu-
tional framework. Only after these guiding principies are set 
up can work begin on the formulation of the programme— 
that is, on the establishment of policies to be pursued by the 
various organs which guide and direct economic activity. 
The aim of subsequent chapters is to explain how such 
a task of formulation can be carried out. An attempt will 
be made to give a broad, general picture of the establishment, 
on the basis of certain directives, of the co-ordinated objectives 
for the development policies of various sectors of economic 
activity. The selectioñ of general directives is outside the 
scope of the present study, which will consider the question 
fairly superficially. 
Since present trends indicate that the annual rate of growth 
of per capita income will not exceed 1.5 per cent during the 
period 1955-62, as compared with a rate of 3.0 registered 
during 1939-53, a rate of 2 per cent may be considered as 
the minimum objective of a development programme 
(hypothesis 5 of table 27, developed in table V of the annex.) 
As a máximum hypothesis—disregarding the favourable 
action of other external factors, which are difficult to forecast— 
a rate of 3.8 per cent might be adopted (hypothesis 8 of table 27, 
developed in table VIII of the annex). 
It is the highest authorities directing economic policy who 
must decide between the minimum and máximum objectives. 
Nevertheless, if a programme is to exist at all, at least a mini-
mum objective should be established, since the present course 
of development tends to dispense with the guiding influence 
of a programme. It can thus be said that, if external contri-
butions such as that indicated in hypothesis 3 of table 27 
are assumed, the minimum objective must be raised. In this 
case, a figure of 2.3 per cent for income and of 2 per cent 
for consumption would be operative. Even so, it was consi-
dered preferable to ignore this mitigating factor and to 
maintain the earlier minimüm objective. 
To achieve this minimum objective, it is unnecessary to 
depend strictly upon an improvement in the rate of saving 
(as in hypothesis 5). The adoption of a programme would 
necessarily bring about an improvement in the productivity 
of capital, which would facilítate the attainment of such ah 
objective through a smaller effort to increase the rate of saving. 
These differences of method are not, however, of any great 
significance when the task is carried out within such narrow 
limits. The rate of growth of consumption, which will serve as 
a guiding principie in forecasting structural changes in demand, 
would not easily undergo alteration, if the above-mentioned 
refinements were introduced into the hypothesis. Table V 
of the annex contains a development of the hypothesis 
chosen to serve as the basis for the general formulation of the 
programme in subsequent chapters. 
Table I. Brazil : most probable hypothesis of spontaneous development 























of net Net 
saving saving 
(10) 




























1950 593 0 . 5 5 3 2 4 . 1 + 5 . 5 3 2 9 . 6 1 7 . 2 3 1 2 . 4 1 3 . 1 4 0 . 8 — — — — 6 . 3 3 4 . 5 3 2 3 . 3 2 7 1 . 6 1 1 . 0 
1951 627 0 . 5 5 3 4 6 . 5 + 1 . 0 3 4 7 . 5 1 8 . 2 3 2 9 . 3 1 0 . 0 3 3 . 1 — — — + 8 . 7 4 1 . 8 3 5 6 . 2 2 9 6 . 2 1 2 . 7 
1952 667 0 . 5 4 3 6 0 . 9 — 3 6 0 . 9 1 9 . 3 3 4 1 . 6 8 . 7 2 9 . 7 — — — + 1 6 . 6 4 6 . 3 3 7 7 . 5 3 1 1 . 9 1 3 . 6 
1953 713 0 . 5 3 3 7 6 . 1 + 3 . 3 3 7 9 . 4 2 0 . 5 3 5 8 . 9 1 1 . 8 4 2 . 5 — — — — 5 . 3 3 7 . 2 3 7 4 . 1 3 1 6 . 4 1 0 . 4 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 1 + 3 . 3 4 2 1 . 4 2 2 . 9 3 9 8 . 5 1 1 . 0 4 3 . 8 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 — 9 . 8 3 4 . 0 4 1 1 . 6 3 5 4 . 7 8 . 5 
1956 823 0 . 5 2 4 2 8 . 0 — 4 2 8 . 0 2 3 . 9 4 0 4 . 1 1 1 . 0 4 4 . 5 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 1 — — 5 . 6 3 8 . 9 4 2 2 . 4 3 5 9 . 6 9 . 6 
1957 , , 862 0 . 5 2 4 4 8 . 2 — 4 4 8 . 2 2 5 . 0 4 2 3 . 2 1 1 . 0 4 6 . 6 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 2 — — 5 . 5 4 1 . 1 4 4 2 . 7 3 7 6 . 6 9 . 7 
1958 903 0 . 5 2 4 6 9 . 6 — 4 6 9 . 6 2 6 . 2 4 4 3 . 4 1 1 . 0 4 8 . 8 — 3 . 1 — 2 . 3 — — 5 . 4 4 3 . 4 4 6 4 . 2 3 9 4 . 6 9 . 8 
1959 946 0 . 5 2 4 9 1 . 9 — 4 9 1 . 9 2 7 . 4 4 6 4 . 5 1 1 . 0 5 1 . 1 — 4 . 8 — 2 . 5 — — 7 . 3 4 3 . 8 4 8 4 . 6 4 1 3 . 4 9 . 4 
1960 990 0 . 5 2 5 1 4 . 8 — 5 1 4 . 8 2 8 . 7 4 8 6 . 1 1 1 . 0 5 3 . 5 — 6 . 2 — 2 . 6 — — 8 . 8 4 4 . 7 5 0 6 . 0 4 3 2 . 6 9 . 2 
1961 1 ,035 0 . 5 2 5 3 8 . 2 — 5 3 8 . 2 3 0 : 0 5 0 8 . 2 1 1 . 0 5 5 . 9 — 2 . 4 — 2 . 7 — — 5 . 1 5 0 . 8 5 3 3 . 1 4 5 2 . 3 1 0 . 0 
1962 1 ,086 0 . 5 2 5 6 4 . 7 — 5 6 4 . 7 3 1 . 5 5 3 3 . 2 1 1 . 0 5 8 . 7 — 1 . 1 — 2 . 8 — — 3 . 9 5 4 . 8 5 6 0 . 8 4 7 4 . 5 1 0 . 3 
NOTE.—Column (1) : reproducible capital for 1955 was obtained by adding net investment for that 
year to reproducible capital for 1954. Column (2) estimated as explained in the test. Column (3) : 
calculated from cois. (1) and (2). Column (4) estimated as explained in the text. Column (5) calculated 
from cois. (3) and (4). Column (6) .• calculated from col. (1) (2.9 per cent). Column (7) : calculated from 
cois. (5) and (6). Column (8) : estimated as explained in the text. Column (9) : calculated from cois. (7) 
and (8). Column (10) : snbheading (A) : known data; subheading (B) : data calculated from col. (9) 
(4.8 per cent); subheading (C) : estimated as explained in the text. Column (11) calculated from cois. (9) 
and (10). Column (12) .• calculated from cois. (5) and (10). Column (13) : calculated from cois. (6), (7) 
and (12). Column (14) : calculated from cois. (11) and (7). 
Table II. Brazil : hypothesis of a deterioration in the terms of trade 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Servi- Income 
Effect ctng from 
Repro- Product- of the Rate of the direct Foreign Net Con- Rate of 
ducible capital terms Gross Depre- Net of net' Net public invest- contri- invest- Expen- sump- invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade xncome ciation xncome savtng savtng debt ments bution Total ment diture tion ment 
(A) (B) (c) " m 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 7 4 2 1 . 9 2 2 . 9 3 9 9 . 0 1 1 . 0 4 3 . 9 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 — 9 . 8 3 4 . 1 4 1 2 . 1 3 5 5 . 1 8 . 5 
1956 823 0 . 5 2 4 2 8 . 0 — 1 . 2 4 2 6 . 8 2 3 . 9 4 0 2 . 9 1 1 . 0 4 4 . 3 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 1 — — 5 . 6 3 8 . 7 4 2 1 . 2 3 5 8 . 6 9 . 6 
1957 861 0 . 5 2 4 4 7 . 7 — 7 . 1 4 4 0 . 6 2 5 . 0 4 1 5 . 6 1 1 . 0 4 5 . 7 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 2 — — 5 . 5 4 0 . 2 4 3 5 . 1 3 6 9 . 9 9 . 7 
1958 901 0 . 5 2 4 6 8 . 5 — 1 3 . 2 4 5 5 . 3 2 6 . 1 4 2 9 . 2 1 1 . 0 4 7 . 2 — 3 . 1 — 2 . 3 — — 5 . 4 4 1 . 8 4 4 9 . 9 3 8 2 . 0 9 . 7 
1959 942 0 . 5 2 4 8 9 . 8 — 1 3 . 5 4 7 3 . 3 2 7 . 3 4 4 6 . 0 1 1 . 0 4 9 . 1 - 4 . 8 — 2 . 4 — — 7 . 2 4 1 . 9 4 6 6 . 1 3 9 6 . 9 9 . 4 
1960 983 0 . 5 2 5 1 1 . 2 — 1 3 . 8 4 9 7 . 4 2 8 . 5 4 6 8 . 9 1 1 . 0 5 1 . 6 — 6 . 2 — 2 . 5 — — 8 . 7 4 2 . 9 4 8 8 . 7 4 1 7 . 3 9 . 1 
1961 . . . 1 , 025 0 . 5 2 5 3 3 . 0 — 1 4 . 1 5 1 8 . 9 2 9 . 7 4 8 9 . 2 1 1 . 0 5 3 . 8 — 2 . 4 — 2 . 6 — — 5 . 0 4 8 . 8 5 1 3 . 9 4 3 5 . 4 1 0 . 0 
1962 1 ,073 0 . 5 2 5 5 8 . 0 — 1 4 . 4 5 4 3 . 6 3 1 . 1 5 1 2 . 5 1 1 . 0 5 6 . 4 — 1 . 1 — 2 . 7 — — 3 . 8 5 2 . 6 5 3 9 . 8 4 5 6 . 1 1 0 . 3 
NOTE.—See note to table I. 
Table III-A. Brazil : hypothesis of an inflow of external resources 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
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(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1954 , , , . 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 3 4 2 1 . 5 2 2 . 9 3 9 8 . 6 1 1 . 0 4 3 . 8 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 2 . 9 — 6 . 9 3 6 . 9 4 1 4 . 6 3 5 4 . 8 9 . 3 
1956 826 0 . 5 2 4 2 9 . 5 — 4 2 9 . 5 2 3 . 9 4 0 5 . 6 1 1 . 0 4 4 . 6 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 1 2 . 9 — 2 . 7 4 1 . 9 4 2 6 . 8 3 6 1 . 0 1 0 . 3 
1957 868 0 . 5 2 4 5 1 . 4 — 4 5 1 . 4 2 5 . 2 4 2 6 . 2 1 1 . 0 4 6 . 9 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 2 2 . 9 — 2 . 6 4 4 . 3 4 4 8 . 8 3 7 9 . 3 1 0 . 4 
1958 912 0 . 5 2 4 7 4 . 2 — 4 7 4 . 2 2 6 . 4 4 4 7 . 8 1 1 . 0 4 9 . 3 — 3 . 1 — 2 . 4 2 . 9 — 2 . 6 4 6 . 7 4 7 1 . 6 3 9 8 . 5 1 0 . 4 
1959 959 0 . 5 2 4 9 8 . 7 — 4 9 8 . 7 2 7 . 8 4 7 0 . 9 1 1 . 0 5 1 . 8 — 4 . 8 — 2 . 5 2 . 9 — 4 . 4 4 7 . 4 4 9 4 . 3 4 1 9 . 1 10 .1 
1960 . . . . 1 ,006 0 . 5 2 5 2 3 . 1 — 5 2 3 . 1 2 9 . 2 4 9 3 . 9 1 1 . 0 5 4 . 3 — 6 . 2 — 2 . 6 — — 8 . 8 4 5 . 5 5 1 4 . 3 4 3 9 . 6 9 . 2 
1961 . . . . 1 ,052 0 . 5 2 5 4 7 . 0 — 5 4 7 . 0 3 0 . 5 5 1 6 . 5 1 1 . 0 5 6 . 8 — 2 . 4 — 2 . 7 — — 5 . 1 5 1 . 7 5 4 1 . 9 4 5 9 . 7 1 0 . 0 
1962 1 , 1 0 4 0 . 5 2 5 7 4 . 1 — 5 7 4 . 1 3 2 . 0 5 4 2 . 1 1 1 . 0 5 9 . 6 — 1 . 1 — 2 . 9 — -^.0 5 5 . 6 5 7 0 . 1 4 8 2 . 5 1 0 . 3 
NOTE.—See note to table I. 
Table III-B. Brazil : hypothesis of an inflow of external resources with total reinvestment 
(Biilions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Reprodu- Product- Effect Rate Servicing Income Foreign Net Rate 
cible capital of ike terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net of ihe from direct contri- invest- Expen- Consump- of invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade income ciation income savmg savmg public. debt investments bution Total ment diture tion ment 
(A) (B) (C) <D) 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 3 4 2 1 . 5 2 2 . 9 3 9 8 . 6 1 1 . 0 4 3 . 8 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 2 . 9 — 6 . 9 3 6 . 9 4 1 4 . 6 3 5 4 . 8 9 . 3 
1956 826 0 . 5 2 4 2 9 . 5 — 4 2 9 . 5 2 3 . 9 4 0 5 . 6 1 1 . 3 4 6 . 0 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 2 2 . 9 — 2 . 8 4 3 . 2 4 2 6 . 7 3 5 9 . 6 1 0 . 6 
1957 869 0 . 5 2 4 5 1 . 9 — 4 5 1 . 9 2 5 . 2 4 2 6 . 7 1 1 . 3 4 8 . 3 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 3 2 . 9 — 2 . 7 4 5 . 6 4 4 9 . 2 3 7 8 . 4 1 0 . 7 
1958 915 0 . 5 2 4 7 5 . 8 — 4 7 5 . 8 2 6 . 5 4 4 9 . 3 1 1 . 3 5 0 . 8 — 3 . 1 — 2 . 4 2 . 9 — 2 . 6 4 8 . 2 4 7 3 . 2 3 9 8 . 5 1 0 . 7 
1959 963 0 . 5 2 5 0 0 . 8 — 5 0 0 . 8 2 7 . 9 4 7 2 . 9 1 1 . 3 5 3 . 4 — 4 . 8 — 2 . 5 2 . 9 -—4.4 4 9 . 0 4 9 6 . 4 4 1 9 . 5 1 0 . 4 
1960 . . . . 1 , 0 1 2 0 . 5 2 5 2 6 . 2 — 5 2 6 . 2 2 9 . 3 4 9 6 . 9 1 1 . 3 5 6 . 1 — 6 . 2 — 2 . 7 — — 8 . 9 4 7 . 2 5 1 7 . 3 4 4 0 . 8 9 . 5 
1961 . . . . 1 , 0 5 9 0 . 5 2 550 .7 — 5 5 0 . 7 3 0 . 7 5 2 0 . 0 1 1 . 0 5 7 . 2 — 2 . 4 — 2 . 7 — — 5 . 1 5 2 . 1 5 4 5 . 6 4 6 2 . 8 1 0 . 0 
1962 1 ,111 0 . 5 2 5 7 7 . 7 — 5 7 7 . 7 3 2 . 2 5 4 5 . 5 1 1 . 0 6 0 . 0 — 1 . 1 — 2 . 9 — ^ . 0 5 6 . 0 5 7 3 . 7 4 8 5 . 5 1 0 . 3 
NOTE.—See note to table I . 
Table IV. Brazil : combination of the hypotheses appearing in tables II and III-A 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) í¿) (5) (6) (7) (8) O) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Servi- Income 
Effect cing from Rate 
Repro- Product• of fhe Rate of the direct Foreign Net Con- of in-
ducible capital terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net public invest- contri- invest- Expen- sump- vest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade meóme ciation income saving savtng debt ments bu-tion To'al ment di'ure tion ment 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 7 4 2 1 . 9 2 2 . 9 3 9 9 . 0 11.0 4 3 . 9 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 2 . 9 — 6 . 9 3 7 . 0 4 1 5 . 0 3 5 5 . 1 9 . 3 
1956 826 0 . 5 2 4 2 9 . 5 — 1 . 2 4 2 8 . 3 2 3 . 9 4 0 4 . 4 11.0 4 4 . 5 — 3 . 5 —2.1 2 . 9 — 2 . 7 4 1 . 8 4 2 5 . 6 3 5 9 . 9 1 0 . 3 
1957 868 0 , 5 2 4 5 1 . 4 — 7 . 1 4 4 4 . 3 2 5 . 2 4 1 9 . 1 11.0 4 6 . 1 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 2 2 . 9 — 2 . 6 4 3 . 5 4 4 1 . 7 3 7 3 . 0 1 0 . 4 
1958 911 0 . 5 2 4 7 3 . 7 — 1 3 . 2 4 6 0 . 5 2 6 . 4 4 3 4 . 1 11.0 4 7 . 7 — 3 . 1 — 2 . 3 2 . 9 — 2 . 5 4 5 . 2 4 5 8 . 0 3 8 6 . 4 1 0 . 4 
1959 956 0 . 5 2 497 .1 — 1 3 . 5 4 8 3 . 6 2 7 . 7 4 5 5 . 9 11.0 5 0 . 1 - 4 . 8 — 2 . 4 2 . 9 — 4 . 3 4 5 . 8 4 7 9 . 3 4 0 5 . 8 1 0 . 0 
1960 . . . . 1 , 0 0 2 0 . 5 2 5 2 1 . 0 — 1 3 . 8 5 0 7 . 2 2 9 . 1 4 7 8 . 1 11.0 5 2 . 6 — 6 . 2 — 2 . 5 — — 8 . 7 4 3 . 9 4 9 8 . 5 4 2 5 . 5 9 . 2 
1961 . . . 1 ,051 0 . 5 2 5 4 6 . 5 — 1 4 . 1 5 3 2 . 4 3 0 . 5 5 0 1 . 9 11.0 5 5 . 2 — 2 . 4 — 2 . 6 — — 5 . 0 5 0 . 2 5 2 7 . 4 4 4 6 . 7 1 0 . 0 
1962 1 , 1 0 1 0 . 5 2 5 7 2 . 5 — 1 4 . 4 5 5 8 . 1 3 1 . 9 5 2 6 . 2 11.0 5 7 . 9 —1.1 — 2 . 8 — — 3 . 9 5 4 . 0 5 5 4 . 2 4 6 8 . 3 1 0 . 3 
NOTE.—See note to table I. 
Table V. Brazil : hypothesis of a rise in the rate of saving 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Servi- Income 
Effect cxng from 
Repro- Product- of the Rate of the direct Foreign Net Con- Rate of 
ducible capital terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net public invest- contri- invest- Expen- sump- invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade xncome ciation xncome saving savtng debt ments bution Total ment dxture tion ment 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1954 752 0.54 409.2 +7 .7 416.9 21.8 395.1 10.2 40.2 — — — —3.0 37.2 413.9 354.9 9.4 
1955 789 0.53 418.2 +3 .3 421.5 22.9 398.6 11.0 43.8 —7.7 —2.1 —9.8 34.0 411.7 354.8 8.5 
1956 823 0.52 428.0 — 428.0 23.9 404.1 12.0 48.5 —3.5 —2.3 — —5.8 42.7 422.2 355.6 10.6 
1957 866 0.52 450.3 — 450.3 25.1 425.2 13.0 55.3 —3.3 —2.7 — —6.0 49.3 444.3 369.9 11.6 
1958 . . . . . 915 0.52 475.8 — 475.8 26.5 449.3 13.0 58.4 —3.1 —2.8 — —5.9 52.5 469.9 390.9 11.7 
1959 967 0.52 502.8 — 502.8 28.0 474.8 13.0 61.7 —4.8 —3.0 — • —7.8 53.9 495.0 413.1 11.4 
1960 . . . . 1,021 0.52 530.9 — 530.9 29.6 501.3 13.0 65.2 —6.2 —3.1 — —9.3 55.9 521.6 436.1 11.2 
1961 . . . . 1,077 0.52 560.0 — 560.0 31.2 528.8 13.0 68.7 —2.4 —3.3 — —5.7 63.0 554.3 460.1 11.9 
1962 , 1,140 0.52 592.8 — 592.8 33.1 559.7 13.0 72.8 —1.1 —3.5 — —4.6 68.2 588.2 486.9 12.2 
NOTE.—See note to table I. 
Table VI. Brazil : hypothesis o f a rise in the productivity o f capital 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Effect Servicing Income 
Repro- Product- of the Rate of the from Foreign Net Rate oj 
ducible capital terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net public direct contri - invest- Expen- Con- invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade xncome ciation xncome savtng savtng debt investment bution Total ment diture sumption ment 
(A) <B) (C) (D) 
1954 752 0.54 409.2 +7 .7 416.9 21.8 395.1 10.2 40.2 — — — —3.0 37.2 413.9 354.9 9.4 
1955 . . . . . 789 0.53 418.2 +3 .3 421.5 22.9 398.6 11.0 43.8 —7.7 —2.1 —9.8 34.0 411.7 354.8 0.8 
1956 823 0.54 444.4 — 444.4 23.9 420.5 11.0 46.2 —3.5 —2.2 — —5.7 40.5 438.7 374.3 9.6 
1957 863 0.55 474.6 — 474.6 25.0 449.6 11.0 49.5 —3.3 —2.4 — —5.7 43.8 468.9 400.1 9.7 
1958 907 0.56 507.9 — . 507.9 26.3 481.6 11.0 53.0 —3.1 —2.5 — —5.6 47.4 502.3 428.6 9.8 
1959 954 0.57 543.8 — 543.8 27.7 516.1 11.0 56.8 —4.8 —2.7 — —7.5 49.3 536.3 459.3 9.5 
1960 . . . . 1,003 0.57 571.7 — 571.7 29.1 542.6 11.0 59.7 —6.2 —2.9 — —9.1 50.6 562.6 482.9 9.3 
1961 . . . . 1,054 0.57 600.8 — 600.8 30.6 570.2 11.0 62.7 —2.4 —3.0 — —5.4 57.3 595:4 507.5 10.0 
1962 1,111 0.57 633.3 — 633.3 32.2 601.1 11.0 66.1 —1-1 . —3.2 — - 4 . 3 61.8 629.0 535.0 10.3 
NOTE.—See note to table I. 
Table VII. Brazil : combination of the hypotheses appearing in tables V and VI 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflow or outflow of resources 
Reprodu- Product- Effect Rate Servicing Income Foreign Net Rale 
cidle capital of the terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net of the from direct contri- invest- Expen- Consump- of invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade meóme ciation income savtng saving public debt investments bution Total ment diture tion ment 
(A) (B) (c} (D) 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 3 4 2 1 . 5 2 2 . 9 3 9 8 . 6 1 1 . 0 4 3 . 8 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 — 9 . 8 3 4 . 0 4 1 1 . 7 3 5 4 . 8 8 . 5 
1956 823 0 . 5 4 4 4 4 . 4 — 4 4 4 . 4 2 3 . 9 4 2 0 . 5 1 2 . 0 5 0 . 5 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 4 — — 5 . 9 4 4 . 6 4 3 8 . 5 3 7 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 
1957 870 0 . 5 5 4 7 8 . 5 — 4 7 8 . 5 2 5 . 2 4 5 3 . 3 1 3 . 0 5 8 . 9 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 8 — — 6 . 1 5 2 . 8 4 7 2 . 4 3 9 4 . 4 1 1 . 6 
1958 923 0 . 5 6 5 1 6 . 9 — 5 1 6 . 9 2 6 . 8 4 9 0 . 1 1 3 . 0 6 3 . 7 — 3 . 1 — 3 . 0 — — 6 . 1 5 7 . 6 5 1 0 . 8 4 2 6 . 4 1 1 . 7 
1959 981 0 . 5 7 5 5 9 . 2 — 5 5 9 . 2 2 8 . 4 5 3 0 . 8 1 3 . 0 6 9 . 0 — 4 . 8 — 3 . 3 — — 8 . 1 6 0 . 9 5 5 1 . 1 4 6 1 . 8 1 1 . 5 
1960 . . . . 1 , 0 4 2 0 . 5 7 5 9 3 . 9 — 5 9 3 . 9 3 0 . 2 5 6 3 . 7 1 3 . 0 7 3 . 3 — 6 . 2 — 3 . 5 — — 9 . 7 6 3 . 6 5 8 4 . 2 4 9 0 . 4 1 1 . 3 
1961 . . . . 1 , 1 0 6 0 . 5 7 6 3 0 . 4 — 6 3 0 . 4 3 2 . 1 5 9 8 . 3 1 3 . 0 7 7 . 8 — 2 . 4 — 3 . 7 — — 6 . 1 7 1 . 7 6 2 4 . 3 5 2 0 . 5 1 2 . 0 
1962 1 ,178 0 . 5 7 6 7 1 . 5 — 6 7 1 . 5 3 4 . 2 6 3 7 . 3 1 3 . 0 8 2 . 8 — 1 . 1 — 4 . 0 — — 5 . 1 7 7 . 7 6 6 6 . 4 5 5 4 . 5 1 2 . 2 
NOIE,—See note to table I, 
Table VIH. Brazil : combination of the hypotheses appearing in tables III-B, V and VI 
(Billions of cruzeiros -it 1952 prices) 
a ) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Inflóte or outflow of resources 
Servi- Income 
Effect cing from 
Repto- Product - of the Rate of the direct Foreign Net Con- Rate of 
ducible capital terms Gross Depre- Net of net Net public invest- contri- invest- Expen- sump- invest-
Year capital ratio Product of trade income ciation income saving saving debt ment bution Total ment diture tion ment 
(A) (B) (C) (D) 
1954 752 0 . 5 4 4 0 9 . 2 + 7 . 7 4 1 6 . 9 2 1 . 8 3 9 5 . 1 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 — — — — 3 . 0 3 7 . 2 4 1 3 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 9 . 4 
1955 789 0 . 5 3 4 1 8 . 2 + 3 . 3 4 2 1 . 5 2 2 . 9 3 9 8 . 6 11.0 4 3 . 8 — 7 . 7 — 2 . 1 2 . 9 — 6 . 9 3 6 . 9 4 1 4 . 6 3 5 4 . 8 9 . 3 
1956 826 0 . 5 4 4 4 6 . 0 — 4 4 6 . 0 2 3 . 9 4 2 2 . 1 1 2 . 0 5 0 . 6 — 3 . 5 — 2 . 4 2 . 9 — 3 . 0 4 7 . 6 4 4 3 . 0 3 7 1 . 5 1 1 . 3 
1957 874 0 . 5 5 4 8 0 . 7 — 4 8 0 . 7 2 5 . 3 4 5 5 . 4 1 3 . 0 5 9 . 2 — 3 . 3 — 2 . 8 2 . 9 — 3 . 2 5 6 . 0 4 7 7 . 5 3 9 6 . 2 1 2 . 3 
1958 930 0 . 5 6 5 2 0 . 8 — 5 2 0 . 8 2 7 . 0 4 9 3 . 8 1 3 . 0 6 4 . 1 — 3 . 1 — 3 . 1 2 . 9 — 3 . 3 6 0 . 8 5 1 7 . 5 4 2 9 . 7 1 2 . 3 
1959 991 0 . 5 7 5 6 4 . 9 — 5 6 4 . 9 2 8 . 7 5 3 6 . 2 1 3 . 0 6 9 . 7 - 4 . 8 — 3 . 3 2 . 9 — 5 . 2 6 4 , 5 5 5 9 . 7 4 6 6 . 5 1 2 . 0 
1960 1 ,055 0 . 5 7 6 0 1 . 3 — 6 0 1 . 3 3 0 . 6 5 7 0 , 7 1 3 . 0 7 4 . 2 — 6 . 2 — 3 . 6 — — 9 . 8 6 4 . 4 5 9 1 . 5 4 9 6 . 5 1 1 . 3 
1961 1 , 1 1 9 0 . 5 7 6 3 7 . 8 — 6 3 7 . 8 3 2 . 4 6 0 5 . 4 1 3 . 0 7 8 . 7 — 2 . 4 — 3 . 8 — — 6 . 2 7 2 . 5 6 3 1 . 6 5 2 6 . 7 1 2 . 0 
1962 1 ,191 0 . 5 7 6 7 8 . 9 — 6 7 8 . 9 3 4 . 5 6 4 4 . 4 1 3 . 0 8 3 . 8 —1.1 — — 5 . 1 7 8 . 7 6 7 3 . 8 5 6 0 . 5 1 2 . 2 
NOXE.—See note to table I. 
Chapter III 
PROJECTIONS OF DEMAND FOR FINAL PRODUCTS 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
Once the guiding principies of a development policy are 
estabhshed, it is possible, with the aid of the programming 
technique, to anticipate the changes and adjustments that 
must be made if the economy is to reach and maintain the 
rate of growth imphcit in such directives. 
As economic development advances, changes will be 
required in the structural mechanism of production and in 
the system of income distribution; but, as a general rule, 
these changes take place a posteriori. The first corrective 
measures are adopted when bottle-necks and a waste of 
factors begin to be evident. In the majority of cases, it is 
possible, by means of economic analysis, to forecast the most 
significant of these maladjustments. Consideration will now 
be given to the all too frequent problem of a disequilibrium bet-
ween the capacity to import and the demand for imported 
goods. Whenever a relatively high rate of growth is postulated 
in a development policy, the following proposition must be 
formulated : unless the capacity to import and income grow 
with equal intensity, production for the domestic market 
will have to increase more rapidly than income. 
If it is assumed that the coefficient of imports remains 
stable, i.e., that there is a parallel growth of income and imports, 
does this hypothesis imply an intensification of either the 
historical or the recent rate of expansión in exports ? Could 
such a rate of growth be achieved, given the existing domestic 
supply and foreign market conditions ? If overseas demand 
for export products is not growing at the required pace, 
what price reductions will be necessary to obtain an increase 
in exports ? 
If the conclusión is reached that the capacity to import 
cannot expand at the rate postulated for income, a higher 
rate of growth will have to be assumed for production 
destined for the domestic market than for income. In this 
case, and according to the income-elasticity of demand for 
the commodities imported, a series of structural adjustments 
will have to be made in the economy to permit the substitution 
of domestically produced goods for imports. Under present 
conditions, such changes take place after the inadequacy of 
the capacity to import has been ascertained. That is why 
some sectors are more backward than others and why idle 
capacity in certain sectors exists side by side with a deficient 
capacity in others. These are the distortions that slow down 
the rate of growth. 
There are other aspects of this problem which must be taken 
into account. As a general rule, export activities are charac-
terized by a comparatively low capital intensity. Therefore, 
an expansión of exports requires relatively less capital than 
import replacement. But since most equipment is purchased 
abroad, if production for the domestic market is to grow more 
rapidly than income, capital-goods imports must increase 
even more intensively. In other words, either the replacement 
of consumer-goods imports is accelerated, or effort is concen-
trated on the domestic production of capital goods. Whatever 
the solution, major structural changes must be introduced. 
Given a particular hypothetical growth-pattern, these changes 
both in over-all demand and in demand for goods at present 
imported may be estimated. Only in this way is it possible 
to adopt opportune measures aimed at facüitating adjustments 
in the productive mechanism and at maintaining an intensive 
rate of growth over a prolonged period. 
A development policy is imphcit in the aggregate projections 
presented in the previous chapter. However, for this policy 
to shape itself into a programme, the elaboration of sector-by-
sector projections is indispensable; that is, the rate of growth 
of each group of economic activities compatible with the 
hypothetical growth-pattern of the economy as a whole must 
be determined with some degree of accuracy. Without 
analysis at the sectorial level, the aggregate projections will 
lack normative valué, since only by such analysis can the 
structural changes required by a definite rate of growth be 
brought to light. As noted earlier, an anticipation of these 
structural changes enables opportune safeguards to be adopted, 
so that a disturbance of economic growth by sectorial disequi-
libria may be avoided. 
2 . CONCISE ACCOUNT OF THE METHOD FOLLOWED 
Projections by sector are based partly on the aggregate 
projections and partly on a meticulous analysis of both the 
dynamics of demand and the interrelationship between 
economic activities. Once a hypothesis is formulated on the 
growth of the economy—of the product, of income, of 
consumption, etc.—an analysis by sector within the limits 
of that hypothesis can be carried out. The aggregate projec-
tions give an indication of the probable volume of consump-
tion, but do not explain how the community will distribute 
its consumption expenditure. However, it is the composition 
of this expenditure which, in the final instance, determines 
the structure of die product and of imports. 
The programming of development does not necessarily 
imply any interference with the composition of consumption 
beyond the limits usually admitted as normal in a free-market 
economy. It is understood that the consumer will enjoy 
complete autonomy in determining the structure of his expen-
diture. The limitations that may exist on the supply side are 
those which are determined by balance-of-payments or other 
motives common to free-market economies. In fact, the 
autonomy of the consumer is an essential mechanism in pro-
gramming development, whose disappearance would require 
the creation of a whole new superstructure for determining 
the distribution of resources according to some criterion 
which would also have to be defined. 
From the macro-economic point of view, the pattern of 
consumption is a function of the level of per capita income 
22 
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and of the way in which it is distributed. Since it is possible 
to influence these two factors without encroaching on 
the freedom of the consumer to decide his own pattern 
of expenditure, diere is no reason to introduce elements of 
rigidity into the economic system.1 
If a programme is based on freedom of the consumer, 
it can also anticipate his conduct. In other words, it pre-
supposes the possibility of foreseeing future changes in the 
pattern of consumption, given certain hypotheses on the 
volume and distribution of income. If it is known, for example 
that the volume of income to be consumed directly by the 
population will grow by approximately 50 per cent per capita 
during a given number of years and that the way in which 
this income is distributed will not undergo fundamental 
modification, the major alterations that must occur in the 
pattern of consumption should be indicated on the basis 
of an analysis of the dynamics of demand. As this problem 
can be resolved with an objective criterion, it is also possible 
to set up projections by sector which would be compatible 
with the directives of a development pohcy. 
It is not sufficient, however, to forecast the structural changes 
in consumption. By this means, a projection can be made 
of the demand for those goods and services which reach the 
hands of the final consumer, but not of the demand for 
intermedíate goods and services and for capital goods. The 
way to attain this second objective should now be examined. 
Producer goods in general (raw materials and equipment) 
are destined, in the final instance, for transformation into 
consumer goods and services. Production of an intermedíate 
or capital commodity today is thus a stage in the production 
of a consummer commodity or service, since the economic 
system is nothing more than the process whereby the com-
munity meets its needs, and these needs are satisfied by 
consumption. Once the probable growth in the production 
of consumer goods is known, an estimate of the demand 
for the intermediate products embodied in such consumer 
goods is not difficult, provided that the interrelationships 
of the productive system are known. The establishment 
of these interrelationships permits a table of coefficients to 
be drawn up by means of which the demand for intermediate 
goods can be approximately deduced from the demand for 
the final goods in which they are incorporated. 
From the point of view of programming, the demand for 
capital goods is likewise considered as derived demand. 
Once the growth of final and intermediate goods industries 
is projected, the volume of equipment and building materials 
required for their expansión can be estimated. 
The first stage in the elaboration of a programme consists 
in forecasting the structural changes in consumption which 
are likely to result from the rise in per capita income. To this 
end, a detailed appraisal is made of the consumption pattern 
in the base period, and as accurate a study as possible undertaken 
of the situation regarding relative prices and the income 
elasticity of demand for the principal groups of consumer 
goods. After this analytical work has been carried out, a 
projection of consumer expenditure will be made, by combin-
ing the income-effect with the estimated increase in per capita 
1 The problem would obviously be different if there were a major 
disequilibrium between real supply and monetary demand; to avoid 
hardship for certain groups, this would involve the introduction of direct 
controls on the price system and on the allocation of consumer goods. 
income. Thus, if the income-elasticity coefficient of demand 
for unprocessed foodstuffs is 0.6 2 and if a 37-per-cent increase 
in consumer income is foreseen over a period of eight years, 
it may be inferred that the total demand for unprocessed 
foodstuffs wíll grow by 31 per cent. As soon as this calculation 
is made for the different groups of consumer goods, an approxi-
mate idea may be obtained of modifications which the pattern 
of consumption will undergo during the course of develop-
ment. 
The second problem is as follows : what share of the demand 
for consumer goods will be satisfied by domestic production 
and what share by imports ? The starting-point must 
obviously be an analysis of the situation during the base period 
and of trends in the process of substituting domestic pro-
duction for imported consumer goods. 
This substitution problem will be considered in detail 
later.3 For the moment, it is sufficient to recall diat the 
intensity of the substitution process will be determined by 
the prospects for the capacity to import, another problem 
to be dealt with at a subsequent stage.4 
The proportion of the demand to be met by domestic 
production will be assessed on the basis of the preliminary 
estimate of the probable volume of substitution in the con-
sumer-goods sector. This will provide a new point of 
departure for projecting the activities normally associated with 
the production of consumer goods. These projections, in turn, 
constitute a new starting-point for estimating the demand 
for intermediate goods—that is, for the commodities incor-
porated in consumer goods. 
As regards intermediate products, it will be necessary to 
undertake an analysis identical with that of consumer goods 
representing an appraisal of the way in which demand is 
being satisfied, the share of imports, trends in the process 
of substituting domestic production for imported articles, 
and so on. As in the case of final consumer goods, the analysis 
of the trend towards substitution will enable a preliminary 
assessment of the probable volume of indispensable imports 
to be made. The demand to be satisfied by domestic produc-
tion will be estimated by comparing aggregate demand with 
anticipated imports. 
If the sum total of all the imports forecast in these projections 
is compared with the volume of the capacity to import, 
the capacity for external payment available for capital-goods 
imports—in other words, the capacity to import capital 
goods—will result as the difference. 
The projections of the growth of activities associated with 
the production of consumer goods will serve as the basis 
for calculating the demand for capital goods. This calculation 
is not difficult if each branch of industry is treated separately. 
However, it is not always advisable—or even possible— 
to enter into detail in these projections. The type of pro-
gramming considered here necessitates a simple method of 
2 An income-elasticity coefficient of 0.6 implies that if the growth in 
per capita income were 1 per cent, that of demand for the consumer 
commodity in question would be 0.6 per cent. It must be borne in mind 
that this is a question of a ratio between two rates of variation, one of 
income and the other of consumption (both in per capita valúes). In 
the calculation appearing in the text, an annual rate of demographic 
growth of 2.4 per cent was assumed. 
3 See chapter V of Part One. 
4 See chapter IV of Part One. 
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estimating the demand for capital goods which exempts 
the economist from making a direct study of each project. 
This method is based on the average product capital ratios 
for each group of activities. Given a certain structure of rela-
tive prices, such ratios indicate how far each unit of capital 
invested in a branch of industry increases the productive 
capacity of that industry. If the valué of the increase in pro-
duction is divided by that of investment, a coefficient will be 
obtained which expresses the product capital ratio. This ratio 
reflects a given price structure, which is necessarily subject to 
modification, since productivity in the various industries will 
evolve in different ways. This, however, does not invalídate 
the use of the above-mentioned coefficients, since they are 
applied to groups of affiliated industries and not to highly 
specialized branches. In addition, they claim only to give 
an idea of the volume of the resources required. At all events, 
it will be necessary to revise these calculations from year to 
year in order to introduce the effects of the more important 
changes occuring in cost and price structures. 
Once the demand for capital goods has been projected, 
an estimate. should be made of the manner in which this 
demand must be satisfied. Because a calculation of the capacity 
to import capital goods is already available, the volume 
of the demand for these goods to be met from domestic 
production is determined by substraction. Finally, if the rate 
of growth of capital goods industries is known, it will be 
possible to calcúlate the investment required for this growth. 
Thus, a second estimate can be obtained of the total demand 
for capital goods and, indirecdy, of the proportion of this 
demand to be satisfied by domestic production. 
3 . INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND RELATIVE PRICES 
As is well known, changes in the pattern of demand for 
final products are a fundamental reflection of alterations in the 
average level of consumer income, in the distribution of this 
income and in the relative prices of final products. It is now 
pertinent to give more detailed consideration to the possible 
importance of these last two factors. 
The problem of income distribution will be considered 
first. The effect of an increase of 10 per cent in per capita 
income upon the pattern of consumption is entirely different 
according to whether it arises from a higher level of wages, 
whether it is caused by an increase in the profits distributed 
by enterprises or whether the higher remuneration affects urban 
or rural workers. Should a good system of national accounts 
be available, the origin of consumer income may be observed 
at the end of each period. This will show what proportion 
is derived from the payment of labour, what share results 
from distributed profits and what part originates in other factor 
payments. On the basis of the projections of the different 
sectors of production, of wage policy and of some elements 
of fiscal policy, it is possible to project the structure of income 
available for consumption. However, these projections are 
valid only when they refer to relatively short periods. The 
five-or-ten-year projections of the pattern of consumption 
must be based on broad and flexible hypotheses subject to 
annual revisión in accordance with the findings of short-term 
studies of the type previously mentioned. 
The problem of relative prices assumes a similar form. 
It is practically impossible to forecast changes in such prices 
very far ahead. In addition to reflecting the immediate 
market situation for each product, these changes bring to 
light alterations in the cost structure and in the exchange 
situation. Bad weather in an agricultural area, the appearance 
of a particular disease, or some other factor of this nature 
can, from time to time, reduce the supply of a consumer 
commodity. As a result, and according to the dynamics 
of demand for the product concerned, its price—as well as 
those of other rival products—may rise sharply. Since their 
effects are more permanent, changes in relative price deter-
mined by an unbalanced increase in productivity are even 
more important. 
Their significance lies in the fact that consumers react in a 
specific way according to the commodity whose price changes 
in relation to the general level. Sometimes a fall in the relative 
price of a product implies the ousting of others from the 
market. Conversely, it may provoke an increase in the 
consumption of other products or a rise in the level of saving 
of certain groups of consumers. It is obvious that, if the 
relative price of a cereal or a fruit is reduced, consumption 
of this particular foodstuff will tend to increase at the expense 
of other cereals or fruits. But what influence will a fall in the 
price of a foodstuff exert on the demand for garments and 
footwear? Probably, it will be impossible to forecast this 
influence without considering each consumer group separately. 
In the higher income groups, a fall in relative prices for 
foodstuffs will probably bring about an increase in saving. 
In the lower income groups, it will perhaps cause a rise in food 
consumption. In the middle income groups, the consequence 
will most probably be heavier consumption of other goods. 
Changes in relative prices among groups of consumer 
goods—that is, among products with a low substitution-
elasticity—provoke reactions similar to those resulting from 
variations in the level of personal income. For this reason, 
forecasts of alterations in relative prices are of secondary 
importance if the projections of consumption are based on 
an analysis of relatively large groups of products. 
However, their importance is greater at the level of pro-
jections within each group, as in the case of foodstuffs. Thus, 
the necessity arises for annual revisión of longer-term pro-
jections. For long-term projections, the revisión must 
incorpórate the changes imposed by the operation of the 
aforementioned factors—unequal technological progress, dis-
parities in the level of investment, losses in crops, etc.5 
5 The effects on relative prices of advances in technology and of the 
pardal loss of a harvest are fundamentally distinct phenomena, and must 
be considered differently in correcting projections of demand. The impact 
of the loss of a harvest is temporary, and the change in relative prices 
thereby provoked represents the prejudiced sector's attempt to transfer 
part or all of the loss to the community as a whole. What it is important 
to bear in mind, in this instance, is the loss in real income and its effect 
on the pattern of consumption. A technological improvement results 
in a basic reduction of production costs, the benefit of which may be 
retained by the producer, who will thus widen his profit margin. If, 
however, the producer considers that by transferring this gain to the 
consumer, through the lowering of the sales prices, he can enlarge his 
market and earn more by increasing the scale of production, there will 
be a change in relative prices. In this case, it must be borne in mind 
that a concomitant increment in real income is produced. Should the 
phenomenon occur simultaneously in various sectors, it is possible that 
the heavier consumption of those products whose prices have fallen 
will not mean that the consumption of other commodities declines, but 
that it expands less or remains stationary. There are instances, however, 
in which an advance in a sector's production technique leads to the 
total exclusión of competing products. 
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4 . PROJECTION OF DEMAND FOR FINAL PRODUCTS 
Given the relative stability in income distribution and the 
slow effect of changes in relative prices—an effect virtually 
felt only within each commodity group—modifications 
in the level of per capita income figure as the major determinant 
of changes in the composition of consumption. It is common 
knowledge that the pattern of consumption of persons enjoy-
ing the same level of income shows many points of similarity. 
Broadly speaking, these persons react to an increase in income 
in a far more uniform way than those with different income 
levels. 
Projections of consumption covering periods of five or 
ten years must therefore be based on an income-elasticity 
analysis, with a correction of the annual projections in terms 
of the changes in relative prices. Some over-all data on the 
income-elasticity of demand for certain important groups 
of consumer goods will now be given. On the basis of these 
coefficients, an attempt will be made to determine the prin-
cipal changes which may occur in the structure of consumption, 
assuming that the economy will grow according to the 
so-called minimum programme. 
(a) Agricultural products 
To analyse the dynamics of demand, the agricultural sector 
will be divided into three groups : foodstuffs for the domestic 
market; raw materials for the domestic market; and export 
products. The third group will be considered in detail else-
where.6 Raw materials for the domestic market do not 
6 See chapters I and II of Part two. 
constitute an independent sector for purposes of the analysis 
of demand, but should be considered jointly with the manu-
facturing sector which uses them. For the moment, attention 
will be devoted solely to foodstuffs for the domestic market. 
Food absorbs a major share of the expenditure of the 
population, as a whole and of that of the large majority of 
social groups, the higher-income brackets being the solé 
exception. Nevertheless, only some of this expenditure on 
foodstuffs reaches the agricultural sector. A considerable 
proportion is absorbed by services, the valué of which is 
added to that of the foodstuffs, by the manufacturing activities 
associated with food processing and by taxation. 
A direct estimate of the pattern of consumers' expenditure 
would be necessary in order to assess the share of foodstuffs 
within the aggregate expenditure on consumption. Inquines 
made in 1952 by the Comissao Nacional da Bem-Estar Social 
among working-class families in many Brazilian cides, reveal 
that foodstuffs absorbed almost 50 per cent of the total expen-
diture of such families. In the city of Sao Paulo, the corres-
ponding percentage appeared to be 41.1 per cent, and in the 
Federal District 47.3 per cent. According to general expe-
rience, the proposition of expenditure on foodstuffs tends to 
decrease as real income rises. In the middle classes, it is 
already substantially lower (30 per cent or less, as a rule) 
and in the more privileged groups it undergoes an even 
greater reduction. A rapid calculation, for which 1949 was 
taken as the base year, revealed that foodstuffs absorbed 
approximately 41.2 per cent of BraziTs total consumer expen-
diture during the period 1947-54. Table 28 gives an 
approximate idea of the relative importance of this expenditure 
since 1947. 
Table 28. Brazil : share of foodstuffs in total popular expenditure 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Expenditure on foodstuffs 9 6 . 7 100 .4 1 0 9 . 4 117 .9 1 2 3 . 6 122 .3 132 .1 135 .5 
Total consumer expenditure . . . 2 3 6 . 9 2 4 5 . 9 2 4 8 . 0 2 7 1 . 6 2 9 6 . 3 3 1 1 . 9 3 1 6 . 4 3 5 4 . 9 
Foodstuffs as a percentage o f the 
total 4 0 . 8 4 0 . 8 4 4 . 1 4 3 . 4 4 1 . 7 3 9 . 2 4 1 . 8 3 8 . 2 
NOTE.—A calculation was made of the volume of expenditure in 1949; for the remaining years an estímate was made on the basis 
of Indices of the physical volume of apparent consumption of foodstuffs. 
These data obviously constitute a preliminary estimate, 
since they are based on the approximate supply and exelude 
possible movements in the level of stocks from one year to 
another. They indicate that the share of expenditure on food-
stuffs in total expenditure is highly stable, a fact which can easily 
be explained if the relatively short duration of the period 
concerned is recalled. However, this stability conceals a 
state of flux in the pattern of consumer expenditure on 
foodstuffs, the share of processed commodities in the total 
tending to rise. 
The specific way in which the Brazilian economy is develop-
ing—with little or no increase in the average real urban, wage, 
but with a substantial rise in the average national wage as 
a result of the population shift from country to town— 
is responsible in large measure for this rapid change in the 
composition of expenditure on foodstuffs. The expenditure 
on unprocessed food, calculated at constant prices, increased 
by 25.5 per cent between 1947 and 1953. An increment of 
this size represents an income-elasticity coefficient of 0.5. 
If imported wheat is added, this coefficient rises to 0.7. But 
it should be recalled that the rapid rise in wheat consumption 
is partly a consequence of the artificially low levels prevailing 
during the base period (1947). By way of illustration, unpro-
cessed foodstuffs in table 29 were grouped as articles of lower 
income-elasticity (cereals, tubers and pulses) and higher 
income-elasticity (meat, fruit and sugar). Coefficients of 
0.39 and 0.61 were obtained for the.first and second groups, 
respectively. 
The data relating to food processing are not strictly repre-
sentative of the dynamics of demand, owing to the strong 
influence of fluctuations in wheat imports during the period 
in question. If the analysis is extended to cover a longer 
period, the income-elasticity coefficient obtained will be 
substantially lower than that which can be inferred from 
4 
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Table 29. Brazil : increment of consumer expenditure on foodstuffs during the period 1947-53 
(1947 = 100) 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
I. Unprocessed foodstuffs . 104 .2 113 .2 118 .8 120 .6 1 1 9 . 6 1 2 5 . 5 
(a) Low income-elasticity group a . 102 .8 112 .0 119 .7 117 .5 1 1 7 . 3 1 2 3 . 9 
(6) High income-elasticity group b . 1 0 6 . 2 1 1 5 . 2 117 .4 1 2 5 . 3 1 2 3 . 0 127 .9 
II. Imports . 8 7 . 6 9 4 . 2 1 2 3 . 8 143 .9 125 .4 142 .1 
(a) Wheat . 8 6 . 4 9 9 . 8 125 .8 141 .4 128 .2 165 .7 
(b) Others . 9 0 . 4 8 2 . 3 119 .3 149 .3 119 .5 9 1 . 6 
III. Foodstuff processing . 109 .1 119 .9 129 .8 141 .4 1 4 5 . 6 1 6 4 . 5 
IV. Total of I and II . 102 .2 111 .0 119 .4 123 .4 1 2 0 . 3 1 2 7 . 5 
V. Total of I and II (a) . 1 0 2 . 6 112.1 119 .4 122 .4 1 2 0 . 3 128 .9 
VI. Total ofIf II and III . 103 .9 113 .2 122 .0 127 .9 126 .6 136 .7 
TOTAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURE . . . 103 .8 104 .7 114 .6 125.1 131 .6 133 .6 
Sources : Basic data from official Brazilian statistics and the Fundado GetúLio Vargas. 
a Cereals, tubers and pulses. 
b Meat, fruit and sugar. 
table 29. In the period 1939-53 as a whole, the supply of 
industrially processed foodstuffs (including beverages) increased 
at an annual rate of about 6 per cent, which implies an income-
elasticity coefficient of demand of 1.2. This coefficient seems 
to be higher in times of rapid development, that is, when 
urbanization.is more intensive. 
The data in table 30 constitute a projection of expenditure 
on foodstuffs based on income-elasticity coefficients of 0.6 
and 1.2 for unprocessed and processed foodstuffs, respectively, 
and on an increase in per capita consumption at an average 
annual rate of 1.6 per cent. This hypothesis corresponds 
to what may be assumed as the minimum objective of a 
programme.7 
Table 30. Brazil : projection of expenditure on foodstuffs 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Sectors of production 1949 1954 Projections for 1962 
Agriculture 5 2 . 9 63 82 
Industry 1 5 . 9 ' 22 31 
Servicesa 4 0 . 6 51 68 
Table 31. Brazil : domestic supply of consumer manufactures 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
TOTAL. . . 109 .4 
Expenditure on food-
stuffs as a percentage 
o f total consumer 
expenditure 4 4 . 1 
136 
3 8 . 2 
181 
3 7 . 2 
a Including taxes. 
(b) Manufactured consumer goods 
With the aim of providing a rough idea of the relative 
importance of manufactures in popular consumption, an 
estimate was made of the total domestic supply of these goods. 
Table 31 shows the results of this estimate in relation to 
aggregate consumption. 
These data reflect the net contribution of the manufacturing 
sector, excluding both the valué of agricultural raw materials 
and that of services, which is added to the valué of the commo-
dities during and after the manufacturing process. 
In the period 1949-54, relative stability is observed in the 
share of manufactured goods in total consumption. In 
comparison with the pre-war period, a rise—albeit relatively 














(A) (B) (C) 
1939 . . . 154 3 1 . 7 2 1 . 4 2 0 . 6 1 3 . 9 
1949 . . . 248 5 5 . 5 3 9 . 8 2 2 . 4 1 6 . 0 
1950 . . . 272 6 1 . 4 4 3 . 8 2 2 . 6 1 6 . 1 
1951 . . . 296 6 8 . 8 4 9 . 9 2 3 . 2 1 6 . 9 
1952 . . . 312 6 7 . 8 4 7 . 4 2 1 . 8 1 5 . 2 
1953 . . . 316 6 8 . 0 4 7 . 5 2 1 . 5 1 5 . 0 
1954 . . . 354 7 6 . 7 5 5 . 4 2 1 . 5 1 5 . 6 
NOTE.—The data in this table are based on an index of the domestic production 
of consumer manufactures (calculated by the Fundado Getúüo Vargas) and on 
another of the imports of these commodities (calculated by the Economic Com-
mission for I*atin America). The aggregation was made on the basis of 1949 
census data. 
insignificant—can be noted. If these data are valid, an income-
elasticity coefficient of approximately 1.2 will be obtained 
for the demand for manufactured goods as a whole. This 
coefficient remains virtually unaltered if processed foodstuffs 
are excluded from the group. 
During the period 1939-54, per capita consumption of 
manufactured goods increased at an annual rate of 3.5 per cent. 
More recently (1949-54), it rose to 4 per cent. However, 
if these rates are suitably related to the increase in income, 
a slight fall can be noticed in the elasticity coefficient. It may 
be assumed that, in periods when consumption increases more 
rapidly, the income-elasticity coefficient of demand for food-
stuffs undergoes a relative reduction, particularly if a re-
distribution of income takes place at the expense of the 
wage-earning sector. Nevertheless, although it is possible 
to observe this trend, it can be measured only with difficulty, 
owing to the unreliability of the data used. 
The task of projection in this sector comprises two stages : 
an estimate of the income-elasticity coefficients for the prin-
cipal commodities groups and an appraisal of the pattern 
of consumption during the base period slected. 
The first difficulty to be faced arises from the manner in 
which industrial statistics are classified, because the classi-
fication is linked with the natureof the production process and 
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not with the ultimate use of the article produced. Even if 
detailed figures relating to consumer expenditure on manu-
factured goods were available, it would be difficult to estabhsh 
any exact connexion between these data and statistics of 
industrial production. 
To calcúlate elasticities, estimates are required of the quantity 
of manufactured goods that reach the hands of the consumer. 
These data must refer to the gross valué of the articles at 
constant prices as purchased by the consumer and are generally 
derived from analyses of typical family budgets. Since 
adequate studies on consumer expenditure are not yet available 
in Brazil, an apraisal of the supply of manufactured consumer 
goods based on production and import data will have to 
suffice. 
The income-elasticity coefficients were calculated on the 
basis of the trends in real consumption of the principal commo-
dity groups and in income available for consumption. As 
regards some of the former, this calculation cannot yet be 
made in practice. However, the gaps may be partially filled 
with the aid of indirect information and by resorting to data 
from countries with a similar economic structure. It must 
not be forgotten that these estimates aim only at affording 
an idea of volume and that the margin of error for one 
industrial group may be offset by other errors in the opposite 
direction. 
Table 32 presents two calculations of income-elasticity 
coefficients : one refers to the trend during the period 1937-39 
to 1947-49; the other is based on the trend in 1949-54. The 
data on durable goods are less accurate and their trend more 
erratic than that of the remainder. Broadly speaking, a 
comparison of the two columns of coefficients reveáis that the 
rate of relative increase of basic consumer goods underwent 
a reduction. 
Table 32. Brazil : income-elasticity coefficients 
of demand for consumer manufactures 
Trends 
Commodity groups 1937-39 to 1947-49 1949-54 
Foodstuffs 1 . 2 1 . 0 
Textiles 0 . 9 0 . 6 
Garments 1 . 0 0 . 9 
Footwear 1 . 0 0 . 5 
Pharmaceutical products 1 . 9 1 . 9 
Paper 1 . 2 2 . 1 
Printed matter 1 . 0 1 . 4 
Tobacco and matches 2 . 0 2 . 3 
China 2 . 0 2 . 4 
Furniture 2 . 0 2 . 5 
Automobiles 2 . 5 — 
Electrical apparatus 2 . 0 3 . 7 
Other goods 2 . 0 2 . 1 
NOTE.—These coefficients express the relation between the average annual 
per capita rates of growth of consumption of the commodity in question and of 
the total income available for consumption. As an illustration, in the latter 
series, ex-post data on total consumption were used. In reality the results do not 
vary greatly, given the reduction in voluntary personal saving. 
Since the rate of growth of consumption forecast here for 
the period 1954-62 is even lower than that registered during 
the years 1937-39 to 1947-49, it was felt more suitable to use 
the elasticity coefficients for the former period in the pro-
jections. 
To estabhsh these projections, the consumption behaviour 
of manufactured goods during the base period must be 
known. It will have to be assessed on the basis of data relating 
to the valué added during the manufacturing process, so that 
the exact share of each industry in the production of the 
final goods may be ascertained. 
In the study on the dynamics of demand, it was necessary 
to group commodities according to the form in which they 
reach the hands of the final consumer, since it is his freedom 
of choice in the matter that operates as a strategic variable. 
But it so happens that this grouping does not necessarily 
correspond to the organization of production. Since demand 
must be projected in such a way that the objectives of domestic 
•production and of import replacement can be established, 
a reclassification must be attempted which will also satisfy 
the aims of an investment programme. 
In the case of domestic production, the break-down presents 
no great difficulty, since it is sufficient to compute the valué 
added by the various industries instead of the gross valué 
of production. For imports, the problem is more complex, 
since statistics refer to gross c.i.f. valúes. In order to obtain 
a preliminary break-down of these valúes, a simplified scheme 
of inter-industry relations was worked out on the basis of 
the input-output matrix of the United States economy. 
(See table 34.) 
Table 33 appraises the consumption of manufactured goods 
in 1949 and 1954, in the manner described, and presents the 
projection for 1962. These projections are based on the 
income-elasticity coefficients appearing in the first column 
of table 32, which correspond to the working hypothesis 
that an average annual rate of increase of 1.6 per cent will 
occur for per capita consumption. This table also shows the 
estimated expansión in the per capita consumption of each 
commodity group during the period in question. 
Table 33. Brazil : projection of demand for consumer 
manufactures a 









Non-durable goods 4 3 . 8 5 9 . 1 8 2 . 6 1 5 . 6 
Foodstuffs 1 5 . 8 2 1 . 3 3 0 . 0 1 6 . 5 
Textiles 1 2 . 8 1 5 . 9 2 1 . 4 1 1 . 3 
Garments 3 . 8 5 . 1 7 . 0 1 3 . 5 
Footwear 2 . 4 2 . 9 4 . 0 14 .1 
Pharmaceutical products and 
toilet articles 3 . 3 5 . 1 7 . 8 2 6 . 5 
2 . 0 3 . 2 4 . 5 1 6 . 3 
Printed matter 2 . 6 3 . 7 5 . 1 1 4 . 0 
Tobacco and matches 1 . 1 1 . 8 2 . 8 2 8 . 6 
Durable goods 6 . 4 9 . 7 15 .3 3 0 . 4 
China and table-ware 1 . 0 1 . 7 2 . 6 2 6 . 5 
Furniture 1 . 4 2 . 4 3 . 7 2 7 . 5 
Motor vehicles 1 . 6 1 . 4 2 . 3 3 5 . 9 
Electrical apparatus 1 . 0 2 . 1 3 . 3 2 9 . 9 
1 . 4 2 . 2 3 . 4 2 7 . 8 
Industrial chemical producís 3 . 3 5 . 3 8 . 4 3 1 . 1 
Unclassijied 2 . 0 2 . 6 3 . 5 1 1 . 3 
TOTAL . . . 5 5 . 5 7 6 . 7 109 .8 1 8 . 4 
Sources : Basic data from offitíal Brazilian statistics and the Funda^ao Getúlio 
Vargas. 
a The data express the valué added by industry group. 
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Foodstuffs 194 68 512 
Textiles 56 74 234 
Paper 127 62 
Printed matter 31 3 
Pharmaceutical products 12 63 
Leather 12 3 6 
Durable goods 
China and table-ware 13 7 
Furniture — 
Automobiles 213 39 
Electrical apparatus 33 31 
Others 134 45 
Industrial chemical products 301 120 169 
Unclassified 82 
Capital goods 
Iron and steel 145 106 
Other industrial metáis 4 0 38 
Machinery 494 181 
Transport equipment 243 87 
Electrical equipment 102 45 
Others 63 34 
Cement 182 15 
Glass 4 4 
W o o d 3 
Others 17 8 










348 671 419 42 447 43 54 3 672 
NOTE.—The valúes given at the foot of each column correspond to the share of the industry-group indicated above. C.i.f. valúes are shown at the end of each 
horizontal line. 
5 . INTERMEDÍATE PRODUCTS greater, owing to the possibility of substituting one type 
Intermedíate products consist mainly of raw materials of o f ra™ " ^ " f 1 f ^ another. The textile industryaffords 
agricultural or mineral origin and of semi-manufactured a good example The replacement of one type of fibre by 
goods derived from them. Some intermedíate products a n ° t h e f 18 a L l a r S e e x t e n t / P ^ c r n of the influence of 
are directly absorbed by capital goods industries, building technologica change upon demand through relative pnces. 
materials and metáis for engineering industries, for example. A s n o r t e d c a r l l e r ' t h e , f l ^ - o r t e n "y e a r P r o J e c t l o n s * suc,h c a s e s 
Consideration will be given here only to the intermedíate a r e ° f a v e rV S e n e r a l carácter and must be revised each year. 
products direedy incorporated in consumer goods, even T h e Projection of demand for industrial chemical products 
when this distinction can be made only in a very arbitrary requires a detailed knowledge of the present use of these 
manner. Industrial chemical products, for instance, are partly P r o d u c t s - I f t h e P a t t c r n o f consumption and the probable 
absorbed by consumer-goods industries and partly by capital- development of each of the activities utilizing these products 
goods industries. The same may be said of aluminium, were known, it would not be diíEcult to project their demand. 
tin and, to a lesser degree, iron and copper. In these cases, However, given the frequent changes that technical progress 
as in many others an arbitrary decisión is indispensable, c a u s e s m t h i s sec tor> 1116 projections in question would be 
owing to the limited nature of the information available. nothing more than a preliminary estímate subject to periodic 
c . i. , , - i n , > revisión. Since available data do not permit the establishment Some intermedíate products, such as textile libres, leather a- • j - i r i . • i • i i - i i 
I . , T - I J £ R I - I_ J I in surricient detail or the way in which chemical products and rubber, present no special dirriculties, since the demand •,. i , , r , c i i r íi f , c i i • i • i are at present utiuzed, the projection must be confined to ror them closely tollows that or the final products m which . i • i i , r , l r a. ' j i j r i i assuming a correlation between the growth or demand ror they are incorporated. Once the demand ror the latter i s , . J R I. J J c c I . , • r r r r i - these products and ol that recorded ror manufactured consumer projected, there isa good point or reterence ior lormulating a oods as a whole 
preliminary hypothesis of the future demand for the interme- s , r , . , . r . . . . , 
diate product. Occasionally, as in the case of pulp and paper, f h e P r ^ e c t l o n d e m a n d f o r fue ls , r l n Pnnaple 
it is more suitable to group them in a single industry for P r e s e n t s t h e s a m e difficulties as were noted for industrial 
purposes of projection. At other times the difficulties are 8 See chapter IV o f Part Two. 
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9 87 9 39 116 1 , 1 8 4 
10 21 552 
15 159 31 15 893 
915 1 , 5 0 5 
435 517 
10 828 32 85 1 , 2 0 6 
5 494 577 
326 145 2 , 3 5 3 181 434 4 , 1 1 4 
22 175 22 1 ,531 87 262 2 , 4 2 9 
9 101 37 649 73 1 , 0 1 6 
11 117 23 11 364 623 
3 108 313 
1 . 3 0 39 
7 10 
1 59 85 
1 , 2 5 7 435 1 ,793 803 2 , 3 5 3 1 ,531 982 1 , 3 5 5 108 3 0 7 59 1 , 9 7 0 1 ,680 5 , 3 4 2 9 , 0 2 1 1 8 , 8 1 8 
a Calculated on the basis of the input-output matrix of the United States economy. 
b Rate of exchange: 1 dollar — 24.8 cruzeiros. 
chemical products. Nevertheless, the data are more abundant, 
and the projection of demand could be made directly, avoiding 
the necessity of a general hypothesis such as that postulated 
on the behaviour of demand for chemical products. 
6 . PROJECTION OF AGGREGATE DEMAND 
FOR FINAL PRODUCTS 
Table 35 presents all the data relating to the demand for 
final products. In, addition to unprocessed foodstuffs, the 
"primary sector" includes textile fibres, leather, rubber and 
mineral fuels. In this preliminary estimate, it is assumed that 
the demand for fibres will grow with the textile industry, 
that of leather with the boot and shoe industry, and that of 
rubber with the number of motor vehicles. Mineral fuels, 
as well as the increase in motor vehicles, are the object of a 
special study appearing in Part Two.9 The group " Others " 
includes unspecified raw materials. It is assumed that demand 
for them will keep pace with the average growth of demand 
for the other raw materials. 
In the " secondary sector " are to be found the data already 
shown in the preceding section. The " tertiary sector " 
comprises services as a whole—whether rendered directly 
9 See chapter III of Part Two. 
Table 35. Brazil : projection of total consumer expenditure 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Annual per capita 
Consumption in rate of growth 
Projection 
Commodity groups 1939 1954 for 1962 a 1949-54 1954-62 
Primary sector 6 6 . 3 82 .1 • 114 .0 2 . 0 1 . 7 
Unprocessed foodstuffs 5 2 . 9 6 3 . 0 8 2 . 0 1 . 2 0 . 9 
Textile fibres 3 . 4 5 . 1 6 . 9 5 . 8 1 . 4 
0 . 4 0 . 5 0 . 7 2 . 0 1 . 8 
Rubber 0 . 4 0 . 6 1 . 0 5 . 8 4 . 0 
Mineral fuels 3 . 0 5 . 3 1 2 . 8 9 . 5 9 . 0 
Others 6 . 2 7 . 6 10 .6 • 1 . 7 1 . 8 
Secondary sector 5 5 . 5 7 6 . 7 1 0 9 . 8 4 . 2 2 . 1 
Non-durable goods . . 4 3 . 9 5 9 . 1 8 2 . 6 3 . 6 1 . 8 
Durable goods 6 . 3 9 . 7 1 5 . 3 6 . 4 3 . 4 
Chemical products . . 3 . 3 5 . 3 8 . 4 7 . 3 3 . 5 
Unclassified 2 . 0 2 , 6 -3.5 2 . 9 1 . 4 
Tertiary sector 126 .2 196 .1 2 6 3 . 1 6 . 6 1 . 3 
Total consumption expen-
diture 2 4 8 . 0 3 5 4 . 9 4 8 6 . 9 4 . 9 1 . 6 
a The projection for 1962 is made on the basis of the income-elasticity coeffi-
cients appearing in the first column of table 32, on the assumption that income 
available for consumption will grow at an annual rate of 1.6 per cent per capita 
and that the growth rate of the population will be 2.4 per cent per annum. 
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to consumers or rendered to enterprises—including those 
of governmental origin. No great validity can be attached to 
the large increase in the share of this sector registered between 
1949 and 1954, given the unreliability of the over-all data. 
The projection of the probable pattern of consumption 
—that is, the forecast of the principal changes in its structure 
—is the corner-stone of a programme. This is apparent when 
it is borne in mind that the central objective of programming 
is to guide productive activity, so that it may satisfy, directly 
or indirecdy, a given pattern of consumption known to 
correspond organically with the rate of growth accepted 
as the target of a development policy. 
Chapter IV 
I N T E G R A T I O N O F F O R E I G N T R A D E W I T H T H E P R O D U C T A N D E X P E N D I T U R E 
1. T H E SUBSTITUTION PROBLEM 
The previous chapter attempted to show how an objective 
forecast could be made of the principal changes caused in 
the pattern of demand for final products by a given rate of 
economic growth. Once these changes are known, the basic 
task of formulating a programme may begín, involving 
a detailed appraisal of the productive mechanism. Only 
then can the changes to be introduced into the various sectors 
of production be determined, so that such modifications may 
meet a demand whose broad outlines are known in advance. 
The analysis of demand therefore precedes that of supply. 
If the future pattern of demand is unknown, it is impossible 
to give a systematic orientation to the sectors whose pro-
duction contributes to supply. However, it is in this second 
stage of the work that a programme begins to take shape. 
Programming cannot stricdy so be termed unless guiding 
principies exist in the different sectors of production. These 
are the criteria upon which fiscal, trade and credit policies 
and—when necessary—direct state action can be based. 
The present chapter includes only the more general aspects 
of formulating a programme. The projections in chapter II 
have provided an idea of the levels which expenditure, outlay 
on consumption and investment will probably reach under 
the hypothesis of growth postulated in the minimum pro-
gramme. In order to pursue the analysis, the following 
question must be answered : what proportion of total demand 
will be directly satisfied by domestic production and what 
proportion indirecdy met from imports ? As soon as this 
problem is elucidated, the time will be ripe to study how best 
the productive mechanism may be adapted to the pattern of 
demand. 
By definition, imports are the least rigid element in supply. 
Whereas domestic production is more or less governed by 
the structure of the productive mechanism, the capacity 
to import can be utilized with great flexibility.1 Because 
this is so, when development is accompanied by an equally 
intensive increase in the capacity to import, adjustments 
between demand and supply are made with much greater 
ease. In this case, whenever demand for a certain product 
outstrips the forecasts of domestic producers, availabilities 
are supplemented by imports. This is one of the reasons 
why stagnation in the capacity to import strongly inhibits 
development, at least in its preliminary stages. 
As noted in chapter I, the period 1939-53 was characterized 
by a substantial rise in the capacity to import. Calculated 
at 1952 prices, imports represented 13.4 per cent of expenditure 
in 1939 and 14 per cent during the period 1947-53. If the 
years 1951-52, when the volume of imports was abnormally 
large, are eliminated from the period 1947-53, the average 
1 The limitations that bilateralism imposes on this flexibility will receive 
due consideration in section 4 of this chapter. 
stands at 13.3 per cent, a figure practically identical with 
that of 1939. The intensive development of BraziTs economy 
during the post-war period was therefore favoured by a 
parallel increase in the capacity to import. 
Even when the capacity to import grows proportionately 
with expenditure, the composition of imports must undergo 
persistent variation. Moreover, the faster the rate of develop-
ment, the more rapid are the changes in the pattern of demand. 
These changes appear magnified in the import sector, the 
focal point for all commodities which are permanent or 
occasionally in short supply. On the other hand, there are 
factors peculiar to under-developed countries which help to 
increase the pressure on the import sector. 
Knowledge of the market, production experience accumul-
ated in a particular branch, the desire to control subsidiary 
sectors and other similar elements are recognized to be of 
fundamental practical importance for the entrepreneur. 
For this reason, he is always inclined to expand his activities 
in the branch he knows. To enter a sector traditionally 
dominated by imports is to incur new risks.2 
The unwillingness of entrepreneurs to enter other sectors 
than their own, particularly those in which the market is 
traditionally supplied by importers, causes an even greater 
pressure on imports and creates new difficulties for develop-
ment. The fear exists among domestic entrepreneurs that 
their productivity is inferior to that of a foreign competitor, 
or that the latter, at one stage or another, may artificially 
reduce his prices in order to recapture the market. The 
domestic entrepreneur knows that he must compete with 
financially powerful groups, with highly efficient foreign 
manufacturers or with those enjoying optimum market 
conditions, ready access to raw materials, and low external 
costs. These reasons, and others peculiar to each specific 
case, often cause the entrepreneur in an under-developed 
country to concéntrate his resources in sectors where he is 
already active and to abstain from chanñelling resources to 
those branches where an actual or potential danger of foreign 
competition exists. It may thus lead to over-investment 
in the sectors controlled by domestic entrepreneurs and 
henee to a growth of the demand for imported commodities 
which would have been less intensive had investment been 
distributed among all branches of production in accordance 
with a single criterion for the prospective increase in demand.3 
After a period of over-investment in the domestic sector, 
the pressure on imports tends to increase until it becomes 
2 An abrupt suspensión of imports, such as took place during the war, 
or a relatively substantial rise in the price of imported products—as during 
a crisis or after a monetary devaluation—obviously provides new stimuli 
which nullify or offset the disadvantages in question. 
3 These phenomena of over-investment appear to be inseparably linked 
with inflation. It should be emphasized that such disequilibria accompany 
development partly because of specific elements in under-developed 
economies. 
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intolerable. By extending the incubation period of disequi-
librium, the liquidation of foreign exchange reserves, the 
contracting of trade debts and the opening of credit lines all 
tend to aggravate the imbalance. The solution has almost 
always been sought in devaluation in one form or another, 
accompanied by a reduction in the real valué of investors' 
net resources4 and in the demand for imported consumer 
goods. During the readjustment phase which follows, 
there is always the risk that part of the productive capacity 
of those sectors which experienced over-investment will be 
under-utilized. 
The foregoing observations demónstrate that, at the present 
stage of development of BraziTs economy, external disequi-
libria and the under-employment of fixed capital can be 
avoided only if a decided stimulus is given to investment 
in order to replace imports. Such stimulus finds long-range 
instruments in an over-all analysis and system of projections 
of economic activity. Without the co-ordinating influence 
of a programme, balance-of-payments disequilibria will 
almost inevitably accompany development in its initial stages, 
subjecting it to periodic readjustments that do not allow 
a high rate of growth to be maintained. 
The substitution problem has aroused much theoretical 
discussion and on repeated occasions has been unsatisfactorily 
presented. It is usually said that, by guiding investments 
in a given direction, resources are being transferred from one 
sector to another and that imports will decline in the first 
sector but will rise in the second. This approach overlooks 
the fact that some proportion of investment is often mis-
directed and that each unit of investment may have a different 
substitution intensity according to the sector where it is 
applied. Thus, one unit of capital invested in the wheat 
crop may represent the incorporation of land previously 
unused; in the paper industry it may cause forest resources 
to be exploited which were formerly unproductive from the 
economic point of view, etc. In such cases, one unit of invest-
ment replaces more than the valué represented by the remu-
neration of the capital and labour employed. The same 
is true of the textile industry when it utilizes fibres whose 
domestic production does not absorb factors with an alternative 
use. Following the argument one stage further, consideration 
should also be given to the problem of the elasticity of the 
labour supply. This elasticity—a characteristic of under-
developed economies—increases the intensity of substitution 
in certain industries. For this reason, the textile industry, 
4 Since a substantial share of investment can be effected only by means 
of industrial equipment imports, devaluation reduces the volume o f 
investment and also causes less pressure on the balance of payments in this 
sector. 
where the labour-absorption capacity is notoriously high, 
has become an economic proposition in almost all under-
developed countries. Thus, it may be accepted as an easily 
verified principie that the greater the absorption of factors 
without alternative use (natural resources and labour) per 
unit of capital invested in a productive activity, the higher 
will be the substitution intensity of that activity. 
Given this premise, it may be assumed that suitable guidance 
of investment can help to reduce the pressure which economic 
development exerts upon the balance of payments. 
2 . AGGREGATE FOREIGN TRADE PROJECTIONS 
Since imports constitute the most flexible sector of supply, 
it is obvious that a relative contraction in the capacity to import 
will enhance the difficulties of spontaneous adjustments 
between the structure of total supply and the changing 
pattern of demand. The waste of resources tends to be greater. 
For this reason it would be difficult—even in the presence 
of stimuli to raise the rate of investment—to avoid a fall 
in the average productivity of capital during the transition 
from one stage of development, which is accompanied by 
an expansión of the capacity to import, to another, which 
is characterized by a relative stagnation of this capacity. 
This is in fact the present situation of the Brazilian economy. 
It would be advisable first to consider the prospects of the 
capacity to import. The hypothesis formulated in chapter II, 
namely the assumption of a return to the 1952 terms of 
trade, will continué to be used. This return virtually carne to 
an end with the fall in the price of coffee registered between 
the last quarter of 1954 and the first few months of 1955. 
A hypothesis of the quantum of exports, the principal deter-
minant of the capacity to import, must thus be formulated. 
The first observation to be made with respect to Brazilian 
exports is their decline in world trade. At no time since 1949 
have exports reached their 1938 volume. On the other hand, 
in 1948 the quantum of world exports was already higher 
dian in 1938 and has since continued to rise steadily. These 
data are of particular significance, since they demónstrate 
that, in a period of substantial expansión in international 
trade, Brazil could not retain its previous markets. As com-
petition is much keener during periods of decline or stagnation 
in world trade, it is easily understandable that a recovery 
of the position lost in recent years will not be easy for Brazil. 
Nevertheless, the relative fall in the quantum of its exports 
does not imply that BraziTs share in the valué of world trade 
has decreased. The fairly substantial rise in the average 
prices of exports fully offset the loss in quantum. Thus, 
in any one of the years between 1948 and 1953, the share 
of Brazil was higher than in 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 . (See table 3 6 . ) 
Table 36. Brazil : share of the valué of exports in the world total 
(Billions o f dollars) 
1937-38 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
(A) World trade 2 2 . 2 52 .8 5 3 . 7 5 5 . 4 7 5 . 4 7 2 . 5 7 3 . 4 
(B) Brazilian exports 0 . 3 2 0 1 .173 1 .089 1 .347 1 .757 1 . 4 0 9 1 . 5 3 9 
(B) as a percentage o f (A) . 1 . 4 4 2 . 2 2 2 . 0 3 2 . 4 3 2 . 3 3 1 . 9 4 2 . 1 0 
Source : United Nations, Direction of International Trade. 
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It is interesting to note that in 1948, when the quantum 
of world trade returned to its pre-war level, the Brazilian 
share rose significantly. This increase reflected a relative 
increment both in quantum and in prices. During the 
following years, relative prices rose substantially, but this 
movement was practically nullified by the fall in quantum, 
for, having reached a peak in 1950, the Brazilian share in world 
trade was lower in 1952-53 than it had been in 1948. If the 
phenomenon is viewed from this angle, it can be seen that the 
rise in coffee prices merely helped Brazil to maintain its share 
in the total valué of world exports. From another standpoint, 
the phenomenon is more complex, for the rise in coffee 
prices was partly a reflection of the decline or anticipated 
decline in the exportable quantum. But the decline in the 
quantum of the other Brazilian exports was even greater. 
Between 1948 and 1953, coffee exports declined by only 
11 per cent, while the total of all other exports fell by 60 per 
It is easy to see diat if Brazil had succeeded in maintaining 
its share in the quantum of world trade, even given a decline 
in the volume of coffee exports, the increase in the capacity 
to import would have been very substantial. If the quantum 
of all exports had remained at the 1948 level until 1953, with 
a reduction corresponding to the decline in the volume of 
coffee exports, the aggregate valué of exports in the period 
1948-53 would have reached $10,105 million. On the other 
hand, if the quantum of exports—excluding coffee—had 
increased with the quantum of world exports, total Brazilian 
sales abroad would have risen to $11,299 million during the 
same period. Since the valué of exports in fact stood at 
$8,314 million it is clear that there was a loss of $1,791 million 
under the terms of the first hypothesis, and of $2,985 million 
Table 38. Brazil : estimate of the loss in foreign exchange 
resulting from the reduction in the export quantum 
(Millions o f dollars) 
Valué oj exports Valué of imports Exports Y'm (f.o.b.) (c.i.f.) (Hypothesis A) (Hypothesis B) 
1948 1 ,173 1 ,134 1 ,173 1 ,173 
1949 1 ,089 1 , U 6 1 , 3 2 9 1 ,383 
1950 1 ,347 1 ,098 1 ,577 1 ,727 
1951 1 ,757 2 ,011 2 , 1 0 5 2 , 4 6 9 
1952 1 ,409 2 , 0 1 0 1 ,966 2 , 2 6 8 
1953 1 ,539 1 , 3 2 0 1 ,955 2 , 2 7 9 
TOTAL.. . 8 ,314 8 , 6 8 9 10 ,105 11 ,299 
Hypothesis A : Maintenance of the quantum of exports (except coffee) at the 
1948 level. Current prices. 
Hypothesis B : Increase in the quantum of exports (except coffee) parallel 
with world exports. Current prices. 
cent. Thus, if the phenomenon is analysed with a dynamic 
criterion—that is, with due regard to the growth of world 
trade—it becomes apparent that Brazil lost5 more through 
the reduction in the quantum of exports than was gained 
from the improvement in the terms of trade. Table 37 shows 
Brazilian exports, at current dollar valúes, from 1948 onwards, 
and the hypothetical valué of these exports had the Brazilian 
share in world trade remained at the 1948 level, that is, at the 
the level attained before the rise in coffee prices. It can 
be seen that, for the five-year period 1949-53 as a whole, 
the total valué of exports is greater in the hypothetical case 
than in real terms. 
5 More explicitly, lost in terms o f the capacity to import. From the 
point of view o f generating income, the problem may assume a different 
form, since the factors not utilized in export production may have been 
absorbed in production for the domestic market. 
1953 Total 
1 ,539 8 , 3 1 4 
1 ,629 8 , 5 0 8 
90 194 
under those of the second. The relative decline in the quantum 
—excluding coffee—represented a loss for Brazil of $1,194 
million during this ñve-year period. (See table 38.) 
In a period of expanding world trade, the mere maintenance 
of the 1948 quantum of exports—always excluding coffee— 
would have been sufficient to cover the déficit of nearly 
$1.2 billion in the balance of payments on current account 
during the period 1949-53. If this quantum had grown 
with that of world trade, the gain would have been 
nearly $3 billion, thus exceeding the profit of approximately 
$2.5 billion obtained by Brazü during the same period through 
higher coffee prices. 
The recovery of the export quantum is undoubtedly one of 
the most important objectives to be established in a develop-
ment programme for Brazil. The increase in the capacity 
to import during the post-war period was caused exclusively 
by the improved terms of trade, since the quantum of exports 
decreased steadily throughout this period. Between 1946— 
the peak year for exports during the last decade—and 1954, 
a 31.3 per cent reduction in the quantum of exports and a 158 
per cent improvement in the terms of trade were apparent. 
The assumption that the terms of trade will be re-established 
at the 1952 level implies a loss of rather more than half this 
improvement. In the meanwhile, what can be forecast for 
the quantum of exports, the reduction of which to a large 
extent reflected the exchange pohcy pursued until the end 
of 1953 ? The answer is that part, if not all, of the ground 
lost will be recovered. There is no reason for Brazilian exports 
to decline when world trade is expanding, unless the appli-
cation of domestic measures is the cause. 
The quantum of Brazilian exports declined in 1952 to its 
lowest point, which almost equalled the nadir reached during 
Table 37. Brazil : valué of exports 
(Millions o f dollars) 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
(A) Actual exports 1 ,173 1 , 0 8 9 1 ,347 1 ,757 1 ,409 
(B) Hypothetical exports * 1 ,173 1 ,192 1 , 2 3 0 1 ,674 1 , 6 1 0 
Difference between (B) and 
(A) — 103 —117 — 83 201 
a Assuming a constant share of 2.22 per cent (observed in 1948) in the current valué of world trade. 
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the war. In 1953, there was a recovery of 18.5 per cent in 
relation to the preceding year, while in 1954, despite the serious 
drop in coffee exports, the quantum was still 11 per cent 
above that of 1952. It may therefore be said that a tendency 
towards recovery exists as a consequence of exchange reform. 
In reality, if 1954 coffee exports had reached the 1953 level, 
the aggregate quantum for that year would have increased 
by 26 per cent above that of 1952. On the basis of these data, 
it may be assumed that BraziTs quantum of exports will 
tend to recover the 1951 level spontaneously, as long as there 
is no fundamental modification of exchange policy. This 
level—33.8 per cent above that of 1952—was the peak for 
the last five years. It is reasonable to assume that the process 
of recovery will take at least three years, as from 1955. 
Given this hypodiesis of the probable future growth of the 
quantum of exports, the minimum objective of a programme 
should now be indicated. The recovery of the peak registered 
by BraziTs quantum of exports in the period 1939-54 will 
be set as the target. This level was reached in 1946 and is 
21.7 per cent above that of 1951, which was referred to earlier 
as the limit of spontaneous recovery. This should not be 
considered an exceptionally ambitious target, since it barely 
exceeds the 1939 level. However, it represents an increase 
of 45.8 per cent in relation to 1954. Provided that spontaneous 
recovery can continué at the same rate after 1957, the target 
of the programme will be reached in 1960.6 Thus, the pro-
gramme's objective would consist purely and simply in extend-
ing the period of recovery from three to six years. In this 
way there would be an annual average rate of growth of 
6.5 per cent until 1957 in the case of the spontaneous recovery, 
and until 1960 in that of the programme. In both it will 
be assumed that, once the phase is concluded, the quantum 
of exports will grow at 2 per cent per annum.7 
Table 39. Brazil : initial hypothesis : production for export. 
and for the domestic market 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Exports 
Production for as a percentage 
Year Gross product Exports a domestic market of the product 
1950 3 2 4 . 1 4 3 . 9 2 8 0 . 2 1 3 . 5 
1951 3 4 6 . 5 5 1 . 6 2 9 4 . 9 1 4 . 9 
1952 3 6 0 . 9 3 8 - 4 3 2 2 . 5 1 0 . 6 
1953 3 7 6 . 1 4 6 . 8 3 2 9 . 3 1 2 . 4 
1954 . . , , 4 0 9 . 2 4 2 . 0 3 6 7 . 2 1 0 . 3 
1955 418 .1 4 4 . 7 3 7 3 . 4 10 .7 
1956 4 2 8 . 0 4 7 . 6 3 8 0 . 4 11 .1 
1957 4 4 8 . 2 5 0 . 7 3 9 7 . 5 1 1 . 3 
1958 4 6 9 . 6 5 1 . 7 4 1 7 . 9 11.0 
1959 4 9 1 . 9 5 2 . 7 4 3 9 . 2 1 0 . 7 
1960 5 1 4 . 8 5 3 . 8 4 6 1 . 0 1 0 . 5 
1961 5 3 8 . 2 5 4 . 9 4 8 3 . 3 1 0 . 2 
1962 5 6 4 . 7 5 6 . 0 5 0 8 . 7 9 . 9 
a Including the effect of fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
Tables 39 and 40 present two hypotheses of the growth 
of exports, comparing them with the projections of the 
6 Even if world trade remained stationary during this period and the 
above-mentioned target were reached, Brazil would not regain its 1948 
share in the quantum of world exports. 
7 T w o per cent is the historical rate of growth registered during the 
period 1901-50 for the quantum of Brazil's exports. 
product given in chapter II for the initial hypothesis and the 
minimum programme. In either event, the share of exports 
in total production will remain preactically stable at the 
1952-54 level. In other words, the relative decline in export 
production between 1939 and 1952 will have come to an end, 
and a period of parallel expansión in production for the domes-
tic and foreign markets will have ensued. 
Table 40. Brazil : hypothesis of a minimum programme : 
production for export and for the domestic market 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 





as a percentage 
of the product 
1950 . . . . 324 .1 4 3 . 9 2 8 0 . 2 1 3 . 5 
1951 . . . . . . . . 3 4 6 . 5 5 1 . 6 294 .9 1 4 . 9 
1952 . . . . 3 6 0 . 9 3 8 . 4 3 2 2 . 5 1 0 . 6 
1953 . . . . 3 7 6 . 1 4 6 . 8 3 2 9 . 3 1 2 . 4 
1954 . . . . 4 0 9 . 2 4 2 . 0 3 6 7 . 2 10 .3 
1955 . . . . . . . . 4 1 8 . 2 4 4 . 7 3 7 3 . 5 10 .7 
1956 . . . . . . . . 4 2 8 . 0 4 7 . 6 3 8 0 . 4 11 .1 
1957 . . . . 4 5 0 . 3 5 0 . 7 3 9 9 . 6 1 1 . 2 
1958 . . . . . . . . 4 7 5 . 8 5 4 . 0 4 2 1 . 8 1 1 . 3 
1959 . . . . 5 0 2 . 8 5 7 . 5 4 4 5 . 3 1 1 . 4 
1960 . . . . 5 3 0 . 9 6 1 . 2 4 6 9 . 7 1 1 . 5 
1961 . . . . . . . . 5 6 0 . 0 6 2 . 4 4 9 7 . 6 11 .1 
1962 . . . . . . . . 5 9 2 . 8 6 3 . 6 5 2 9 . 2 10 .7 
a Including the effect of fluctuations in the terms of trade. 
Given a hypothesis of the growth of the capacity to import 
—resulting from the quantum of exports, the index of the 
terms of trade and the net outflow of resources—it is possible 
to calcúlate the probable volume of imports. This estimate 
appears in tables 41 and 42. The first of these tables presents 
the initial hypothesis and the second the minimum programme. 
In both cases, the process of substituting domestic production 
for imports must be continued. The share of imports in total 
expenditure, which rose to 14 per cent in 1947-53, will have 
to be reduced to 10 per cent in the minimum programme 
hypothesis. Imports will have to be about 30 per cent less 
than if their share in expenditure could be maintained. It is, 
Table 41. Brazil : initial hypothesis : share of domestic 
production and of imports in available goods and services 













1950 . . . 3 2 3 . 3 2 8 0 . 2 4 3 . 1 1 3 . 3 
1951 . . . 3 5 6 . 2 2 9 4 . 9 6 1 . 3 1 7 . 2 
1952 . . . . . . . . 3 7 7 . 5 3 2 2 . 5 5 5 . 0 1 4 . 6 
1953 . . . . . . 374 .1 3 2 9 . 3 4 4 . 8 1 2 . 0 
1954 4 1 3 . 9 3 6 7 . 2 4 6 . 7 11 .3 
1955 . . . . . . 411 .6 3 7 3 . 4 3 8 . 2 9 . 3 
1956 . . . 4 2 2 . 4 3 8 0 . 4 4 2 . 0 9 . 9 
1957 . . . 4 4 2 . 7 3 9 7 . 5 4 5 . 2 1 0 . 2 
1958 . . . 4 6 4 . 2 4 1 7 . 9 4 6 . 3 1 0 . 0 
1959 . . . . . . . 4 8 4 . 6 4 3 9 . 2 4 5 . 4 9 . 4 
1960 . . . 5 0 6 . 0 4 6 1 . 0 4 5 . 0 8 . 9 
1961 . . . . . . . 533 .1 4 8 3 . 3 4 9 . 8 9 . 3 
1962 5 6 0 . 8 5 0 8 . 7 5 2 . 1 9 . 3 
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therefore, a question of substituting domestic production for 
imports on a relatively large scale, but this will be difficult 
to achieve in the period envisaged without a definite policy 
for the encouragement and guidance of domestic producers. 
Table 42. Brazil : hypothesis of a minimum programme : 
share of domestic production and of imports in available 
goods and services 













1950 . . . 3 2 3 . 3 2 8 0 . 2 4 3 . 1 1 3 . 3 
1951 . . . . . . . 3 5 6 . 2 2 9 4 . 9 6 1 . 3 1 7 . 2 
1952 , . . 3 7 7 . 5 3 2 2 . 5 5 5 . 0 1 4 . 6 
1953 . . . . . . . 374 .1 3 2 9 . 3 4 4 . 8 1 2 . 0 
1954 . . . 4 1 3 . 9 3 6 7 . 2 4 6 . 7 12 .7 
1955 . . . . . . 4 1 1 . 7 3 7 3 . 5 3 8 . 2 1 0 . 2 
1956 . . . . . . 4 2 2 . 2 3 8 0 . 4 4 1 . 8 9 . 9 
1957 . . . . . . 444 .3 3 9 9 . 6 4 4 . 7 10 .1 
1958 . . . . . . 4 6 9 . 9 4 2 1 . 8 4 8 . 1 1 0 . 2 
1959 . . . . . . 4 9 5 . 0 4 4 5 . 3 4 9 . 7 1 0 . 0 
1960 . . . . . . 5 2 1 . 6 4 6 9 . 7 5 1 . 9 9 . 9 
1961 . . . . . . 5 5 4 . 3 4 9 7 . 6 5 6 . 7 1 0 . 2 
1962 5 8 8 . 2 5 2 9 . 2 5 9 . 0 1 0 . 0 
This estimate of the total volume of substitution is based on 
the probably unrealistic hypothesis that the dynamics of 
demand for imported goods are identical with those of aggre-
gate demand. From a sample of the principal goods imported, 
it can be seen that the demand for them grows more than 
proportionately to an increase in aggregate expenditure. 
Assuming that the disparity between the two rates of growth 
ranges from 1 to 1.5, the substitution process would have to 
cover 52 per cent of the imports with a potential demand. 
These data bring to hght the far-reaching changes imposed 
by development on the structure of the productive mechanism, 
given a relative stagnation in the capacity to import. 
3 . LIMITING FACTORS OF A QUALITATIVE 
AND PHYSICAL NATURE 
The probable future level of the quantum of imports having 
been defined, attention should now be directed to their 
composition. What changes will be necessary in the compo-
sition of imports to ensure that a relative shortage of foreign 
exchange creates the minimum difficulties for development ? 
As noted in the previous section, there is every indication that 
in the near future the rate of increase in the capacity to import 
will not keep pace with the growth of expenditure. Under 
such conditions, it is obvious that development can take 
place only if some imported goods are replaced by similar 
commodities produced domestically. 
However, substitution camiot be effected with equal intensity 
in all sectors. Limiting factors of different kinds create 
difficulties for the profcess in some sectors and indirectly 
encourage it in others. Strictly speaking, these factors are 
of a physical, qualitative and economic nature. 
The physical factors will be examined first. Climatic 
conditions and a lack of adequate natural resources can be 
serious obstacles to the development of certain lines of pro-
duction. This is true of coffee and cacao in the United States 
and Europe, of manganese in the United States, of cotton 
in Japan, and of innumerable other examples. From this 
point of view, Brazil, with its extensive territory and variety 
of climates, is an exceptionally well-endowed country. 
It is not always easy to isolate a limiting factor of a physical 
nature from others of a strictly economic character, since 
technology is constandy changing the facts of the case. Illus-
trative examples are provided by beet sugar, synthetic rubber, 
synthetic gasoline, the utilization of low-grade ores and 
synthetic nitrogenous fertilizers. Notwithstanding this persist-
ent expansión of natura] resources through technological 
progress, a substitution pohcy must begin by identifying 
those goods whose domestic production at one time or 
another encounters obstacles of a physical nature. In Brazil, 
sulphur is a case in point, although the possibility of its repla-
cement by carbón pyrites has given the economic aspect of 
the problem precedence over the physical. Tin, lead and 
copper, whose proven deposits are of a relatively low grade, 
are in an almost identical situation. 
Physical and economic factors play an equal part in the 
problem of petroleum. If petroleum production were absolu-
tely sure to increase as a result of higher investment in this 
sector, the problem would be purely economic, and would 
consist in obtaining the required financial resources and 
technical knowledge. But such an increase, although liighly 
probable, is hypothetical, and there is thus a limiting factor 
of a physical nature which must be taken into account. This 
conclusión applies only to the valué of crude petroleum in 
the port of embarkation, since refming and transport meet 
merely with limitations of an economic nature.8 
The second group of factors to be considered are those which 
have been termed " quahtative There exist certain products 
that can be replaced only with difficulty, owing to their 
intrinsic quality. Works of art and science are an extreme 
instance. Imports of technical journals and books, or fellow-
ships in foreign universities and research institutes, are the 
easiest means of gaining access to the knowledge being accu-
mulated in countries in the vanguard of scientific research. 
The samemay be said of certain forms of art regularly imported 
as services. The cinema provides an outstanding example. 
Although the development of the domestic film industry 
can progressively reduce the number of imported films in 
national cinema programmes, the term " substitution" 
lacks meaning in this context, since a work of art—if such 
it can justly be called—cannot really be replaced. The limits 
of this group are therefore to a certain point arbitrary. Specific 
beverages, ornaments, china-ware and other objects whose 
trademark is an integral part of the quality must also be 
considered. The problem is not so much one of " substitution " 
as of the criterion to be followed by the authorities. In such 
cases, it may be assumed that the solutions to be adopted 
in the future will not differ gready from those which have 
prevailed in the past. 
Once the limiting factors of a physical or quahtative order 
have been hsted and the total of essential or desirable imports 
evaluated, some idea can be obtained of the volume of substi-
8 If current expectations as regards the recently-discovered reserves 
in the Amazon area are confirmed, the petroleum problem will become 
strictly economic in nature. 
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tution to be carried out in accordance with a strictly economic 
criterion. At this stage, the problem takes the following 
form : what would be most useful for the Brazilian economy 
at present—the replacement of imports of pharmaceutical 
products or of paper; of mechanical or of chemical products ? 
But, before this problem is broached directly in chapter V, 
another general question must be discussed—that of the división 
of the world market. 
4 . PECULIARITIES OF BILATERAL TRADE 
The break-down of international trade into mónetary 
compartments increases the complexity of the substitution 
problem. However, in the particular case of Brazil, this 
división has less importance than is commonly attributed to it. 
Because most of BraziTs foreign trade is carried on with 
industrialized countries, a high degree of substitution exists 
among the different markets supplying the country. Since 
exports are largely paid for in dollars, payment for imports 
from outside the dollar area which must be purchased with 
dollars should not, strictly speaking, present serious problems. 
Another large share of exports is paid for in the currencies 
of Western European countries—France, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the Benelux States—which 
supply the manufactured and semi-manufactured goods 
forming the bulk of Brazilian imports. 
Separate consideration should, however, be given to the 
problem of trade with neighbouring countries—in particular, 
Argentina. In contrast with other trade flows, the exports of 
neighbouring countries to Brazil are in the form of primary pro-
ducts. Thus, there is an exchange of primary products which 
is realized on a stricty bilateral basis. In such circumstances, 
the substitution problem assumes a completely different 
aspect. For example, the replacement of a manufactured 
commodity or any imported article from the United States 
leaves room for another commodity which it would be 
relatively advantageous to import. This does not occur, 
however, in the case of imports from Argentina, because 
the number of Argentine products which can be exported 
to Brazil is Umited. In reducing its purchases of Argentine 
wheat, Brazil is not leaving room for other types of imports; 
more probably it is restricting the total volume °of trade 
between these two countries. 
Since this trade is balanced on a bilateral basis and is limited 
to a small number of products, a reduction in imports of any 
commodity, by either party will tend to have a negative 
effect on the total volume of trade. The decrease would not 
have such importance for the country concerned if it were auto-
matically offset by increased trade in another direction. How-
ever, there are cases in which a reduction of bilateral trade 
almost inevitably causes the aggregate trade of one or both of 
the participating countries to contract. The main point is 
to know the size of the market that each of the two countries 
represents for the products of the other. If it be assumed 
that Argentina can absorb Brazilian products to a valué of 
$100 million and that Brazil can purchase $120 million worth 
of Argentine goods, the minimum trade level would have 
to be estabhshed at $100 million on both sides. Given this 
level, the question arises as to whether or not it would be in 
BraziTs interest to raise its imports to $120 million. In view 
of current conditions in Latin America, the additional $20 mil-
lion would have to be covered with foreign exchange, 
probably dollars, and in this way the substitution problem 
would again appear in its normal terms. If it were easier 
to replace $20 million wordi of Argentine products than goods 
for a similar valué paid in convertible currency,9 it is clear 
that it would be unsuitable to raise imports to $120 million. 
Since imports from Argentina are in the form of agricultural 
products, their replacement broadly speaking, requires smaller 
investment. Wheat production, so long as it does not imply 
the use of land previously employed for export production, 
demands a lower capital investment per unit of production 
than that of manufactured articles from the United States, 
imports of which would have to be reduced as an alternative 
to replacement. 
The terms of the problem would change if Argentina's 
capacity to absorb Brazilian products expanded beyond 
$120 million. Two hypotheses would have to be considered. 
First, larger exports—an increase in exports of lumber and 
other primary products, for example—would raise productivity 
in Brazil. By increasing their sales abroad, Brazilian producers 
in these sectors would reduce their unit costs. The same 
applies to certain manufactured goods; manufacturers of 
railway wagons, for instance, can reduce average costs by 
raising the scale of production. Wheat imports from Argentina 
would have to grow to offset greater exports to that country, 
and, if the losses experienced by Brazilian farmers or producers 
of other commodities were greater than the export sector's 
gains, the increment in trade would obviously be to BraziTs 
disadvantage. But in such cases it may be affirmed almost 
a priori that the more advantageous course is to increase exports, 
since, especially in an under-developed economy, the export 
sector is by definition that with the highest economic pro-
ductivity. 
Under the second hypothesis, greater exports to Argentina 
would not raise the productivity of the sectors making 
additional sales. This may be the case of a Brazilian commo-
dity the supply of which is occasionally inelastic or which 
has alternative markets, for example, coffee between 1949 
and 1953, and the products of manufacturing industries that are 
working at full capacity for the domestic market. If steel 
were currently exported to Argentina, for instance, Brazil 
would be obliged to increase its own steel imports by an 
equal tonnage. If such higher Brazilian steel imports had to 
be based on reductions in other imports of manufactured 
goods, a decrease in the total availability of manufactures 
(production for the domestic market plus imports) and an 
increase in the supply of primary products would take place, 
a situation which is not always desirable. Problems of this 
nature frequently arise in bilateral trade, particularly where 
neighbouring countries are concerned. In fact, because they 
are neighbours, the possibilities of complementary trade 
should be studied with great care, since therein often lies the 
key to the solution of the basic problems of regional develop-
ment. 
9 This problem would assume a different aspect if the possibility of 
combining two bilateral trade channels were considered. If, instead of 
liquidating the balance iri convertible currency, Brazil were to pay in the 
currency of another country that wished to increase its purchases of Bra-
zilian goods, there would be an increase in aggregate trade. 
Chapter V 
UTILIZATION OF THE CAPACITY TO IMPORT 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
The estimate of the total volume of substitution given in 
the preceding chapter constitutes only an indication of the 
demand likely to be imposed by development on the economic 
system in that sector. With due regard to the general remarks 
embodied in the last two sections of chapter IV, an attempt 
will now be made to investígate the lines along which the 
effort towards import replacement should be directed within 
each sector of production. To this end, substitution trends 
in the recent past will be examined and a study made of the 
country's potentialities in terms of the expansión of the 
domestic market and of the relatively deficient capacity for 
external payment. 
For the purposes of this analysis, imports may conveniently 
be broken down into the following catagories: (a) foodstuffs; 
(b) manufactured and semi-manufactured consumer goods; 
(c) fuels and lubricants; and (d) capital goods. 
Four main points are included within the general scope 
of the analysis, namely, the probable volume of import 
replacement in each sector, past substitution trends, the 
substitutive potentiality of each sector and the objectives to 
be attained. 
To set up objectives for import replacement is to define 
by implication the targets at which domestic production must 
aim. Both the critical examination of these targets and the 
precise nature of the means whereby the system may be led 
to attain them are fundamental aspects of the work of pro-
gramming. 
The following is a brief outline of the method adopted 
in analysing the problem of import replacement. The level 
and composition of expenditure, as well as the volume of 
imports, are deduced from previous analyses. Imports bound 
up with rigidly bilateral systems are estimated in terms of 
the probable volume of such trade. Those that are difficult 
to replace, like petroleum, are calculated on the basis of the 
probable development of domestic production; other imports 
of consumer goods are in general assessed on the assumption 
that an intensive substitution pohcy will be pursued. Finally, 
the capacity to import capital goods is estimated residually, 
by taking the difference between imports of consumer goods 
and the capacity to import. 
2 . FOODSTUFFS 
If the supply of foodstuffs is measured by the valué paid 
to domestic producers and by the c.i.f. valué of imports— 
that is, if the proportion corresponding to services and taxes 
is excluded from the amount spent by the population on food-
stuffs—imports are seen to have represented 8.4 per cent 
of the supply over the period 1 9 4 7 - 5 4 . If it is assumed that, 
within the minimum programme outlined, the demand for 
foodstuffs will expand by 30 per cent between 1954 and 1962, 
were imports to maintain their share of 8.4 per cent, they 
would have to rise in valué from their 1954 level of 8.3 bil-
lion cruzeiros to 10.1 billions (at 1952 prices). Such imports 
would therefore increase by 22 per cent. The growth envi-
saged for aggregate imports being 26 per cent, the inference 
is that in the given hypothesis imports of foodstuffs would 
absorb a smaller quota of foreign exchange, leaving more 
avaüable for other imports. 
The foregoing paragraph assumed that an average of 8.4 per 
cent would be representative of the share of imported foodstuffs 
during the period 1 9 4 7 - 5 4 . The objection might be raised, 
however, that this average is depressed by the abnormally 
low imports during 1 9 4 7 - 4 9 , a factor emphasized in table 4 3 
below. 
Table 43. Brazil : share of imports in the total supply of foodstuffs 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1939 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Total supply 3 8 . 6 6 1 . 5 6 4 . 1 6 8 . 8 7 3 . 1 7 6 . 6 7 7 . 0 8 7 . 9 9 0 . 2 
Imports 4 . 8 4 . 6 4 . 9 4 . 9 6 . 6 7 . 6 7 . 0 7 . 9 8 . 3 
Percentage of imports 1 2 . 4 7 . 5 6 . 4 7 . 2 9 . 0 9 . 9 9 . 1 9 . 0 9 . 2 
Source: Basic data from official Brazilian statistics. 
If the years 1947-49 are excluded, the share of imports 
reaches 9.2 per cent. The adoption of this last percentage 
gives an import valué for 1962 equivalent to 11 billion 
cruzeiros, which would represent an increase of 33 per cent 
above the 1953 figure. In this event, imports of foodstuffs 
would expand more than total imports. 
It is appropriate here to comment on the quantitative 
restrictions imposed on specific imports of foodstuffs during 
the period under review, and it is important to define how 
far these were real restrictions or how far they merely cancelled 
out the effects of the heavy exchange subsidy granted to 
such imports. The data for 1954 are very enlightening in this 
connexion, as in that year imports were unaffected by any 
quantitative restrictions and were still subsidized, at least 
in the case of wheat, by means of an exceptionally low rate 
of exchange. Yet despite the abolition of quantitative controls, 
22 
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imports of foodstuffs increased by only 4.5 per cent between 
1953 and 1954. It may well be that if wheat had not enjoyed 
such a high exchange subsidy, imports of foodstuffs in 1954 
might actually have been lower than in the previous year. 
At all events, it is interesting to note the difference between 
the increment of only 4.5 per cent in imports of foodstuffs 
and the increase of 23 per cent in total imports. 
It is also a fact that the income-elasticity of the demand for 
imported foodstuffs, which in some cases are of better quality 
and in others satisfy mainly urban consumption, is considerably 
higher than that of the average demand for all foodstuffs. 
The expansión of food imports might therefore be logically 
expected to be more intensive than that of their demand; 
yet experience belies this conclusión. 
An analysis of the data on food consumption in Brazil 
reveáis a long-term trend towards the replacement of imported 
items by the domestic production of similar commodities. 
This phenomenon is perhaps linked with the fact that, however 
high the income-elasticity of demand for imported foodstuffs, 
as a general rule it is still higher for imports of manufactures. 
This being the case, from the moment when internal factors 
began to stimulate a more intensive growth of the economy 
than of its capacity to import, prices of imported commodities 
tended to rise in relation to those of domestically produced 
goods, the replacement of the former by the latter being thus 
accelerated in sectors where competition already existed, 
Table 44. Brazil : composition of the valué of imports of foodstuffs 
(At current prices) 
1937-39 1947-49 1950-52 1953 1954 
Wheat and wheat flour 7 0 . 0 6 4 . 5 5 8 . 5 6 8 . 1 5 4 . 3 
Fruit 8 : 8 11 .4 13 .3 1 3 . 0 1 0 . 5 
Olive oil : 4 . 4 2 . 6 3 . 9 2 . 1 6 . 8 
Dried cod 5 . 6 5 . 4 • 9 . 9 5 . 7 1 0 . 7 
Beverages 4 . 2 4 . 5 3 . 1 1 . 5 2 . 0 
Others 7 . 0 1 1 . 6 11 .3 9 . 6 1 5 . 6 
. TOTAL . . . 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
(a) FRUIT 
The considerable increase in fruit imports since the war 
is linked with the fall in their relative prices, brought about 
by BraziTs exchange policy and by the sharp devaluation of 
the Argentine currency as from 1948. Between this latter 
year and 1951 these two factors operated in conjunction and 
the volume of fruit imports doubled. An opposite trend 
set in, however, from 1952 onward and was accentuated by 
exchange reform in 1953. 
Table 45. Brazil : comparison of imported fruit with domestic supplies 
(1937-39 = 100) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Imported fruit 233 192 238 288 387 336 296 234 
Pineapples 78 83 92 110 110 111 122 130 
Oranges 101 108 113 113 120 124 125 128 
Bananas 202 210 230 261 265 298 297 320 
Total for the three kinds of home-
grown fruit 135 142 153 166 170 173 179 190 
as was true of foodstuffs. This accounts for the drop in the 
share of imports in total foodstuffs supplies from 20 per cent 
in 1925 to little more than 12 per cent in 1939, and then to 
an average of 8 per cent in the post-war years. There are 
thus grounds for assuming that such a trend will persist, 
and that by 1962 the share of imports in the supply of foodstuffs 
will have decreased to less than 8 per cent. If it is further 
assumed that such imports will remain at the level attained 
in 1954, diis figure would fall to 6.9 per cent. 
To conclude : in view of the predicted increase in demand 
and the substitution trends prevailing in the sector, a preli-
minary objective for imports of foodstuffs might be their 
maintenance at the 1954 level. A pre-requisite for the ful-
fdment of this aim will be a permanent change in the compo-
sition of imports, since not all imported commodities are 
equally susceptible to replacement. 
Once a general target has been set up, a detailed study 
of the principal imported foodstuffs must be undertaken, 
to include, firstly, the probable future behaviour of demand 
and, secondly, the real possibilities of meeting the demand 
from BraziTs domestic production. 
A preliminary analysis of the demand for the main groups 
of foodstuffs will next be presented. So important is the 
problem of wheat that it will be accorded fuller treatment 
in a special study to be published separately. Table 44 has 
been prepared to show the composition of imported foodstuffs. 
As regards the relative prices of domestic and imported 
fruit, the situation created by exchange reform seems to suggest 
that during the next few years the volume of imports will 
be perceptibly lower than during the period 1951-53. 
Some idea of the relative evolution of the domestic and foreign 
fruit supplies during the post-war years may be obtained 
from table 45. 
An examination of the population's expenditure on imported 
fruit shows that between 1953 and 1954 it fell from 665 
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to 549 million cruzeiros,1 thus declining from 14 to 11 per cent 
of total expenditure on foodstuffs. However small the 
reduction, it seems to indicate a price-elastidty higher than 
unity. It may thus be assumed that the course to be taken 
by fruit imports in the future will depend far more ón relative 
prices than on real income in Brazil. Again, as these relative 
prices will be closely bound up with the development of bila-
teral trade between Brazil and Argentina, it may be concluded 
that, from the standpoint of the balance of payments as a whole, 
little interest attaches to a projection of the domestic demand 
for imported fruit. However, it may be said as a guiding 
principie that the relative prices prevailing in 1954 are approxi-
mately representative of the structure of relative costs in these 
two countries at the present level of trade. Thus, future 
demand will tend to develop along the lines laid down by 
the increase in the income of consumers and by income 
elasticity. 
A calculation of this elasticity gives a coefficient of nearly 0.9, 
on which assumption, the increment in the demand for import-
ed fruit between 1954 and 1962 would be approximately 
35 per cent. 1 0 
(b) Beverages 
In 1947 and 1951, which were peak years for free trade, 
imports of beverages considerably increased. This, however, 
was the group most affected by the new exchange system. 
Placed as they were in the last category, there was a sharp 
rise in beverage prices, which brought imports down to a low 
level in 1954.2 (See table 46.) This situation must necessarily 
encourage domestic production of both distilled beverages and 
table wines. Clearly, the probable volume of future beverage 
imports will depend far more on relative prices than on any 
other factor. Because per capita imports in 1954 were less 
than half those in 1937-39, despite the substantial increase 
in income, it can hardly be assumed—given the less favourable 
outlook for the payments capacity—that the trend towards 
substitution is likely to be reversed. The hypothesis of a 
continuation of the 1954 level for imports may therefore 
be considered as genuine. 
C;i.f. prices, excluding services and taxes within the country. 
2 The reduced imports in 1953 reflect the consequences of the quanti-
tative restrictions which were intensified at that time. Between this year 
and 1954 an inelastic supply situation, attributable to import difficulties, 
gave way to one of elasticity in the supply. In some cases the incidence 
of this circumstance sufficed to lower the prices paid by the final consumer,. 
despite the sharp rise in import prices. . . 
Table 46. Brazil : some groups of imported foodstuffs 
(1937-39 - 100) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Beverages 266 197 83 97 210 117 68 11 
Olive oil 38 95 45 236 192 101 122 . 346 -
Dried cod 83 107 121 145 231 279 128 217 
(c) Cod and olivé oil 
Imports of olive oil and dried cod, unlike those of beverages, 
increased in 1954. The rise in prices was not high enough 
to offset the abolition of the quantitative controls previously 
in forcé. Even so,, imports of cod were substantially lower 
than in 1951-52, when they had been comparatively free 
from restrictions and prices had been much lower. If it is 
assumed that the relative price level in 1954 reflected the 
existing cost structure in Brazil and the countries exporting 
cod, the growth of the demand can be estimated on the basis 
of income-elasticity, following exactly the same method as 
for fruit. In this case, the income-elasticity coefficient fluc-
tuates around 0.8, based on the trend for the period 1937-39 
to 1954. The aggregate expansión achieved in the period 
1954-62 would thus amount to 33 per cent. 
Imports of olive oil, which were subject to quantitative 
restrictions for a long period, increased substantially in 1954. 
But the raising of the exchange rate for the highest categories 
in 1955 will certainly have repercussions upon imports. 
If this should not occur, careful consideration must be given 
to the problem of creating other incentives for domestic 
production, a practice which has already begun in some 
parts of the country. The growth of per capita income cannot 
alone account for the large volume of imports in 1954, which 
was three times higher than the average for 1937-39. The 
explanation is rather to be found in the price, which was 
relatively low in comparison with the pre-war level. Never-
theless, a considerable reduction in imports may be expected 
to result from the higher prices already in evidence during 1955. 
For want of better grounds on which to base an opinion, 
it is assumed that, between 1953 and 1962, imports of these 
products will increase commensurátely with the aggregate 
supply of foreign exchange, that is, by about 32 per cent, 
thus representing decidedly smaller imports than in 1954. 
(d) Wheat 
According to the special study to be pubhshed separately, 
wheat consumption in 1962 will probably stand at about 3 
million tons. More than half this demand should be met from 
domestic production. Imports are expected to come entirely 
from Argentina and Uruguay and will mainly depend on the 
volume and relative prices of Brazil's exports to these two 
countries. It may be assumed that Brazil will import from 1.2 
to 1.6 million tons, according to circumstances, 1.3 millions 
at 1952 prices being adopted as a working hypothesis. 
(e) Total imports of foodstuffs 
Imports of foodstuffs have been projected in accordance 
with the hypotheses formulated in the preceding sections. 
(See table 47.) 
The projections in table 47 are based on the following 
assumptions : 
(1) Wheat production would have to expand sufficiently 
to satisfy approximately 50 per cent of consumption, estimated 
at about 3 million tons, and seed; 
(2) There would be no basic modifications in the relative 
prices of imported fruit and cod; in other words, the prices 
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Table 47. Brazil : projection of imports of foodstuffs 
(Millions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Groups of products 1952 1953 1954 1962 
Wheat and wheat flour 2 , 7 4 4 . 5 3 , 7 0 5 . 1 3 , 5 0 3 . 0 3 , 2 1 2 
Fruit 5 8 5 . 0 4 2 1 . 2 4 0 3 . 7 545 
Beverages 130 .0 7 5 . 4 8 5 . 8 86 
Dried cod 5 3 8 . 6 2 4 7 . 8 420 .1 559 
Olive oil 1 0 7 . 7 1 3 0 . 3 3 6 9 . 4 166 
Others 692 .1 9 7 5 . 9 1 , 1 4 2 . 0 1 ,085 
TOTAL . . . 4 , 7 9 7 . 9 5 , 5 5 5 . 7 5 , 9 3 4 . 0 5 , 6 5 3 
reached in 1954 under the new exchange system would be 
approximately representative of the cost structure in Brazil 
and in the exporting countries; this being so, it may be assumed 
that the demand for these commodities would expand on the 
basis of income-elasticity and the increase in consumer income; 
(3) Imports of beverages and olive oil would remain 
at levels corresponding to foreign exchange availabilities; 
for beverages, this level would be equal to that of 1954, 
and for olive oil, 33 per cent higher than in 1953, these being 
arbitrary valúes which might be modified as a result of consi-
derations relating to bilateral trade; 
(4) The demand for other foodstuffs would follow the 
same lines as the average trend in the above groups. 
If the above-mentioned objectives were attained, the 
quantum of all imports in 1962 would be only 2 per cent 
higher than in 1953 and nearly 5 per cent lower than in 1954. 
Consequently, there are real possibilities of liberating some 
capacity to import, for the benefit of other sectors where 
demand is growing more rapidly. 
3 . MANUFACTURED CONSUMER GOODS 
Manufactured consumer goods will initially be considered 
as a whole, excluding processed foodstuffs and fuel, but 
including industrial chemicals. In a preliminary estimate 
of the share of imports in total consumption of manufactured 
goods, production and imports were computed on the cost 
of the factors 
(See table 48.) 
employed in the manufacturing process.3 
Table 48. Brazil : share of imports in the supply 
of consumer manufactures 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Year 
Domestic 




1939 1 7 . 2 4 . 2 2 1 . 4 20 
1949 3 3 . 1 6 . 1 3 9 . 8 17 
1950 3 6 . 8 7 . 0 4 3 . 8 16 
1951 3 8 . 2 1 1 . 7 4 9 . 9 23 
1952 3 9 . 4 8 . 0 4 7 . 4 17 
1953 4 2 . 1 5 . 4 4 7 . 5 11 
1954 4 7 . 6 8 . 0 5 5 . 4 14 
NOTE.—See table 31 o! chapter III . 
3 Chapter III explains the advisability o f calculating consumption on 
the lines indicated in the text. 
Despite the substantial increase in the capacity to import 
which characterized the period under review, it may be seen 
that import replacement was necessary on a large scale both 
in 1939-49 and during the more recent five-year period. While 
the aggregate supply in this sector grew at an annual rate 
of 6.4 per cent, imports expanded at only 4.7 per cent during 
1939^49. Over the recent five-year period, these rates stood 
at 6.8 and 3.7 per cent respectively. The ratio between 
these rates provides what may be called the substitution coeffi-
cient. During the period 1939-49, this coefficient had stood 
at 1.4 and rose to 1.8 in 1949-54. It is interesting to note 
that during the period when development was more rapid, 
import replacement also proceeded more swiftly in the 
manufactured consumer goods sector. 
According to the projections presented in chapter III, the 
demand for manufactured consumer goods, in the form 
defined here, would in the minimum programme rise at an 
annual rate of 4.7 per cent; this means that the pace of expansión 
would be slower than in either the 1949-54 or the 1939-49 
period. In view of this decline in the process of growth, 
the substitution coefficient may be expected to decrease. 
If this coefficient returns to its 1939-49 valué of 1.4, imports 
in this sector will increase by 3.3 per cent annually, on the 
assumption of a rate of growth of 4.7 per cent for the demand 
for manufactured consumer goods. The total increment 
over the whole period 1954-62 should therefore amount 
to roughly 30 per cent. 
The foregoing conclusión clearly indicates that the effort 
towards import replacement must be intensified in this sector, 
since, if all the conditions described were fulfdled, imports 
of manufactured consumer goods would grow more rapidly 
than the capacity to import. The attempt to reverse this 
trend would have to be one of the principal objectives of 
a programme, as there are ampie possibilities of expanding 
the consumer goods industry in Brazil. 
Some consideration should now be given to the hypothesis 
whereby the substitution coefficient recorded for the most 
recent five-year period is maintained. As this coefficient 
was 1.8, the inference is that imports must grow at a rate 
of 2.6 per cent over the period 1954-62. The total increase 
over these eight years will amount to 22.8 per cent, which 
is not much lower than the predicted expansión of 26.3 per 
cent in the capacity to import. 
An accelerated process of import replacement is not a very 
difficult objective in this sector, but the problem should 
perhaps be examined from another angle. Over the period 
1939-49, domestic production of manufactured consumer 
goods expanded at an annual rate of 6.7 per cent, and in the 
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most recent quinquennium this rate rose to 7.6 per cent. 
Clearly, this growth was accompanied by rapid over-
all development and a pronounced increase in the 
capacity to import. However, these data emphasize that 
if suitable incentives were provided, domestic production might 
reach rates of growth sufficiently high for an acceleration of 
the substitution process. Thus, if it were to expand between 
1954 and 1962 at the rate of 6.7 per cent recorded for the 
decade 1939-49, at the end of this period domestic production 
would be equivalent to total demand, or, in other words, 
import replacement would have attained 100 per cent. 
Even though it be taken into account that the total repla-
cement of imports, in a sector so wide as that under conside-
ration, is neither practicable ñor desirable, the real possibility 
of intensifying the substitution of domestically produced 
for imported manufactured consumer goods cannot be 
disregarded. If the rate of growth of production is taken 
to be 5.3 per cent—or 30 per cent lower than that recorded 
for the whole of the period 1939—54—by 1962 imports of 
manufactured consumer goods should have risen no higher 
than their 1954 level. This would hardly be an ambitious 
objective and could well be established as a target within 
the minimum programme. 
Once this central objective has been defined, the various 
industry groups must be studied to determine the best way of 
distributing the load of import replacement. 
(a) Non-durable goods 4 
Contrary to what might be supposed at first sight, the non-
durable consumer goods sector proved less suitable for import 
replacement that that of durable goods. While imports 
of the latter declined by 42 per cent,5 between 1949 and 1954, 
those of non-durable goods rose by 33.7 per cent. This 
increase caused imports to remain at approximately 9.5 per 
cent of the total supply of manufactured consumer goods. 
Nevertheless, the stability of the proportion represented 
by imports conceals radical changes in their composition. 
(See table 49.) 
4 Under this head are included textiles, footwear, processed and semi-
processed hides and skins, pharmaceutical and toilet articles, paper and 
printed matter. 
5 If motor vehicles are excluded, these imports were reduced by 27 
per cent. 
Table 49. Brazil : imports and domestic supply of non-durable consumer goods in 1949 and 1954 
1949 1954 
Imports Imports Percentage 
Composition as a percentage Composition as percentage in imports 
of of total of of total change between 
imports domestic supply imports domestic supply 1949 and 1954 
Textiles 4 1 . 2 
Leather goods 2 . 6 
Pharmaceutical and toilet articles . . 2 7 . 4 
Paper 2 5 . 7 
Printed matter 3 . 1 
TOTAL . . . 1 0 0 . 0 
7 . 0 1 6 . 3 3 . 0 4 6 . 6 
2 . 4 2 . 4 2 . 4 2 0 . 9 
1 7 . 9 3 4 . 5 1 9 . 7 6 9 . 8 
2 8 . 0 4 2 . 3 3 8 . 8 1 2 2 . 0 
2 . 2 4 . 5 3 . 6 1 0 4 . 0 
9 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 9 . 5 3 3 . 7 
Source: Basic data from official Brazilian statistics. 
The only group in which imports decreased during the 
period under review was that of textiles. The reduction was 
not, however, great enough to offset the marked increase 
in the other groups. Imports of pharmaceutical products 
and paper, which had accounted for a litde more than half 
the total, carne to represent more than 75 per cent. More 
striking still was the enlargement of the share of imports 
in the domestic supply of these two groups. 
It is obvious from these preliminary remarks that if the 
general target indicated in the foregoing section is to be 
attained, current trends in the pharmaceutical products and 
paper sectors must be modified. 
With respect to pharmaceutical products, the advent of 
antibiotics has brought about a basic technological revolution. 
Suffice it to recall that the volume of antibiotic imports was 
almost fourteen times as great in 1954 as in 1949. For other 
pharmaceutical products the pattern was entirely different, 
since imports decreased by almost 20 per cent during the same 
period. 
It may therefore be assumed that import replacement in this 
sector is proceeding satisfactorily, and that the basic problem 
concerns oxdy antibiotics. Brazil began to produce them very 
recently, but on a considerable scale. The capacity of two 
penicillin factories which entered production at the cióse of 
1954 is sufficient to meet the needs of the domestic market 
in future years; imports of penicillin will therefore drop sharply 
from 1955 onwards. The same cannot yet be said, however, 
of other antibiotics, although specific undertakings are planned 
to produce them. 
A thorough study of the steps taken so far will be required. 
Once research has been devoted to the technological features 
of this branch of industry—optimum size of factories, relations 
with kindred industries, etc.—it will be possible to ascertain 
whether the total replacement of imports can or cannot 
be expected in this sector. 
Even now, however, the reduction of imports of antibiotics 
to half their 1954 volume 6 and the maintenance of imports 
of other pharmaceutical products at that year's level may 
be regarded as a reasonable target. If the latter continué 
6 This implies that, even though imports o f penicillin may be entirely 
replaced by domestic production, other antibiotics will still be imported 
in increasing quantities during the period under consideration. 
5 
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being replaced, they will presumably leave room for the new 
products that the pharmaceutical industry is always putting 
on the market; in these circumstances, imports of pharmaceu-
tical products will be 28 per cent less in 1962 than in 1954. 
The pulp and paper problem must now be considered. 
This is a typical case of the systematic discouragement of 
domestic production as a result of exchange policy. The 
reform carried out at the end of 1953, while it completely 
altered the situation with respect to pulp, merely aggravated 
it for newsprint. 
It is acknowledged that the possibilities of producing pulp 
and newsprint in Brazil, as far as the availability of raw materials 
is concerned, are considerable.7 Market conditions are also 
eminently favourable to the development of this industry. 
Yet production in this sector was far from maintaining its 
share in the domestic supply. There can be no doubt that 
this is one of the sectors in which an import replacement 
policy cannot fail to yield immediate results. Given the 
experience already accumulated by Brazilian producers, 
as well as the abundance and accessibility of domestic sources 
of raw materials, it may be confidently asserted that the 
consistent provision of incentives will result in very substantial 
progress.8 Programmes whose preparation is already well 
on the way to completion justify the assumption that the 
present output of newsprint, which barely exceeds 40,000 tons, 
will be doubled or even trebled. Thus, provided that the requi-
site conditions are created for this industry to become a sound 
economic proposition in Brazil, an output of about 100,000 
tons will be available in 1962. This is one of the objectives 
that a programme should define with the utmost precisión, 
for there can hardly be a sector in which the possibilities for 
import replacement are more certain or more advantageous, 
the point being to mobilize potential domestic resources, 
which for the moment have no other prospects of being 
utilized. If it is taken into account that, even within the 
exceptionally moderate hypothesis adopted here, newsprint 
consumption must rise to nearly 225,000 tons in 1962, it may 
be deduced that die target for the expansión of domestic 
production already indicated would barely maintain imports 
at a level cióse to that of1954. It is therefore a modest objective. 
If an investment plan for Brazil were studied more thoroughly, 
it would perhaps seem advisable to raise the target in question 
to 150,000 or even to 200,000 tons.- The objective of 100,000 
tons will be postulated as a minimum to be considered for 
a development programme. 
The problem of pulp for the manufacture of paper is, from 
one point of view, more serious, because its relative importance 
is greater and, from another standpoint less complicated, 
since exchange reform made this industry highly remunerative. 
At present, several projects for the expansión of domestic 
production are under way. Here again the definition of precise 
objectives is indispensable, since, if the steps taken are ina-
7 See the report on Possibilities for the Development of the Pulp and Paper 
Industry in Latín America, (E /CN.12 /294 /Rev .2 ) , United Nations publi-
cation, Sales No. : 1953. II. G.2, and also Pulp and Paper Prospects in Latin 
America, (E /CN.12 /361 .Rev . l ) United Nations publication, Sales No. : 
1955.II.G.4. 
8 The stimulus required is practicaily confined to the newsprint sector, 
where imports are heavily subsidized through the exchange system. At 
the cióse of 1954 certain compensatory measures were adopted with the 
limited aim o f avoiding a falling-off in production. But still more 
positive steps must be taken to provide an incentive for investment in 
this sector. 
dequate, incentives of another sort will have to be created. 
As a preliminary hypothesis, it may be assumed that the 
production of pulp for paper will grow at a rate similar to 
that already suggested for the production of newsprint.9 
Since the consumption of pulp for the manufacture of grades 
of paper other than newsprint will amount to approximately 
250,000 tons in 1962,10 it may be inferred that 75,000 tons 
would have to be imported in that year. In 1954, imports 
had stood at 160,000 tons, though probably not more than 
120,000 were actually consumed. In the closing months 
of the year, considerable stocks were accumulated, as confirmed 
by the reduction of imports in the early months of 1955. 
Should the two hypotheses just formulated become a concrete 
reality, imports in the paper sector would be approximately 
40 per cent less in 1962 than in 1954. 
A rapid glance must now be given at other non-durable 
consumer goods. Imports of printed matter should be encou-
raged, at least as far as scientific and technical publications 
are concerned. It will therefore be assumed that in this sector 
imports will grow as rapidly as domestic demand. 
It is well known that imports of textiles and leather goods 
mainly consist of high quality arricies, demand for them being 
to some extent bound up with the prestige of certain trade-
marks. However, the process of import replacement may be 
expected to continué in the textile sector, though perhaps 
at a slower pace. 
As a preliminary approximation, it may be assumed that 
imports will remain at their 1954 level in these two sectors. 
(See table 50.) 
Table 50. Brazil : projection of imports 
of non-durable consumer manufactures 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1949 1954 1952 
0 . 9 1 0 . 5 3 0 . 5 3 
Leather goods 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 7 
Pharmaceutical and toilet articles . . . 0 . 6 0 1 . 1 0 0 . 7 9 
0 . 5 7 1 .29 0 . 7 7 
Printed matter 0 . 0 7 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 3 
TOTAL . . . 2 . 2 1 3 . 0 9 2 . 2 9 
Source: Basic data from official statistics. 
(b) Durable goods 
The sharp reduction in imports of durable consumer goods 
already mentioned demonstrates the high price-elasticity 
of the demand. One of the negative aspects of the exchange 
policy followed until 1953 was that it effected an artificial 
reduction in the relative price of imported durable goods. 
The rigid control imposed on imports of these commodities 
gave rise to excessive profits for holders of import licences, 
9 The output o f pulp, which was approximately 55,000 tons in 1954, 
would have to be increased to 175,000. The four most important projects 
for expanding capacity in this sector, some of them well on the way to 
full implementation, represent the addition of 120,000 tons, of which 
20,000 would be pulp for rayón. 
1 0 On the basis o f the projections presented in chapter III, it is assumed 
that consumption will increase by 40.6 per cent between 1954 and 1962. 
For a paper/pulp ratio o f 1 to 0.65, the total consumption of the latter 
—excluding newsprint and rayón—will be nearly 250,000 tons. 
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and this, in turn, exerted continuous pressure on the authorities 
exercising such control. With the introduction of the new 
exchange system, prices of durable consumer goods, which 
were generally included in the highest category and were 
imported from the countries whose currencies were most 
in demand, became from five to ten times higher. To grasp 
the effect of this price increase, it is sufficient to compare the 
quantum of imports in the only two years of the recent period 
when such import barriers were almost completely removed— 
namely, 1951 and 1954. During the latter year, imports 
of durable consumer goods represented only one-quarter 
of their 1951 volume. The reduction was still more marked 
in the case of passenger cars. 
A comparison between imports of durable consumer goods 
in 1954 and in 1947-53 reveáis that the former represented 
only 45 per cent of the average, and stood at a lower level than 
in any other year except 1953. This shows that price incre-
ments have constituted a much more effective curb on imports 
than direct control. 
Available data on domestic production of durable consumer 
goods are too unreliable to be used as a basis for analysis. 
Nevertheless, ít is clear that import substitution was intensive 
in this sector. Although imports declined by 42 per cent 
between 1949 and 1954, total domestic supplies seem to have 
increased by about 60 per cent. If passenger cars are excluded, 
the increment seems to have been still greater. The develop-
ment of the China and porcelain and electrical appliance 
industries proceeded at a really exceptional rate, which, by 
lowering prices, permitted a considerable expansión of the 
domestic market. 
The new exchange pohcy placed the process of substituting 
domestically próduced for imported durable consumer goods 
in a relatively favourable position. It may be taken for 
granted that die considerable degree of substitution which 
had been fostered by direct controls was intensified under 
the new regime. In view of the margin of protection afforded 
by the exchange rate and the high income-elasticity of demand, 
few branches of production present such favourable prospects 
as the durable consumer goods industry. 
Within this group, the motor vehicle industry requires 
separate treatment. All the others have already been installed 
in Brazil and it may be presumed that existing problems will 
be solved in the course of their normal development. Some 
of these industries are benefiting from higher yields arising 
from an increase in the scale of production. The high degree 
of profitability caused by these favourable circumstances 
should provide resources for future growth. This is not true 
of the motor vehicle industry. Development to date has 
been limited to the assembly process or the manufacture of 
simple parts which wear out rapidly. Owing to the concen-
tration of resources and techniques required for the manufacture 
of basic parts, the domestic entrepreneur finds access to this 
industry difficult. But the possibility exists that some inter-
national groups, which have already placed heavy investments 
in Brazil, might also become interested in the manufacture 
of complete vehicles. 
The current market problem takes the following form. 
BraziTs motor vehicle park numbers 350,000 units (excluding 
lorries and buses). The mere maintenance of such a level 
requires an annual supply of 35,000 vehicles. On the assump-
tion of a modest rate of increase for income and an income-
elasticity coefficient of 2 (which is undoubtedly very low), 
the inference is that motor vehicle stocks should expand by 
20,000 units by 1955 and by 29,000 units in 1962. By adding 
the necessary units for replacement, respective totals of 
55,000 and 80,000 units are reached. This figure indicates 
the magnitude of the potential demand for motor vehicles 
in the future. Obviously, for the potential demand to become 
real, prices must not exceed certain limits, since the price-
elasticity of demand for motor vehicles is high. 
In 1951, imports of motor vehicles totalled about 50,000 
units, though the number of import licences actually granted 
during that year was considerably higher. Again, imports 
in 1954 were limited to about 7,500 units. Given the increase 
in income and population, it may be assumed grosso modo 
that demand declined from 10 to 1. Yet the average increment 
in real prices actually paid by the consumer did not exceed 5. 
The price-elasticity may therefore be roughly estimated at 
about -2, or, in other words, when prices are doubled, demand 
is reduced by 50 per cent. 
On the assumption that the average price paid by the con-
sumer for a new motor vehicle in 1954 was 400,000 cruzeiros, 
the conclusión may be drawn that for demand to rise from 
7,500 to 50,000 units the price will have to fall to 133,000 
cruzeiros. Thus, either motor vehicles must be manufactured 
in the country so that they can be sold to the consumer at 
an average price not much higher than 150,000 cruzeiros, 
or demand for them will not attain the levels previously 
deduced from income-elasticity. The second inference is 
that if the price indicated is too low, in view of manufacturing 
conditions, it is clear that the number of cars available in 
Brazil is too high for the real level and distribution of income. 
In other words, some of the available motor vehicles would 
not have been bought if the exchange subsidy had not placed 
them within the reach of persons with relatively low incomes. 
If the supply of new cars continúes to depend exclusively 
on imports, and if the average price per imported vehicle 
remains at the 1954 level, by 1962 imports will have to reach 
about 12,000 units, according to the hypothesis of income 
growth implicit in the so-called minimum programme. 
These data have been adopted as a basis for the projection. 
It will be assumed that imports of the remaining durable 
goods, which are being replaced at a rapid rate, will remain 
stationary at the 1954 level. (See table 51.) 
Table 51. Brazil : projection of imports 
of durable consumer goods 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1949 1954 1962 
Automobiles 0 . 8 0 0 . 2 9 0 . 4 3 
Other goods 1 . 4 0 1 . 0 2 1 . 0 2 
TOTAL . . . 2 . 2 0 1 . 2 1 1 . 4 5 
Source: Basic data from offiáal Brazilian statistics. 
(c) Industrial chemicals 
Industrial chemicals are producer goods—that is, they are 
incorporated into other goods during the production process. 
Nevertheless, since the main products, such as alkalis, fertilizers 
and dyes, are used mainly in consumer goods, they will be 
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grouped with the latter. It has already been seen that the 
data available are insufficient to permit a detailed appraisal 
of the demand. Only a few brief comments can be made on 
the substitution possibilities in this sector. 
Alkalis, fertilizers, insecticides and dyes accounted for 
about two-thirds of the imports of industrial chemicals in 
1954; such imports were, however, exceptionally heavy in 
that year because of the desire to increase stocks, which had 
previously been maintained at a low level by the import 
licence system. Imports of alkalis—that is, caustic soda and 
sodium carbonate—reached a level of 205,000 tons, against 
107,000 in 1953 and an average of 120,000 over the period 
1949-53. Imports of dyes rose by 53 per cent between 1949 
and 1954, and those of fertilizers and insecticides by 70 per cent. 
Demand for fertilizers is basically dependent on the pro-
fitability of agricultural activities. The sharp rise in agri-
cultural prices during recent years caused a considerable 
expansión of the demand for fertilizers, imports of which 
trebled between 1949 and 1951. The trend was reversed as 
from 1954, when prices of fertilizers rose and agricultural 
prices underwent a relative decline, although this drop 
became marked only from 1955 onward. This ís the reason 
why imports in this sector were 42 per cent less in 1954 than 
in 1951. Two factors should be taken into account as regards 
future years. First, the downward movement in the relative 
prices of farm products which began in 1955 will prob-
ably remain unaltered. Secondly, domestic production of 
fertilizers is bound to expand considerably, since it is expect-
ed that, in addition to other plans, by 1956 a plant for the 
manufacture of nitrogenous products, associated with the 
Cubatao petroleum refinery,11 will enter production. It can 
therefore be assumed that domestic production will meet an 
increasing share of the requirements in this sector. How-
ever, since it is impossible to evalúate the probable extent of 
substitution, the same level of imports as in 1954 will be 
postulated for 1962. 
Demand for alkalis depends on the growth of a group of 
industries such as those producing paper, rayón, textiles, 
glass, etc. The rapid expansión of these industries, some of 
which have been installed or diversified in recent years, 
caused a sharp increase in the demand for alkalis, which rose 
by about 60 per cent between 1948 and 1953-54.12 A compa-
rison of this increment with that of production of manufactured 
consumer goods gives a ratio of 1 to 1.33. In the extreme 
hypothesis that the same rate of expansión of industrial pro-
duction as in the last six years, and that the same ratio of 
1 to 1.33 will be maintained, the demand for alkalis will increase 
by about 90 per cent between 1954 and 1962. If consumption 
of imported alkalis in 1954 is estimated at 150,000 tons (the 
average for 1953-54), demand will total about 285,000 tons 
by 1962. 
The previous calculation does not include domestic pro-
duction of electrolytic soda, on which no reliable information 
is available although output is known to be increasing with 
the expansión of the market for chloride. Moreover, pro-
1 1 In order to utilize.the residual gas from the Pefrobras refinery at 
Cubatao, with a daily capacity of 50,000 barréis, a factory is being installed 
to produce 375 tons o f nitrogenous fertilizers and 55,000 cubic metres 
o f hydrogen daily. 
1 2 The average for these two years has been taken because in 1953 
imports were severely restricted, while in 1954, apparently, heavy imports 
were made in order to replenish stocks. 
duction of Solvay soda at Cabo Frió, partly financed by the 
Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico, is expected 
to begin within two or three years. It may be assumed, 
with an ampie margin of security, that production of alkalis 
will expand by at least 100,000 tons. Imports in 1962 will 
therefore fluctuate around 185,000 tons. 
It is assumed that the demand for dyes will grow at the same 
rate as the production of textiles, according to the estimate 
for the latter presented in chapter VI. Owing to the lack 
of precise information on substitution prospects for this 
sector, it is further assumed that imports will increase at the 
same rate as demand. 
Finally, the average for the three groups already analysed 
will be adopted for the remaining products, which account for 
about one-third of the aggregate. (See table 52.) 
Table 52. Brazil : projection of imports 
of industrial chemicals 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1949 1954 1962 
262 478 429 
Fertilizers and insecticides 199 339 339 
208 318 509 
Others 430 882 992 
TOTAL . . . 1 , 0 9 9 2 , 0 1 7 2 , 2 6 9 
Source : Basic data from ofñcial Brazilian statistics. 
(d) Aggregate consumer manufactures 
In drawing up table 53 to show the projections for imports 
of manufactured consumer goods, the same expansión as for 
the aggregate of the groups analysed in previous sections 
was attributed to the " unclassified " group. 
Table 53. Brazil : projection for aggregate imports 
of consumer manufactures 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1949 1954 1962 
Non-durable goods . . . 2 . 2 1 3 . 0 9 2 . 2 9 
Durable goods 2 . 2 1 1 .31 1 . 4 5 
Industrial chemicals . . . 1 . 1 0 2 . 0 2 2 . 2 7 
Unclassified 0 . 8 0 1 . 0 3 0 . 9 6 
TOTAL . . . 6 . 31 7 . 4 5 6 . 9 7 
It was suggested earlier that a reasonable target for this 
sector would be the maintenance of the 1954 level of imports. 
The analysis summarized in table 53 demonstrates the feasi-
bility of this objective, since the total for 1962 is slightly lower 
than that for 1954. Given the working margin of error, 
the two valúes may be considered approximately equal. 
4 . FUELS AND LUBRICANTS 
Fuels constitute the most rapidly expanding group among 
Brazilian imports. At 1948 prices, the share of this group 
rose from 10.2 per cent in 1937-39 to 12.1 in 1947-49, 15.2 
in 1950-52 and 19.1 per cent in 1953-54. But, since fuel 
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prices increased less than the total index of import prices, 
the valué of fuel imports in proportion to the valué of all 
imports remained nearly stationary up to 1952. In 1953 the 
general decline of imports and the rigidity of the demand 
for fuels caused the latter's share in the total to rise sharply. 
(See table 54.) 
Table 54. Brazil : share of fuels and lubricants in total valué of imports 
In millions of cruzeiros at 1948 prices In millions of cruzeiros at current prices 
Total Fuels and lubricants Total 
Fuels and lubricants 
Year imports Valué Percentage imports Valué Percentage 
1937 15 ,221 1 ,457 9 . 6 5 , 3 1 5 555 1 0 . 4 
1938 14 ,010 1 , 4 1 6 1 0 . 1 5 , 1 9 6 572 11.0 
1939 13 ,190 1 ,425 1 0 . 8 4 , 9 9 4 576 1 1 . 5 
1947 2 2 , 9 0 2 2 , 3 6 7 1 0 . 3 2 2 , 7 8 9 2 , 0 6 0 9 . 0 
1948 2 0 , 9 8 5 2 , 5 7 5 1 2 . 3 2 0 , 9 8 5 2 , 5 4 0 1 2 . 1 
1949 2 0 , 5 1 6 2 , 6 8 2 1 3 . 1 2 0 , 6 4 8 2 , 3 5 3 1 1 . 4 
1950 2 2 , 8 4 5 4 , 0 4 9 1 7 . 7 2 0 , 3 1 3 2 , 6 8 6 1 3 . 2 
1951 3 2 , 3 2 7 3 , 9 0 7 1 2 . 1 3 7 , 1 9 8 3 , 9 1 5 1 0 . 5 
1952 2 8 , 5 8 2 4 , 4 9 9 1 5 . 7 3 7 , 1 7 9 4 , 5 8 9 1 2 . 3 
1953 23 ,271 4 , 6 3 3 1 9 . 9 2 5 , 1 5 2 4 , 6 1 0 1 8 . 3 
1954 2 8 , 5 5 6 5 , 2 4 6 1 8 . 4 3 3 , 7 0 0 5 ,227 1 5 . 5 
Source : Basic data from official Brazilian statistics. 
The projection of the demand for fuels has formed the 
subject of a special study which appears in Part Two.13 It 
shows that the total consumption of petroleum derivatives 
should rise from 7.6 to 15.3 million tons between 1954 and 
1962. (See table 55.) 
Table 55. Brazil : projection of fuel and lubricant 
consumption a 
(Thousands o f tons) 
Percentage 
1954 1962 increase 
2 , 4 0 8 5 , 5 1 4 129 
3 , 0 3 3 5 , 0 5 8 67 
1 , 2 2 9 2 , 7 8 4 127 
539 1 ,017 89 
218 517 137 
209 418 200 
7 , 6 3 6 ' 1 5 , 3 0 8 200 
808 1 , 2 0 0 49 
6 Imported products only. 
By considering fuels and lubricants at 1952 prices, the valué 
of the projected consumption for 1962 would be raised 
to 12,028 million cruzeiros. How much of this consumption, 
then, will be covered by domestic production and how much 
by imports ? If imports were to contribute the same pro-
portion as in 1954, about 30 per cent of the capacity to import 
would be absorbed by this sector in 1962. This shows that 
in the case of fuels there is an urgent need for substitution. 
Without doubt the effective possibilities for substitution 
in the petroleum sector are very great, given the country1s 
proven reserves. However, any forecast of domestic produc-
tion must pay due regard to the limited nature of financial 
resources and to the shortage of qualified manpower, problems 
13 See chapter IV. 
which Petrobras must continué to face during its early years 
of operation. This is not the place for a full discussion of the 
matter, which would unduly divert the present report from 
its main purposes. It will suffice to accept a few general data 
mentioned by responsible authorities in Brazil. Two hypo-
theses should be considered. In both it will be assumed that 
in 1962 one-half of the required lubricants will be produced 
within the country, since a definite plan already exists in this 
sector. As for the production of crude oil, in the first hypo-
thesis it will be assumed that there is a target of 100,000 
barréis a day, and in the second, that the aim is much more 
modest, viz. 30,000 barréis,14 not counting the petroleum 
needed in the production of lubricants. In the first case, pro-
duction would cover about one-third of consumption and 
in the second one-tenth. As regards refining, it will be 
presumed that in both cases two-thirds—or about 200,000 
barréis a day—will be refined in the country. Fiñally, so far as 
transport is concerned, the assumption is that two-thirds of the 
imported petroleum will be carried in Brazilian ships in the 
first case, and only one-half in the second. (See table 56.) 
Table 56. Brazil : hypothetical replacement 
of petroleum imports 
(Millions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Valué of petroleum derivatives for consumption in 1962 : • 11,524 
Less lst hypothesis 2nd hypothesis 
(A) Domestic production of lubricants 648 648 
(B) Domestic production o f crude a . . . . 2 , 9 5 0 885 
(C) Refining and transport . . . 2 , 0 3 0 2 , 0 3 0 
Total valué of domestic production . . . . . 5 , 6 2 8 3 , 5 6 3 
Valué of imports 5 , 8 9 6 . 7 , 9 6 1 
B Excluding petroleum for lubricant production. 
1 4 The second target could be reached even if the promising field recently 
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In the first hypothesis the valué of imports would be 
approximately the same as in 1954, and in the second it would 
be 45 per cent more. As regards the capacity to import, 
in the first case there would be a 15-per-cent and in the second 
a 20-per-cent absorption. 
Within the two hypotheses the share of domestic production 
in total supply will tend to vary between 30 and 50 per cent. 
Neither assumption can be considered extreme. Optimistic 
and pessimistic hypotheses may alike be classed as moderate. 
For the purpose of the projection the average of the two 
may be taken as a figure representative of present trends. 
In that event imports of petroleum derivatives will in 1962 
amount to 6,928 million cruzeiros (at 1952 prices). If coal 
imports are added the total becomes 7,432 millions, represent-
ing an increase of 27 per cent over 1954 imports. 
5 . CAPITAL GOODS 
Once imports of foodstuffs, manufactured consumer goods, 
fuels and lubricants have been projected, the capacity to 
import consumer goods may be estimated residually. The 
use of this method is based on the following premises : for 
an under-developed country, the importation of capital goods 
is the most effective way of profiting by the working methods 
of more-advanced countries which are in the forefront of 
scientific and technological research; further, in a country 
whose income level is excessively dependent on the valué 
of its exports, imports of capital goods enjoy much greater 
flexibility than those of consumer goods. A fall in export 
valúes is immediately reflected in a reduced demand for 
capital goods; if imports mainly consist of the latter, then 
the reduction in the demand means an immediate relief of 
the balance-of-payments situation. No such development 
occurs when imports are mainly composed of consumer 
goods, since in this case the lowered demand is merely a 
concomitant of the contraction of income, which is less than 
the drop in the valué of exports and much smaller still than 
the reduction in investment. The greater flexibility of 
capital goods imports is fairly obvious. (See table 57.) 
Table 57. Brazil : Quantum Índices a of capital 
goods and consumer goods imports 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Consumer goods 100 107 125 170 147 140 166 
Capital goods . . 100 9 7 . 8 89 152 138 81 108 
Source : Basic data from official Brazilian statistics. 
a At 1948 prices. 
The average annual variation in capital goods imports 
was 28 per cent in the period under review, as contrasted 
with 16 per cent in the case of consumer goods. The máximum 
variation was 71 per cent for the former and 36 for the latter. 
When the projections of consumer-goods imports in 
general are known, it is possible to estimate—by subtraction 
from the projected capacity to import—the margin remaining 
for payment of capital-goods imports. (See table 58.) 
The above data indicate that consumer-goods imports 
should remain almost constant, although their composition 
will be substantially modified. Meanwhile the capacity to 
import capital goods should rise by over 60 per cent. This 
heavy increase partially reflects the relatively low level in 
Table 58. Brazil : projection of the capacity 
to import capital goods 
(Millions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
1954 1962 
Capacity to import . . . . 3 0 , 2 6 8 3 8 , 1 4 0 
I. Consumer-goods imports . . . . 19 ,227 2 0 , 1 5 5 
(a) Foodstuffs 5 , 9 3 4 5 , 6 5 3 
(b) Manufactured goods 7 , 4 5 0 6 , 9 7 0 
(c) Fuels and lubricants 5 , 8 4 3 7 , 4 3 2 
II. Capital-goods imports 11 ,041 17 ,985 
NOTE.—The difference between the total capacity to import, as shown in this 
table, and the data given in chapter III , results from the divergent rates of 
exchange employed. But since it is the increments which are used in the pro-
jections, the difference is not of major importance. 
the base year (1954). Compared with the situation in 1952 
and 1951, imports would move up by 26 and 14 per cent 
respectively. 
But a substitution policy which treated all capital goods 
as a single homogeneous bloc would be unsound. The 
previous argument that capital-goods imports are the gateway 
admitting a higher technology is not universally applicable. 
If a comparison is made between the import of a textile and 
that of a textile-manufacturing machine, the difference is 
clear, since, while in the first case the effect is of short duration, 
in the second the national productive apparatus is being 
permanently enriched by the incorporation of a new technique. 
Finished capital goods—i.e., equipment—thus specifically 
possess this characteristic of transmitting a technique. Semi-
finished capital goods—industrial metáis, building materials, 
etc.—viewed from the same angle, are in a situation identical 
with that of consumer goods. 
In reality, the domestic production of semi-finished capital 
goods has priority for more than one reason. Such goods, 
given their heavy weight and volume per unit of valué, are 
subject to considerable price surcharges on account of freight 
costs, payable by the importer. Neither should it be over-
looked that the production of semi-capital goods is a factor 
favourably influencing the establishment of industries manu-
facturing in equipment general. 
The semi-finished-capital-goods industry has developed 
with great intensity in the last decade. Steel and cement 
output are the main indications of this development. None 
the less, imports of these products in 1954 constituted almost 
40 per cent of all capital goods imports. But in view of plans 
now in process of implementation, it may be taken for 
granted that substitution will be intensified in this sector. 
Imports of cement will be almost completely replaced by 
domestic production in the next two years. The replacement 
of other building materials is also progressing or has already 
been achieved. As regards metáis, existiiig plans show that 
the substitution process is being reinforced in the iron and 
steel and aluminium sectors. 
If it is assumed as a first hypothesis that in 1962 capital-goods 
imports will be at the same level as in 1954—when this level 
was exceptionally high compared with that of previous 
years—the conclusión is reached that the capacity to purchase 
equipment will rise from 7.8 to 13.8 billion cruzeiros at 
1952 prices, during the period under review. The increase 
would be 77 per cent in relation to 1954. If, however, the 
comparison is made with the peak in recent years, which 
was attained in 1951, there will be a decrease of about,5 per cent. 
Chapter IV 
PRODUCTION FOR THE DOMESTIC MARKET 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
On the basis of the analysis presented in previous chapters 
it is possible to draw up an outline of the main changes which 
would have to be introduced into the mechanism of domestic 
production in order to attain the targets inherent in a develop-
ment pohcy. 
A minimum target has already been set up for the export 
sector. This target—the feasibility of which was determined 
only in a very general way—must be the starting-point for 
a detailed study of this sector. A preliminary analysis of this 
question appears in two studies in Part Two. One of them 
deals with the main aspects of the coffee problem as a funda-
mental factor in the capacity to import.1 The other examines 
briefly the main markets for Brazilian commodities and the 
potential supply.2 
The general targets for production of consumer goods 
for the domestic market are already known, since the study 
of the substitution problem required an appraisal, albeit an 
indirect one, of the share of consumption to be covered by 
domestic production. It now remains to define these objectives 
more precisely. 
The statements made in the preceding paragraphs permit 
the preparation of a draft programme which will be aimed 
at directing domestic production and will define the targets 
for agricultural production and consumer manufactures. 
The next stage will be to study the sectors of derived demand, 
that is, capital goods and the basic services, namely transport 
and energy.3 
The projection of the demand for basic services pre-supposes 
a knowledge of the probable development of over-all pro-
duction of goods. And it is this production which shapes 
the demand for basic services once the problems of changes 
in their structure and localization have been considered. 
Special studies on these sectors appear in Part Two of this 
report,4 and constitute only a preliminary description of the 
principal problems arising from the preparation of a develop-
ment programme for the complex sectors of transport and 
energy. 
Just as the projection of the demand for basic services implies 
an approximate forecast of the over-all production of goods, 
so the hypothetical development of these services must be 
estimated before the production of capital goods can be 
projected. These basic services are capital intensive and a 
sizeable share of the equipment utilized by the production 
system is allotted to them. 
1 See Part Two, chapter II. 
2 See Part Two, chapter I. 
8 Both transport and energy are " consumer " as well as producer 
services, in that part of them reaches the final consumer. The projection 
of the demand for such " consumer services " is an independent problem 
and must be so considered. 
4 See chapter III and IV. 
The interdependence of the projections of demand for capital 
goods on the one hand and basic services on the other, is not, 
however, a problem of real practical significance. Capital-
goods industries and basic services have one feature in 
common : they normally operate with some margin of idle 
capacity owing to the high degree of concentration which 
is characteristic of both sectors. As a general rule, neither 
a railway ñor a blast-furnace is built for immediate use at 
full capacity. This implies that the basic sectors—production 
of capital goods, energy and transport—intrinsically require 
projections over a longer term in a development programme. 
The aim of the present chapter is to define the production 
targets for the capital-goods sector. They will be funda-
mentally derived from the predicted rate of expansión of 
the production of goods for the domestic consumer market 
and for export, and from the preliminary hypotheses of 
the development of basic services. The process of capital 
formation provides the basis for "such deductions. When 
the rate of expansión of an industry—that is, the increase 
in its productive capacity—is known, and when this pro-
ductive capacity has been expressed in terms of equipment 
and structures, an idea can be formed of the demand for 
capital goods deriving from this expansión. Thus, in order 
to project the demand for capital goods it will be necessary 
to estimate the investment required for the expansión of the 
sectors producing consumer and export goods. 
The estimates of investment by groups of industries made 
in the present chapter have only limited valué. Their purpose 
is to permit the projection of demand for capital goods. 
This demand will be compared with the capacity to import 
capital goods in order to define the part which will have to 
be covered by domestic production. 
The contení of the programme will therefore comprise 
a series of growth Índices which can be grouped as " targets for 
import replacement " and " targets for domestic production 
It is essential to bear in mind that these objectives constitute 
an organic whole, and are interdependent. Under the general 
conditions assumed, available investment will be sufficient 
to permit their simultaneous attainment. In more than one 
specific case it is probable that the volume of resources required 
will differ from the estimate made in order to project the 
over-all demand for capital goods. But there is no reason 
to believe that all these miscalculations will be in the same 
direction. In practice they are likely to cancel one another 
out, unless the statistical material used for the initial estimate 
contains a high degree of distortion, since they mainly arise 
from changes in relative prices which as a rule counterbalance 
one another. 
The method to be used in this chapter will now be described 
in broad outline. First, an attempt will be made to infer 
from the foregoing data the production target for agriculture 
and for the sector producing manufactured consumer goods. 
The investment required to attain these objectives will then 
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be estimated on the basis of the so-called coefficients of capital, 
which are the result of observations made with respect to 
each group of activities. These coefficients represent the ratio 
between one unit of fixed capital in a productive activity 
and the unit of net production obtained. They are therefore 
similar to the product-capital ratios used in chapter II. 
The capital coefficients are largely affected by the position 
of relative prices in the same period. These prices fluctuate 
constantly—although such changes are not always evident 
over a short term—under the influence of a series of economic 
and technological factors. It has already been noted diat the 
errors resulting from these fluctuations tend to cancel one 
another out. So long as the coefficients in question are used 
strictly to estimate demand for equipment, the distortions 
caused by changes in relative prices are not very significant. 
The demand for certain commodities in general use in the 
capital-goods industry—cement and industrial metáis, for 
instance,—can be projected by following the same method 
advocated in the previous chapter with respect to intermedíate 
products for the manufacture of consumer goods. 
2 . AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Agricultural production is destined both for the export 
market and to cover domestic requirements of foodstuffs 
and certain raw materials. The analysis made in previous 
chapters of foreign and domestic demand for agricultural 
commodities enables a general target to be defined for this 
sector. 
As data for the numerous branches of agricultural production 
in 1954 have not yet all been published, only a preliminary 
estimate can be presented. (See table 59.) 
Table 59. Brazil : agricultural production in 1954 
at prices paid to the producer 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Foodstuffs for the domestic market 5 8 . 5 
R a w materials for the domestic market 4 . 7 
Forest products 5 . 5 
Increase in animal stocks 5 . 2 
Production mainly for export 2 3 . 9 
TOTAL . . . 9 7 . 8 
Some brief comments will now be made on die rate of 
expansión of each of these items within the framework of 
a minimum programme. To judge from the data presented 
in the two previous chapters, demand for domestically 
produced foodstuffs will have risen by about 37 per cent 
by 1962. Domestic market demand for raw materials will 
inevitably keep pace with the expansión of the industries that 
absorb them, and its probable future increment may be estima-
ted at about 50 per cent. The production of the forestry 
sector will receive a strong Ímpetus from the development 
of the pulp and paper industry, while it is assumed that the 
output of fuelwood will remain stationary. Nevertheless, 
the latter plays so important a part (representing more than 
50 per cent of total production at present), that the over-all 
growth rate is unlikely to exceed 30 per cent. The increase 
in animal stocks is an item of capital formation, and will 
therefore not be included in this calculation. Finally, pro-
duction mainly for the export market will expand by about 
26 per cent, given the projection for the capacity to import 
postulated here. 
The calculation of expansión in the various groups shows 
that total agricultural production—excluding animal stocks— 
will have to rise from 92.6 to 124.9 billion cruzeiros, at 1952 
prices, or by about 34 per cent. The exclusión of the forestry 
sector has virtually no effect on this calculation. 
It is interesting to note that the rate of growth of agricultural 
production resulting from the foregoing estimate (3.7 per cent 
annually) exceeds by an ampie margin that prevailing in the 
period 1 9 4 0 - 5 4 ( 2 . 3 ) and is also higher than the rate for the 
last five years ( 3 . 5 ) . These discrepancies are explicable, 
in that during the period 1 9 4 0 - 5 4 , agricultural production 
for export remained stationary. If this group is set aside and 
an analysis is made of production for the domestic market, 
the rate forecast for the period 1 9 5 5 - 6 2 ( 4 . 1 per cent) is equal 
to that registered over the whole period 1 9 4 0 - 5 4 , and lower 
than the rate for 1 9 5 0 - 5 4 (5 per cent). 
How far is the attainment of these objectives feasible ? The 
growth of agricultural production in the last period mentioned 
was mainly stimulated by a substantial rise in relative prices 
favouring this sector. Such a phenomenon is very unlikely 
to recur in the near future, the probabilities being that any 
readjustment will take place in the opposite direction. This 
suggests that it may be no easy matter for the projected rate 
of growth to be spontaneously achieved by the agricultural 
sector. At a later stage of programming it would be necessary 
to make a detailed study of the sector, since this would be 
the only way tó define the concrete measures to be adopted 
for the attainment of the targets set up. As an example of 
this type of study, an analysis of the wheat problem is to be 
published separately. In it the real possibilities of an incre-
ment in production are enumerated; the feasibility of the 
target is examined; the difficulties hampering current develop-
ment are outlined; the resources required for the develop-
ment envisaged in the programme are estimated; and the 
problems most urgently in need of solution are set forth. 
The essential point in an agricultural development pro-
gramme is that its objective should be integrated in an over-all 
study. It is not necessary to establish definite targets for all 
commodities, since medium-term factors within the agri-
cultural sector have a high degree of mobility. But it is indis-
pensable to expand the production capacity of agriculture by 
reclaiming land, enlarging storage and transport capacity, 
providing necessary equipment, and so on. Once agricultural 
enterprise has been organized, production plans may be 
modified by annual measures aimed at satisfying changes in 
demand which can be forecast over the short term. 
Agricultural production for export constitutes an indepen-
dent problem, some aspects of which, as already mentioned 
in the introduction to the present chapter,5 are dealt with in 
two studies iri Part Two. One of them will analyse world 
market prospects—even if only on broad lines—with a view to 
a recovery of the quantum of Brazilian exports. In the other, 
a specific examination will be made of the problem of coffee. 
3 . MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
In previous chapters a projection was made of the demand 
for consumer manufactures, and the possible contribution 
6 See page 61. 
Part One—Chapter VI. Production for the domestic market 63 
of imports to the satisfaction of this demand was estimated. 
Table 60 has been prepared on the basis of these data, and 
shows the projection for the domestic production of consumer 
manufactures. The foodstuffs industry was included, as it 
had not been dealt with in the analysis of demand together 
with the other branches of manufacturing industry. 
Table 60. Brazil : projection of the production 
of consumer manufactures 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Commodity-groups 1954 1962 
A nnual rate 
of increase 
Non-durable goods 
Foodstuffs 2 0 . 2 6 2 8 . 9 0 4 . 6 
Textiles 1 5 . 3 7 2 0 . 8 7 3 . 9 
Garments 5 . 1 0 7 . 0 0 • 4 . 0 
Footwear 2 . 8 3 3 . 9 3 4 . 1 
Pharmaceutical products and toilet 
articles 4 . 0 0 7 .01 7 . 2 
Pulp and paper 1 . 9 1 3 . 7 3 8 . 7 
Printed matter 3 . 6 0 4 . 9 7 4 . 1 
Tobacco and matches 1 . 8 0 2 . 8 0 5 . 7 
Durable goods 
China and table-ware 1 . 7 0 2 . 6 0 5 . 5 
Furniture 2 . 4 0 3 . 7 0 5 . 6 
Motor vehicles 1 . 1 1 1 .87 6 . 7 
Others 3 . 2 8 5 . 6 8 7 . 1 
Industrial chemicals 3 . 3 0 6 . 1 0 8 . 0 
Undassified 1 . 6 0 2 . 5 0 5 . 5 
TOTAL . . . 6 8 . 2 6 1 0 1 . 6 6 5 . 2 
Sources : Basic data from official Brazilian statistics and the Fundado Getúlio 
Vargas. 
Production of consumer manufactures, according to these 
data, may be expected to expand by 49 per cent in the period 
1955-62, or 52 per cent if the food industry is excluded. 
Unlike that of the agricultural sector, the rate of growth 
forecast in the minimum programme for manufactured 
consumer goods is considerably lower than that registered 
in recent years, having reached 7 per cent in 1940-54, and 
7.8 per cent in 1950-54, as against the 5.4 per cent projected 
for the period 1955-62. 
The over-all increase for the industries producing non-
durable consumer manufactures will be 44 per cent, correspond-
ing to an annual rate of 4.7 per cent. There will, however, 
be considerable fluctuations among the different industrial 
activities, the lowest rate being found in the textile industry 
(3.9 per cent) and the highest in the pulp and paper industry 
(8.7 per cent). It is important to stress that this latter is the 
only branch in which the rate of growth would have to rise 
above the 1950-54 level (from 6.6 to 8.7 per cent). For all 
other branches of production of non-durable consumer 
manufactured goods the rate of growth of the last five years 
is higher than that forecast for the immediate future, according 
to the development hypothesis implicit in the minimum 
programme. 
As regards durable goods, the only sector in which consi-
derably more effort would have to be expended than has been 
in recent years is the motor vehicle industry. As has been 
pointed out elsewhere, in this branch of production it is 
indispensable to progress from the stage of manufacturing 
parts which wear out rapidly, to the production of more 
valuable parts such as motor blocks and transmission gear. 
It is even possible that the manufacture of complete cars 
might be undertaken. In this case the expansión index has 
virtually no significance, since present production mainly 
comprises parts such as tires and batteries which do not 
belong to the motor vehicle industry proper. 
The general problem of the motor vehicle industry—includ-
ing both passenger-cars and lorries—has been specially studied 
by the Economic Commission for Latin America in a document 
to be published separately.6 An analysis is made therein of 
the main obstacles to the installation of such an industry 
in Brazil. Up to now, studies carried out by official organiza-
tions have paid exclusive attention to freight vehicles. Govern-
ment pohcy in this sector seems to be aimed at fostering 
gradual substitution, through the manufacture of medium-size 
lorries. The main objective indicated by the Comissao 
do Desenvolvimento Industrial is to achieve the manufacture 
of 70 per cent of the weight of some 100,000 medium-size 
lorries by 1962. 
The authorities have not yet directly concerned themselves 
with the production of automobiles. Nevertheless, certain 
steps taken by European and United States firms have been 
discussed in Brazil. Some of these related the manufacture 
of parts to the concession of trade and market privileges, 
which naturally provoked objections. However, it is to be 
hoped that, once the present stage of exchange adjustments 
has passed and a long-term pohcy for the development of 
automobile production has been established, rapid strides will 
be made towards the solution of this problem. Difficulties 
inthe supply of the raw materials concerned have already been 
overcome, and if a formula is adopted similar to that suggested 
for lorry production, the question of skilled labour will be 
easier to tackle. 
It has previously been noted that during the last five years 
the rate of expansión of the different branches of consumer 
manufactures—with the exception of the pulp and paper 
and motor vehicle industries—may be considered more than 
satisfactory. This should be understood in its exact implica-
tions. It should be recalled that the rates of growth quoted are 
averages for the period 1950-54 and that in general they 
tend to decline in the last years of the period. Thus the food 
industry, which expanded by about 40 per cent between 1949 
and 1953, contracted shghtly in 1954. A similar trend was 
apparent in the footwear industry. Paper production, which 
increased at an average rate of 6.6 per cent between 1949 
and 1954, remained practically stationary in this latter year. 
If the rate of growth for aggregate consumer manufactures 
remained high in 1954, this was due to the vigorous recovery 
in the textile industry. 
The second comment to be made is that industrial production 
was strongly stimulated in the recent past by foreign trade 
policy, which favoured it by low prices for raw materials, 
semi-processed goods and equipment, while protecting it 
against competition from abroad. The new exchange pohcy, 
although maintaining the margin of protection by the system 
of categories, considerably increased costs of semi-processed 
imports and—more important still—effected a substantial 
reduction in the real valué of funds for investment by raising 
6 See chapter on Brazil in Iron and Steel Trattsforming Industries in Selected 
Latin American Countries (E /CN.12/377) . 
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the prices of imported equipment. In 1953, with the reform 
of the exchange system, the phase during which this latter 
provided a strong incentive to industrial investment may be 
said to have closed. The new system barely permitted the 
consolidation of profits made under the previous regime. 
It should not be forgotten that the economy evolved from a 
stage of vigorous expansión to one of relative stagnation in 
the capacity to import. The previous system had made it 
possible for part of the increment in the capacity to import 
to be channelled towards industry in the guise of real capital 
earnings. The present regime will allow only for the main-
tenance of the advances made. The process of accumulation 
will no longer benefit from the abundant inflow of resources 
it received during the stage just ended, not because these 
resources have been directed towards other sectors, but simply 
because the sources from which they were generated— 
improvement in the terms of trade, liquidation of reserves 
accumulated during the war, and short-term debts—have 
been completely exhausted. 
From these considerations, it can be inferred that a series 
of measures will have to be adopted to counterbalance the 
depressive effect of the reduction in the marginal profitability 
of capital, if expansión is to be maintained even at a lower 
rate than during the previous five-year period. The problem 
can be summarized as follows. Prices of industrial equipment 
doubled or trebled between 1953 and 1955, while those for 
domestically-produced industrial commodities did not rise 
more than 30 per cent in the same period. Consequently 
there was a sharp reduction in the self-financing capacity 
of the industrial sector. Even with the same margin of profits 
as before, an industry can now accumulate only with difficulty 
a volume of resources, in terms of external purchasing power 
for expansión purposes, which will still be much smaller than 
in the past. And it is not that the resources which fail to reach 
industry are being accumulated in another sector, leaving 
open the possibility of channelling their application through 
the banking system. The resources concerned, owing to the 
reduction in the average economic productivity caused by 
the reversal of foreign trends, are simply no longer flowing 
into the system. 
This curtailment of resources for self-financing may possibly 
be felt with greater intensity in those industries with higher 
current and replacement costs to be paid in foreign exchange. 
A detailed study of each branch should therefore be made in 
order to determine : (a) the possibilities for better utilization 
of the existing installed capacity; (b) the volume of financial 
expenditure involved in the possible replacement of imported 
equipment by domestic production; (c) the reduction in 
self-financing capacity arising from the exchange reform; 
and (d) the means that will have to be placed at the disposal 
of industrialists to enable production to develop at the desired 
rate. 
4 . CAPITAL GOODS 
Manufactured goods to be used for capital formation pur-
poses are, in the final instance, intermedíate products. Their 
purchase is but a stage in the investment process. It is therefore 
necessary to analyse this process and to formúlate some 
hypotheses on its future development before projecting the 
demand for capital goods. 
The preparation of a programme requires two estimates of 
investment needs. The first has already been calculated in 
chapter II as part of the aggregate projections. According 
to the annual data presented on the volume of depreciation 
expenditure and net investment, gross investment will expand 
by 72 per cent between 1954 and 1962. 
The projection of over-all investment needs is an element 
of fundamental importance for formulating the general 
outline of a programme. With the help of such an outline 
the specific targets for each sector of economic activity can 
be defined. Once these sectorial objectives have been ascer-
tained, it will be possible to estimate capital requirements from 
the particular to the general, that is, on the basis of a study 
of specific cases. This second estimate of investment expen-
diture, if al1 sectors of economic activity are included, will 
necessarily be equivalent to the estimate made from the 
general to the particular, once all the partial data have been 
added up. Any difference between the two figures will give 
an approximate indication of the degree of unreliability of 
the basic material and of the methods used. 
The definition of the investment needs implicit in the targets 
for the main group of activities is not difficult. These needs 
are closely linked to specific conditions in each sector. It is 
more or less obvious that capital requirements for an expansión 
of the paper industry will depend on the type of raw materials 
to be utilized, sizé and integration of the milis, location and 
availability of public services, etc. This kind of estimate is 
possible only when concrete projects are prepared. 
Investment estimates by sector are an essential element in 
the projection of demand for capital goods. Thus, if no 
hypothesis is available for the probable expansión of building 
activities, it will be practically impossible to project the demand 
for the materials required. But, if the projection of the demand 
for capital goods were to depend on the preparation of all 
the projects required for a programme, industries in this 
sector would be deprived of all guidance for an indefinite 
period. It is therefore indispensable to work out techniques 
to facilitate preliminary estimates of capital goods requirements 
as a function of the general targets of the programme. 
Table 61 shows data on the supply of capital goods in 1949, 
on the basis of the Census and of import statistics. In table 33 
of chapter III, data on imports are presented, including not 
only capital-goods imports as such, but also those which are 
incorporated in other imported manufactures. Thus, of the 
c.i.f. valué of iron and steel imports, only 69 per cent repre-
sented their valué on leaving the steel mili; on the other 
hand, imported iron and steel goods as such constituted 
only 46 per cent of the total valué of iron and steel products 
purchased abroad. The remaining 54 per cent was made up 
of ferrous raw materials incorporated in BraziTs imports 
of products of the mechanical industries—namely, equipment 
and durable consumer goods. 
The break-down of imports as indicated in the previous 
paragraph is very useful as a guide for a substitution policy. 
With the help of these elements it is possible to appraise the 
impact on die market for intermediate products of any change 
in the composition of imports aimed at intensifying substitution. 
In a country which imports manufactured arricies, producer 
goods, whether equipment or intermediate products, therefore 
command two markets, which could be called direct and in-
direct. In the first stages of development, when imports 
of consumer manufactures increase rapidly, the indirect 
market for producer goods grows at a faster rate than the 
direct. If the former attains a certain magnitude, the installa-
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Table 61 . Brazil : : supply of manufactured goods for investment 1949 
(Millions o f cruzeiros at 1949 prices) 
Imports Imports as a percentage 
Capital goods Production Direct Total Supply of supply 
Metallurgical products 2 , 7 5 2 1 ,322 2 , 5 9 6 5 , 3 4 8 49 
Iron and steel 2 , 0 3 2 828 1 ,793 3 , 8 2 5 47 
Other metáis 720 494 803 1 , 5 2 3 53 
Mechanical industries 3 , 7 3 0 4 , 8 9 7 6 ,221 9 , 9 5 1 63 
Machinery 1 , 0 0 1 2 , 3 5 3 2 , 3 5 3 3 , 3 5 4 70 
Transport equipment . . . 1 , 0 2 3 1 ,531 1 ,531 2 , 5 5 4 60 
Electrical equipment 512 649 982 1 , 4 9 4 66 
Others 1 , 1 9 4 364 1 ,355 2 , 5 4 9 53 
Building materials 4 , 0 3 2 204 204 4 , 2 3 6 5 
Cement 392 108 108 500 22 
Lime, bricks, etc 1 , 3 0 6 59 59 1 ,365 4 
Porcelain 820 — — 820 — 
W o o d 1 , 3 8 2 7 7 1 , 3 8 9 — 
Glass 132 30 30 162 19 
TOTAL . . . 10 ,514 6 , 4 2 3 9 , 0 2 1 1 9 , 5 3 5 46 
Sources : For production : 1949 Census ; for imports : table 33 of chapter I I I . 
tion of a producer-goods industry may bring about rapid 
transformations in the over-all structure of the production 
system. 
A typical example was Brazil's installation of a steel mili 
with coke blast furnace, after the Second World War. Pro-
duction of iron and steel was mainly centred on building 
materials until 1946, when production of sheet and other 
rolled products for the mechanical industries began. Between 
1946 and 1954 consumption of iron and steel products by the 
mechanical industries increased threefold, while the over-all 
growth of industrial production did not exceed 64 per cent. 
The existence of an indirect or potential market implies that 
the launching of the producer-goods industry automatically 
creates stimuli for a large number of other industries which 
in one way or another depend on it. In effect it is very 
difficult to imagine the installation of large mechanical indus-
tries on the basis of imported iron and steel in a country 
whose capacity to import is subject to periodic crises and whose 
foreign supplies have at times been almost totally suspended 
for other than economic reasons. 
Capital goods will be classified in three groups for the pro-
jection of demand : (a) metallurgical products, (b) building 
materials and (c) equipment. 
(a) Metallurgical products 
The analysis will be confined for the moment to semi-
processed ferrous products. Each of the main non-ferrous 
metáis requires a special study involving a defmition of pro-
duction targets for the electric materials industry and certain 
sectors of the metallurgical and mechanical industries, such 
as would not be possible in this general outline. The same 
applies to special steels.7 
Table 62 shows the data relating to iron and steel supplies 
in the period 1946-54, excluding special steels. 
Table 62. Brazil : supply of semi-processed iron 
and steel goods 
(Thousands of tons) 
Production 
as a percentage 
Year Imports Production Total of total supply 
1946 411 298 709 42 
1947 439 384 823 47 
1948 205 505 710 71 
1949 230 626 856 7 3 
1950 256 724 980 74 
1951 351 732 1 ,083 68 
1952 344 755 1 , 0 9 9 69 
1953 209 892 1 ,101 81 
1954 . . . . 280 972 1 , 2 5 2 78 
7 Seé Iron and Steel Transforming Industries in Selected Latin American 
Countries, prepared by the Economic Commission for Latin America 
as a technical study of the problem of special steels. 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
The data in this table refer to direct supplies of iron and 
steel. It has already been seen in table 61 that indirect con-
sumption accounted for about 25 per cent of the total in 1949. 
This indirect demand, however, will be shown in the projec-
tions only in so far as it affects the substitution of domestic 
production for imported equipment. 
In the most recent of the periods under review, the composi-
tion of iron and steel consumption in Brazil was approximately 
as follows : mechanical industries, 40 per cent; construction 
and public works, 40 per cent; agriculture (mainly in the form 
of wire), 14 per cent; and railways (rails and accessories), 
6 per cent. Clearly the growth of demand will depend on 
the evolution of each of these Ítems. The first step is to appraise 
this evolution within the general context of the minimum 
programme. 
In the case of the mechanical industry, only the probable 
expansión of the group producing consumer goods will be 
considered at present. This, according to the data in table 60 
on motor vehicles and other durable goods, will amount 
to 72 per cent between 1954 and 1962. A more accurate 
estimate might later be made, but the difference would not be 
significant. 
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Investment in building depends basically on the growth 
of the population, on income and on the Government's 
social policy. Yearly fluctuations in this sector, however, 
are principally due to factors depending on the level of 
economic activity. In order to identify long-term trends, 
it is necessary to isolate these fluctuations as far as possible 
from the action of the factors in question. The evolution of 
the index of building activities during the last ten years may 
be studied in table 63. 
Table 63. Brazil : index of building activities 
1945 1UQ 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
83 105 111 100 87 92 113 149 151 144 
Source: Conjuntura Económica. 
These data clearly indicate that there were two stages of 
expansión in building activities during the post-war period. 
The first reached its peak in 1947 and the second in 1953. 
With respect to building, these two years can therefore be 
considered as the points of inflection of a rising trend, so that 
the annual growth rate recorded between these two peaks 
(5.3 per cent) is provisionally representative of the long-term 
trend over the last ten years.8 This rate may decline in the 
next few years owing to the slowing down of over-all develop-
ment. It may, however, be adopted as an initial estimate. 
The consequent increase between 1954 and 1962 will be 
51 per cent. 
On the basis of the studies prepared for agriculture and 
railways, rates of 3.8 and 6.0 per cent, respectively, will be 
assumed for these sectors. Table 64 gives the preliminary 
projection of the demand for iron and steel. 
Table 64. Brazil*: projection of demand for iron and steel 









Mechanical industries 500 72 860 
Construction . . 500 51 755 
Agriculture 175 35 236 
Railways 75 59 119 
T O T A L B . . . . 1 , 2 5 0 58 1 , 9 7 0 
° The distribution of demand among the groups is the average for 1949-53. 
b A second estimate, taking account of the growth of mechanical industries 
producing capital goods, would raise total demand by about 50,000 tons. 
Demand for rolled products will therefore rise to about 
2 million tons in 1962—i.e., some 2.5 million iron ingots. 
What proportion of this demand will be covered by domestic 
supplies? For domestic production to satisfy total require-
ments, the 1954 level of about 1.2 million tons of ingots would 
have to be raised by 113 per cent. This is perfectly feasible 
according to existing plans for expansión and for the installation 
of new factories, some of which are already totally or partially 
fmanced. 
The detailed discussion on this point in the relevant study 9 
indicates that the plans in question will enable production of 
rolled goods to expand to 1,712,000 tons before 1960. Special 
mention should be made of four projects : the Volta Redonda 
project, where production should rise from the 1953 figure 
of 363,000 tons to 750,000; Mogi das Cruzes, where it should 
expand from 60,000 to 300,000 tons; Monlevade, with a 
probable increase from 145,000 to 250,000; and Mannesmann, 
where production should reach 110,000 tons. 
(b) Building materials 
If metallurgical products are excluded, building materials 
mainly include cement, wood, porcelain and glass. Wood 
and porcelain products are manufactured by small-scale 
industry, and nearly always locally. In the development 
programme careful consideraüon should be given to die 
expansión of these industries in order to provide lower cost 
housing. The main problem is one of technical assistance, 
whereby better utilization of available resources may be 
achieved through rational production systems. As to glass, 
demand will grow at the same rate as building activities. 
In view of the importance of cement for public works 
and the fact that it is produced in large-scale plants, special 
attention should be devoted to it in the development pro-
gramme. Without adequate cement supplies it is practically 
impossible to carry out an investment plan. Consumption 
of cement grew rapidly in Brazil after the war. (See table 65.) 
Table 65. Brazil : apparent consumption of cement 
(Thousands o f tons) 




1947 914 339 1 ,253 73 
1948 . . . . . . 1 , 1 1 2 351 1 ,463 76 
1949 . . 1 ,281 428 1 ,709 . 7 5 
1950 1 ,386 394 1 , 7 8 0 78 
1951 . . . . . . 1 , 456 638 2 , 0 9 4 70 
1952 . . 1 , 6 1 9 812 2 ,431 67 
1953 . . 2 , 0 3 0 967 2 ,997 68 
1954 2 , 4 0 6 340 2 , 7 4 6 88 
8 Since the annual growth o f urban population exceeds 4 per cent and 
the coefficient of demolition is high in large cities, the rate of 5.3 per cent 
does not seem to indicate that the area available per city dweller has 
increased appreciably. 
Source : Official Brazilian staltistics. 
The excepdonal expansión of consumption shown in table 65 
seems to be due mainly to the increase in public works. No 
separate data are available on the cement consumed in this 
important sector. However, it can be proved that the share 
absorbed by building activities (whose index of expansión 
refers only to urban construction) is a good deal less than half. 
Even on the assumption that all cement consumed in 1947 
had been used for building activities and that this consumption 
therefore grew at the same rate as the Índex for urban construc-
tion, the total for 1953 would stand at 1.7 million tons, or 
only 57 per cent of total consumption in that year. If in 1947 
construction had absorbed three-quarters of the available 
cement—which is obviously an exaggeration—in 1953 the 
corresponding fraction would have been only 43 per cent. 
9 See footnotés 6 and 7. 
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There is every indication that consumption of cement, 
apart from urban construction, rapidly increased in the period 
under review, since under the hypothesis that this consumption 
absorbed 25 per cent of the total in 1947, it must have risen 
from 300,000 tons in that year to 1.7 million tons in 1953. 
This period witnessed the initiation and expansión of the 
national road programme, the plan for improving road surfaces 
in the State of Sao Paulo, the construction of the Paulo 
Alfonso dam and other like projects in the States of Rio, 
Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul, the real 
estáte boom in large cities, etc. This phase of development 
reached its peak in 1953. By 1954, an 11-per-cent decline 
in cement consumption in activities other than building was 
already apparent. 
It will be assumed here that cement consumption, excluding 
building activities, will grow at the same rate as the total 
volume of investment10—that is, by 72 per cent. In other 
words, the possibility of the Government's undertaking 
a vast plan of pubhc works, which might serve as a guide, is 
being tacitly excluded. If it is borne in mind that the number 
of highways will probably increase more slowly, that the 
expansión of coffee areas has already lost Ímpetus, and that, 
in brief, the whole of the economy is entering a stage of conso-
lidation of development, the hypothesis does not seem 
unduly pessimistic. Demand for cement is likely to increase 
by 63 per cent between 1954 and 1962. (See table 66.) 
Table 66. Brazü : projection of the demand for cement 






Building activities 1 ,214 1 , 8 3 3 51 
Other sectors 1 ,532 2 , 6 3 5 72 
TOTAL . . . 2 , 7 4 6 4 , 4 6 8 63 
The contribution of imports to domestic supply began to 
decline in 1954, after a sharp increase in previous years. 
The expansión forecast for domestic production justifies 
the belief that imports will be totally eliminated, perhaps 
from 1955. On the assumption that by 1962 all demand will 
be covered by domestic production, the latter will have to 
expand by 86 per cent in the period under review. 
(c) Equipment 
The mechanical industries producing capital goods are very 
heterogeneous. An over-all survey of these industries is of 
only limited valué for specific purposes. The items in this 
group range from heavy transport material to laboratory 
instruments. The data in table 61 therefore represent a 
substantial simplification of real facts. They show that in 
1949 machinery accounted for one-third of equipment, 
and that the contribution of imports to total supplies amounted 
to 70 per cent in this sector. Electrical material comes next 
in dependence on imports, with 66 per cent, followed by 
transport with 60 per cent. 
Available data fail to indícate the supply trends for each 
group during 1949-54. The analysis will have to be confmed 
to the over-all series, which is based on the domestic production 
index for the whole mechanical industry,11 and on the quantum 
of equipment imports. According to these statistics, the 
share of imports declined to 43 per cent in 1953, after having 
risen from 63 to 66 per cent between 1949 and 1951. (See 
table 67.) 
Table 67. Brazil : equipment supplies 
(Millions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 




1949 6 ,221 3 , 7 3 0 9 , 9 5 1 63 
1950 5 , 8 5 4 4 , 2 0 7 10 ,061 58 
1951 10,821 5 , 6 8 5 16 ,506 66 
1952 9 , 5 6 2 6 , 5 1 9 16 ,081 59 
1953 4 ,883 6 , 8 2 2 11 ,705 42 
1954 5 ,758 7 , 7 7 0 1 3 , 5 2 8 43 
Sources : Banco do Desenvolvimento Económico and Economic Commission 
for Latin America, Joint Working Party. 
The figures in question reveal on the one hand wide fluc-
tuations in imports, and on the other a steady growth of 
domestic production, which has increased at an average annual 
rate of about 15 per cent. 
It must be repeated that the over-all projection of demand 
for equipments is of only limited valué. The heterogeneity 
of the articles produced and the variety of technical processes 
involved in their manufacture make it impossible to set up 
objectives for the mechanical industries as a whole on the basis 
of simplified expedients. In any case, some additional consi-
derations will help to give an idea of the extent of the problem 
and will provide a subsidiary element for the projection of 
demand for iron and steel. 
According to available information, the composition of the 
demand for equipment is more or less as follows : 
Percentage 
1. Industrial machinery 25 
2. Transport equipment 26 
3. Electrical equipment 15 
4. Other equipment 34 
TOTAL 100 
Each group will now be briefly reviewed. Because of its 
múltiple utilization, machinery constitutes the group most 
difficult to analyse. The best method is to calcúlate fixed 
capital stocks in the various industrial groups and to project 
these figures on the basis of capital coefficients12 and of the 
10 Volume of gross investment—that is, the sum o f net investment 
and depreciation. (See table V of the statistical annex to chapter II.) 
11 The index referred to in the text was calculated on the basis of supply 
data for the semi-manufactured ferrous products used by the mechanical 
industry. The index includes the industries producing both capital goods 
and durable consumer goods made with ferrous raw materials. Only 
a rough approximation is possible, owing to the way in which this index 
has been used in the text. 
1 2 Capital coefficients indícate the product-capital ratio for each group 
o f industries. This ratio, when applied to the manufacturing industry 
as a whole, is very stable, to judge from the experience of countries with 
greater economic maturity; but its stability decreases in isolated industries 
owing to the fluctuations in relative prices. The data presented in the 
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probable growth of production. A pre-requisite for this kind 
of projection is a hypothesis of the expansión of the various 
industrial groups. Consideration will be given only to 
consumer-goods industries at present. 
According to the projection of capital stocks for this group 
of industries (see table 68), the fixed capital in consumer-goods 
industries will increase from 114.4 to 169.5 billion cruzeiros, 
or roughly 50 per cent. Machinery accounts for about 
Table 68. Brazil : projections of the reproducible capital stock 
of manufactured consumer goods 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Consumer goods 
Production Index of 
production 
increase 





1954 1962 1954 1962 
Non-durable goods 5 4 . 8 7 79 .21 144 9 7 . 1 1 4 0 . 4 
Foodstuffs 2 0 . 2 6 2 8 . 9 0 143 2 . 0 4 0 . 5 5 7 . 8 
Textiles 15 .37 2 0 . 8 7 136 2 . 1 3 2 . 3 4 3 . 8 
Garments 5 . 1 0 7 . 0 0 137 0 . 8 4 . 1 5 . 6 
Footwear and leather goods 2 . 8 3 3 . 9 3 139 1 . 1 3 . 1 4 . 3 
Pharmaceutical products and toilet arricies 4 . 0 0 7 . 0 1 175 1 . 0 4 . 0 7 . 0 
Paper 1 .91 3 . 7 3 195 3 . 1 5 . 9 1 1 . 6 
Printed matter 3 . 6 0 4 . 9 7 138 1 . 5 5 . 4 7 . 5 
Tobacco and matches 1 . 8 0 2 . 8 0 156 1 . 0 1 . 8 2 . 8 
Durable goods 8 . 4 9 13 .85 164 — 1 0 . 0 1 6 . 3 
China and table-wáre 1 . 7 0 2 . 6 0 153 1 . 2 2 . 0 3 . 1 
Furniture 2 . 4 0 3 . 7 0 154 1 . 5 3 . 6 5 . 6 
Motor vehicles 1 .11 1 . 8 7 168 1 . 0 1 . 1 1 . 9 
Others a 3 . 2 8 5 . 6 8 173 1 . 0 3 . 3 5 . 7 
Industrial chemicals 3 . 3 0 6 . 1 0 185 1 . 4 4 . 6 8 . 5 
Unclassified 1 . 6 0 2 . 5 0 156 1 . 7 2 . 7 4 . 3 
TOTAL . . . 6 8 . 2 6 101 .66 149 — 1 1 4 . 4 169 .5 
Sources : Production data : table 2; product-capital ratio: on the basis of the 1939 Census. 
ft Includes metáis for production of consumer goods : tinplate, aluminium, etc. 
35 per cent of this total, so that its valué will rise from 40 to 
60 billion cruzeiros. On the assumption of consistent growth, 
the increment in 1962 will be 2.8 billion cruzeiros, to which 
must be added the 3 billion cruzeiros for replacement needs.13 
Aggregate demand in the sector of consumer manufactures 
will therefore amount to about 5.8 billion cruzeiros. 
Machinery supplies in 1954 reached a level of about 4.7 bil-
lion cruzeiros14 and it may be assumed that the consumer 
industries absorbed about two-thirds of this total,15 or 3.1 bil-
lion cruzeiros. In that case the increment in the demand 
for machinery in this sector would rise to 87 per cent in the 
period under review. 
Footnote 12 (continued) 
text may help in the appraisal o f the evolution o f fixed capital stocks for 
industry as a whole, but they are o f much less valué for the study o f each 
branch o f industrial production. The coefficients used in the text have 
been calculated on the basis o f the 1939 census. 
13 On the assumption o f an average useful life o f twenty years for 
industrial machinery as a whole. 
1 4 According to the data in table 67, supplies o f equipment in 1954 
were worth 13.5 billion cruzeiros (at 1949 prices); 25 per cent o f this 
amount equals 3.4 billion cruzeiros. Since the price index for capital goods 
rose by 38 per cent between 1949 and 1952, supplies o f industrial 
machinery in 1954, at 1952 prices, stood at 4.7 billion cruzeiros. 
16 Capital-goods industries contribute less than 30 per cent of the aggre-
gate valué o f manufacturing production. Since they have a more rapid 
rate o f growth and higher capital intensity, they probably absorbed at 
least one-third of the new equipment in 1954. 
In order to project the growth of demand for machinery 
in the capital goods industries a simple formula will be used, 
which will probably not be too unrealistic. Hypotheses 
have already been set up for the prospective growth of the 
steel-making, cement and other building-material industries. 
The over-all expansión in these three branches between 1954 
and 1962 would be equivalent to 74 per cent, or 50 per cent 
more than that of the consumer-goods industries. If the 
same difference were assumed for the growth of machinery 
stocks, their valué in the capital-goods industries would 
increase from 201 6 to 35 billion cruzeiros. By the same pro-
cedure, machinery replacement needs can be estimated at 
1.8 billion cruzeiros and demand corresponding to liquid 
investment at 2.6 billion, which gives an aggregate demand 
of 4.4 billion. The increase in relation to the 1954 supply 
level of 1.6 billion in this sector would therefore be 175 per 
cent. Aggregate demand for industrial machinery would 
then rise from 4.7 to 10.2 billion cruzeiros, that is, by 117 per 
cent. 
The demand for electrical and transport equipment will be 
projected on the basis of annual rates of increase of 7.2 and 
6 per cent respectively, estabhshed in the special studies to 
be found in Part Two of this report.17 The average rate 
prevailing in these sectors is applied to the residual group. 
(See table 69.) 
1 9 It was postulated that one-third o f total machinery stocks would 
fall to the share o f the capital-goods industry. 
17 See chapters III and IV. 
Part One—Chapter VI. Production for the domestic market 69 
Table 69. Brazil : projection of the demand for equipment 
(Thousands of millions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Percentage 
increase between 
1954 1962 1954 and 
Industrial machinery 4 . 7 1 0 . 2 117 
Transport equipment 4 . 8 7 . 6 59 
Electrical equipment 3 . 0 5 . 2 74 
Others 6 . 1 1 1 . 2 84 
TOTAL . . . 1 8 . 6 3 4 . 2 84 
What part of this over-all increment in demand for equip-
ment must be supplied by domestic production ? It has already 
been seen that the capacity to import capital goods, in the 
minimum programme, might rise by about 60 per cent.18 But 
if imports of semi-finished capital goods—building materials, 
industrial metáis, etc.—remain at the same level as in 1954, 
the capacity to import equipment might grow by 77 per cent. 
Under this'hypothesis, domestic production would have to 
expand by at least 90 per cent. 
(d) Capital-goods industries as a whole 
The data presented in previous sections permit the establish-
ment of a general target for the production of capital goods 
as a whole. (See table 70.) 
1 8 See section 5 o f the preceding chapter. 
Table 70. Brazil : capital goods industries as a whole : 
production projected for 1962 




1954 and 1962 
Metallurgical 5 . 9 1 2 . 6 113 
Mechanical 1 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 90 
Building materials . . 9 . 3 1 4 . 4 55 
TOTAL . . . 2 5 . 9 4 7 . 4 84 
In order to satisfy the requirements of the minimum 
programme, manufacturing production of capital goods 
would have to expand at an average annual rate of about 
8 per cent, in comparison with only 5 per cent for consumer-
goods manufactures. Within this framework, over-all 
industrial production would grow at the rate of 6 per cent— 
that is, at a much lower rate than during 1950-54 (7.9 per cent) 
and even than in 1940-54 (7.2 per cent). In the less favourable 
circumstances prevailing at present, the slower progress 
envisaged for the immediate future would imply a greater 
effort on the part of enterprises and the community as a whole 
than during the recent past. The effort required to attain the 
targets set forth in chapter II would be very difficult to make 
without the guidance of an over-all programme, both in the 
agricultural sector, which would have to expand at a faster 
rate, and in the industrial sector, for which the possibility 
of a slower rate of growth was assumed. 
S T A T I S T I C A L A P P E N D I X 
Table I. Brazil : estimate of geographic income 
according to the main branches of production 
(At factor cost; billions o f cruzeiros) 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total 
1939 1 0 . 6 4 . 8 1 7 . 0 3 2 . 4 
1940 1 1 . 6 5 . 1 18 .1 3 4 . 8 
1941 1 2 . 9 6 . 6 2 0 . 5 4 0 . 0 
1942 14 .1 7 . 8 2 3 . 3 4 5 . 2 
1943 1 8 . 4 1 0 . 1 2 8 . 1 5 6 . 6 
1944 2 3 . 9 1 4 . 2 3 5 . 8 7 3 . 9 
1945 2 7 . 1 1 6 . 7 4 2 . 3 8 6 . 1 
1946 3 5 . 2 2 1 . 1 5 5 . 1 1 1 1 . 4 
1947 3 9 . 8 2 9 . 3 7 3 . 8 1 4 2 . 9 
1948 4 7 . 6 3 1 . 7 8 0 . 4 159 .7 
1949 5 3 . 6 3 6 . 3 9 1 . 8 181 .7 
1950 6 6 . 0 4 1 . 9 1 0 3 . 6 2 1 1 . 5 
1951 7 6 . 6 5 2 . 3 1 2 3 . 4 2 5 1 . 3 
1952 9 0 . 6 6 3 . 4 1 4 5 . 0 2 9 9 . 0 
1953 1 0 6 . 3 a 6 4 . 2 a 1 7 6 . 9 a 3 4 7 . 4 
Sources : For the period 1939-46 : Economic Commission for I^atin America; 
for 1947-53 : Fundado Getúlio Vargas. 
a Provisional data. 
Table II. Brazil : effect of fluctuations in the terms of trade 





Index of the 
terms of trade 






fluctuations in the 
terms of trade in 
relation to 1952 
(A) (B) (C) (C-A) 
1939 . . . 3 9 . 4 4 5 . 6 1 8 . 0 — 2 1 . 4 
1940 . . . 3 2 . 5 3 8 . 5 1 2 . 5 — 2 0 . 0 
1941 . . 2 5 . 7 4 2 . 9 11.0 — 1 4 . 7 
1942 . . . 2 8 . 1 4 7 . 8 1 3 . 4 — 1 4 . 7 
1943 . . . 2 8 . 9 3 9 . 4 1 1 . 4 — 1 7 . 5 
1944 . . . 3 1 . 7 5 6 . 8 1 8 . 0 — 1 3 . 7 
1945 . . . 3 4 . 1 6 1 . 7 2 1 . 0 — 1 3 . 1 
1946 . . . 4 2 . 2 7 1 . 0 3 0 . 0 — 1 2 . 2 
1947 . . . 3 9 . 8 8 4 . 6 3 3 . 7 — 6 . 1 
1948 . . . 4 0 . 1 7 1 . 4 2 8 . 6 — 1 1 . 5 
1949 . . . 3 6 . 1 7 7 . 7 2 8 . 0 — 8 . 1 
1950 . . 3 1 . 7 117 .4 3 7 . 2 + 5 . 5 
1951 . . . 3 4 . 9 1 0 3 . 0 3 5 . 9 + 1 . 0 
1952 . . 2 6 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 2 6 . 1 — 
1953 . . . 3 0 . 5 1 1 0 . 7 3 3 . 8 + 3 . 3 
1954 . . . 2 9 . 0 1 2 3 . 0 3 6 . 0 + 7 . 0 
Sources: Banco do Desenvolvimento Económico and Economic Commission for 
Latin America, Joint Working Party. 
NOTE.—The quantum expresses the purchasing power of exports according 
to the hypothesis of stability in the terms of trade. The " real valué " represents 
the quantum corrected by variations in the terms of trade. The final column 
shows the difference between " real valué " and the valué of exports under the 
above-mentioned hypothesis of stability in the terms of trade. 
Table III. Brazil : calculation of the index of the general price level 
(Billions of cruzeiros) 
Year 
Gross geographic income General index of prices 
(At current prices) (At 1952 prices) (1952 = 100) (1939 = 100) 
1939 3 9 . 3 1 7 8 . 9 2 2 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1940 4 2 . 3 180 .3 2 3 . 5 1 0 6 . 8 
1941 4 8 . 3 195 .3 2 4 . 7 112 .3 
1942 5 5 . 0 188 .8 2 9 . 1 1 3 2 . 3 
1943 6 9 . 5 1 9 1 . 5 . 3 6 . 3 1 6 5 . 0 
1944 8 9 . 6 2 0 5 . 7 4 3 . 6 198 .2 
1945 1 0 4 . 4 2 2 1 . 5 4 7 . 1 214 .1 
1946 133 .5 2 4 5 . 5 5 4 . 4 2 4 7 . 3 
1947 169 .5 2 7 2 . 2 6 2 . 3 2 8 3 . 2 
1948 1 9 0 . 7 2 8 2 . 6 6 7 . 5 3 0 6 . 8 
1949 2 1 7 . 7 2 9 4 . 0 7 4 . 0 3 3 7 . 4 
1950 2 5 2 . 3 3 2 9 . 6 7 6 . 5 3 4 7 . 7 
1951 3 0 7 . 0 3 4 7 . 5 8 8 . 3 4 0 1 . 4 
1952 3 6 0 . 9 3 6 0 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 4 5 4 . 5 
1953 4 2 1 . 6 3 7 9 . 4 111.1 5 0 5 . 0 
NOTE.—The series of income at current prices is the same as for table I, with suitable adjustments; the series of income at 
constant prices is that which appears in table 1 of chapter I. 
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Table IV. Brazil ; : calculation of the index of 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 



















1939 3 8 . 7 6 . 2 3 2 . 5 1 5 3 . 5 2 1 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 
1940 4 2 . 1 6 . 3 3 5 . 8 156 .8 2 2 . 8 1 0 7 . 5 
1941 4 7 . 0 7 . 1 3 9 . 9 165 .9 2 4 . 1 113 .7 
1942 5 2 . 3 7 . 9 4 4 . 4 1 5 9 . 9 2 7 . 8 131.1 
1943 6 6 . 4 1 1 . 2 5 5 . 2 1 6 2 . 6 3 3 . 9 159 .9 
1944 8 5 . 9 1 5 . 2 7 0 . 7 173 .1 4 0 . 8 1 9 2 . 5 
1945 9 9 . 5 1 3 . 9 8 5 . 6 190 .8 4 4 . 9 2 1 1 . 8 
1946 128 .5 2 0 . 5 1 0 8 . 0 2 0 6 . 9 5 2 . 2 2 4 6 . 2 
1947 171 .5 2 6 . 5 145 .0 2 3 6 . 9 6 1 . 2 2 8 8 . 7 
1948 1 9 0 . 7 2 5 . 9 1 6 4 . 8 2 4 5 . 9 6 7 . 0 3 1 6 . 0 
1949 2 1 8 . 2 3 3 . 6 184 .6 2 4 8 . 0 7 4 . 4 3 5 0 . 9 
1950 2 4 7 . 4 3 6 . 7 2 1 0 . 5 2 7 1 . 6 7 7 . 5 3 6 5 . 6 
1951 3 1 4 . 6 5 2 . 8 2 6 1 . 8 2 9 6 . 3 8 8 . 4 4 1 7 . 0 
1952 3 7 7 . 5 6 5 . 6 3 1 1 . 9 3 1 1 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 4 7 1 . 7 
1953 4 1 5 . 8 6 4 . 0 3 5 1 . 8 3 1 6 . 4 1 1 1 . 2 5 2 4 . 5 
NOTE.—The series of expenditure (=total domestic supply) is that which appears in table 1 of chapter I ; the series of 
investment at current prices emanates from the Fundado Getúlio Vargas; the series of consumption at current prices was obtained 
residually; the series of consumption at 1952 prices was also calculated by subtracting investment at constant prices from 
expenditure. 
Table V. Brazil : effect of the net inflow of resources 
on income 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Balance on Balance 
Balance current account as a on current 
of payments on percentage of income account 
Year current account ai current prices at 1952 prices 
1939 — 0 . 6 1 . 5 — 2 . 7 
1940 — 0 . 2 0 . 5 — 0 . 9 
1941 — 1 . 3 2 . 7 — 5 . 3 
1942 — 2 . 7 4 . 9 — 9 . 3 
1943 — 3 . 1 4 . 5 — 8 . 6 
1944 — 3 . 7 4 . 1 — 8 . 4 
1945 — 4 . 9 4 . 7 — 1 0 . 4 
1946 — 5 . 0 3 . 7 — 9 . 1 
1947 + 2 . 3 1 . 4 + 3 . 8 
1948 — 1 . 0 0 . 5 — 1 . 4 
1949 + 0 . 5 0 . 2 + 0 . 6 
1950 — 4 . 9 1 . 9 — 6 . 3 
1951 + 7 . 6 2 . 5 + 8 . 7 
1952 + 1 6 . 7 4 . 6 + 1 6 . 6 
1953 — 5 . 8 1 . 4 — 5 . 3 
Table VI. Brazil : calculation of the exchange rate 
Index Deflator of Index of the parity 
of the General the G.N.P. of the purchasing Rates of 
price level United States power exchange 
Year (1950 = 100) (1950 = 100) of the cruzeiro (Base : 1950) 
1939 2 8 . 7 5 4 . 5 5 2 . 7 1 3 . 2 
1940 3 0 . 6 5 5 . 4 5 5 . 2 1 3 . 8 
1941 . . . . 3 2 . 2 5 9 . 8 5 3 . 8 1 3 . 5 
1942 3 7 . 9 6 8 . 0 5 5 . 7 1 3 . 9 
1943 4 7 . 3 7 2 . 8 6 5 . 0 1 6 . 3 
1944 5 6 . 8 7 4 . 3 7 6 . 4 1 9 . 1 
1945 6 1 . 4 7 6 . 6 8 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 
1946 7 0 . 9 8 3 . 3 8 5 . 1 2 1 . 3 
1947 8 1 . 4 9 2 . 0 8 8 . 5 2 2 . 1 
1948 . . . . 8 8 . 3 9 8 . 7 8 9 . 5 2 2 . 4 
1949 9 6 . 9 9 7 . 9 9 9 . 0 2 4 . 8 
1950 . 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 2 5 . 0 
1951 . . . . . 115 .1 108 .0 1 0 6 . 6 2 6 . 7 
1952 . 130 .4 1 1 0 . 0 118 .5 2 9 . 6 
1953 . 1 4 4 . 8 1 1 1 . 0 1 3 0 . 5 3 2 . 6 
NOTE.—The basic data were calculated from estimates of the Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento Económico and the Superintendencia da Moeda e do Crédito, 
adjusted by the rates of exchange shown in table VI. I t has been assumed that the 
ratio balance income would be the same at constant prices as at current prices. 
NOTE.—The estimate of parity in the base year (1950) is based on observation 
of relatively normal years, such as 1929 and 1937, and has been confirmed by a 
survey made in Rio at the request of the United Nations. 
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Table VII. Brazil : estimate of investment 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Table VIII. Brazil : estimate of investment at constant prices 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Gross Net Gross Net 
Year investment Depreciation investment Year investment Depreciation investment 
1939 6 . 2 3 . 3 2 . 9 1939 2 2 . 7 1 2 . 0 1 0 . 7 
1940 6 . 3 3 . 4 2 . 9 1940 2 2 . 6 1 2 . 2 1 0 . 4 
1941 7 . 1 3 . 7 3 . 4 1941 2 4 . 1 1 2 . 5 1 1 . 6 
1942 7 . 9 5 . 2 2 . 7 1942 1 9 . 6 1 2 . 9 6 . 7 
1943 1 1 . 2 7 . 2 4 . 0 1943 2 0 . 3 1 3 . 1 7 . 2 
1944 1 5 . 2 8 . 4 6 . 8 1944 2 4 . 2 1 3 . 4 1 0 . 8 
1945 1 3 . 9 9 . 3 4 . 6 1945 2 0 . 3 1 3 . 6 6 . 7 
1946 . . . . . 2 0 . 5 9 . 6 1 0 . 9 1946 2 9 . 5 1 3 . 8 1 5 . 7 
1947 2 6 . 5 9 . 7 1 6 . 8 1947 3 9 . 1 1 4 . 3 2 4 . 8 
1948 2 5 . 9 1 1 . 1 1 4 . 8 1948 3 5 . 3 15 .1 2 0 . 2 
1949 3 3 . 6 1 1 . 7 2 1 . 9 1949 4 6 . 6 1 6 . 3 3 0 . 3 
1950 3 6 . 7 1 2 . 2 2 4 . 5 1950 5 1 . 7 1 7 . 2 3 4 . 5 
1951 5 2 . 8 1 6 . 0 3 6 . 8 1951 5 9 . 9 1 8 . 2 4 1 . 7 
1952 6 5 . 6 1 9 . 3 4 6 . 3 1952 6 5 . 6 1 9 . 3 4 6 . 3 
1953 6 4 . 0 * 2 2 . 7 4 1 . 3 1953 5 7 . 7 2 0 . 5 3 7 . 2 
1954 5 9 . 0 a 2 1 . 8 3 7 . 2 
Sources: For gross investment: Funda^ao Getúlio Vargas; for depreciation 
Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
• Preliminary estímate. 
Source : Economic Commission for I«atin America. 
* Preliminary estimate. 
Table IX. Brazil : distribution of expenditure between 
consumption and investment 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Investment 
Gross as a percentage 
Year Expenditure Consumption investment of expenditure 
1939 3 8 . 7 3 2 . 5 6 . 2 1 6 . 0 
1940 4 2 . 1 3 5 . 8 6 . 3 1 5 . 0 
1941 4 7 . 0 3 9 . 8 7 . 1 1 5 . 1 
1942 5 1 . 9 4 4 . 0 7 . 9 1 5 . 2 
1943 6 6 . 4 5 5 . 2 1 1 . 2 1 6 . 7 
1944 8 5 . 9 7 0 . 7 1 5 . 2 1 7 . 7 
1945 9 9 . 5 8 5 . 6 1 3 . 9 1 4 . 0 
1946 . . . 1 2 8 . 5 1 0 8 . 0 2 0 . 5 1 6 . 0 
1947 . . . 171 .5 1 4 5 . 0 2 6 . 5 1 5 . 5 
1948 . . . 190 .7 1 6 4 . 8 2 5 . 9 1 3 . 6 
1949 . . . 2 1 8 . 2 1 8 4 . 6 3 3 . 6 1 5 . 4 
1950 . . . 2 4 7 . 2 2 1 0 . 5 3 6 . 7 1 4 . 8 
1951 . . . 3 1 4 . 6 2 6 1 . 8 5 2 . 8 1 6 . 8 
1952 . . . 3 7 7 . 5 3 1 1 . 9 6 5 . 6 1 7 . 4 
1953 . . . . 4 1 5 . 8 3 5 1 . 8 6 4 . 0 1 5 . 4 
Source: Preceding tables. 
Table X . Brazil: utilization of geographic income 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Year 
Geographic 




1939 3 9 . 3 3 2 . 5 6 . 8 1 7 . 3 
1940 4 2 . 3 3 5 . 8 6 . 5 1 5 . 4 
1941 4 8 . 3 3 9 . 9 8 . 4 1 7 . 4 
1942 5 5 . 0 4 4 . 4 1 0 . 6 1 9 . 3 
1943 6 9 . 5 5 5 . 2 1 4 . 3 2 0 . 6 
1944 8 9 . 6 7 0 . 7 1 8 . 9 2 1 . 1 
1945 . . . . 1 0 4 . 4 8 5 . 6 1 8 . 8 1 8 . 0 
1946 . . . . 133 .5 1 0 8 . 0 2 5 . 5 19 .1 
1947 . . . . 1 6 9 . 5 1 4 5 . 0 2 4 . 5 1 4 . 5 
1948 . . . . 1 9 0 . 7 1 6 4 . 8 2 5 . 9 1 3 . 6 
1949 . . . . 2 1 7 . 7 1 8 4 . 6 3 3 . 1 1 5 . 2 
1950 . . . . 2 5 2 . 3 2 1 0 . 5 4 1 . 8 1 6 . 6 
1951 . . . . 3 0 7 . 0 2 6 1 . 8 4 5 . 2 1 4 . 7 
1952 . . . . 3 6 0 . 9 3 1 1 . 9 4 9 . 0 1 3 . 6 
1953 , , , 4 2 1 . 6 3 5 1 . 8 6 9 . 8 1 6 . 6 
NOTE.—The series of income and consumption are those which appeared in 
previous tables; the series of saving was obtained residually. 
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Table XI. Brazil : distribution of income between 
consumption and saving 
(Billions o f cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Year 
Geographic 




1939 . . . . 178 .9 153 .5 2 5 . 4 1 4 . 2 
1940 . . . . 180 .3 156 .8 2 3 . 5 1 3 . 0 
1941 . . . . 195 .3 1 6 5 . 9 2 9 . 4 1 5 . 0 
1942 . . . . 1 8 8 . 8 1 5 9 . 9 2 8 . 9 1 5 . 3 
1943 . . . . 191 .5 1 6 2 . 6 2 8 . 9 1 5 . 1 
1944 . . . . 2 0 5 . 7 173 .1 3 2 . 6 1 5 . 8 
1945 . . . . 2 2 1 . 5 1 9 0 . 8 3 0 . 7 1 3 . 9 
1946 . . . . 2 4 5 . 5 2 0 6 . 9 3 8 . 6 1 5 . 7 
1947 . . . . 2 7 2 . 2 2 3 6 . 9 3 5 . 3 1 3 . 0 
1948 . . . . 2 8 2 . 6 2 4 5 . 9 3 6 . 7 1 3 . 0 
1949 2 9 4 . 0 2 4 8 . 0 4 6 . 0 1 5 . 6 
1950 3 2 9 . 6 2 7 1 . 6 5 8 . 0 1 7 . 6 
1951 3 4 7 . 5 2 9 6 . 3 5 1 . 2 1 4 . 7 
1952 3 6 0 . 9 3 1 1 . 9 4 9 . 0 1 3 . 6 
1953 . . . . . 3 7 9 . 4 3 1 6 . 4 6 3 . 0 1 6 . 6 
1954 • 4 1 6 . 9 3 5 4 . 9 6 2 . 0 1 4 . 9 
Table XII. Brazil: calculation of the net investment rate 









1939 3 6 . 3 2 . 9 8 . 0 
1940 3 8 . 9 2 . 9 7 . 5 
1941 4 4 . 6 3 . 4 7 . 6 
1942 4 9 . 8 2 . 7 5 . 4 
1943 . . . . . 6 2 . 3 4 . 0 6 . 4 
1944 8 1 . 2 6 . 8 8 . 4 
1945 9 5 . 1 4 . 6 4 . 8 
1946 1 2 3 . 9 1 0 . 9 8 . 8 
1947 160 .1 1 6 . 8 1 0 . 5 
1948 1 8 0 . 3 1 4 . 8 8 . 2 
1949 2 0 6 . 6 2 1 . 9 1 0 . 6 
1950 . . . . . . 2 4 0 . 5 2 4 . 5 1 0 . 2 
1951 2 9 0 . 9 3 6 . 8 1 2 . 7 
1952 3 4 1 . 6 4 6 . 3 1 3 . 6 
1953 3 9 8 . 9 4 1 . 3 1 0 . 4 
NOTE.—The series of income and consumption are those which appeared in 
previous tables; the series of saving was obtained residually. 
NOTE.—The series of net income was adjusted to market prices in order to 
render it stricUy comparable with net investment. 
Table XIII. Brazil : income, product and terms of trade 
of the agricultural sector 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Net income 








Terms of trade 
(1952 = 100) 
1939 1 0 . 6 4 5 . 5 6 9 . 1 6 5 . 8 
1940 1 1 . 6 4 9 . 4 6 5 . 1 7 5 . 9 
1941 1 2 . 9 5 2 . 2 6 9 . 4 7 5 . 2 
1942 14 .1 4 8 . 5 6 5 . 0 7 4 . 6 
1943 1 8 . 4 5 0 . 7 6 8 . 0 7 4 . 6 
1944 2 3 . 9 5 4 . 9 6 8 . 2 8 0 . 5 
1945 2 7 . 1 5 7 . 5 6 7 . 6 8 5 . 1 
1946 3 5 . 2 6 4 . 7 74 .1 8 7 . 3 
1947 3 9 . 8 6 4 . 0 7 4 . 7 8 5 . 7 
1948 4 7 . 6 7 0 . 2 7 8 . 6 8 9 . 3 
1949 5 3 . 6 7 2 . 3 8 2 . 8 8 7 . 3 
1950 6 6 . 0 8 6 . 3 8 6 . 6 9 9 . 7 
1951 7 6 . 6 8 6 . 7 8 6 . 4 100 .3 
1952 9 0 . 6 9 0 . 6 9 0 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 
1953 . , . • . . . 1 0 6 . 3 9 5 . 7 9 0 . 7 1 0 5 . 5 
NOTE.—The series of income at current prices is that given in table I ; that 
of income at 1952 prices is the same deflated by the general price index; the series 
of the product was obtained with the index of the production quantum shown 
in table 8 of chapter I. The terms of trade show the extent to which income at 
constant prices increases at a slower or faster rate than real production. 
Table XIV. Brazil : income, product and terms of trade 
of the industrial sector 
Net income 








Terms of trade 
(1952 = 100) 
1939 4 . 8 2 1 . 8 2 5 . 4 8 5 . 8 
1940 5 . 1 2 1 . 7 2 6 . 8 8 1 . 0 
1941 6 . 6 2 6 . 7 2 9 . 5 9 0 . 5 
1942 7 . 8 2 6 . 8 2 8 . 5 9 4 . 0 
1943 . . . 10 .1 2 7 . 8 3 1 . 8 8 7 . 4 
1944 1 4 . 2 3 2 . 6 3 3 . 1 9 8 . 5 
1945 1 6 . 7 3 5 . 5 3 4 . 9 1 0 1 . 7 
1946 2 1 . 1 3 8 . 8 4 0 . 8 9 5 . 1 
1947 2 9 . 3 4 7 . 1 4 2 . 5 1 1 0 . 8 
1948 3 1 . 7 4 6 . 8 4 6 . 6 1 0 0 . 4 
1949 3 6 . 3 4 9 . 0 4 9 . 5 9 9 . 0 
1950 4 1 . 9 5 4 . 8 5 5 . 0 9 9 . 6 
1951 5 2 . 3 5 9 . 2 5 9 . 3 9 9 . 5 
1952 . . . . . . 6 3 . 4 6 3 . 4 6 3 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 
1953 6 4 . 2 5 7 . 1 6 7 . 6 8 4 . 5 
NOTE.—See the note in table X I I I . 
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Table XV. Brazil : income, product and terms of trade 
of the services sector 
Net income at factor cost 
Product Terms of 
Current 1952 at 1952 trade 
Year prices prices prices (1952=100) 
1939 1 7 . 0 7 7 . 3 8 1 . 3 9 5 . 1 
1940 18 .1 7 7 . 0 8 1 . 8 9 4 . 1 
1941 2 0 . 5 8 3 . 0 8 4 . 4 9 8 . 3 
1942 2 3 . 3 8 0 . 1 8 2 . 4 9 7 . 2 
1943 2 8 . 1 TIA 8 2 . 5 9 3 . 8 
1944 3 5 . 8 8 2 . 3 8 7 . 7 9 3 . 8 
1945 4 2 . 3 8 9 . 8 9 5 . 6 9 3 . 9 
1946 5 5 . 1 1 0 1 . 3 1 0 3 . 4 9 8 . 0 
1947 7 3 . 5 1 1 8 . 2 1 1 3 . 4 104 .2 
1948 . . . . . 7 8 . 7 116 .1 1 1 9 . 6 9 7 . 1 
1949 9 1 . 2 123 .1 1 2 0 . 8 1 0 1 . 9 
1950 . . . . 1 0 3 . 2 1 3 4 . 9 1 3 0 . 2 1 0 3 . 6 
1951 . . . . 1 2 2 . 5 1 3 8 . 7 1 4 4 . 3 9 6 . 1 
1952 . . . . 1 4 5 . 0 1 4 5 . 0 1 4 5 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1953 . . . . 164 .2 1 4 7 . 8 1 4 8 . 8 111.1 
NOTE.—See the note in table X I I I . 
Table XVII. Brazil : distribution of consumer expenditure 
between imports and domestically-produced commodities 









as a percentage 
of the total 
1939 . . . . . . 1 5 3 . 5 1 6 . 8 1 3 6 . 7 1 0 . 9 
1940 . . . . . . 156 .8 1 5 . 4 1 4 1 . 4 9 . 8 
1941 . . . . . . 1 6 5 . 9 1 5 . 2 1 5 0 . 7 9 . 2 
1942 . . . . . . 1 5 9 . 9 1 2 . 6 1 4 7 . 3 7 . 9 
1943 . . . . . . 1 6 2 . 6 1 4 . 8 1 4 7 . 8 9 . 1 
1944 . . . . . . 173 .1 17 .1 1 5 6 . 0 9 . 9 
1945 . . . . . . 1 9 0 . 8 1 6 . 0 1 7 4 . 8 8 . 4 
1946 . . . . . . 2 0 6 . 9 1 4 . 7 1 9 2 . 2 7 . 1 
1947 . . . . . . 2 3 6 . 9 2 3 . 1 2 1 3 . 8 9 . 8 
1948 . . . . . . 2 4 5 . 9 2 2 . 6 2 2 3 . 3 9 . 2 
1949 . . . . . . 2 4 8 . 0 2 4 . 8 2 2 3 . 2 1 0 . 0 
1950 . . . . . . 2 7 1 . 6 3 0 . 1 2 4 1 . 5 11 .1 
1951 . . . . . . 2 9 6 . 3 3 9 . 0 2 5 7 . 3 1 3 . 2 
1952 . . . . . . 3 1 1 . 9 3 4 . 5 2 7 7 . 4 11 .1 
1953 . . . . . . 3 1 6 . 4 3 2 . 8 2 8 3 . 6 1 0 . 4 
1954 . . . . . . 3 5 4 . 9 3 9 . 0 3 1 5 . 9 11.0 
Table XVI. Brazil : distribution of expenditure between 
imports and domestically - produced commodities 












1939 . . 176 .2 2 3 . 6 1 5 2 . 6 1 3 . 4 
1940 . . 1 7 9 . 4 2 0 . 8 1 5 8 . 6 1 1 . 6 
1941 . . 1 9 0 . 0 2 1 . 4 1 6 8 . 6 1 1 . 3 
1942 . . 179 .5 16 .1 1 6 3 . 4 9 . 0 
1943 . . 1 8 2 . 9 1 9 . 2 163 .7 1 0 . 5 
1944 . . 1 9 7 . 3 2 3 . 4 1 7 3 . 9 1 1 . 9 
1945 . . 2 1 1 . 1 2 3 . 6 1 8 7 . 5 1 1 . 2 
1946 . . 2 3 6 . 4 2 6 . 7 2 0 9 . 7 1 1 . 3 
1947 . . 2 7 6 . 0 4 0 . 9 2 3 5 . 1 1 4 . 8 
1948 . . 2 8 1 . 2 3 6 . 9 2 4 4 . 3 1 3 . 1 
1949 . . 2 9 4 . 6 3 9 . 3 2 5 5 . 3 1 3 . 3 
1950 . . 3 2 3 . 3 4 3 . 1 2 8 0 . 2 1 3 . 3 
1951 . . 3 5 6 . 2 6 1 . 3 2 9 4 . 9 1 7 . 2 
1952 . . 3 7 7 . 5 5 5 . 0 3 2 2 . 5 1 4 . 6 
1953 . . 3 7 4 . 1 4 4 . 8 3 2 9 . 3 1 2 . 0 
1954 . , • • 4 1 3 . 9 5 5 . 0 3 5 8 . 9 1 3 . 3 
N O T E . - —The exchange rates appearing in table VI were used to calcúlate imports. 
Table XVIII. Brazil : : share of exports in the formation 
of geographic income 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 







1939 . . 3 9 . 3 5 . 6 3 3 . 7 1 6 . 6 
1940 . . 4 2 . 3 5 . 0 3 7 . 3 1 3 . 4 
1941 . . 4 8 . 3 6 . 7 4 1 . 6 16 .1 
1942 . . 5 5 . 0 7 . 5 4 7 . 5 1 5 . 8 
1943 . . 6 9 . 5 8 . 7 6 0 . 8 1 4 . 3 
1944 . . 8 9 . 6 1 0 . 7 7 8 . 9 1 3 . 6 
1945 . . . . . . 1 0 4 . 4 1 2 . 2 9 2 . 2 1 3 . 2 
1946 . . . . . . 1 3 3 . 5 1 8 . 2 1 1 5 . 3 1 5 . 8 
1947 . . . . . . 1 6 9 . 5 2 1 . 2 1 4 8 . 3 1 4 . 3 
1948 . . . . . . 190 .7 2 1 . 7 1 6 9 . 0 1 2 . 8 
1949 . . . . . . 2 1 7 . 7 2 0 . 2 197 .5 1 0 . 2 
1950 . . . . . . 2 5 2 . 3 2 4 . 9 2 2 7 . 4 1 0 . 9 
1951 . . . . . . 3 0 7 . 0 3 2 . 5 2 7 4 . 5 1 1 . 8 
1952 . . . . . . 3 6 0 . 9 2 6 . 1 3 3 4 . 8 7 . 8 
1953 . . . . . . 4 2 1 . 6 3 2 . 0 3 8 9 . 6 8 . 2 
NOTE.—See the note in table XVI. 
NOTE.—The f.o.b. valué of exports at the official rate of exchange has been used, 
since it reflects total export earnings. 
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Table X I X ; Brazil : Consolidated account of receipts and expenditure in the public sector 
(Millions o f cruzeiros) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
¿urrent account 
Receipts 2 8 , 8 3 3 . 6 3 3 , 8 2 6 . 0 4 0 , 4 7 0 . 4 4 6 , 4 5 9 . 4 6 2 , 1 5 8 . 2 7 0 , 2 3 3 . 4 
Direct taxes 6 , 4 5 0 . 9 7 , 2 4 7 . 6 8 , 4 5 1 . 6 1 0 , 0 2 6 . 4 1 3 , 2 0 5 . 4 1 6 , 3 5 1 . 4 
Indirect taxes 1 8 , 7 9 7 . 2 2 2 , 1 5 3 . 4 2 6 , 6 6 2 . 8 3 0 , 8 6 0 . 0 4 1 , 8 0 5 . 3 4 6 , 0 1 9 . 1 
Other receipts 3 , 5 8 5 . 5 4 , 4 2 6 . 0 5 , 3 5 6 . 0 5 , 5 7 3 . 0 7 , 1 4 7 . 5 7 , 8 6 2 . 9 
Expenditure 2 1 , 8 7 4 . 6 2 5 , 8 4 1 . 7 3 2 , 2 9 4 . 2 3 8 , 7 1 2 . 0 4 5 , 3 2 6 . 3 5 5 , 7 0 8 . 2 
Employees* salaries 1 0 , 1 2 4 . 3 1 2 , 3 0 2 . 3 1 4 , 6 7 8 . 0 1 6 , 9 6 0 . 8 2 0 , 3 9 8 . 1 2 5 , 5 8 5 . 6 
Other purchases of goods and services 5 , 6 7 6 . 6 6 , 5 0 2 . 6 8 , 0 8 8 . 3 1 0 , 4 4 8 . 6 1 1 , 4 1 8 . 2 1 3 , 5 6 8 . 6 
Other expenditures 6 , 0 7 3 . 7 7 , 0 3 6 . 8 9 , 5 2 7 . 9 1 1 , 3 0 2 . 6 1 3 , 5 1 0 . 0 1 6 , 5 5 4 . 0 
Balance + 6 , 9 5 9 . 0 + 7 , 9 8 4 . 3 + 8 , 1 7 6 . 2 + 7 , 7 4 7 . 4 + 1 6 , 8 3 1 . 9 + 1 4 , 5 2 5 . 2 
Capital account 
Receipts 6 , 9 6 3 . 7 8 , 1 4 3 . 1 8 , 2 6 4 . 3 7 , 7 9 6 . 7 1 6 , 8 5 3 . 1 1 4 , 6 9 8 . 4 
Balance on current account 6 , 9 5 9 . 0 7 , 9 8 4 . 3 8 , 1 7 6 . 2 7 , 7 4 7 . 4 1 6 , 8 3 1 . 9 1 4 , 5 2 5 . 2 
Liquidation o f real assets 4 . 7 1 5 8 . 8 8 8 . 1 4 9 . 3 2 1 . 2 1 7 3 . 2 
Expenditure 7 , 3 2 4 . 3 9 , 1 6 7 . 7 1 3 , 0 5 9 . 8 1 5 , 4 2 9 . 8 1 7 , 2 3 8 . 2 2 1 , 5 7 8 . 6 
Purchase of new real assets 5 , 7 7 7 . 6 8 , 1 1 8 . 6 1 1 , 5 3 6 . 3 1 4 , 1 0 1 . 8 1 5 , 4 8 2 . 6 1 5 , 2 3 9 . 0 
Purchase of existing real assets 9 3 . 8 9 2 . 0 1 6 5 . 6 213 .1 1 3 9 . 5 1 8 3 . 0 
Increase ( + ) or decrease (—) in inventories — 1 3 . 7 + 1 0 . 8 — 1 6 . 3 + 6 . 3 + 5 . 7 + 4 , 4 5 3 . 5 
Financial transactions 1 , 4 6 6 . 6 9 4 6 . 3 1 , 3 7 4 . 2 1 , 1 0 8 . 6 1 , 6 1 0 . 4 1 , 7 0 3 . 1 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Table X X . Brazil : valué of agricultural production 
(Billions o f cruzeiros) 
Year Total 
1939 1 0 . 6 
1940 1 1 . 6 
1941 1 2 . 9 
1942 14 .1 
1943 1 8 . 4 
1944 2 3 . 9 
1945 2 7 . 1 
1946 3 5 . 2 
1947 3 9 . 8 
1948 4 7 . 6 
1949 5 3 . 6 
1950 6 6 . 0 
1951 7 6 . 6 
1952 9 0 . 6 
1953 106 .3 
1954 114 .3 
Production for the 
domestic market 
7 . 0 
8 . 3 
9 . 5 
10.8 




2 9 . 8 
3 6 . 6 
3 9 . 2 
42 .1 
4 9 . 9 
6 0 . 4 
7 5 . 6 
7 3 . 5 
Production 
for export 
3 . 6 
3 . 3 
3 . 4 
3 . 3 
4 . 9 
6 . 2 
6 . 3 
9 . 2 
10.0 
11.0 
1 4 . 4 
2 3 . 9 
2 6 . 4 
3 0 . 2 
3 0 . 7 
4 0 . 8 
Table XXI . Brazil : index of the quantum 
of agricultural production 
(1939 = 100) 
Year Total 




1940 9 4 . 7 9 5 . 4 9 5 . 4 
1941 100 .3 1 0 6 . 4 9 6 . 4 
1942 9 3 . 9 1 0 7 . 2 7 8 . 1 
1943 9 8 . 4 1 1 0 . 3 9 5 . 2 
1944 9 8 . 7 1 1 8 . 8 8 8 . 9 
1945 9 7 . 7 1 2 4 . 9 7 8 . 3 
1946 107 .5 141 .1 8 2 . 5 
1947 1 0 8 . 0 1 4 1 . 2 8 1 . 3 
1948 1 1 3 . 6 1 4 8 . 8 8 2 . 9 
1949 119 .7 1 5 3 . 2 9 2 . 0 
1950 1 2 5 . 2 165 .7 9 2 . 5 
1951 1 2 5 . 0 166 .8 8 8 . 0 
1952 1 3 1 . 0 1 6 7 . 6 1 0 4 . 2 
1953 131.1 1 7 9 . 7 9 0 . 0 
1954 1 4 1 . 4 1 8 4 . 0 9 6 . 0 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
NOTE.—The total, which was calculated at 1939 prices, includes eighteen main 
products. Production for export comprises coffee, cacao and cotton (fibreand seed). 
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Table XXII. Brazil : index of prices paid 
to the agricultural producer 
(1939 - 100) 








1940 1 1 5 . 5 1 2 4 . 3 9 6 . 1 
1941 1 2 1 . 3 1 2 7 . 5 9 7 . 9 
1942 1 4 1 . 6 1 4 3 . 9 1 0 7 . 4 
1943 1 7 6 . 4 1 7 4 . 9 1 4 3 . 0 
1944 2 2 8 . 5 2 1 2 . 9 1 9 3 . 7 
1945 2 6 1 . 7 2 3 7 . 9 2 2 3 . 5 
1946 3 0 8 . 9 2 6 3 . 2 3 0 9 . 8 
1947 3 4 7 . 7 3 0 1 . 5 3 4 1 . 7 
1948 3 9 5 . 3 3 5 1 . 4 3 6 8 . 6 
1949 4 2 2 . 5 3 6 5 . 5 4 3 4 . 8 
1950 4 9 7 . 3 3 6 2 . 9 7 1 7 . 7 
1951 5 7 8 . 1 4 2 7 . 4 8 3 3 . 3 
1952 6 5 2 . 4 4 8 0 . 2 8 0 5 . 1 
1953 7 6 4 . 9 6 0 1 . 0 9 3 8 . 2 
1954 7 6 2 . 6 5 7 0 . 7 1 , 1 8 0 . 5 
NOTE.—The series presented in this table were obtained by comparing those 
in tables X X and X X I . 
(1939 = 100) 
Year 
Imports Production 
of of mechanical 
capital goods industries Building Total 
1940 5 9 . 3 1 0 7 . 5 120 .2 9 6 . 5 
1941 7 0 . 0 9 6 . 2 145 .7 1 0 6 . 3 
1942 3 7 . 0 7 8 . 0 1 4 3 . 6 8 9 . 3 
1943 4 6 . 4 8 4 . 0 1 3 3 . 6 9 0 . 5 
1944 5 3 . 4 1 3 2 . 6 158 .5 1 1 6 . 3 
1945 8 2 . 5 1 1 7 . 0 187 .1 132 .1 
1946 147 .4 1 6 9 . 6 2 5 5 . 7 1 9 4 . 8 
1947 2 3 7 . 9 2 3 5 . 9 2 6 4 . 9 2 4 7 . 5 
1948 2 1 9 . 3 2 0 0 . 8 2 3 4 . 2 2 1 9 . 5 
1949 2 5 7 . 4 2 4 3 . 2 2 3 0 . 3 2 4 3 . 0 
1950 3 5 1 . 5 2 7 1 . 0 2 4 0 . 7 2 8 6 . 0 
1951 3 4 6 . 3 3 6 4 . 6 2 8 8 . 7 3 2 9 . 9 
1952 3 1 1 . 6 4 1 9 . 3 3 4 8 . 6 3 5 7 . 1 
1953 160 .4 4 3 8 . 2 3 5 2 . 0 3 1 4 . 3 
1954 2 1 4 . 1 5 0 0 . 0 2 8 6 . 2 3 1 9 . 0 
NOTE. —The index of production of mechanical industries is based on an 
estimate of iron and steel input. The building index was provided by the 
Fundaban Getúlio Vargas. The quantum of imports was calculated at 1948 
prices. The aggregate index was weighted as follows (1949 Census data) : 
Imports 32.9 
Mechanical industry 29 .3 
Building 37.8 
T O T A L 1 0 0 . 0 
Part Two 
PROJECTIONS IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF ACTIVITY 

Chapter I 
THE PROJECTION OF EXPORTS 
In establishing projections for the external sector in Part the pardal loss of the Germán and Japanese markets. In 
One of this study, two hypotheses were formulated as to the 1937-38, these two markets absorbed 22.6 per cent of all 
probable future behaviour of the export quantum. This exports, a proportion which had fallen to 1 per cent by 1948. 
chapter contains an analysis of the evolution of the quantum Except for Western Germany, continental Europe's share 
between 1937 and 1954. It begins with a geographic survey in Brazilian exports had recovered by 1948, when it stood 
to determine the national markets in which Brazil has lost at 33.2 per cent as compared with 32.5 per cent in 1937-38. 
ground. There follows a summary of some of the more im- It is thus clear that the relative increase of the share of the 
portant products; coffee, however, requires a separate study.1 Americas merely counter-balanced the loss of the Germán 
and Japanese markets. Nevertheless, a marked recovery in 
I . ANALYSIS BY COUNTRIES shipments to these countries has been taking place during 
During the period immediately preceding the Second ^ast y e a r s < 
World War (1937-38), about 40 per cent of Brazilian exports L U n i ( c d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a 
were shipped to the Americas. By the time the war was over, 
this figure had risen to 60 per cent. Since the aggregate quantum The valué of imports from Brazil has increased substantially 
did not increase, it is clear that the expansión of BraziTs in the United States. In 1937-38, Brazil's share of United 
sales to the Americas simply offset the reducüon of ship- States imports amounted to 4.3 per cent; in 1948 it had risen 
ments to other markets. It should not be overlooked, to 7.2 per cent and by 1949 reached 8.3 per cent. The major 
however, that the relative increase in coffee prices—the reason for the increase during the latter year was the decline 
United States is the principal market for this product—also in aggregate imports by the United States as a result of a 
helped to bring about this shift. relative recession in business activity, although special condi-
Brazil's exports to Latin America had increased from 6.6 t i o n s affecting the coffee market were also helpful for Brazil. 
per cent in 1937-38 to 13.8 per cent in 1948. In succeeding D u r i n g t h e ^ subsequent years, the valué of United States 
years, however, they declined to a level of 8.1 per cent in ^ P ^ t s rose sharply (34 per cent in 1950 and 24 per cent 
I95Q in 1951), but the relative position of Brazil was unchanged. 
^ . i i • T* -v (See table 71). Although the valué of United States imports The most unportant structural change in Braman exports a l m Q S t r e m a i n e d a t t h e 1 9 5 1 k l e v e l t h r o u g h o u t 1952 and 
b e t w e e n t h e p r e " w a r p e n o d a n d r e c e n t y e a r s c o n s l s t e d o f 1953, Brazil's share fell to 7.5 and 6.8 per cent respectively. 
1 See chapter II of Part T w o . In 1954, a year in which Brazilian sales to the United States 
Table 71. Brazil : Quantum of exports to ten selected countries 
1937-38 
(average) 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
Absolute valué (millions of doUars) 
United States 1 0 9 . 2 5 1 3 . 9 5 5 1 . 8 7 1 5 . 2 9 1 0 . 6 8 0 8 . 4 7 4 5 . 2 5 7 8 . 4 
Argentina 1 4 . 8 1 1 1 . 0 8 3 . 7 7 5 . 7 1 1 6 . 9 9 5 . 5 7 6 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 
United Kingdom 3 9 . 6 9 5 . 6 8 6 . 6 1 1 3 . 7 1 8 5 . 3 4 3 . 6 7 0 . 7 7 4 . 4 
Western Germany 8 1 . 4 1 1 . 8 2 4 . 6 2 0 . 6 7 4 . 9 7 4 . 3 147.2 1 8 7 . 5 
Italy 7 . 9 3 5 . 3 2 9 . 4 3 0 . 7 3 4 . 7 3 7 . 9 4 6 . 3 5 3 . 2 
France 2 2 . 5 3 1 . 9 3 2 . 0 5 3 . 3 8 8 . 8 8 5 . 5 8 7 . 6 9 1 . 7 
Netherlands 7 . 5 2 5 . 8 1 7 . 0 1 8 . 8 2 8 . 7 2 0 . 7 3 7 . 3 4 5 . 6 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1 1 . 6 5 0 . 7 4 2 . 0 4 0 . 7 3 8 . 5 3 0 . 8 2 3 . 2 2 2 . 0 
Sweden 9 . 1 3 0 . 9 3 3 . 6 3 8 . 7 5 3 . 8 5 4 . 0 5 4 . 2 5 6 . 3 
Japan 1 5 . 6 0 . 3 3 . 5 1 . 6 3 2 . 1 1 5 . 4 4 0 . 8 6 8 . 3 
Relative valué (percentages of the total of each country's imports) 
United States 4 . 3 7 . 2 8 . 3 8 . 1 8 . 3 7 . 5 6 . 8 5 . 7 
Argentina 3 . 3 7 . 4 7 . 8 7 . 2 8 . 1 8 . 0 8 . 7 1 0 . 5 
United Kingdom 0 . 8 1 . 1 1 . 0 1 . 6 1 . 7 0 . 5 0 . 8 0 . 8 
Western Germany 3 . 5 0 . 8 1 . 1 0 . 8 2 . 1 1 . 9 3 . 9 4 . 1 
Italy 1 . 2 2 . 3 1 . 9 2 . 1 1 . 6 1 - 6 1 . 9 2 . 2 
France 1 . 5 0 . 9 1 . 0 1 . 7 1 . 9 1 . 9 2 . 2 2 . 2 
Netherlands 0 . 9 1 . 4 0 . 9 0 . 9 1 . 1 0 . 9 1 . 6 1 . 6 
Belgium-Luxembourg 1 . 4 2 . 5 2 . 3 2 . 1 1 . 5 1 . 3 1 . 0 0.-9 
Sweden 1 . 7 2 . 3 2 . 9 3 . 3 3 . 0 3 . 1 3 . 4 3 . 2 
Japan 1 . 7 — 0 . 4 0 . 2 1 . 6 0 . 8 1 . 7 2 . 8 
Source: United Nations, Direction of International Trade. 
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1949. Consequently, if Brazil maintained the 1949 share 
of the over-all valué throughout the years 1950 and 1951, 
it may be assumed that the effect of the rise in relative coffee 
prices was neutralized by the real or virtual decline in the 
quantum of BraziTs exports to the United States. This 
downward movement, which began early in 1950, was 
chiefly a reflection of the reduced volume of coffee sales. 
Since 1952, a sharp decline in the quantum of the other 
products was also apparent. (See table 72.) 
The export quantum (coffee excepted) closely followed 
the increase in aggregate United States imports until 1951. 
During subsequent years, however, aggregate imports con-
tinued to rise, while, in contrast, Brazilian shipments declined 
to less than half. The most pronounced drop in BraziTs 
exports to the United States—except for that of coffee in 
1954—represented agricultural raw materials and vegetable 
extracts. (See table 73.) Lower exports of castor-oil seed, 
carnauba wax, babazú and sisal were mainly responsible 
for the decline in this group, 
Table 73. Brazil : Indices of exports to the United States 
(1948 = 100) 
Agricultural raw 
materials and Manufactures and 
Total Foodstuffs vegetable extracts Minerals semi-manufactures 
Year Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 . . . . . 73 23 80 24 40 16 9 29 6 16 
1936 . . . . . 72 26 77 27 50 22 23 18 9 21 
1937 . . . . . 64 30 67 30 56 29 45 33 7 28 
1938 . . . . . 80 24 86 23 52 24 15 55 13 29 
1939 . . . . . 86 25 89 24 77 33 42 45 32 43 
1940 . . . . . 81 26 84 23 76 37 80 62 32 57 
1941 . . . . . 103 34 98 32 126 44 150 57 169 48 
1942 . . . 63 49 57 46 87 62 96 59 120 78 
1943 . . . . . 85 49 83 47 86 48 125 90 163 83 
1944 . . . . . 104 48 103 49 86 33 113 75 232 105 
1945 . . . . . 103 53 99 50 96 66 144 60 147 100 
1946 . . . . . 97 76 97 72 89 102 86 60 169 117 
1947 . . . . . 85 100 86 99 87 117 73 61 73 112 
1948 . . . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 . . . . . 108 105 112 108 186 87 100 134 95 96 
1950 . . . . . 93 169 88 183 102 98 150 131 222 77 
1951 . . . . . 96 189 90 199 99 138 202 203 278 94 
1952 . . . . . 72 185 77 202 46 88 195 239 156 80 
1953 . . . . . 74 210 75 229 46 104 126 237 188 73 
1954 49 — 48 — 45 — 115 — 99 — 
Source: Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
declined to near the 1949 level, the proportion dropped to 5.7 
per cent. 
The price index for imports to the Americas from Brazil 
has risen much more than that of all imports, especially since 
Table 72. Brazil : Indices of trade with the United States 
(1948 = 100) 
Exports 
Aggregate 
Other Percentage United States 
Year Total Coffee products of coffee11 impotts 
1948 100 100 100 73 100 
1949 108 105 116 80 98 
1950 93 83 121 86 119 
1951 96 90 114 83 117 
1952 72 80 50 86 123 
1953 74 77 67 83 128 
1954 49 48 51 88 119 
Sources : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and United Nations 
publications. 
a At current prices. 
2. The United Kingdom 
In relation to the pre-war period, Brazil was able to increase 
its share of the British market from 0.83 per cent in 1937-38 
to 1.14 per cent in 1948. BraziTs share rose slighdy higher 
in 1950-51, through the relative increase in raw material 
prices, but during 1952 the percentage dropped sharply and 
the quantum fell to one-quarter of the 1951 level. The 
improvement up to 1951 was all the more significant because 
aggregate imports into the United Kingdom had expanded 
relatively little in comparison with the pre-war level. 
Cotton plays a predominant part in Brazil's exports to 
Great Britain. In 1937-38, this commodity contributed 
57 per cent of the total 'valué of BraziTs shipments to the 
British market and 52 per cent of that in 1948-1951. Never-
theless, Brazil achieved greater success on the market of the 
United Kingdom with products of less relative importance. 
(See table 74.) 
In 1952, the decrease in the " other products " group of 
exports was similar to that observed in sales to the United 
States. But, while coffee maintained its position on the 
United States market, cotton shipments to Great Britain 
disappeared altogether. 
The cotton problem is considered separately.2 It will be 
seen that any possibilities of increasing sales to the market 
of the United Kingdom are subj ect to a series of 
limitations the most important of which is the stationary level 
2 See sub-section 1 in section II o f this chapter. 
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but only sporadically; they all have a relatively elastic 
supply, although at different periods. In the case of cacao, 
the higher exports from Brazil aróse from the decline in 
output from the British Non-Self-Governing Territories 
in West Africa. Although exports of hides increased 
between pre-war and recent years, they reached their peak 
in 1947. Pinewood exports have risen significantly since 
the war. This is a product with an elastic supply, so that 
continuing exports to die United Kingdom will depend 
mainly upon the price pohcy adopted. 
The difficulties of entering the United Kingdom market 
are self-evident. Imperial preferences exist and the nature 
of Brazilian products is such that most of them must compete 
with commodities from British Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tories where wages are very low. The short-term fluctuations 
of many products exported to Great Britain reflect their 
marginal character on the British market. In fact, Brazilian 
commodities are imported from time to time to bridge gaps 
which appear in one or another sector of the British market. 
Apart from cotton and a few other commodities which are 
highly competitive, the remaining exports from Brazil 
depend entirely upon import pohcy in the United Kingdom. 
(See table 75.) 
Table 75. Brazil : Indices of exports to the United Kingdom 
(1948 = 100) 
Year 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials Semi-manufact ures 
Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 32 29 2 2 31 3 6 3 0 41 1 
1936 64 32 26 35 86 31 21 23 
1937 54 32 28 3 9 69 2 9 27 24 
1938 62 18 29 5 78 25 7 6 19 
1939 6 9 29 45 3 6 77 28 130 15 
1940 84 29 74 3 0 87 29 103 2 0 
1941 71 31 81 3 0 63 3 2 121 2 0 
1942 . . . . . 83 3 3 119 34 61 3 4 133 14 
1943 7 9 44 103 54 55 4 0 256 3 4 
1944 93 46 114 48 7 2 4 6 232 31 
1945 119 52 86 61 126 4 9 253 3 4 
-1946 114 61 97 87 123 5 0 9 4 26 
1947 85 86 41 114 102 7 0 161 103 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 83 104 57 117 93 65 126 6 0 
1950 111 132 111 216 108 94 153 6 0 
1951 95 197 7 9 230 102 184 112 141 
1952 24 178 45 235 14 158 27 50 
1953 53 143 10 237 73 102 68 44 
1954 63 — 3 0 — 79 — 81 — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
Table 74. Brazil : Indices of the quantum of exports 
to the United Kingdom 












1937 . . . 54 73 37 58 95 
1938 . . . 62 78 47 56 91 
1948 . . . . . 100 100 100 48 100 
1949 . . . 83 91 76 56 109 
1950 . . . . . 111 88 133 41 109 
1951 . . . 95 84 105 65 122 
1952 . . . 24 — 46 — 112 
1953 . . . 53 56 50 34 120 
1954 63 65 61 37 123 
Sources: Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and United Nations 
publications. 
a Based on current valúes. 
in the British cotton textile industry. Among those products 
which showed most progress on the British market are : 
coffee, cacao, hides and pinewood. Others, such as rice 
and maize, have been exported in relatively large tonnages, 
3. Continental Europe 
Excluding Western Germany, which is dealt with separa-
tely, the countries of continental Europe maintaining a certain 
volume of trade with Brazil are considered as belonging to 
this group. They are France, Sweden, Italy, Belgium-
Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Table 71 gives Brazil's 
share of their aggregate imports. 
In 1948, Brazil had gained a foothold in the markets of each 
of these countries, except France. Further progress was 
made including the French market during 1950, although 
some ground was lost in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
It should be recalled, however, that Brazil's increased share 
in the imports of these countries chiefly reflects an improvement 
in the terms of trade. As regards France, the quantum of 
aggregate imports substantially exceeded pre-war Índices but 
imports from Brazil continued to be on a much lower level. 
Since 1948, a more rapid decline is apparent in Italy's pur-
chases from Brazil, although aggregate imports from all 
sources were increasing steadily during the same period. 
The Netherlands and Belgium show trends similar to that of 
Italy. Sweden is the only country which is an exception to 
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the rule; imports from Brazil have, in fact, risen more than 
aggregate imports as a whole. 
(a) France 
French imports from Brazil consist chiefly of coífee and 
raw cotton. Cacao and leaf tobacco figure regularly but 
are of less relative importance. Other products from time 
to time meet a demand unsatisfied by suppliers in the French 
Union. The drop in the quantum of Brazilian exports to 
France since the pre-war period reflects reduced coffee 
shipments more than any other factor. But coffee sales 
to France show an upward trend; they rose steadily 
between 1949 and 1953, declinings lightly in 1954. Exclud-
ing the decline in 1952-53, exports of cotton remained 
stable during 1950-54 at about the average for 1937-38. 
(See table 76). 
Table 76. Brazil : Indices of exports to France 
(1948 = 100) 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials Iron ore 
Year Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 160 21 356 4 53 31 _ 
1936 161 20 323 5 73 29 — — 
1937 131 18 2 5 3 7 66 25 — — 
1938 205 16 323 4 145 2 2 — — 
1939 219 28 329 3 8 163 23 — — 
1940 67 13 187 36 — — — — 
1945 4 2 — 5 6 1 — — 
1946 68 54 47 6 79 81 79 63 
1947 115 53 9 6 5 129 82 — — 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 72 113 131 13 36 103 125 — 
1950 126 76 172 34 104 102 — — 
1951 135 144 201 4 0 100 196 26 102 
1952 99 152 198 139 45 163 — — 
1953 119 117 235 134 57 111 — — 
1954 153 — 182 — 141 .— — — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
(b) Sweden 
This is the only example among the five countries where 
exports from Brazil increased, both between 1937-38 and 
1948, and since that date. It is entirely the result of higher 
coffee sales, which in some years reach 90 per cent of BraziTs 
exports to Sweden. In 1952, shipments of coffee exceeded 
50,000 tons, while in 1937-38 they had stood at approxima-
tely 30,000. Nevetheless, in 1953 and 1954 these sales declined 
to 40,000 and 30,000 tons repectively. Ranking next in 
importance in trade with Sweden is cotton. In 1937-38, 
exports had barely surpassed 1,000 tons. After the war they 
reached 16,500 tons in 1949, although in 1951 they fell to 
3,500. In 1952, as occured with other markets, they dropped 
to an insignificant figure and for the next two years remained 
at a level of3,500 tons. Cacao exports were lower than before 
the war. Hides were exported on a fairly high scale in 1947-
48 and then immediately dropped back to their low pre-war 
level; by 1952 they had practically disappeared from the 
Swedish market. The only new export of any importance 
is the banana. However, after reaching 19,000 tons in 1950, 
shipments declined and finally disappeared in 1953 and 1954. 
In brief, the behaviour of Brazilian exports to Sweden is no 
different from that of sales to other countries in Europe 
with the solé exception that Sweden has continued to buy 
relatively large tonnages of coffee. (See table 77.) 
(c) Italy 
Before the war, cotton and coffee contribuetd more than 
three-quarters of the valué of all exports from Brazil to 
Table 77. Brazil: Indices of exports to Sweden 
(1948 = 100) 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials 
Year Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 . . . 97 26 184 22 2 3 0 
1936 . . . 82 39 151 48 6 29 
1937 . . . 91 33 163 32 11 34 
1938 . . . 119 26 217 24 11 27 
1939 . . . 62 77 95 116 24 34 
1940 . . . 28 20 48 24 5 15 
1941 . . . 46 32 22 46 67 17 
1942 . . . 179 34 91 48 252 19 
1943 . . . 122 37 140 48 93 24 
1944 . . . 193 40 116 49 253 29 
1945 . . . 130 39 168 45 80 32 
1946 . . . 166 80 231 76 86 85 
1947 . . . 133 96 193 99 61 92 
1948 . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 . . . 153 103 165 100 128 107 
1950 . . . 139 136 229 182 37 86 
1951 . . . 124 184 206 198 31 170 
1952 . . . 161 159 303 201 4 114 
1953 . . . 133 178 228 233 26 117 
1954 . . . 108 — 179 — 31 — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
Italy. In 1948, the share of these two products exceeded 
85 per cent, but cotton, which had figured in first place 
after trade was resumed in 1945, practically disappeared in 
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1949 and 1952. Between 1953 and 1954, cotton recovered 
and reached a substantially higher level than before the war, 
although it is still somewhat below the peak of 1946-48. 
The relative importance of coffee has thus tended to increase. 
In 1952, its share rose to 86 per cent, but the quantum 
of exports decreased between 1948 and 1952 from 34,800 
to 25,600 tons. Herein hes the cause of the sharp and con-
tinuous decline of the quantum of Brazilian exports to Italy 
which was apparent until 1952. In 1953-54, thanks to the 
recovery in cotton and cacao exports, the index showed an 
upswing and in 1954 it exceeded the 1948 level. The other 
products of some importance demonstrated no tendency to 
rise either in comparison with the pre-war period or during 
more recent years. (See table 78.) 
Table 78. Brazil : Indices of exports to Italy 
(1948 = 100) 
Table 79. Brazil : Indices of exports to Belgium-Luxembourg 
(1948 - 100) 
Year 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials 
Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 . . . . 58 27 124 8 17 39 
1936 . . . . 72 36 137 31 33 38 
1937 . . . . 47 36 74 37 31 36 
1938 . . . . 67 35 110 27 41 28 
1939 . . . . 79 29 116 26 56 3 0 
1940 . . . . 43 32 91 27 13 34 
1945 . . 14 56 0 54 22 57 
1946 . . . . 195 84 128 97 237 7 6 
1947 . . . . 58 102 9 103 88 101 
1948 . . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 . . . . 7 0 45 155 117 118 119 
1950 . . . . 56 154 100 191 2 3 131 
1951 . . . . 50 218 108 236 15 207 
1952 . . . . 51 96 118 244 9 5 
1953 . . . . 84 190 135 283 53 132 
1954 . . . . 104 — 117 — 95 — 
Year 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials 
Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 . . . . 36 31 4 0 3 0 29 34 
1936 . . . . 32 32 3 0 32 36 32 
1937 . . . . 27 37 25 4 0 3 0 31 
1938 . . . . 48 40 55 31 3 3 56 
1939 . . . . 41 29 47 31 31 26 
1940 . . . . 12 31 16 31 5 3 3 
1945 . . . . 2 0 43 24 46 13 4 
1946 . . . . 93 88 6 0 96 152 74 
1947 . . . . 95 95 79 98 122 89 
1948 . . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 . . . . 80 110 113 111 22 106 
1950 . . . . 36 57 46 33 17 100 
1951 . . . . 39 231 53 244 14 207 
1952 . . . . 23 166 32 253 6 11 
1953 . . . . 25 222 19 272 37 132 
1954 . . . . 26 — 13 — 50 — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
(d) Belgium-Luxembourg 
In 1947-49, Brazil's export quantum to Belgium-Luxem-
bourg was substantially higher than during the pre-war 
period and aróse from a remarkable advance in cotton and 
coffee sales. Exports of the former, which had stood at 
about 6,500 tons in 1937-38, rose to 25,600 in 1946-48. 
The volume of coffee purchases also more than doubled. 
Exports of cotton fell sharply after 1949; those of coffee also 
declined after 1950, but returned to the pre-war figure in 
1952 and finally reached a much lower level. Cotton ship-
ments, which had dropped to an insignificant figure between 
1949 and 1952, again rose in 1953 and 1954 and recovered 
their pre-war position. Among other regular exports are 
tobacco, cacao and frozen meat, which all showed a tendency 
to decline in relation to their 1947-48 levels. Maize demon-
strates a somewhat irregular trend, while Paraná pine seems 
to be strengthening its position on the Belgium-Luxem-
bourg market. (See table 79.) 
(e) The Netherlands 
The major exports to the Netherlands are cotton, coffee 
and cacao. In 1947, the volume of Brazilian exports exceeded 
the pre-war level through a sharp increase in cotton ship-
ments—which reached 17,700 tons, as compared with an 
average of 6,000 in 1937-38— and through a substantial 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
rise in cacao sales. Nevertheless, cotton exports have declined 
considerably since 1949. The recovery witnessed in that 
year resulted from increased coffee exports, but since 1950 
they have returned to the 1937-38 level. Among the other 
exports, only cacao has a larger volume after 1950 than 
before the war; even so, the quantum returned to the level 
of the 'thirties in 1953. In 1954 an encouraging recovery 
became evident, due chiefly to cotton shipments, which 
exceeded those of 1947, and to cacao exports, which were 
well above their pre-war level. Other products, such as 
hides and tobacco, also remained firm. Coffee alone declined 
substantially. (See table 80.) 
Table 80. Brazil : Indices of exports to the Netherlands 
(1948 = 100) 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials 
Year Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 . . . 143 23 441 24 47 23 
1936 . . . 141 24 386 29 62 23 
1937 . . . 117 34 227 32 82 35 
1938 . . . 168 3 0 466 24 72 31 
1939 . . . 150 34 201 44 134 3 0 
1940 . . . 44 39 91 27 28 43 
1945 . . . 40 41 45 4 8 39 39 
1946 . . . 234 87 667 8 0 96 8 9 
1947 . . . 176 103 305 102 135 103 
1948 . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 . . . 149 108 490 100 57 111 
1950 . . . 112 121 375 181 28 102 
1951 . . . 134 199 394 212 50 195 
1952 . . . 94 162 339 212 15 146 
1953 . . . 89 156 270 235 31 130 
1954 . . . 155 — 272 — 117 — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
4. Western Germany 
Before the war, Germany ranked second as a market for 
Brazilian exports. If this position was not regained until 
after 1954, the main cause lay in the fall of Brazil's export 
quantum. In 1937-38, Germany had absorbed 18 per cent 
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of all Brazilian exports, but in 1950-51 this figure had dropped 
to 5 per cent. Despite a sharp upswing in shipments to 
Western Germany, the proportion had reached only 9.6 per 
cent in 1953. As the recovery continued, the West Germán 
share rose to 12 per cent in 1954. In 1951-52, the volume 
of BraziTs sales to Germany declined to less than one-third 
of their 1937-38 level. It is interesting to note that this was 
apparently a true loss of market, since other countries replaced 
Brazil in Western Germany's import quantum which in 
recent years has become greater than it was before the war. 
In spite of a substantial improvement in the relative prices 
of BraziTs exports, the share of Germán imports in fact dimi-
nished from 3.52 per cent in 1937-38 to 0.80 in 1949-50 and 
to 2.00 in 1951-52. Not until 1951 did the Germán market 
begin to improve as regards Brazilian exports. This recovery 
became more marked in 1953 and was virtually Consolidated 
'in 1954. In the latter year, the export quantum to Western 
Germany was 85 per cent that of 1938, the peak during the 
five-year period 1935-39, and was equal to or more than 
that of any other year of that period. 
Table 81 shows the evolution of some of the principal 
exports to Western Germany as compared with the position 
of these same products during 1937-38. It is at once evident 
that the only commodity which substantially exceeds the 
pre-war level is cacao. All the other products which formed 
the basis for trade before the war remained at a lower level. 
Greater cacao shipments, the appeareance of a new commo-
dity—sisal—and an expansión in exports of some other less 
important products raised the over-all quantum of BraziTs 
exports to Western Germany to a level higher than that of 
the average for the main products. 
Table 81. Brazil : Quantum of exports to Western Germany 
1937-38 = 100) 
Total import 
Total by Western 
Raw Ginned (quantum Germany 
Year cotton cotton Coffee Cacao Hides Tobacco Índices) (quantum Índices) 
1949 . . . 0 . 0 2 __. 1 9 . 2 5 . 8 6 2 . 4 3 1 . 6 9 . 7 
1950 . . . 2 . 6 6 . 4 4 . 1 1 4 . 7 2 1 . 4 6 4 . 7 8 . 6 114 
1951 . . . 1 7 . 9 7 6 . 8 27 .1 6 2 . 7 6 6 . 9 3 9 . 6 3 4 . 4 116 
1952 . . . 3 . 8 9 3 . 6 4 5 . 8 3 6 . 1 1 5 . 7 6 2 . 5 2 7 . 3 134 
1953 . . . . 2 6 . 5 7 3 . 6 6 8 . 0 2 9 4 . 8 3 4 . 4 3 7 . 4 6 3 . 4 151 
1954 . . . . 6 4 . 4 5 6 . 2 5 0 . 8 3 7 3 . 4 4 . 3 5 1 . 8 8 4 . 9 190 
Sources: Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and United Nations publications. 
: Before the war, cotton was the major product sold to 
Germany, followed by coffee and cacao, the latter being of 
much less relative importance. Today, because of the increase 
in cacao shipments and an expansión in relative coffee prices, 
these three products are practically on an equal footing. 
Increased exports to Western Germany may be pardy 
attributed to efforts on the part of the Federal Government 
to provide Brazil with an opportunity to liquidate outstanding 
trade obligations over the past two years. But there has 
still been a recovery of the Brazilian position. Since this 
is an example of typical complementary economies, the 
natural trend is in the direction of more extensive trade. 
(See table 82.) 
5. Japan 
Before the war, Japan represented an important market 
for Brazil and in 1937-38 absorbed 4.66 per cent of the valué 
Table 82. Brazil : Indices of exports to Germany 
(1948 = 100) 
Total 
Year Quantum Prices 
1935 1 , 4 2 5 4 0 
1936 1 ,058 51 
1937 1 ,573 62 
1938 2 , 0 0 8 56 
1939 1 ,177 . 64 
1940 136 56 
1948 100 100 
1949 174 158 
1950 154 259 
1951 616 338 
1952 489 310 
1953 1 ,135 316 
1954 1 ,521 — 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
a Since 1948 to the Federal Republic only. 
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of all Brazil's exports. In 1951-52, the figure had fallen to 
little more than 1 per cent. As in the case of Western Ger-
many, since 1953—when the percentage reached 3.1— an 
appreciable recovery can be observed. The fall in the export 
quantum to Japan is as clearly defined as it was with Ger-
many. Taking the index of the trade volume in 1937-38 
as a base, it had reached 30 in 1951-52 and 43 in 1953. 
However, if it is recalled that Japan's import quantum in 
1951-52 was at only half the pre-war level, while that of 
Western Germany varied around 125 per cent, it may be seen 
that the true loss of market in Japan was less than in the case 
of Germany. Brazil's share of Japanese imports in reality 
declined from 1.69 per cent in 1937-38 to 1.07 in 1951-52. 
Raw cotton formerly contributed almost 90 per cent of 
shipments to Japan. Among all the major markets for Bra-
zilian exports, Japan represented the outstanding example 
of the domination of a single product. Since the war other 
commodities have appeared, such as sisal, rice and sugar, 
but cotton exports, although reduced, continué to exercise 
a predominant role. In 1953, they reached 23,000 tons, as 
against 10,300 in 1951 and an average of 63,000 for the period 
1937-40. In 1954, aggregate Brazilian exports to Japan sur-
passed those of the pre-war years, reaching an index of 144. 
Cotton sales (59,000 tons) still remained on a lower level than 
befor the war, but this was more than offset by an increase 
in sugar shipments (95,000 tons). (See table 83.) 






salted hides Sisal Sugar 
Indices 
(1937-38 ~ 100) 
1935 2 , 4 9 2 5 
1936 4 3 , 3 2 8 — . — — — 83 
1937 50 ,918 — 7 — — 92 
1938 6 0 , 1 5 9 — — — — 108 
1939 7 7 , 8 0 7 — 479 — 142 
1940 6 4 , 1 9 3 — 1 , 7 9 9 — — 118 
1941 5 3 , 0 1 4 — — — — 95 
1948 497 — — — — 1 
1949 — — — 6 , 0 4 2 — 4 
1950 9 , 3 2 0 — 625 — — 18 
1951 9 , 5 7 5 6 , 0 5 5 837 — 960 21 
1952 1 0 , 2 6 8 3 , 0 0 0 — — 3 3 , 9 9 9 40 
1953 2 2 , 9 5 2 — 152 760 9 , 6 0 0 43 
1954 5 8 , 9 1 0 — — 1 , 9 4 8 9 5 , 2 7 5 144 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
6. Argentina 
Argentinas share in Brazilian exports rose from 4.63 in 
1937-38 to 9.46 per cent in 1948. It has declined since 1949 
to 6.8 per cent in 1952 and 5.0 in 1953; in other words, exports 
returned to their relative pre-war position. The considerable 
decline reflects the reduced quantum, which was halved in 
the years 1948 to 1953. 
The reduction in Argentine imports since 1948 is a general 
phenomenon. If imports for 1951-52 are compared with 
the pre-war level, then the decline shown by Brazilian pro-
ducts is definitely less. But from the same aspect, it is clear 
that Brazil's exports have definitely been losing ground 
since 1948. 
Exports to Argentina consist of three well-defined groups : 
foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods. The 
first, which is the most important, is composed of coffee, 
cacao, bananas, oranges and yerba maté. (See table 84.) 
None of the products of this group indicates a definite ten-
dency to increase, while two (yerba maté and oranges) show 
every sign of declining. However, yerba maté alone reflects 
a long-term downward trend based on a real process of substi-
Table 84. Brazil : Foodstuff exports to Argentina 
(Thousands o f tons) 
Quantum Índices 
of the 5 products 
Vear Coffee Cacao Bananas Oranges Yerba maté (2948 =» 100) 
1937 1 9 . 8 4 . 1 1 6 6 . 8 4 6 . 1 ' 3 4 . 0 81 
1938 2 6 . 2 5 . 6 1 6 0 . 5 4 7 . 8 2 9 . 8 100 
1948 4 2 . 1 5 . 0 1 3 8 . 4 5 2 . 8 2 2 . 2 100 
1949 1 8 . 5 4 . 6 146 .4 3 4 . 3 1 4 . 3 66 
1950 3 0 . 3 4 . 4 9 0 . 6 4 3 . 7 8 . 9 72 
1951 2 8 . 5 6 . 3 1 3 2 . 5 3 1 . 1 1 3 . 6 78 
1952 2 5 . 4 5 . 5 1 7 8 . 5 1 2 . 1 1 0 . 5 70 
1953 3 4 . 1 9 . 9 1 3 9 . 0 8 . 9 6 . 5 84 
1954 3 3 . 7 8 . 0 1 8 9 . 0 1 6 . 3 1 5 . 5 91 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
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tution. As regards the others, their stagnation or decrease 
arises from a contraction of income in Argentina on the 
one hand—a phenomenon apparent since 1949—and on the 
other to balance-of-payments difficulties. The lower exports 
to Brazil, caused principally by reduced wheat production 
and a considerable increase in raw material imports, induced 
the Argentine authorities to curtail their purchases of food-
stuffs to avoid accumulating substantial trade déficits with 
Brazil. Recendy, however, the foodstuffs group recovered 
while that of raw materials declined. The deferred demand 
for tropical products in Argentina is considerable, and the 
chief factor limiting mutual trade is the inability, within 
bilateral agreements, to pay for more foodstuffs without 
sacrificing raw material imports. The solution to the problem 
thus lies in a return to normal conditions for Argentina's 
agricultural production and in a recovery of exports to Brazil. 
After 1948, the loss in the raw material group was a good 
deal greater than that in foodstuffs; it can pardy be explained 
by the reduction in the volume of investment. Even in recent 
years, and despite the near-collapse of raw material exports 
in comparison with previous levels, the volume of shipments 
was still equal to the average for 1937-38. As regards food-
stuffs, it has already been seen that in 1952 the volume was 
considerably lower than before the war. The market for 
Brazilian lumber in Argentina is known to be large. If the 
investment level in that country were to recover, a strong 
demand for lumber would be assured. In this case, and even 
more so in that of foodstuffs, trade will depend on the reco-
very of Arg entina's economy, and in particular on the capa-
city to import from Brazil. (See table 85.) 
Table 85. Brazil : Raw material exports to Argentina 
(Thousands o f tons) 




of the 5 products 
(1948 = 100) 
1937 1 6 6 . 8 3 . 3 5 . 3 38 
1938 1 4 5 . 7 2 . 4 — — 4 . 7 33 
1948 4 7 2 . 7 1 5 . 5 2 7 . 5 3 . 9 6 . 4 100 
1949 3 1 0 . 6 14 .1 1 6 . 7 2 . 1 5 . 2 70 
1950 2 4 2 . 9 2 . 5 1 . 4 2 . 0 2 . 0 47 
1951 3 3 2 . 0 4 8 . 9 1 . 2 1 . 0 1 . 0 65 
1952 2 0 7 . 6 4 . 8 — 0 . 6 — 37 
1953 2 4 4 . 9 — — 0 . 9 — 43 
1954 1 6 1 . 3 1 4 . 8 — . 1 . 7 — 31 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
Exports of manufactured goods consist fundamentally. of 
textiles and cotton yarn. Such shipments were in existence 
on a small scale before the war and expanded considerably 
at that time. Between 1942 and 1945, cotton textile goods 
were the principal article of export from Brazil to Argentina, 
amounting to 33 per cent of the total, as against approxi-
mately 1 per cent in 1937-38. These exports, however, 
declined during the post-war period and in 1951-52 repre-
sented only 4 per cent of the total valué. Exports of cotton 
yarn, which hardly existed before the war, did not develop 
Table 86. Brazil : Indices of exports to Argentina 
(1948 = 100) 
Total Foodstuffs Raw materials Semi-manufactures 
Year Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices Quantum Prices 
1935 37 19 73 35 28 13 5 6 
1936 40 19 75 32 31 16 8 8 
1937 45 21 81 34 38 18 10 7 
1938 47 20 100 27 33 19 1 10 
1939 63 22 95 31 44 19 57 14 
1940 67 23 73 32 38 19 113 16 
1941 92 31 86 36 43 32 191 23 
1942 149 44 76 52 57 45 420 33 
1943 92 49 92 49 48 51 174 45 
1944 126 67 88 53 49 84 320 53 
1945 109 75 116 58 44 90 222 70 
1946 77 82 89 83 69 96 76 55 
1947 109 100 121 89 74 121 156 77 
1948 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 82 102 66 104 70 106 125 90 
1950 53 123 72 187 47 97 37 87 
1951 69 156 78 223 65 119 62 136 
1952 48 134 70 232 37 105 39 56 
1953 46 123 84 254 43 94 
1954 43 — 91 — 31 . 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
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during the period of hostilities, on account of supply diffi-
culties in Brazil. But they increased after the war, reaching 
a peak in 1951-52, when they represented 20 per cent of the 
aggregate valué of Brazilian shipments to Argentina. Exports 
of cotton yarn in 1952 stood at 25 per cent of the total, exceed-
ing those of pinewood and practically equalling coffee ship-
ments. The drop in exports of manufactured goods during 
1948 and 1952 was no greater than that in raw material 
shipments. (See table 86.) 
The prospects for manufactures are in no way compa-
rable to those for raw materials and foodstuffs because cotton 
textiles and yarn have almost disappeared from mutual trade 
already. Even so, when cotton textiles andyarns are excluded, 
the drastic decline in the exports of manufactured goods 
must be attributed more to administrative measures than to 
purely economic factors. Manufactured goods do not need 
to disappear entirely from Brazil's export schedule, since 
other products will inevitably take the place of those which 
are replaced by domestic production in odier countries. 
This is a problem which must be considered in broader 
terms, bearing in mind the bilateral character of the trade, 
the elasticity of the supply of manufactures in Brazil, and 
other factors. 
I I . ANALYSIS BY PRODUCTS 
The foregoing observations clearly show that Brazil's 
export trade is composed of a small group of products. Except 
for coffee and cotton, Brazil's shipments to practically all 
markets are limited to insignificant tonnages. If cacao, 
hides and pinewood are also excluded, the list of exports 
is reduced to commodities of scant importance but which 
enjoy a stable demand on certain markets; such products 
include, ínter alia, maganese and fruit. There are others 
lacking an assured market, but which have definite export 
possibilities for the future. 
The comparative importance of the principal products in 
the valué of Brazilian exports has been much influenced in 
recent years by the advance in relative coffee prices. Table 87 
shows the position of the major products. Only coffee and 
pinewood among them show a larger share of the aggregate 
valué of exports in 1948-53 than they did in 1937-38. The 
position of cacao practically remained unchanged. In 1948-
53, cotton was well below the level which it reached in 
1937-38. Hides and skins present a clearly diminishing 
trend, partly because of the competition from plastics. Other 
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regular export products are meat, rubber, yerba maté, tobacco, 
castor oil and carnauba wax. The three latter showed averages 
in 1948-52 that are higher than those of 1937-38, but with 
a tendency to decline in more recent years. Rubber and 
yerba maté are typical products of an export branch that is 
tending to disappear, the first because no exportable surplus 
exists and the second because of the process of substitution 
which has been taking place in the principal import market. 
Meat has practically disappeared from the export schedule 
and its situation is similar to that of rubber as regards the 
increase of domestic consumption; yet, unlike rubber which 
suffers from growing synthetic competition, meat continúes 
to enjoy excellent prices and expanding markets. 
Table 87. Brazil : Share of the principal products 
in export valúes 
(Percentages) 
Raw Cacao Skins All 
Year Coffee cotton beans and hides Pine Others 
1937 4 2 . 2 1 8 . 5 4 . 5 5 . 9 1 . 0 2 7 . 7 
1938 4 5 . 0 1 8 . 2 4 . 2 4 . 1 1 . 1 2 7 . 4 
1948 4 1 . 6 1 5 . 6 4 . 9 3 . 5 • 3 . 7 3 0 . 7 
1949 5 7 . 6 1 0 . 0 4 . 8 3 . 4 2 . 9 2 1 . 3 
1950 6 3 . 8 7 . 8 5 . 8 2 . 3 2 . 4 1 7 . 9 
1951 5 9 . 8 11 .8 3 . 9 2 . 2 2 . 8 19 .5 
1952 7 3 . 7 2 . 4 2 . 9 0 . 8 2 . 3 1 7 . 9 
1953 7 0 . 6 6 . 6 4 . 9 — 2 . 5 1 4 . 8 
1954 6 0 . 7 14 .3 8 . 7 — 2 . 4 1 3 . 6 
Source : Statistical Service, Ministry of Finance, Brazil. 
Sisal and iron ore are among the few products for which 
exports have increased in relation to the pre-war period and 
sales of which are not sporadic. Sisal fibres, which were 
not shipped abroad before the war, appear in 1948 with 
19,900 tons, rising strongly in the following years until 
they reached 57,400 tons in 1951. The valué of sisal exports 
in 1951 amounted to $23.6 million and was exceeded only 
by sales of coffee, raw cotton, cacao, pinewood and hides. 
But sisal exports declined during the next two years, decreas-
ing by 60 per cent of their volume and 75 per cent of their 
valué between 1951 and 1953. In 1954, however, the export 
volume rose again to 55,000 tons, although its valué was 
only slightly more than $9 million because lower prices 
prevailed. 
Table 88. Brazil : Quantum of exports, by principal products 
(1948 - 100) 
A nimal Other 
Other and vege• mineral Textile Other 
food' Raw Pine- table raw raw mana- manu~ 
Year Coffee Cacao stuffs cotton wood materials Iron ore materials factures fact ures Total 
1937 6 9 . 3 146 .6 6 3 . 9 9 1 . 3 3 5 . 9 8 8 . 6 3 1 . 0 5 6 . 1 1 0 . 9 6 0 . 5 7 5 . 0 
1938 . . . . . . . . 9 7 . 8 178 .4 7 0 . 7 103 .9 3 7 . 7 8 6 . 6 6 1 . 5 7 4 . 6 3 . 9 7 3 . 7 9 2 . 0 
194 8 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 100 .0 1 0 0 . 0 
1949 110 .7 184 .5 3 1 . 8 5 4 . 0 6 7 . 8 8 9 . 6 112 .7 6 2 . 3 7 7 . 1 9 5 . 1 8 9 . 6 
1950 8 4 . 8 184 .1 3 8 . 8 4 9 . 8 8 7 . 4 9 5 . 0 1 4 8 . 5 6 5 . 3 2 5 . 2 117 .0 7 9 . 2 
1951 9 3 . 5 134.1 5 7 . 3 5 5 . 4 1 1 4 . 6 100 .4 2 2 0 . 3 112 .7 5 4 . 3 123 .5 8 7 . 0 
1952 9 0 . 4 8 1 . 2 4 2 . 7 1 0 . 9 6 7 . 5 5 3 . 8 2 6 0 . 5 1 0 9 . 0 2 9 . 2 7 7 . 1 6 4 . 7 
1953 8 9 . 0 172 .0 4 3 . 6 5 3 . 9 9 8 . 6 6 1 . 0 2 5 8 . 2 1 0 6 . 0 2 . 0 1 1 7 . 3 7 7 . 4 
1954 6 2 . 4 168 .8 2 9 . 2 119 .6 8 4 . 8 7 0 . 3 2 8 0 . 0 6 9 . 8 — 6 4 . 0 7 4 . 0 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
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Exports of iron ore, of little significance in 1937-38, rose 
in 1948 to 599,000 tons, continued to increase in subsequent 
years and reached 1,638,000 tons in 1954. The valué of such 
exports in that year stood at $21.6 million and was exceeded 
only by coffee, cacao, raw cotton and pinewood. (See 
table 88.) 
1. Cotton 
Lower cotton sales have been the chief factor in the fall 
of the quantum of Brazilian exports. This represents a serious 
problem, since cotton was the main product exported to 
some of BraziTs major supplier markets and in some instances 
became pratically the only steady export item. 
According to the analysis in section I, it is doubtful whether 
Brazil will be able to recover the previous capacity to import 
from certain markets—especially Germany and Japan—if the 
former level of cotton exports is not regained. Table 89 
shows the importance of cotton among Brazilian exports to 
a large number of countries. 
Table 89. Brazil : Cotton exports, 1937-38 
Volume 
(Average of the two years in Percentage of the export 
Countries thousands of tons) valué, by country 
Germany 8 3 . 3 3 2 . 7 
Japan 5 5 . 5 9 2 . 3 
United Kingdom 4 8 . 9 3 9 . 2 
France 2 1 . 2 2 2 . 8 
Italy 8 . 6 3 0 . 2 
Belgium-Luxembourg . . . 6 . 8 15 .1 
Portugal 6 . 2 6 1 . 5 
Netherlands 6 . 1 1 1 . 6 
Poland 5 . 3 6 7 . 8 
China 3 . 8 5 8 . 9 
Others 6 . 8 1 .1 
TOTAL . . 2 5 2 . 5 1 8 . 4 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
Brazilian cotton production has not improved since the 
'thirties; the annual average for 1934-38 stood at 389,000 tons 
and in 1948-53 at 395,000. During this period there was no 
appreciable change in world production, although the 1947-
48 level was lower and that of 1951-52 higher than the pre-
war period. Output from the Americas as a whole increased, 
while the Brazilian share declined from 11.5 per cent in 
1934-38 to 9.7 in 1948-53. 
Although there was no real decrease in Brazilian produc-
tion, the exportable surplus declined as a result of greater 
consumption by the domestic textile industry and of larger 
stocks used for other purposes. (See table 90.) 
Table 90. Brazil : Production, export and apparent 
consumption of raw cotton 
(Thousands of tons) 
Period Production Export Apparent consumption 
1934-38 3 8 9 . 0 194 .1 1 9 4 . 9 
1939-48 4 2 9 . 0 2 2 4 . 0 2 0 5 . 0 
1949-53 4 0 8 . 0 1 1 6 . 0 2 9 2 . 0 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
Even by adding to aggregate exports in 1949-53 a volume 
of 150,000 tons which remained in bond at the end of 1953, 
average exports would represent only 136,000 tons. This 
compares with domestic consumption of 262,000 tons, or 
about three-fifths of the production, in contrast to one-half 
in 1934-38. The exportable surplus would therefore be 
reduced to two-thirds of the figure in the 'thirties. 
The Brazilian share of aggregate exports from the Americas 
declined from 11.9 per cent in 1934-38 to 8.6 in 1949-51; 
in 1952 there was a complete collapse and the figure fell to 
2.2 per cent. The Brazilian share of total world exports for 
the two periods stood at 6.3 and 5.1 per cent, respectively. 
Comparing the world situation in recent years with the 
pre-war period, it may be seen that while cotton production 
increased, world trade in this commodity decreased. In 
1951-52, world production was almost 900,000 tons (15 per 
cent higher than in 1934-38, but world exports over the 
same period declined by more than 400,000 tons (18 per cent). 
This falling-off in trade was mainly due to lower British and 
Japanese imports, which represented 25 per cent of the aggre-
gate world trade in cotton during 1934-38. The post-war 
import peak of these two countries (1954) was not more than 
19 per cent of the world total. The decline in imports by the 
United Kingdom and Japan is a reflection of the reduced world 
trade in cotton fabrics. The development of cotton textile 
industries in many under-developed countries has led them 
to encourage the domestic cultivation of cotton. In Latin 
America—excluding Brazil—production increased from 
236,000 tons in 1934-38 to 561,000 in 1951-52; in Asia 
—excepting India, Pakistan and China—from 130,000 to 
306,000; in Africa—excluding Egypt—from 190,000 to 
311,000 tons. In many countries where production for 
export could not be justified, because of compctition from 
lower-cost production, domestic consumption could be 
supplied, given adequate protection, and thus the decentra-
lization of the cotton textile industry is also giving rise to a 
similar trend in cotton production. 
Prospects are therefore unfavourable for cotton shipments 
to the large exporting centres of cotton fabrics; and this is 
not the only problem. European countries which import 
cotton for their own use are also unlikely to raise their pur-
chases, since at relatively high income levels there is little 
elasticity in demand for cotton fabrics. Competition from 
rayón is also becoming increasingly severe, especially as 
regards prices. The consumption of rayón, which stood at 
only 11 per cent of that of cotton in 1935-39, had risen to 
22 per cent in 1949-52. 
Although it is true that the prospects are unfavourable for 
the world cotton trade, there is no reason why BraziTs share 
should decline. Had Brazilian exports in 1949-52 retained 
the percentage of world trade enjoyed in 1934-38, cotton 
shipments would have been 50 per cent higher than those 
actually achieved. This loss of markets has largely arisen 
from United States trade policy, principally since 1949, when 
Marshall Plan funds or credit were used to encourage exports 
funds of United States cotton. The effects of this policy are 
mainly apparent in Western Germany and Japan, which were 
the principal markets for Brazilian cotton before the war. It 
must be noted, however, that Brazilian price policy was 
also partly to blame for the loss of these markets. 
In Brazil, the area under cotton cultivation may be widely 
varied by means of an effective price policy. This area has 
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been altered recently, from one year to another, by more 
than 20 per cent, as a result of price variations; from 1951 
to 1952, for instance, there was an increase from 2.5 to 3.0 mil-
lions hectares. At the same time, the average yield per hec-
tare is extremely low and could be greatly expanded by 
improved cultivation techniques. 
As previously mentioned, apparent domestic consumption 
between 1949 and 1953 was approximately 260,000 tons. 
But these data are only approximate and do not agree with 
statistics for mili consumption, which stood at 179,000 tons 
in 1949.3 The discrepancy arises from inaccuracies in esti-
mating stocks, consumption by small arrisan spinning establish-
ments and utilization outside the textile industry, etc. The 
projection of demand for textile products indicates a possible 
increase of approximately 60 per cent in the consumption 
of cotton fabrics between 1949 and 1962, which would 
involve a consumption of 286,000 tons by textile milis at 
the end of that period. Allowing for other types of con-
sumption, the minimum domestic demand for cotton in 
1962 may be estimated at 320,000 tons. 
If domestic output can again equal the 1944 peak of 592,000 
tons, an exportable surplus of 272,000 tons would remain. 
If, on the other hand, production falls to the 1948 level 
(320,000 tons) there would be no surplus for export, while 
an average of these two extremes (136,000 tons) would still 
be higher than 1949-53 exports. The production necessary 
to meet domestic demand plus this export figure would 
represent 484,000 tons; this is less than the 1952 total of 
515,000 tons, and no marketing difficulties for that tonnage 
would apparently exist. 
Cotton is the only one of the three main Brazilian export 
items which has a high elasticity of supply, and its world 
market is not appreciably affected by Brazilian exports; 
for these reasons cotton is one of the chief products affecting 
Brazil's capacity to import. A well-directed development 
pohcy could achieve a substantial increase in production, 
whose sale on the world market would be unlikely to cause 
a reduction in prices such as would occur in the case of coffee 
and to a smaller degree in that of cacao. 
2. Cacao 
Brazil's share of the world cacao trade is considerably 
greater than that of cotton : 17 per cent in 1934-38 and 
18 per cent in 1950-52. Not only is this share greater, but 
the trade is more stable and shows a slight upward trend. 
(See table 91.) 
Table 91. Brazil : Share of world exports of cacao beans 
(Percentages) 
1935-39 1945-49 1949-50 
Brazil 1 7 . 0 1 7 . 0 18 .1 
Gold Coast 3 9 . 2 3 6 . 2 3 7 . 0 
Others 4 3 . 8 4 6 . 8 4 4 . 9 
TOTAL . . , 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
Source : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
3 See A Study of Trade between Latin América and Europe ( E / C N . 1 2 / 2 2 5 ) 
United Nations publication, Sales No. : 1952.II.G.2. 
A principal feature of the cacao market is that world demand 
is inelastic in the high-income countries, which are the main 
consumers. A major part of the consumption is indirect 
—as an ingredient for sweets—and a relative price increase 
causes manufacturers to reduce the cacao content of their 
product; although the demand for cacao as a final product 
is inelastic, substitution is possible when it is used as a raw 
material. Moreover in high-income countries the demand 
tends to reach a saturation point beyond which it becomes 
inelastic in terms of higher income. In the United States, for 
instance, in spite of the considerable increase in the income 
available for consumer spending between the pre-war period 
and recent years, the per capita consumption of cacao remained 
almost constant; increased imports covered only the amount 
required to meet the needs of population growth. In Europe, 
per capita consumption has not yet returned to its pre-war 
level, although there are wide differences between individual 
countries. Peak consumption in recent years was reached in 
1950, when aggregate world imports were only 8.4 per cent 
higher than in 1935-39. It is therefore clear that per capita 
consumption in importer countries as a whole has fallen—a 
decline partly explained by insufficient supply, which in 
turn has been causing heavy and continued increases in cacao 
prices since 1949. 
As regards supply, it should be mentioned that short-term 
variation is impossible because of the manner of cultivation. 
Thus price cycles tend to be of long duration. The highest 
price of the Accra product in the 'thirties amounted to 8.2 dol-
lar cents per pound in 1937, while it had stood at 15 cents 
in 1927. After the long recession, lasting until 1945, prices 
rose abruptly and since 1947 a high level has been maintained. 
The effects of this continued price increment on the supply 
will undoubtedly be felt in coming years, although there 
are other factors adversely affecting the supply in producer 
countries. On the Gold Coast, for instance, plagues have 
had very serious effects, while the availabihty of suitable 
land is limited, a circumstance which is affecting West African 
production more and more as the population grows. 
Ñor are prospects favourable for greater production in 
Brazil, although improved methods of tree-culture and the 
substitution of more productive varieties could in time 
improve the yield. Shortage of suitable land prohibits greater 
cultivation in the Bahia area, although there are possibilities 
of expansión in the Espiritu Santo zone. It is estimated that 
some 100,000 hectares are available for cacao cultivation on 
the lower Rio Dulce, which gives a theoretical production 
capacity of between 50,000 and 80,000 tons. Only 10,000 
hectares of this land are already planted, and most of the 
trees are new. Production in Espiritu Santo has been steadily 
increasing during recent years—from 1,704 tons in 1947 to 
4,312 in 1951. If prices remain firm during the next few 
years—which is most probable (assuming a high price level 
of over 30 dollar cents per pound)—production in Espiritu 
Santo may well reach 15,000 to 20,000 tons annually during 
the next ten years; at the worst, 10,000 tons may be expected. 
On the basis of these data, two hypotheses may be presented 
upon the probable production of cacao in Brazil. (See 
table 92.) 
Assuming that exports and consumption maintain the same 
relationship as in recent years, exports in 1926 would vary 
between 129,000 and 141,000 tons. This is an acceptable 
figure in view of the fact that 132,000 tons were exported 
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Table 92. Hypotheses of growth of Brazilian cacao production 
(Thousands of tons) 
1947-51 1953-57 1958-62 
Hypothesis A: 
Bahía 120y 125 125 
Espíritu Santo . 3 5 10 
Other States . . 2 2 2 
TOTAL . . . 125 132 137 
Hypothesis B: 
Bahia 120 125 130 
Espíritu Santo . 3 7 20 
Other States . . 2 2 2 
TOTAL . . . 125 134 152 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
in 1949-50. Compared with average 1947-51 exports 
—106,000 tons—the minimum and máximum represent 
22 and 33 per cent respectively. The average of the two 
agrees with the hypothesis of the increase in the quantum 
of exports assumed in these projections. 
3. Pinewood 
Brazilian exports of pine have almost doubled in relation to 
the pre-war figure. In 1937-39, average exports represented 
240,000 tons per year, while recent annual sales stood at 
more than 600,000 tons; during only two years—1949 and 
1950—have they fallen below 400,000 tons. In 1951, when 
655,000 tons were exported, foreign exchange income from 
this source rose to $50.5 million. In subsequent years, there 
was a slight decline, but in 1954 pinewood still held fourth 
place, with an income of $37.2 million. Until 1949, exports 
were chiefly shipped to Argentina, which took 70 to 80 per 
cent of the total, but since that year there has been a steady 
trend towards a diversifxcation of markets, partly owing to 
insuíficient demand in Argentina. Between 1950 and 1952 
sales to Argentina varied around 50 per cent of the total, 
falling in 1953 and 1954 to 43 and 33 per cent respectively. 
Meanwhile, other countries increased their purchases; among 
them were Australia, the United Kingdom—which bought 
26 per cent in 1954—Western Germany, the Netherlands, 
Uruguay and the Belgo-Luxembourg Union. Since pinewood 
is a product whose supply is very elastic, it is possible, and 
even probable—taking into account the exchange rate used— 
that such exports may rise considerably. An annual level 
of exports higher than the present 500,000 tons might, 
however, rapidly exhaust forestry reserves. 
4. Sisal 
Large-scale cultivation of sisal is a relatively recent inno-
vation in Brazil, the first exports having been made in 1946. 
From 2,800 tons in that year, foreign sales have risen rapidly 
to 57,400 tons in 1951, when the foreign exchange income 
derived from this product amounted to more than $20 mil-
lion. Exports declined in 1952-53, but in 1954 rose again 
to 55,200 tons, with a valué of a little over $9 million at the 
reduced market price during that period. Brazil's share of 
world exports of hard fibres (sisal, manilla and hemp) varíes 
around 10 per cent, from which it may be assumed that 
greater exports would not have any appreciable effect on 
world prices. As in the case of other minor export products, 
an increase in sales of sisal would, in addition to enlarging 
foreign exchange resources, give remunerative employment 
to productive factors which would otherwise remain idle 
or only partially utilized. 
5. Tobacco 
Leaf tobacco is a traditional Brazilian export product; 
but its share of world tobacco exports rarely exceeds 6 per 
cent. Tobacco has recently taken sixth place among export 
items, providing foreign exchange revenue of $15.8 million 
in 1953 and $17.9 million in 1954. Since there is an expanding 
world market, in which Brazil has but a small share, a sub-
stantial increase in tobacco exports appears to be possible. 
Such an increase is desirable not only from the aspect of its 
effect upon the capacity to import, of the prospects for greater 
employment and of higher real incomes in rural areas, but 
even more so because an increase in production does not 
require heavy investment. 
6. Minerals 
The export of mineral raw materials in 1954 provided 
foreign exchange revenue totalling almost $30 million. 
Greater sales of ferrous ores and the favourable prices for most 
mineral products have led to their increasing share of aggre-
gate export valúes. Substantial investment is needed to expand 
export capacity, but a number of projects are in hand, espe-
cially for iron and manganese. In spite of the instability of 
the world metáis market, therefore, a considerable increase 
in sales—possibly as much as 200 to 300 per cent—may be 
expected in the near future. 
7. Other commodities 
The remaining Brazilian export products have a fairly 
broad elasticity of supply. Some of them are being absorbed 
on an increasing scale by the domestic market, but even in 
extreme cases, such as meat, the exportable surplus can be 
recovered, since there are ampie possibilities for raising 
production. By-products present a different problem, since 
their supply situation is inelastic, depending always upon 
the market for the main commodity; typical examples are 
cotton by-products, such as cotton-seed cake, linters and 
their respective oils. The domestic demand for these items 
increases with the growth of the population, higher real 
income, industrialization, etc. If there is no increment in 
cotton production—possibly because foreign demand is 
being fully met—the exportable surplus of by-products is 
reduced. The same may occur for hides, since the demand 
for leather goods—chiefly footwear—is increasing rapidly. 
Because leather is a by-product of meat, it is possible that 
the exportable surplus may show a declining trend. 
In other cases, the development of the domestic market 
enables an exportable surplus to be maintained. The Brazil-
ian sugar industry, for instance, was excluded from the world 
market many years ago, but the increasing domestic demand 
has given the industry stability and substantial expansión 
prospects. Some parts of the country have idle capacity 
and would benefit from both higher yields and an increase 
of production greater than that warranted by the domestic 
market. World prices, however, are much lower than those in 
Brazil, so that exports would have to be subsidized. The 
capacity of the world market is limited and is at present 
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Table 93. Brazil: Exports Índices, 1935-54 
(1939 = 100) 



















1935 73 25 89 25 56 28 2 0 18 3 14 24 5 
1936 78 28 85 28 73 31 34 21 5 18 48 12 
1937 75 31 75 32 83 31 50 2 9 11 18 60 21 
1938 92 25 99 24 90 27 71 3 0 4 20 74 18 
1939 98 26 99 25 106 28 73 34 32 18 82 21 
1940 81 27 82 25 78 31 99 37 70 21 95 35 
1941 64 33 74 33 98 33 168 55 174 27 165 39 
1942 70 48 54 49 64 42 141 82 439 38 103 68 
1943 72 52 65 52 44 47 181 95. 441 50 123 66 
1944 79 57 79 55 52 56 125 141 344 63 117 71 
1945 85 61 76 59 64 61 122 127 412 69 163 82 
1946 . . . 105 81 95 82 112 80 58 127 226 63 143 78 
1947 99 100 89 102 106 98 65 89 264 92 95 91 
1948 . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1949 90 106 101 108 68 104 75 108 77 107 95 87 
1950 79 148 83 176 70 105 86 91 25 131 117 82 
1951 87 182 90 196 79 166 140 105 54 134 123 117 
1952 65 174 80 199 33 138 147 135 29 153 77 85 
1953 77 184 83 229 62 118 144 152 1 100 117 53 
1954 74 65 98 123 64 
Source : Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico. 
NOTE.—(A) = Quantum. 
(B) = Prices. 
Table 94. Brazil : Geographic distribution of Brazilian exports 
(Percentages) 
Specification 
A ver age 
1937-38 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 ! 
United States and Cañada . . 3 5 . 7 3 4 4 . 7 0 5 1 . 9 8 5 5 . 8 6 5 0 . 2 1 5 3 . 1 8 5 0 . 0 3 8 . 0 
Argentina 4 . 6 3 9 . 4 6 7 . 6 8 5 . 6 2 6 . 6 5 6 . 7 8 5 . 0 6 . 4 
Latin America (others) 2 . 0 3 4 . 3 7 2 . 8 5 2 . 5 1 2 . 1 2 2 . 3 3 — — 
United Kingdom 8 . 8 9 9 . 4 4 8 . 5 0 8 . 3 4 9 . 8 3 2 . 7 2 4 . 6 4 . 8 
Belgium-Luxembourg 3 . 3 2 4 . 7 5 4 . 3 5 2 . 5 3 2 . 3 6 2 . 0 5 1 . 5 1 . 4 
France 6 . 3 8 2 . 5 2 2 . 1 0 4 . 7 2 5 . 0 5 5 . 6 7 5 . 7 5 . 9 
Western Germany . . 1 7 . 9 9 1 . 0 6 1 . 5 5 1 .34 4 . 7 8 5 . 6 4 9 . 6 1 2 . 0 
Netherlands 3 . 6 9 2 . 5 0 3 . 1 3 2 . 4 0 2 . 9 4 2 . 8 2 2 . 4 2 . 9 
Sweden 2 . 1 0 1 . 7 6 2 . 8 7 3 . 2 9 2 . 6 7 4 . 4 5 3 . 5 3 . 6 
Italy 2 . 1 6 2 . 6 1 2 . 5 7 1 . 7 5 1 . 7 2 2 . 3 2 3 . 0 3 . 4 
Western Europe (others) 3 . 7 2 7 . 5 0 6 . 5 5 6 . 3 3 5 . 7 3 5 . 1 7 — — 
Eastern Europe ' 2 . 4 7 2 . 0 9 1 . 6 5 1 . 6 8 1 . 4 8 2 . 1 8 — — 
Japan 4 . 6 6 0 . 0 7 0 . 1 6 0 . 7 9 0 . 9 3 1 . 3 3 2 . 7 4 . 4 
Other countries 2 . 2 3 7 . 1 7 4 . 0 6 2 . 8 4 3 . 5 5 3 . 3 6 — — 
Brazil's share in world exports 1 . 4 4 2 . 2 2 2 . 0 3 2 . 4 3 2 . 3 3 1 . 9 4 2 . 0 6 2 . 0 2 
Sources: Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Económico and United Nations publications. 
nearing saturation point, but by means of bilateral agreements, 
Brazil should be able to sell between 100,000 and 200,000 
tons abroad. 
In general, Brazil shows favourable possibilities for increasing 
exports of most of the minor products. Because in no case 
would they constitute more than 1 per cent of the world 
supply, it may be accepted in principie that the demand is 
sufficiently elastic to absorb such tonnages without affecting 
world prices. The problem, therefore, is basically one of 
an adequate export price pohcy, which depends upon foreign 
exchange measures, the guidance of credit, technical assistance, 
investments tending to aid import substitution, etc. 
From the aspect of supply, many of the minor export 
products come from areas where the means of production 
have but limited alternative use and where it is of prime 
importance that exports should be maintained. In the case 
of primary products, an interruption would mean abandoning 
the land or other natural factors; any alternative employment 
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of labour at the same economic productivity level would 
require greater investment. 
In a country in process of development, exports must be 
regarded not only as a source of income, but even more 
as a means of increasing the capacity to import and therefore 
of contributing to a higher technical level of the economy. 
In the case of Brazil, it must be recalled that many of the 
so-called minor products are fundamentally necessary for 
maintaining and increasing the level of income of the less-
developed areas of the country. Export development policy 
must therefore be considered not only from the angle of 
supplying foreign exchange, but also as an integral part of 
zonal development plans. 
Chapter II 
THE COFFEE PROBLEM 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
Some preliminary projections of the external payments 
capacity of Brazil's economy until 1962 are given in Part 
One of this study. They are basically founded upon the 
hypothesis of a return to normal conditions in coffee exports. 
Such an assumption implies the recovery of the average 
export level for 1949-53, the preservation of Brazil's share 
in the world coffee trade, and the establishment of firm 
relative prices similar to diose existing in 1952, or, in fact, 
before the sharp upswing caused by the frosts in 1953. 
It is unikely that these two objectives—the maintenance of 
Brazil's quota in world trade and the stabilization of relative 
prices at a level similar to that of 1952—can be attained 
spontaneously. In view of their peculiar nature, the econo-
mics of coffee require a long-term pohcy. When such a 
pohcy is lacking, those elements of instability appear which 
are inherent in the coffee sector and which render any fore-
cast of its behaviour impracticable. 
This chapter aims at analysing the courses open to Brazil 
in terms of the prospects for the world coffee trade. In other 
words, an attempt will be made to ascertain how far the 
above-mentioned objectives are feasible and by what means 
they might be attained. As a beginning, a brief study based 
upon data since 1939 is devoted to the position of coffee in 
Brazil's economy, with particular reference to its signifi-
cance as an element in the formation of income and of the 
capacity to import. A subsequent section attempts to define 
the special features of the coffee sector as it has evolved in 
Brazil. The specific nature of the crop, Brazil's exceptional 
position as a producer and the characteristics of the demand 
for the commodity are all fundamental elements for drawing 
up any national or international coffee policy. At a later 
stage, this chapter describes the current situation as regards 
present or future disequilibria between world supply and 
demand. Finally, consideration is given to the possible 
objectives of a coffee pohcy consistent with the development 
targets for Brazil's economy detailed in Part One. 
2 . COFFEE IN BRAZIL'S ECONOMY 
It is well known that coffee constitutes a fundamental 
element in Brazil's economy. If the structural modifications 
which have taken place in this latter during the last twenty-
five years have in some respects weakened the importance 
of coffee, they have increased its significance from other 
angles. 
In 1939 the valué of coffee production—planter's income— 
represented 5.1 per cent of Brazil's aggregate income. During 
the war years this share dechned, dropping to 3 per cent in 
1942. After the war, thanks to the relatively high prices, 
it rose to 7.5 per cent in 1950, and has remained above 6 per 
cent during subsequent years. 
In addition to the income direcdy accruing from coffee 
production, it should not be forgotten that its transport, 
marketing and export give rise to another substantial source 
of income. The whole coffee economy undoubtedly repre-
sents a large proportion of Brazil's productive activities.)1 
It has already been seen that coffee's share in gross income 
has increased since 1939. AJI owing for the 20-per-cent 
reduction in production between 1939 and 1950-54, the 
magnitude of the relative rise in coffee prices which took 
place during this period is clear. On the one hand, the gross 
real product doubled;2 on the other, coffee production dechned 
by 20 per cent. Even so, coffee's contribution to gross income 
rose from 5.1 to 6.6 per cent. 
An examination of the evolution of coffee output within 
the valué of over-all agricultural production reveáis that its 
share increased from 20.3 per cent in 1939 to 26.8 per cent 
in 1950-54. It is interesting to note that between 1939 and 
1944 this proportion dechned from 20.3 to 13.6 per cent, 
and that even in 1948 it was no greater than 18.8 per cent. 
Since the volume of coffee production decreased by some 
20 per cent during this period, while the quantum of agri-
cultural production expanded by approximately 30 per cent, 
it is apparent that the relative prices of coffee improved 
substantially within this sector. 
These manifestations of a relative improvement in both 
the agricultural sector and the economy as a whole do not 
mean that there has been a redistribution of income in favour 
of the coffee sector. As explained in chapter I of Part One, 
what is imphed is in fact an improvement in the economic 
productivity of the sector, a reflection of higher coffee prices 
on the world market. The coffee sector did not absorb 
the entire product of this improvement, but the proportion 
retained was sufEciently large to modify coffee's position 
within the economy, as described above. 
The 3,042,000 hectares planted with coffee represented 
22.3 per cent of the aggregate area in 1939. During the 
five-year period 1950-54, the acreage under coffee declined 
to 2,821,000 hectares, while the aggregate area increased 
by 37 per cent. Monetary income per hectare, which was 
6.3 times greater in 1950-54 than in 1939 for agriculture as 
a whole, was twelve times larger for the coffee sector. 
The above remarks show the considerable alteration caused 
during the last fifteen years in the relative position of the 
coffee sector within the over-all economy of Brazil. Never-
theless, it should be recalled that during the period used for 
reference purposes the economy of the coffee sector was in 
a highly precarious situation, since it had fallen to one of the 
1 The coffee sector probably contributes at least 10 per cent of the 
national product, which means that its share represents approximately 
60 per cent of that of the whole manufacturing sector. 
2 See table 1 of Part One. 
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lowest levels recorded during a depression which had lasted 
ten years. 
Although the share of coffee in gross income rose, the 
increase in its relative significance as an element in forming 
the capacity to import was even greater. The proportion 
represented by coffee in the valué of aggregate exports grew 
from 40 per cent in 1939 to 66 per cent in 1950-54. Table 95 
gives percentages and Índices of coffee's part in the formation 
of income and of the capacity to import. With respect 
to income, the máximum increase, 47 per cent, was registered 
in 1950; for the capacity to import, the peak of 85 per cent 
was reached in 1952. 
Table 95. Brazil : Coffee's share in the formation 
of income and of the capacity to import 
Year • 




• share Index 
1939 5 . 1 1 0 0 . 0 3 9 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 
1940 . . . . . . 4 . 0 7 8 . 4 3 2 . 0 8 0 . 4 
1941 3 . 4 6 6 . 7 3 0 . 0 7 5 . 4 
1942 3 . 0 5 8 . 8 2 6 . 2 6 5 . 8 
1943 3 . 1 6 0 . 8 3 2 . 1 8 0 . 7 
1944 3 . 2 6 2 . 7 3 6 . 2 9 1 . 0 
1945 4 . 3 8 4 . 3 3 4 . 9 8 7 . 7 
1946 4 . 8 9 4 . 1 3 5 . 3 8 8 . 7 
1947 3 . 9 7 6 . 5 3 6 . 6 9 2 . 0 
1948 4 . 0 7 8 . 4 4 1 . 6 1 0 4 . 5 
1949 4 . 7 9 2 . 2 5 7 . 6 1 4 4 . 7 
1950 7 . 5 147 .1 6 3 . 9 1 6 0 . 6 
1951 6 . 6 1 2 9 . 4 5 9 . 8 1 5 0 . 3 
1952 6 . 4 1 2 5 . 5 7 3 . 7 1 8 5 . 2 
1953 6 . 2 1 2 1 . 6 6 7 . 7 170 .1 
Source : Tables of the Statistical Annex. 
Nevertheless, this information is insufficient to give an 
accurate idea of die strategic importance of coffee in the 
recent growth of BraziTs economy. The explanation for 
the Ímpetus gathered by this development during the last 
five-year period perhaps lies in the way in which the increase 
in the income of the coffee sector took place. It has already 
been noted that this increase was determined by higher 
coffee prices on the world market. As is readily under-
standable, this caused an immediate upswing in the profits 
of planters and dealers, as well as capital gains for all those 
in possession of stocks. Under such conditions an immediate 
increase in the funds available for investment might have 
been expected. The data in Part One on the rate of saving 
clearly emphasize this phenomenon, since it advanced from 
13.0 to 17.6 per cent between 1948 and 1950. But the agri-
cultural-export sector did not retain all these earnings for 
very long. Higher domestic prices led to a progressive 
transfer of this income to die other sectors and, in particular, 
to manufacturing. The mechanism of the transfer was 
simple; because the rate of exchange remained stable, prices 
of imported goods underwent a relative decline, while the 
internal price level rose. The industrial sector was thus 
able to acquire a great deal of equipment at relatively low 
prices. Under such circumstances, it was enough to maintain 
the rate of profits for the rate of investment in the industrial 
sector to accelerate. 
There is every indication that industry, as a result of this 
process, absorbed several hundred million dollars, which 
represented real capital gains. It may well be asked here 
what would have happened if prices in the internal sector 
had not risen. In that case, the additional earnings derived 
from higher coffee prices would have been concentrated in 
the planting and exporting sector. As agricultural wages 
primarily depend upon the elasticity of the labour supply, 
it is easy to see that the higher income accruing from the 
rise in coffee prices would mainly have taken the form of 
profits. The practical consequence of this situation would 
have been an even greater concentration of capital in the 
coffee sector. The increase in this sector's relative profita-
bility would have been much larger, within both the over-all 
economy and that of agriculture. 
If it were assumed that investment in expanding coffee 
plantations had been heavy enough to cause a disequilibrium 
between the world supply of coffee and the demand that 
would hypothetically affect the market for several years to 
come, the question would arise as to whether the situation 
might not have been far more serious still, i f the profits 
from higher coffee prices had not been diverted towards 
other agricultural activities and other sectors. This reflection 
suffices to show how important, from the standpoint of 
BraziTs development, was the fact that a substantial proportion 
of the gains accruing from the rise in coffee prices was trans-
ferred to sectors linked with the domestic market. Clearly, 
such an observation in no way exeludes the possibility that, 
by means of fiscal policy, investment could have been suitably 
re-directed and an even greater share of the increment in 
income channelled towards capital formation. 
The vital significance of coffee as a determining factor in 
development during the recent period may therefore be 
deduced from the circumstance that an increase in its price 
enables the profitability of both other agricultural activities 
and manufacturing to rise sharply. As regards industry, 
this phenomenon is particularly interesting, since profits 
earned by this sector are reflected in imports of capital goods; 
a strong incentive was thus created to renew these latter and 
to expand the productive capacity of every branch of industry, 
with the partial exception of that actually manufacturing 
such equipment. 
3 . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COFFEE SECTOR 
Before dealing with the coffee problem as it exists at pre-
sent, it is well to draw attention to some of the main economic 
characteristics of this sector in Brazil. 
Coffee cultivation originally met with conditions excep-
tionally favourable for its development in the southern 
area of Brazil, where suitable soils in great abundance and 
an elastic supply of labour were available. Once the transport 
problem had been solved by the extensión of the railways, 
the crop quickly spread throughout its most suitable habitat, 
the Sao Paulo tableland. By the beginning of the present 
century, the most rapid stage of this expansión had already 
terminated; the Brazilian product had secured a pre-eminent 
place on the world market, eliminating many of the previous 
competitors. 
When the máximum development permitted by the world 
market had been reached, expansión continued, creating 
surpluses which were to upset the balance of the coffee eco-
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nomy throughout the subsequent fifty years. A detailed 
analysis of this problem would exceed the limited objective 
of the present study,. which is simply to examine the alter-
native courses open to Brazil in view of the immediate pros-
pects of the coffee economy. Nevertheless, the basic causes 
of the chronic disequilibrium in the coffee trade require at 
least a cursory glance. 
The expansión of coffee cultivation took place at a period 
when, in face of the lack of a domestic market, foreign trade 
alone permitted economic activities of any size to be orga-
nized in Brazil. Coffee requires specific ecological conditions 
and a large labour forcé. Once planting was estabhshed on 
a satisfactory business basis, the very fact that the crop brought 
in a large income set a problem for the entrepreneurs : how 
were these profits to be used? It was natural that efforts 
should have been made to devote such earnings to the most 
profitable activity, which was in fact coffee cultivation itself. 
It should also be recalled that the abundant labour forcé 
required during the harvest was available at other périods 
of the year and could easily be used to expand the size of the 
plantations. As a result, when suitable land and means of 
transport were available, the expansión of coffee plantations 
tended to take place automatically, depending only on the 
labour supply. This is why coffee planters themselves com-
bined to estabhsh railway companies or to encourage immi-
gration. 
This automatic process of expansión obviously carne to 
an end when the world market was saturated. Given the 
characteristics of the demand for coffee, once a supply surplus 
had arisen, persistent price decreases were inevitable, and 
were bound to reduce income from the crop sufficiently 
to discourage further expansión and even to cause the plan-
tations with the lowest yields to be abandoned. Since coffee 
is a perennial plant, no alternative employment exists for the 
labour forcé, and the expenditure of planters is very modest, 
it is clear that price reductions would have to be very steep 
and persistent to bring about the abandonment of the coffee 
plantations. In Brazil their yield is substantially influenced 
by chmatic factors. An abundant harvest weakens the trees 
and is followed by a scanty crop. Furthermore, it must be 
borne in mind that part of a crop or even of successive crops, 
may be lost. In this way periods of over-production may 
alternate with others of shortage, and sharp and pronounced 
price fluctuations may occur. 
The marked instabihty characterizing the coffee market 
very early drew attention to the advisability of introducing 
a disciphnary mechanism. The fact that the production of 
a single country had such large relative importance must 
also have helped the decisión to introduce this mechanism. 
It was these two factors—market instabihty and the concen-
tration of production in one country—that gave rise to the 
Brazilian policy of defending coffee prices, which so greatly 
influenced the world market for three decades. The principal 
aim of this pohcy was to withhold from the market the 
surplus accumulated in good harvest years, and to use it 
when there was a partial loss of production. In this way 
it was possible to reduce the pressure of the supply on the 
market and to stabilize prices at a relatively high level. 
It is easy to understand that such a pohcy made coffee 
planting even more attractive, so that expansión tended to 
become more intensive. This aspect . of the problem was 
grasped in time, and various restrictive measures were adopted. 
Nevertheless, later experience showed that under the condi-
tions then prevailing, it was practically impossible to halt 
the growth of coffee plantations in Brazil. The price defence 
pohcy, therefore, by guaranteeing an income for this crop, 
created a privileged situation for coffee among the alternatives 
open to the entrepreneur for the investment of resources, 
the accumulation of which was also fostered by the pohcy 
in question. 
The way in which this latter was applied, above all during 
the 'twenties, necessarily aggravated the problem of over-
production. Only by combining price defence with a strict 
re-direction of investment—which would have required a 
far more active fiscal pohcy than was possible at that time— 
could this vicious circle have been broken. 
This problem presented another aspect of fundamental 
importance. It has been seen that during the last decades 
of the nineteenth century the development of coffee culti-
vation brought about Brazil's steady conquest of the world 
market. From the moment the country ceased to compete 
and devoted itself to the defence of a relatively high price 
level, favourable conditions were automatically created for 
an expansión of coffee planting elsewhere in the world. 
In this way, Brazil's share of the United States market, which 
had been 80 per cent at the turn of the century, fell to 65 
per cent in 1929 and to 52 per cent in 1937, the last year of 
the price-defence pohcy. In the final instance, the unilateral 
guarantee of a minimum price imphed a reduction or an eli-
mination of the relative advantage by means of which coffee 
planting had expanded in Brazil. Furthermore, the develop-
ment of coffee cultivation in other Latin American coun-
tries, particularly Colombia and Central America, enabled 
other, different grades to be produced, a situation which 
was to have major consequences at a later date. It was the 
more careful harvesting methods practised in these countries 
—where production as a general rule is in the hands of families 
or relatively srnall units—which caused these differences in 
grade and ultimately led to a definite reduction of Brazil's 
ability to compete on world markets, especially that of the 
United States. 
This decline in Brazil's share of the world market, on the 
one hand, and the differences in grade, on the other, would 
seem to have radically altered the general terms of the coffee 
problem. The possibility of recovering markets through 
a price reduction pohcy is becoming more and more remote, 
given the differences in grade and the relative increase of 
costs in Brazil. 
It is recognized that the inelasticity of the coffee supply 
in all producing countries is high. The experience of the 
'thirties demonstrated that, whatever price decline took 
place, the crop would continué to be harvested normally. 
To understand this phenomenon, it should be recalled that a 
coffee plantation represents a relatively large capital ouday 
per hectare, the fixed costs thus being substantial. The variable 
costs are constituted by the remuneration of the labour 
forcé. As is the case in Colombia, within a family unit this 
remuneration is not of a monetary nature; the same is true 
in some instances of the large Brazilian plantations. Even 
when this is not so, rural labour in under-developed countries 
usually lacks alternative employment and for this reason 
can accept substantial reductions in its monetary wages. 
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In producing countries, the problem of coffee production 
costs is a question fundamentally related to the level of real 
wages, or in fact to the stage of development of each country. 
As average productivity grows and the surplus population 
is absorbed, the rise in average wages will cause an increase 
in the variable proportion of coffee costs, namely, that depen-
dent upon wages. Thus, over the long term there is a tend-
ency towards greater elasticity in the coffee supply, as a 
function of short-term price fluctuations. 
Perhaps the trends mentioned above may be accentuated 
at an even earlier date in Brazil. Because coffee production 
is organized there on the basis of large plantations, a relati-
vely higher proportion of the costs must be paid in money. 
As real wages rise, this share will also grow and coffee pro-
duction will assume the characteristics of an industry. In 
this case, a sharp drop in prices may lead to agricultural 
unemployment, since the planter will be obliged to reduce 
his current expenditure. But it should be recalled that Brazil 
is one of those coffee-producing countries where production 
is developing most rapidly. If it were not for the vast labour 
reserves available in other areas, the rapid industrializaron 
of Sao Paulo would already have had a substantial influence 
upon the structure of coffee production. Finally, large-scale 
coffee-planting in Brazil has led to an impoverishment of 
the most suitable soils and henee to an appreciable drop in 
average yields. The attempts at recovering production levels 
during recent years have been based on incorporating more 
remote areas with a less favourable climate, or on large 
investments aimed at reclaiming the impoverished soil. It is 
inevitable that the average level of costs rises in both cases. 
The remarks above, indicating the trend of the relative 
rise in coffee production costs in Brazil, confirm the previous 
statement that the country will encounter increasing diffi-
culties if efforts are made to recover the position lost on the 
world market during the last fifty years. Clearly this con-
clusión dóes not exelude the possibüity of a partial recovery 
of these markets over the short term. Nevertheless, apart 
from the problem of a return to normal trade conditions and 
of recovering some markets which are at present artificially 
restricted, the characteristics of coffee demand are such diat 
it would be difficult to increase consumption by means of 
a mere reduction of prices. The most that might be achieved 
from this method would be the elimination of a competitor; 
but, given the inelasticity of supply in the principal producing 
countries, it is easy to see that, both individually and collec-
tively, all would suffer from the effects of a price war. 
4 . T H E PRESENT SITUATION 
For a clearer definition of the present status of the coffee 
economy, the production and export data of the last three 
decades must be carefully examined. (See table 96.) 
The intensive growth of Brazilian production during the 
o 'thirties was due to a large increase in the area under coffee, 
a development which took place between 1925 and 1929 
as a result of the very strict application of the price defence 
policy during that period. In 1925, production amounted 
to 15.8 million bags, and by 1933 it had reached a peak of 
29.6 million. It is of interest to note that in the latter year 
there was a surplus of 3.3 million on the world market. 
This trend underwent a natural reversal in the following 
decade. Production declined considerably owing to the 
Table 96. Brazil : Exportable coffee production since 1925 
(Millions of 60 kg. bags) 
Period Brazil Other countries Total 
Percentage 
of Brazil in total 
1925-29 . . . . 2 1 . 3 7 . 8 2 9 . 1 7 3 . 2 
1930-34 . . . . 2 2 . 7 8 . 5 3 1 . 2 7 2 . 8 
1935-39 . . . . 2 2 . 8 1 0 . 2 3 3 . 0 6 9 . 1 
1940-44 . . . . 1 3 . 4 1 4 . 7 2 8 . 1 4 7 . 7 
1945-49 . . . . 1 4 . 7 1 3 . 7 2 8 . 4 5 1 . 8 
1950-54 . . . . 1 5 . 4 1 6 . 9 3 2 . 3 4 7 . 7 
1954 . . . . 1 3 . 8 18 .5 3 2 . 3 4 2 . 7 
Source : Instituto Brasileiro do Café. 
partial abandonment of plantations during the depression. 
Older plantations and diose with comparatively small yields 
were not replaced and the number of trees was substantially 
reduced. The net result of the coffee crisis, which lasted 
from 1930 till the end of the war, may be summarized as 
follows : there was a loss of 1 billion trees—one-third of the 
plantations existing during the peak period of expansión— 
and almost one-third of the crop—approximately 80 million 
bags—was destroyed. 
Between 1925-29 and 1935-39, the volume of the world 
coffee trade increased from 23.6 to 28.8 million bags. The 
latter level was recovered in 1945-49, when the difficulties 
created by the war had been overcome; during the following 
five-year period, 1950-54, a yearly average of 31.6 million 
bags was reached, despite the considerable rise in prices. It 
should be noted, however, that BraziTs share in the coffee 
trade fell from 60 per cent in 1925-29 to 47 per cent in 1950-
54. Thus, it accounted for only 800,000 bags out of a total 
world consumption of 8 million during the period under 
review. 
The effect of BraziTs huge accumulation of stocks was 
negative in two ways : the crisis of the first period was ren-
dered more acute and lasted longer. Thus, during 1945— 
49, Brazil was able to export an annual average of 16.3 million 
bags, when its average production was only 14.7 million. 
This situation helped to aggravate the disequilibrium caused 
by an inadequate supply in the following five-year period. 
Had it not been for the stocks accumulated, coffee prices 
would have recovered earlier and at a more gradual pace; 
an adequete increase in supply would have thus been facilitated. 
The sharp rise in prices that took place at the end of 1949, a 
year in which Brazilian stocks covered about 10 per cent of 
world imports and were then exhasted, created a vigorous 
stimulus to an expansión of the area under coffee. This 
gave rise to intensive speculation in land and to indiscriminate 
coffee planting, without regard to the crop's most favourable 
habitat. 
The area under coffee, which had amounted to 3.5 million 
hectares in 1938, was reduced to 2.5 million in 1948. Never-
theless, the price recovery later caused an expansión of this 
area, which stood at 3 million hectares in 1954. The price 
recovery itself was aided by the incorporation of new plan-
tations, an addition in area which in recent years has more 
than offset the abandonment of the older plantations. In 
tHe States of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo 
(the traditional coffee-growing areas), the older plantations 
—of low yield and sometimes plague infested—were appre-
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ciably reduced in area. Between 1939-41 and 1949, the 
coffee-growing area in the State of Fio de Janeiro decreased 
from 160,000 to 51,000 hectares, but a slight recovery began 
to take place in the latter year and by 1954 it had risen to 
Period 
1939-41 
1949 . . . 
1950 . . , 
1951 . . . 
1952 . . . 
1953 . . . 
1954 . . . 
Source : Ministry of Agriculture, Statistical Service. 
NOTE.—(A) : Area in thousands of hectares. 
(B) : Yields in kilogrammes per hectare. 
As can be seen, those States which were traditional pro-
ducers and reduced their coffee-growing area experienced 
higher yields. In Sao Paulo, however, the reverse is true : 
the cultivated area has increased and the yield is lower. The 
growing importance of the State of Paraná is worthy of 
mention. Its coffee-plantation area practically trebled during 
the period under review, while the average yield increased 
from 443 to 715 kilogrammes per hectare between 1939-31 
and 1950-52. The decline in average yield which took place 
in 1953 and 1954 was due to bad weather conditions. 
The present productive capacity of Brazilian coffee plan-
tations is not known with precisión, since no information 
exists as to the age of plantations in the older coffee-growing 
regions, the extent of new plantations (especially in Paraná), 
and the effective yields of these latter, which are subject to 
less favourable weather conditions. 
With respect to the age-distribution of plantations in the 
traditional coffee-growing areas, it should be borne in mind 
that an improvement in yields may accompany the conser-
vation of cultivated area, since it is known that the replace-
ment of oíd plantations is being carried out on a more rational 
basis and that more productive varieties are being introduced. 
It is assumed, for instance, that production in the State of 
Sao Paulo can increase by as much as 20 per cent without 
an expansión of the present area. However, it should not 
be overlooked that some of this increase would result from 
more intensive cultivation, adequate use of fertilizers, irri-
gation, etc. In this case, account should be taken of the 
corresponding rise in current monetary costs and the sub-
sequent increase in the elasticity of supply. Should prices 
fall, dais proportion of the supply would contract. 
Ñor can a very clear picture be obtained of conditions in 
the new areas, which are situated mainly in the State of 
Paraná. Available information on the area covered by these 
new plantations is vague and contradictory. Data from the 
Ministry of Agriculture show that the number of coffee 
trees in production in Paraná rose from 124 to 234 million 
between 1948 and 1953. But these new coffee trees .were 
planted before 1949, that is, before the recent price boom. 
It was in 1949 onward that planting was really intensified. 
Census data for 1950 show that the number of new and as yet 
57,000 hectares. In Minas Gerais, the plantation area decreased 
from 748,000 to 560,000 hectares. It is interesting to note 
that a reduction in area was nearly always accompanied by 
an increase in yields. (See table 97) 
unfruitful plants had risen to 119 million. All these trees 
must then have been four years oíd at the most, and the 
majority were probably younger. 
Although these data are clearly of limited valué, they 
may serve as a basis for further assumptions. The increase 
in the number of trees between 1948 and 1953 appears to 
indicate that, in the period before the rise in prices during 
1949, approximately 20 million trees were planted annually 
in Paraná, in addition to those intended for replacement 
purposes. If 119 million new trees existed at the end of 
1950, it is likely that approximately 60 million were planted 
in the year immediately following the rise in prices.3 The 
remainder would have been two to four years oíd and would 
have begun to bear fruit in the agricultural years 1950/51, 
1951/52 and 1952/53. 
On the assumption that the rate of planting was maintained 
at 60 million per annum, it is probable that 240 million new 
trees, including those for replacement, were added in the 
interim period between the rise in prices and the great frost 
of 1953. If this was so, the total number of trees in Paraná 
during 1953 must have been approximately 450 millions,4 
classified as follows : 
Millions 
Bearing coffee in 1949 150 
New trees, planted up to 1949 60 
New trees, planted after 1949 240 
TOTAL 450 
3 Since, in 1950, the new trees were between one and four years oíd, 
and on the assumption that in the first three years 20 million were planted 
annually, in the last of these years, 1949/50, the number of trees planted 
would have reached 60 million. 
4 Studies carried out after the 1953 frost were used as a basis for much 
higher estimates than that given in the text. According to these studies 
the number of trees planted annually, from 1950 onward, amounted to 
at least 90 million. In this case, the number of trees existing at the time o f 
the 1953 frost would have totalled about 570 million. This being so, 
it might be assumed that with very favourable weather conditions yearly 
production in Paraná could reach 12 million bags. The existence of as 
many as 680 million trees has been mentioned. However, in the absence 
o f a detailed inquiry, an estimate has been adpoted which is based on the 
few data that are more or less proven, such as statistics of the Ministry o f 
Agriculture and the agricultural census o f 1950. 
Table 97. Brazil : Area and yields of coffee plantations in various states 
Sáo Paulo Minas Gerais Espíritu Santo Rio de Janeiro Paraná Total 
(A) m (A) (B) (A) m (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
1 ,275 500 748 243 230 399 160 220 133 443 2 ,646 394 
1 ,322 369 560 388 228 505 51 680 242 621 2 , 5 3 8 421 
1 ,407 334 571 377 220 387 56 486 267 758 2 , 6 6 3 402 
1 , 4 1 5 337 588 385 232 421 56 643 292 594 2 , 7 3 8 394 
1 , 4 3 0 360 607 292 240 295 56 624 332 793 2 , 8 2 3 399 
1 , 4 5 9 322 624 382 244 407 57 548 372 542 2 , 9 1 8 380 
1 ,464 334 637 368 251 393 57 461 383 345 2 , 9 1 6 356 
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The 1953 frost destroyed a considerable proportion of the 
newer. plantations, and in 1955, when no definite information 
was yet available as to the recovery and re-planting of the 
areas affected, another frost caused new and serious damage 
to the plantations in Paraná. The productive capacity of 
these plantations over the next few years is uncertain. Any 
estimate must be based on mere conjecture. The theory 
can now be advanced that, provided there are no more 
frosts, in 1956/57 or 1957/58 the Paraná plantations will be 
able to exceed the average production of Sao Paulo during 
the last fxve years. Thus, given an average production in 
Paraná equivalent to that of 1952 (1,267 kg. per 1,000 plants), 
the 450 million trees would be able to produce 9.5 million 
bags of coffee. These data merely serve as a point of refer-
ence. What is now known about the plantations of Paraná 
is suíficient indication that their productive capacity will 
probably be seriously affected for two or three years to come. 
Although unreliable from several aspects, the data given 
here are a starting point from which tht following facts can 
be deduced : 
(a) Brazilian coffee plantations are being rehabilitated or 
expanded, although the intensive frosts of 1953 and 1955 
greatly affected their productive capacity. Once these 
adverse effects have been overcome, exportable harvests of 
20-22 million bags are a definite possibility. 
(b) Despite the great frost of 1955,. there is nothing to 
indicate a shortage of supplies during the next few years. 
The carry-over from the 1953/54 and 1954/55 harvests is 
estimated at not less than 6 million bags. Even if the 1955/56 
and 1956/57 harvests are as small as in 1953/54, this sur-
plus would be suíficient to prevent a noticeable disequili-
brium between supply and demand. However, mutatis 
mutandis, difficulties will not arise from disequilibrium caused 
by carry-overs from the next three harvests, including that 
of 1954/55. 
(c) There is a potential disequilibrium in the market which 
may materialize before 1960. It is governed by the existence 
of large plantations in the State of Parana which are approa-
ching maturity, a process which is being disturbed and 
hindered by the recent frosts. Speculation is encouraged by 
the lack of precise information as to the extent and condition 
of these plantations. 
A rapid review of the present status of the price problem is 
called for at this stage. Given the inelasticity of the demand 
for coffee, prices are affected mainly by fluctuations in supply. 
The Brazilian " price defence " policy mentioned earlier was 
based upon this elemental fact, which has been confirmed 
once more by recent experience. Thus, while retail coffee 
prices paid by the United States consumer rose by 90 per cent 
between 1947 and 1953 (58 per cent more than the average 
increase for consumer goods), annual per capita consumption 
increased from 7.8 to 7.9 kg. This does not exelude the 
possibility, which was apparently proven in 1954, that if 
prices are very high, demand begins to show a certain amount 
of elasticity. However, there is no doubt that at price levels 
similar to those at present prevailing (between 50 and 60 cents 
per pound for Santos No. 4), demand appears to be totally 
inelastic, at least in the principal market. 
Demand for coffee is growing slowly and surely, in pro-
portion to the increase in world population. In some regions, 
per capita consumption is also growing. This can be attri-
buted to an increase in the income of the population or to 
other factors. At all events, it must always be borne in mind 
that the growth of demand is a gradual process, and for this 
reason its influence on prices is of little significance. 
The level of coffee prices will therefore be governed mainly 
by the actual or predicted fluctuations of supply. On the 
assumption that supply will undergo no basic modifications 
during the next three years, it is possible that prices will 
remain at dieir present levels.5 This does not mean that 
such levels are. necessarily a reflection of market equilibrium. 
They became operative after prices had fluctuated widely 
and are similar to those prevailing during the period of rela-
tive stability which followed the liquidation of Brazilian 
stocks in 1949. The essential point is the inertia of the price 
level when market conditions remain unchanged. 
As changes will probably take place in two or three years' 
time, the stability of the market may be of short duration. 
This aspect o f the problem is of fundamental importance, 
since it proves that coffee policy must be based on long-
term considerations. 
5 . POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES OF A COFFEE POLICY 
From the preceding observations it is clear that in the case 
of Brazil the possibility of unilateral action in the coffee 
market no longer exists. In the past, the main purpose of 
BraziTs coffee policy was to defend a relatively high price 
level. Nowadays, the aim is to maintain the country's 
position in the world market. It is now only too clear that 
any defence of prices, although fully successful from the 
standpoint of achieving a short-term increase in income, 
will inevitably result in a loss of markets for Brazil. 
On the odier hand, the recovery of markets through the 
exclusión of competitors would appear fairly impracticable 
in BraziTs case and would have negative effects over both 
the short and the long term. Given the inelasticity of supply 
in nealy all producer countries and die inelasticity of demand 
in importing nations, a reduction in prices with competitive 
ends in view would merely involve a transference of income 
at the expense of Brazil as well as of the other exporting 
countries. Moreover, since Brazilian costs appear to be just 
as high as those of its principal competitors (they are probably 
increasing more rapidly), it is to be expected that a prolonged 
price decline would, in the long run, bring about a contraction 
in supply that would be greater in Brazil than in the other 
exporting countries. 
If Brazil were to consider it essential to defend its position 
by means of a price war, and if such means were to produce 
entirely the contrary effect, it would not be surprising if the 
idea that any coffee policy must be based on an agreement 
among exporting countries were to gain ground. 
The most important questions on which this agreement 
would hinge are the following : (¿Í) world market quotas 
of main exporters; (b) stabilization of the price level; (c) fi-
nancing of surpluses; (d) ways ofexpanding the world market. 
The fixing of quotas is a problem which presents some 
difficulty in the establishment of criteria. It is known that 
BraziTs share of the world market has recendy undergone 
a substantial decline, owing to weather conditions and to 
' 5 This study was written at the end of 1954, the three years will thus 
cover the period until 1957. 
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the unilateral price policy. However, the fall in Brazilian 
exports during 1954, although more pronounced than that 
of other exporters, coincided with a general contraction of 
world trade. If this abnormal period be discounted, the 
relative volume of exports approaches that of exportable 
production in Brazil. 
The stabilization of the price level is another question which 
admits of no easy solution. It has already been noted that de-
mand seems to be virtually inelastic within a fairly wide price-
range. It would be without foundation to assert that such 
and such a price level would be the more suitable—namely, 
that it would better reflect the equilibrium between uncontroll-
ed supply and demand. Experience shows that during 
the 1920's the control of supply affected prices, and that these 
latter were lower during the period 1930-49 owing to the 
considerable surpluses accumulated in Brazil. It is also 
known that when these surpluses were sold, prices adj usted 
themselves and remained more or less stable at the same level 
for more than three years, that is, until a sharp contraction of 
supply became likely. It might perhaps be alleged that 
from the end of 1949 to the beginning of 1953, prices to 
some extent reflected an equilibrium between demand and 
supply, since during this period, surpluses were neither liquida-
ted ñor accumulated to any great extent, there was no real 
shortage of the product, and the market operated with a 
minimum of interference. It would also be possible to cite 
contrary reasons—for example, that the likelihood of a liqui-
dation of surpluses and a bad harvest in Brazil affected the 
price level at the end of 1949. However, in this particular 
field, it is not easy to find arguments which do not conflict. 
In cases such as this, the solution has always been to accept 
the price which was prevailing at the time when the agreements 
were made. For coffee, the favourable circumstance exists 
that the present price is almost equivalent to that prevailing 
in the period mentioned (1949-53). 
The prospects for the capacity to import should now be 
considered in the light of the hypotheses formulated on Brazil's 
share in world trade and on the future level of coffee prices. 
This question is of fundamental importance to any programme 
for the economic development of Brazil. For an adequate 
statement of the problem, a certain amount of conjecture 
must first be made as to world demand for coffee during the 
future period under study. As a basis for calculation, recourse 
may be had to the projection of coffee demand in the United 
States which was recently made by A. Szarf and Pignolosa.6 
This projection is itself based on coefficients of income-elasticity 
and prices, on population growth and on a hypothetical 
stabilization of prices similar to that indicated above. Accord-
ing to this projection, absolute consumption in the United 
States will increase by 40 per cent between 1953 and 1957.7 
On the basis of a hypothesis of linear growth, the increase 
between 1953 and 1962 would amount to 15 per cent. If 
consumption in all the other importing countries increases 
with the same intensity as in the United States—a pessimistic 
6 See Food and Agriculture Organization, " Factors affecting United 
States Coffee Consumption " in Monthly Bullctin of Agriculture Economía 
and Statistics, Vol. III, No. 10, October 1954, pp. 6-10. 
7 The results obtained from this projection are somewhat inferior to 
those given in the study on the development prospects of the Colombian 
economy. However, since, in the case of Brazil, the procedure of formu-
lating hypotheses was relatively more conservative, in the interests of 
compatibility the' hypothetical expansión of world demand for coffee 
should perhaps be on a more modest scale. 
hypothesis, since many of these countries have not yet regained 
the pre-war level—and if Brazil maintains its 1949-53 share 
of world trade,8 by 1962 Brazilian exports will reach 18.9 
million bags. 
If the exports projected for 1962 are compared with those of 
1954 (10.9 million bags), the result is an increase of 73 per cent, 
which is substantially greater than the increase in the over-all 
quantum of exports—51 per cent—projected in chapter III 
of Part One. It so happened diat in 1954 coffee exports were 
abnormally low, and for this reason that year was excluded 
from the calculation of Brazil's share in the world market. 
On the basis of the 1953-54 average, the increase of coffee 
exports would amount to 43 per cent, an increment which 
is exactly equivalent to that of the over-all quantum of exports, 
according to the projection cited earlier in the text. 
This assumption—exports of about 18.9 million bags at 
average current prices—is based on the capacity to import 
required for a development programme in accordance with 
the over-all plan outlined in Part One, and could quite easily 
become a reality, always provided that conditions as regards the 
coffee supply were favourable, and that minimum agreement 
between the main exporting countries were reached. 
But is should be recalled that such favourable conditions 
may well have disappeared within two or three years. For 
example, it is possible that, within three years, the exportable 
surplus may rise to 20 million bags while Brazil's export 
quota is still about 17 million. If in five years Brazil has 
three large harvests—within the limits of current productive 
capacity—, by 1962 the surplus stocks may vary between 
10 and 15 million bags, even though exports have remained 
at the normal levels envisaged in the above plan. There 
is thus a structural supply problem which must be carefully 
studied. If measures are not adopted sufficiently far ahead 
to neutralize the depressive action of the probable surplus, 
the price stabilization policy will meet with serious practical 
difficulties. 
This problem is closely linked with that of the financing 
of stocks, to which an earher reference was made. A pohcy 
designed to secure export price stability has its counterpart 
in another aimed at stabilizing the prices paid to the planter. 
In this way, a privileged situation may be established for a 
particular product and may lead to its wider cultivation, 
as occurred in the case of coffee in the past. 
If the absorption capacity of the market is known and the 
possibility of a price war is excluded, a pohcy allowing the 
continued expansión of coffee cultivation when productive 
capacity is already excessive will completely defeat its own 
ends. The limiting of the capacity in question to the size 
of the potential market is a logical consequence of the stabili-
zation policy on which the hypotheses of economic develop-
ment are based. Nevertheless, experience has shown that 
this objective is by no means easy to attain. 
Perhaps the key to the question lies in the possibility of 
forecasting the probable surpluses far enough ahead, and in 
combining the pohcy for financing production with that of 
discouraging its expansión. The financing of a large pro-
8 The average figure for Brazilian exports during the five-year period 
1949-53 was 16.4 million bags; the peak was reached in 1949 (19.4 million) 
and the lowest point in 1950 (14.8 million). If the two extremes are 
discounted, the average figure falls to 15.9 million. On the basis of these 
data, the projection could be 18.3 million bags. 
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duction surplus constitutes first and foremost a problem of 
the internal stability of the system. The purchase of a surplus 
of 5 million sacks of coffee over a limited period of time 
necessarily produces a strong impulse towards inflation. 
If adequate compensatory measures are not taken—and such 
measures are difEcult to put into practice in Brazil—the 
accumulation of coffee stocks will lead to sharp inflationary 
pressure. It is quite possible that a policy aimed at neutralizing 
this pressure may create conditions tending to ehminate the 
structural problem of the excess productive capacity. 
What steps can be taken to avoid inflationary pressures 
resulting from the fmancing of coffee surpluses ? In other 
words, how can the flow of income created by the aggregate 
purchase of the crop be prevented from exceeding the flow 
of income accruing from coffee exports ? This is no new 
problem in Brazil, even if the circumstances in which it aróse 
were different in the past. The substantial accumulation of 
stocks in the 'thirties was financed partly by more liberal 
credit and partly by a system of " sacrífice quotas under 
which each planter handed over a share of his crop to the 
Government. As it was a period of depression, the expansión 
of credit assumed the characteristics of a timely compensatory 
policy. 
Supposing the hypothesis of inflationary financing— 
unjustifiable except in very special circumstances—to be 
discarded, it would not be surprising if the idea of the sacrifice 
quota were reconsidered. Nevertheless, it should be recalled 
that while the surpluses of the 'thirties attained such large 
proportions as to exelude all possibility of their being utilized, 
the present situation suggests that probable future surpluses 
will be much easier to dispose of. Within certain limits, 
such surpluses are necessary for the price stabilization policy. 
Thus, in the case of the partial loss of the harvest, they can be 
used to prevent speculation and sharp rises in prices, which 
tend to cause an uncontrolled expansión of the plantations. 
Reflections of this nature raise new aspeets of the problem, 
especially the need to avoid encouraging marginal coffee 
production during a period when surplus stocks must be 
purchased. In this respect, consideration has recently been 
given in Brazil to the possibility of paying planters only 
a part of the coffee price in cash and using the remainder to 
finance surpluses. It is felt in some circles that this solution 
would have the desired effect upon marginal production. 
From another point of view, the planters could recover 
that share of the price which had not been paid previously 
when the surpluses were sold. 
This is not the appropriate place to discuss such a proposal 
in detail. The only reason for mentioning it is to emphasize 
how far the principie of coffee control has gained ground in 
Brazil and how great is the anxiety of some sectors to provide 
for fmancing methods which, like the one described, would 
not have inflationary consequences. 
Finally, some reference should be made to the possibilities 
of expanding world coffee consumption, which are consi-
derable, in relation both to traditional consumers and to the 
countries where this beverage is little known. From the 
moment it becomes apparent that a surplus exists in world 
coffee production, part of it could justifiably be used—as 
has been suggested on more than one occasion—to publicize 
the product in areas with a low consumption. The organiza-
tion and fmancing of a campaign of this nature presupposes 
co-operation among the main exporting countries. 
But it is in the regions which are traditional consumers of 
coffee that the possibilities for expansión are clearly substantial. 
Advertisement aimed at spreading the habit of coffee-drinking 
is almost non-existent if compared with the publicity given 
to other beverages, such as soft drinks and tea. It is not a 
question of giving information about coffee, but rather one 
of making it readily accessible in possible centres of consump-
tion. This aspect of the problem should be carefully studied, 
and any practical action taken will require the mobilization 
of considerable financial resources. Here again no really 
positive results can be obtained without effective co-operation 
among exporting countries. 
STATISTICAL ANNEX 
Table I. Brazil : Share of coffee in aggregate agricultural 
income 





Valué of aggregate 
agricultural 
production Percentage of 
coffee production 
to total Year (Millions of cruzeiros) 
1939 1 ,667 8 , 1 9 3 2 0 . 3 
1940 1 ,378 7 , 8 0 4 1 7 . 7 
1941 1 ,359 8 , 6 8 2 1 5 . 7 
1942 1 ,334 9 , 1 5 6 1 4 . 6 
1943 1 ,738 12 ,454 1 4 . 0 
1944 2 ,393 17 ,622 1 3 . 6 
1945 3 ,717 19 ,945 1 8 . 6 
1946 5 ,336 26 ,047 2 0 . 5 
1947 5 ,532 2 9 , 3 4 0 1 8 . 9 
1948 6 ,451 3 4 , 3 0 6 1 8 . 8 
1949 8 ,486 4 0 , 1 1 2 2 1 . 2 
1950 15 ,885 51 ,544 3 0 . 8 
1951 16 ,578 5 6 , 7 9 9 2 9 . 2 
1952 19,021 6 9 , 2 2 9 2 7 . 5 
1953 21 ,451 8 6 , 5 3 2 2 4 . 8 
1954 20 ,162 9 3 , 0 6 5 2 1 . 7 
Source : Ministry of Agriculture, Statistical Service. 
4 Price paid to the planter. 
-




aggregate exports Percentage 
of coffee 
to total Year (Millions of cruzeiros) 
1939 2 , 2 3 4 5 , 6 1 6 3 9 . 8 
1940 1 ,589 4 , 9 6 1 3 2 . 0 
1941 2 , 0 1 7 6 , 7 2 6 3 0 . 0 
1942 1 ,966 7 , 5 0 0 2 6 . 2 
1943 2 , 8 0 3 8 , 7 2 9 3 2 . 1 
1944 3 , 8 7 9 10 ,727 3 6 . 2 
1945 4 , 2 6 0 12 ,198 3 4 . 9 
1946 6 ,441 1 8 , 2 3 0 3 5 . 3 
1947 7 , 7 5 5 2 1 , 1 7 9 3 6 . 6 
1948 9 , 0 1 9 2 1 , 6 9 7 4 1 . 6 
1949 11 ,611 2 0 , 1 5 3 5 7 . 6 
1950 15 ,908 2 4 , 9 1 3 6 3 . 9 
1951 19 ,448 3 2 , 5 1 4 5 9 . 8 
1952 19 ,213 2 6 , 0 6 5 7 3 . 7 
1953 21 ,696 3 2 , 0 4 7 6 7 . 7 










Source : Ministry of Finance, Statistical Service. 
a Includes bonuses. 
1939 3 , 0 4 2 13 ,839 2 2 . 0 
1940 2 , 5 1 9 12 ,914 1 9 . 5 
1941 2 , 3 7 8 13 ,320 1 7 . 9 
1942 2 , 1 7 4 12 ,542 1 7 . 3 
1943 2 , 3 4 1 13 ,793 1 7 . 0 
1944 2 , 3 2 6 14 ,960 1 5 . 5 
1945 2 , 3 8 2 15 ,276 1 5 . 6 
1946 2 , 4 0 6 15,611 1 5 . 4 
1947 2 , 4 1 5 15 ,854 1 5 . 2 
1948 2 , 4 6 4 16 ,219 1 5 . 2 
1949 2 , 5 3 8 17 ,021 1 4 . 9 
1950 2 , 6 6 3 1 7 , 7 7 5 1 5 . 0 
1951 2 , 7 3 8 17 ,873 1 5 . 3 
1952 2 , 8 2 3 1 9 , 0 0 0 1 4 . 9 
1953 2 , 9 1 9 19 ,603 1 4 . 9 
1954 2 , 9 6 0 2 0 , 5 3 5 1 4 . 4 
Source : Ministry of Agriculture, Statistical Service. 
Table IV. Brazil : Share of coffee and agricultural production 
in the formation of income 
Valué of Valué of 
agricultural coffee 
production production 
Year Income to income to income 
(Billions of Cruzeiros) ( Percentage ) (Percentage) 
1939 3 2 . 4 2 5 . 3 5 . 1 
1940 3 4 . 8 2 2 . 4 4 . 0 
1941 4 0 . 0 2 1 . 7 3 . 4 
1942 4 5 . 2 2 0 . 2 3 . 0 
1943 5 6 . 6 2 2 . 0 3 . 1 
1944 7 3 . 9 2 3 . 8 3 . 2 
1945 8 6 . 1 2 3 . 2 4 . 3 
1946 111 .4 2 3 . 4 4 . 8 
1947 142 .9 2 0 . 5 3 . 9 
1948 159 .7 2 1 . 5 4 . 0 
1949 1 8 1 . 7 2 2 . 1 4 . 7 
1950 2 1 1 . 5 2 4 . 4 7 . 5 
1951 2 5 1 . 3 2 2 . 6 6 . 6 
1952 2 9 9 . 0 2 3 . 1 6 . 4 
1953 3 4 7 . 4 2 4 . 9 6 . 2 
Source: Statistical Annex and table 1 in chapter I of Part One. 
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Table V. Brazil : Share of exportable coffee production 
Other Percentage of 
Year Brazil countries Total Brazil to total 
(Thousands of 60 kg. bags) 
1925 . . 15 ,761 7 , 0 5 2 2 2 , 8 1 3 6 9 . 1 
1926 . . 18 ,115 7 , 0 6 8 2 5 , 1 8 3 7 1 . 9 
1927 . . 2 7 , 6 2 4 8 , 0 0 3 3 5 , 6 2 7 7 7 . 5 
1928 . . 16 ,061 8 , 8 6 0 24 ,921 6 4 . 4 
1929 . . 2 8 , 9 4 2 8 , 2 7 3 3 7 , 2 1 5 7 7 . 8 
1930 . . . , . . 17 ,419 8 , 6 3 3 2 6 , 0 5 2 6 6 . 9 
1931 . . 2 8 , 3 1 3 8 ,287 3 6 , 6 0 0 7 7 . 4 
1932 . . 19 ,846 9 , 2 3 9 2 9 , 0 8 5 6 8 . 2 
1933 . . . 2 9 , 6 3 4 8 , 9 3 5 38 ,569 •76.8 
1934 . . . 18 ,509 7 , 6 9 9 2 6 , 2 0 8 7 0 . 6 
1935 . . 2 0 , 9 2 7 10 ,028 30 ,955 6 7 . 6 
1936 . . 2 6 , 3 5 9 10 ,889 3 7 , 2 4 8 7 0 . 8 
1937 . . . 24 ,351 10,011 3 4 , 3 6 2 7 0 . 9 
1938 . . . 2 3 , 2 2 2 10 ,125 33 ,347 6 9 . 6 
1939 , . . 19 ,138 10 ,119 2 9 , 2 5 7 6 5 . 4 
1940 . . . 16 ,456 12 ,138 28 ,594 5 7 . 5 
1941 . . . 15 ,797 15 ,596 3 1 , 3 9 3 5 0 . 3 
1942 . . . . . . . 13 ,613 14 ,878 28 ,491 4 7 . 8 
1943 . . . . . . . 12 ,160 15 ,990 28 ,150 4 3 . 2 
1944 9 , 1 3 6 15 ,020 24 ,156 3 7 . 8 
1945 . . . 12,701 12 ,478 25 ,179 5 0 . 4 
1946 . . . 14 ,019 13,101 2 7 , 1 2 0 5 1 . 7 
1947 . . . 13 ,572 14 ,270 2 7 , 8 4 2 4 8 . 7 
1948 . . . 16 ,952 14 ,648 3 1 , 6 0 0 5 3 . 6 
1949 . . 16 ,303 14 ,236 3 0 , 5 3 9 5 3 . 4 
1950 . . 16 ,754 15 ,966 3 2 , 7 2 0 5 1 . 2 
1951 . . 14 ,962 15 ,730 3 0 , 6 9 2 4 8 . 7 
1952 . . 16 ,076 16 ,479 3 2 , 5 5 5 4 9 . 4 
1953 . . 15 ,145 18 ,010 . 3 3 , 1 5 5 4 5 . 7 
1954» . . . . . 13 ,900 18 ,450 . 3 2 , 3 5 0 4 3 . 0 
Table VI. Brazil : Share of exports in world 
coffee consumption 
Percentage of 
Brazilian World Brazilian exports to 
Year exports consumption6 world consumption 
(Thousands of 60 kg. bags) 
1930 15 ,288 2 5 , 7 2 9 5 9 . 4 
1931 17 ,851 27 ,947 6 3 . 9 
1932 11 ,935 2 4 , 5 6 0 4 8 . 6 
1933 15 ,459 26 ,318 5 8 . 7 
1934 14 ,147 25 ,292 5 5 . 9 
1935 15 ,329 2 7 , 1 1 0 5 6 . 5 
1936 14 ,186 2 8 , 4 7 8 4 9 . 8 
1937 12 ,123 2 9 , 8 9 4 4 0 . 5 
1938 17 ,113 3 0 , 0 1 3 5 7 . 0 
1939 16 ,499 2 8 , 7 2 8 5 7 . 4 
1940 12 ,046 22 ,504 5 3 . 5 
1941 11 ,052 19 ,550 5 6 . 5 
1942 7 , 2 8 0 16 ,210 4 4 . 9 
1943 10 ,112 2 0 , 2 1 2 5 0 . 0 
1944 13 ,555 22 ,705 5 9 . 7 
1945 14 ,172 23 ,994 5 9 . 1 
1946 15 ,505 26 ,391 5 8 . 7 
1947 14 ,830 2 7 , 5 3 3 5 3 . 9 
1948 17 ,492 3 0 , 3 3 9 5 7 . 6 
1949 19 ,369 32 ,911 5 8 . 8 
1950 14 ,835 2 9 , 3 1 0 5 0 . 6 
1951 16 ,358 31 ,429 5 2 . 0 
1952 15,821 31 ,964 4 9 . 5 
1953 15 ,562 33 ,771 4 6 . 1 
1954 10 ,918 
Source : Instituto Brasileiro do Café. 
a Exeludes consumption of producing countries. 




I . EVOLUTION OF TRANSPORT 
1. The various means of transport in the pre-war period 
During the pre-war period, railways and coastal shipping 
constituted the basic means of transport for freight and pas-
sengers between the towns of Brazil. At that time, the 
motor vehicle was of little signifxcance to the transport sector, 
and the aeroplane even less. 
Railways have not increased in mileage to any great extent 
since 1939, but a review of the past situation will show why 
they form a much more cohesive system of transport today. 
It has often been remarked that many railways were built 
in Brazil to provide areas of economic activity in the interior, 
particularly those producing export commodities, with 
adequate means of transport. The fact that such areas were 
both scattered and isolated was one of the decisive reasons 
why the railways did not develop as an integrated national 
network, but as local and almost independent systems. 
Such integration as existed was purely regional. In most 
cases, each system was built around oñe or two ports, from 
which the trunk lines radiated fanwise. 
Although the National Transport Plan adopted in 1934 
established the bases for linking up the various zonal systems, 
progress towards the attainment of this objective was slow 
during that decade. In 1939, in fact, the Brazilian railway 
network was still divided into seven local systems, with few 
inter-connexions, and traffic from one to another was very 
hght. (See table 98.) 
Table 98. Brazil : Zonal railway systems existing in the pre-war period 
Principal ports 
Principal railways of each system Zone served of each system 
I. V. F. Rio Grande do Sul R i o Grande do Sul Porto Alegre 
II. R . V. Paraná-Santa Catarina Paraná 
Santa Catarina 
Paranaguá 
III. E . F. Santos Judiaí ' 
Cia. Paulista de E . F. ) Santos 
E . F. Sorocabana ) 
E . F. Noroeste do Brasil ) 
Cia. Mogiana de E . F. S 
IV. E . F. Central do Brasil Sao Paulo (south-east) 
Rede Mineira de Via^ao Minas Gerais R i o de Janeiro 
E . F. Leopoldina Espíritu Santo (south-east) 




VI. Rede Ferroviario do Nordeste 




VII. Rede Via^ao Cearense Ceafá Fortaleza 
Sources: Official publications and the Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
Four products—lumber, coffee, cotton and sugar—contri-
buted approximately one-quarter of the aggregate railway 
goods traffic. Because these four commodities were carried 
for a greater average distance than aggregate freight, they 
represented an even larger proportion of the kilometric 
traffic than of the tonnage. Apart from the products named, 
only a few others (petroleum, iron-ore and some building 
materials) were transported in quantities exceeding half a 
million tons annually. Taken as a whole, these commodities 
—including all building materials—amounted to less than 
40 per cent of the volume of railway freight. 
Goods were mainly transported over relatively short dis-
tances, the average being about 200 kilometres.1 
Coastal shipping filled the gap left by the absence of an 
integrated railway network, forming a link between the diffe-
rent zones of the country and consequendy between the 
various railway systems. For all practical purposes, the entire 
trade between the southern and the north-eastern States of 
Brazil was sea-borne, as well as most of the trade between 
1 There are indications that only a few products were transported for 
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neighbouring States. The volume transported in this trade 
did not exceed 3 million tons annually, but the average run 
was several times longer than in the case of the railways. 
During the 1930s, motor traffic was probably limited to 
towns and short-distance runs, where it competed with more 
primitive means of transport; except in small areas such as 
the district served by the Leopoldina Railway, it was not 
as yet a serious rival to the railways. 
Aviation as a means of passenger transport was at that time 
in its infancy. 
2. Traffic development in the post-war period 
During the Second World War, the distribution of traffic 
among the various means of transport did not radically alter, 
although the railways played a still more predominant part 
in land transport. 
Effective 2 and kilometric 3 traffic increased until the trans-
port of goods stood a little higher and that of passengers 
much higher than before the war.4 At the same time, motor 
transport made scant progress, because fuels and spare parts 
were in short supply. For various reasons, the increase in 
the goods carried by ship was only 15.2 per cent between 
1939 and 1945. 
Shortly after the Second World War, changes in the traffic 
structure began to óccur with marked rapidity. As will 
be seen in greater detail at a later stage, the years 1946/52 
were characterized, firstly by a substantial expansión of road 
passenger and freight transport and by a rise in the number 
of passengers carried by air; secondly by a relative stagnation 
and even a decrease in railway transport; and, finally, by a 
moderate increase in sea transport. 
(a) Rail traffic 
The movement of goods and passengers will be considered 
separately. During the post-war period, except in 1952, 
effective goods traffic was maintained at a level lower than the 
peak reached during the Second World War. The decline 
was almost universal, since it affected all the rail systems 
except one.5 
The evolution of kilometric traffic on Brazil's railways 
as a whole was exactly opposite to that of effective traffic, 
inasmuch as it continued to grow at the end of the war. 
For some railways (those which serve the States of Paraná, 
Santa Catarina and Sáo Paulo), the growth of kilometric 
traffic was largely uninterrupted, while other systems displayed 
an erratic development with a slightly higher average than 
that of the war years. 
If the increment in the volume of freight is compared with 
the number of tons per kilometre, it becomes clear that the 
expansión of kilometric traffic was due to the steady lengthen-
ing of the average distance covered by rail freight. How 
8 Effective traffic is measured in tons transported. 
3 Kilometric traffic is expressed in tons per kilometre. 
. 4 Kilometric traffic increased by 55.9 and effective traffic by 50.0 per 
cent between 1939 and 1945. 
8 The extreme example óf the drop in freight volume took place in the 
rail system serving the State of R i o Grande do Sul. The ,difference between 
the máximum and minimum figures registered (for 1946 and 1952 respecti-
vely) was cióse to 25 per cent. Another railway in southern Brazil consti-
tutéd a striking exception,' since its effective traffic was reached in 1948, 
and has subsequently maintained a higher level than in any previous year. 
great was this expansión can be appreciated from the fact that 
kilometric traffic reached 237 kilometres by 1952, whereas 
in 1945 it had not exceeded 199 kilometres. The origin of 
the increase in the average run lay not only in the incorporation 
of more remote areas into the country's economic life, but 
also in the growing competition from road haulage over 
short and intermediate distances. 
The increase in the number of railway passengers should 
be emphasized. Even more remarkable is the part played 
by suburban passenger. transport in this traffic. Effective 
and kilometric traffic, far from ceasing to expand in 1946, 
continued to increase until they reached their peak, the former 
in 1950 and the latter in 1951. By 1952, both had risen 
approximately 9 per cent in relation to 1946. 
(b) Road traffic 
No statistical series exists to enable the development of 
traffic in this sector to be assessed accurately, with the exception 
of one for lorries licensed or in circulation.8 According to 
these figures, the tonnage hauled by such vehicles practically 
doubled between 1946 and 1953. It is not possible to determine 
from the available information what share of this increase 
represents road transport over short distances or in towns. 
If the changes in the traffic density on federal and state 
roads are examined, the expansión of lorry transport is seen 
to be greater than suggested previously. Table 99 shows 
that, at five check points on four federal highways, substan-
tially larger increases were observed in the traffic density 
than in the number of lorries in the country,7 and that, even 
at the points where the density rose least, the percentage of 
increase was still appreciable. 
Table 99. Brazil : Index of daily average density 
of lorry traffic on federal roads and index of lorries 
in circulation, 1953 
(1948 = 100) 
Federal highways Check -point Index 
( Teófilo Otoni 185 .7 
] Gov. Valadares 243 .1 
( Areal 5 2 7 . 3 
i Paraíbuna 2 8 0 . 3 
¿ Itaipava 5 1 8 . 4 
Atuba 176 .1 
( Caxias do Sul 1 7 5 . 5 
( Sao Leopoldo 4 1 6 . 2 
199 .5 
Source : Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Rodagem. 
Whatever may have been the exact increase in the volume 
of transport, expert opinion is agreed that lorries have begun 
to compete with the railways in transporting all kinds of 
goods, including those usually considered as typical rail 
freight. The data in table 100 prove, at least in one specific 
case, that this judgement is correct. 
6 The accuracy of this series is examined in section III of the Appendix 
to this chapter. 
7 In the case o f the index o f freight transport, the relation o f the number 
of vehicles to the volume of freight and to the tonnage per kilometre 
is examined. 
Rio-Bahia 
Rio -Belo Horizonte . . 
Sao Paulo-Ciiritiba . . . 
Lajos-P. Alegre 
Number of lorries 
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Another aspect of the increased road transport which must 
not be overlooked is the rise in the average distance covered 
by lorries since 1946. In reality, there is no statistical evidence 
on this subject except data on the growing participation of 
lorries in inter-State trade. 
Table 100. Brazil : Share of selected products in the freight 
tonnage transported by the Sorocabana Railway 
and by lorries operating on a parallel road 
(Percentage of total weight) 
Product Road» Railway 
Sugar 1 . 5 1 . 0 
Cotton 1 . 5 0 . 8 
Potatoes 7 . 6 1 . 1 
Lime 2 . 2 3 . 5 
Coal 3 . 6 0 . 4 
Beans 8 . 4 2 . 6 
Gasoline 3 . 1 0 . 6 
Lumber 2 . 1 0 . 8 
Fuelwood 1 2 . 2 1 8 . 8 
Maize 2 . 3 7 . 0 
Stone 2 . 8 3 . 4 
Bricks 2 . 6 0 . 9 
Sources: Basle data obtained from a survey carried out by the Departamento 
Estadual de Estradas de Rodagem. (Sao Paulo) and from the Repori of the Soro-
cabana Railway for 1952. 
6 1953 data. 
b 1952 data. 
(c) Sea-borne traffic 
Maritime freight transport increased, during the period 
1946-52, at an annual rate of 4.5 per cent, despite the limited 
number of craft available. This progress certainly represented 
an appreciable improvement over the rate of growth during 
the previous seven years, but not in relarion to the average 
rate of expansión during the last quarter of a century. 
(d) Distribution of traffic among the various means of transport 
One estimate places the traffic volume handled by coastal 
shipping in 1950 at 8 billion ton-kilometres. In the same 
year, railways carried an identical load. If it is assumed that 
half the number of lorries in circulation are used for inter-
urban freight transport and that the average volume of goods 
per lorry reaches 84,000 ton-kilometres annually (in accordance 
with the estimate in section IV of the appendix to this chapter), 
then the traffic volume of road freight transport is 8.1 billion 
ton-kilometres. 
It is common knowledge that urban and inter-urban (or 
long-distance) transport by lorry expanded rapidly once the 
Second World War was over. There can be no doubt that 
the development of Brazil's economy provided the basic 
Ímpetus to progress in the road transport sector. Nevertheless, 
the following factors certainly helped to give an additional 
stimulus to the expansión during 1946-52 : (a) the restricted 
transport capacity of the railways and coastal shipping; 
(b) the moderate increase in road transport freight rates, 
owing, among other causes, to the stability in the rate of 
exchange during this period; and (c) the development of 
areas not served by the railways—that is, where a gap in the 
railway network existed. 
In sections I and II of the appendix to this chapter, the first 
two factors are examined in greater detail. 
I I . PROJECTION OF THE VOLUME OF TRANSPORT 
1. General considerations 
It is a commoiiplace that the aggregate tpnriage of goods 
hauléd and the average distance over which they are moved 
are the immediate—though not the final—déterminants of 
the volume of transport in a given country. The problem 
of calculating the future volume of transport may therefore 
be solved by projecting what have been called " immediate 
determinants Such projections demand an exáct knowledge 
of the ratio, in the particular case under consideraron, between 
the total tonnage hauled and certain basic variables of the 
system, and between these or other variables and the average 
length of haul. 
Unfortunately, research in this field has not yet proceeded 
beyond the stage of generalizations. In most cases the problem 
has been solved by assuming that the volume of transport 
grows or diminishes with greater intensity than income, or, 
in other words, that the demand for transport, like that for 
other services, is elastic in terms of income. 
In reality, a complete projection of the volume of transport 
would involve studies on the location of economic activity 
and on the interrelation of the volume (and structure) of 
domestic production of goods with the total tonnage 
hauled—studies which, by their nature and complexity, are 
outsidé the limited scope of this chapter. It was therefore 
decided to use the projection of the demand for transport8 
detailed in the following pages. The starting-point was 
the relation in Brazil, during the period 1939-53, between 
the traffic volume and certain variables which will be identified 
at the appropriate time. 
The available data did not permit the kilometric traffic 
index of the country's various means of transport to be 
calculated. Instead, it was necessary to prepare and work 
with an index of effective traffic which is a less accurate 
measure of transport activities. This index was worked 
out by combining three series—goods tonnages transported 
Table 101. Brazil : Index of the volume of freight transported 










1940 . . . . . 1 0 3 . 8 112 .7 1 0 2 . 6 1 0 6 . 3 
1941 . . . . . 1 0 4 . 5 123 .5 1 1 1 . 2 111 .9 
1942 . . . . . 1 0 5 . 8 115 ,6 105 .4 108 .7 
1943 . . . . . 112 .1 118 .4 9 8 . 8 1 1 1 . 2 
1944 . . . . . 1 1 7 . 7 125 .4 114 .9 119 .6 
1945 . . . . . 1 1 3 . 7 128 .5 1 1 5 . 2 118 .7 
1946 . . . . . 1 1 2 . 0 131 .5 1 2 1 . 8 1 2 0 . 2 
1947 . . . . . 1 0 9 . 6 155 .1 115 .9 1 2 5 . 2 
1948 . . . . . 1 0 8 . 7 193 .9 1 3 6 . 5 1 4 1 . 5 
1949 . . . . . 1 0 7 . 2 224 .0 1 3 8 . 8 1 5 0 . 8 
1950 . . . . . 108 .9 2 5 6 . 8 144 .9 1 6 3 . 2 
1951 . . . . . 1 1 9 . 2 2 8 1 . 1 165.1 1 8 0 . 0 
1952 . . . . . 1 2 0 . 4 3 2 7 . 5 163 .0 1 9 4 . 7 
1953 . . . . . 1 1 3 . 8 3 8 6 . 8 1 6 6 . 0 2 1 0 . 9 
Sources : Estatistica das estradas de ferro do Brasil, Departamento Nacional 
de Estradas de Ferro, Ministerio de Via^ao e Obras Públicas, Boletim de estatistica 
e informagoes, Comissao Ejecutiva de Defesa da Borracha y Comercio de Cabo-
tagem do Brasil, Servido de Estatistica Económica e Financiera, Ministerio da 
Fazenda. 
The aggregate projection was restricted to the carriage o f goods. 
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by rail;9 the;.number of lorries in circulation; and cargo 
tonnage transported by coastal shipping. (See table 101.) 
2. Evolution of the index of freight volume10 
The fright volume rosé almost continuously during the 
period 1939-52, at a moderate rate in the war years and with 
marked intensity during the post-war period. The average 
annual rate of increase was 5.3 per cent. 
The relative increment between the first and the last years 
amounted to 94.7 per cent. 
Table 102 shows that there is some relation between the 
variations in the index of freight volume and those of the 
Índices of domestic production11 and goods in circulation.12 
Two well-defined periods are apparent that—of the war, 
when the relation was less distinct, and the post-war years, 
when it was very clear. 
Table 102. Brazil : Annual percentage variation of the Índices 
of freight volume, domestic goods production and goods 
in circulation 
Volume Domestic goods Goods in 
Year of freight production circulation 
1940 6 . 3 — 2 . 5 - 4 . 1 
1941 5 . 3 7 . 9 7 . 0 
1942 — 2 . 9 — 5 . 8 — 8 . 5 
1943 2 . 3 6 . 8 9 . 5 
1944 7 . 6 1 . 6 3 . 3 
1945 — 0 . 8 2 . 2 1 . 9 
194 6 1 . 3 1 1 . 7 1 1 . 9 
1947 4 . 2 1 . 8 9 . 6 
1948 1 3 . 0 7 . 1 3 . 6 
1949 6 . 6 2 . 2 3 . 0 
1950 8 . 2 1 0 . 9 1 0 . 8 
1951 1 0 . 3 3 . 0 1 0 . 3 
1952 8 . 2 5 . 6 1 . 8 
Average 
1940-52 5 . 3 5 4 . 0 4 4 . 6 2 
1946-52 7 . 4 0 6 . 0 4 7 . 2 9 
Sources : Volume of freight: table 101; domestic goods production : agricul-
tural and industrial production at 1949 prices; goods in circulation: domestic 
goods production plus imports at 1949 prices. 
In may be seen that during the period 1939-52 the annual 
variation of the three Índices followed the same trend, whether 
upward or downward, except in 1940 and 1945. The volume 
of freight index is also shown to have risen, on an average, 
át a higher annual rate than the other two over any part of this 
period which may fairly be considered representad ve. It may 
therefore safely be asserted that the elasticity of the freight 
volume was higher than unity in terms of domestic production, 
and cióse to it in relation to goods in circulation. Since it 
has previously been shown that kilometric traffic grew more 
than effective traffic, the inference may be drawn that in 
Brazil the elasticity of the demand for transport in terms of 
domestic production of goods or of goods in circulation 
exceeded unity in 1939-52 by a relatively wide margin, 
which, however, cannot be accurately determined. Moreover, 
the data accumulated demonstrated that the elasticity of the 
demand was greater in relation to the first variable, that is, 
domestic production of goods, than in relation to the second. 
(See again table 102.) 
This conclusión is not surprising, at least in the case under 
review. It is well known that Brazil's centres of economic 
activity and population are situated on a fairly narrow coastal 
strip with many ports open to world traffic. For this reason, 
the average distance over which imported goods are carried 
from point of arrival to final destination is short. 
Broadly speaking, if the distance covered is not to be 
greater in transporting a domestic product, particularly a 
manufactured article than in delivering a similar imported 
commodity, a number of conditions, which it is exceptional 
to find in conjunction, would have to be present. First, the 
centres of domestic production would have to be no farther 
away from the corresponding centres of consumption than 
are the ports receiving foreign merchandise, and, if possible, 
they should be even nearer. Moreover, the ratio between 
the volume of production at domestic supply centres and the 
consumption of the population groups concerned would have 
to be equal to or less than the ratio between the volume of 
goods from abroad arriving in each port and the consumption 
zone it serves. Finally, raw materials for industry and other 
activities should be available on the spot, so that no transport 
would be required in this connexion. 
3. Effects of development upon transport 
The steel mili at Volta Redonda provides an interesting 
—aldiough extreme—example of the influence on the transport 
system exerted by import replacement. During the three-
year period 1951-53, this mili utilized from 3.5 to 3.7 tons 
of raw materials to produce one ton of rolled products; 
and the average distance over which these raw materials 
were transported was more than 290 kilometres, so that 
each ton of rolled products manufactured at Volta Redonda 
represented an increase of more than 1,000 ton-kilometres 
in BraziTs total volume of transport. This figure shows the 
indirect impact on land transport only, since neither the 
shipping of domestic coal ñor the transport of finished products 
by sea was taken into account. (See table 103.) 
Table 103. Brazil : Rail transport of raw materials consumed 
at Volta Redonda 
Total transport at 
Consumption per 1952 production b 
ton of rolled level of 
products ° Average distance (millions of 
Raw materials (kilogrammes) (kilometres) ton-kilometres) 
. . . 1 , 5 8 5 425 243 
Domestic coal 372 275 93 
Imported coal 806 145 128 
Smelting agents . . . 480 160 27 
Othersb 184 200 13 
9 The basic data refer to thirteen railways, the traffic on which represents 
over 90 per cent o f the total. 
1 0 See section III of the Appendix for comments on the method used 
to calcúlate the index of freight volume. 
1 1 This is an index of total real production of agriculture and industry. 
12 The term " goods in circulation " refers to the index formed by 
domestic production and the quantum o f imports. 
Sources : Relatorio da Directoría 1951, 1952 and 1953, Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional; and Relatorio de la Comissao Executiva do Plano Siderúrgico Nacional 
1940-41. 
tt Average for the years 1951-53. 
b Excluding tin, zinc, fuel oil and sulphuric acid. 
The only information on finished products refers to the 
geographic distribution, by large areas, of sales of steel and 
Part Two—Chapter III. Transport ; 107' 
blast-furnace by-products. Most of the steel—86 per cent 
in 1952—is normally absorbed by the Federal District and the 
States of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Volta Redonda is 
145 kilometres and 345 kilometres from the Federal capital 
and Sao Paulo respectively. 
Even if a large share of the finished products dispatched to 
these destinations were for industries situated at intermediate 
points on the route from the mili to the cities of Rio de Janeiro 
or Sao Paulo, the average distance would probably not be 
less than 125 kilometres. Since sales to these cities and to the 
corresponding states amounted to 300,532 tons in 1951, the 
transport of rolled products must have amounted to at least 
38 million ton-kilometres. If the ton-kilometres of .products 
sold to other areas are added, the total rises to about 45 million 
ton-kilometres.13 
The aggregate contribution of Volta Redonda to transport 
(at the 1952 level of production) was more than 550 million 
ton-kilometres, raw materials accounting for shghtly over 
505 million. If the same tonnages of rolled products had 
been imported, the corresponding volume of transport would 
have fluctuated between 10 and 15 per cent of the 1952 
aggregates.14 
Many examples could be given of the effect upon the demand 
for transport of substituting domestic production for imports, 
but a more detailed analysis is not justified at this stage. The 
basic question, which must be clarified, is that of the probable 
valué of the coefficient of the elasticity of demand for transport, 
in terms of goods in circulation. 
4. The demand for transport 
When the projection of demand for transport was mentioned 
earlier, it was shown that in recent years its growth was more 
intensive than that óf goods in circulation. It was also noted 
that the valué of the coefficient of elasticity could not be 
accurately assessed. Meanwhile, it may be assumed that this 
coefficient will tend to rise once domestic production begins 
to expand more markedly than imports. One aim of this 
study is to estabhsh a coefficient of 1.3 in the elasticity of 
demand for transport services, in terms of goods in circulation. 
But this assumed valué of the coefficient is very conservative; 
in fact, it would be more accurate to say that it is the absolute 
minimum. 
Under the hypothesis of a minimum rate of growth it is 
foreseen that between 1953 and 1962 domestic production 
(at 1952 prices) will rise from 360.9 to 592.8 billion cruzeiros 
and that imports will increase from 55 to 59 billion. Goods 
in circulation will therefore expand from 415.2 to 651.8 billion 
cruzeiros, that is by 56.7 per cent, or at an annual rate of 
4.5 per cent. If the elasticity of the demand for transport 
is 1.3, its annual rate of growth will probably be about 6 per 
cent. This problem being settled, there still remains the ques-
tion of defining the rate or growth of the demand for the 
different means of transport. 
13 This figure does not include sea transport o f rolled products sold 
to the north-eastern and southern states, ñor the transport o f blast-furnace 
by-products. 
1 4 The calculation is based on the hypothesis that industries which 
consume steel are located in the same areas as at present, even when the 
steel used is imported, which is doubtful. A more rational assumption 
would reduce the transport content o f imported rolled products even 
further. 
This is one of the most difficult questions to solve because 
of its complexity and the lack of basic statistics. An objective 
estimate of the future evolution of partial demand would 
have to be based on a detailed investigation of the degree 
of competition among the various means of transport. Inter 
alia, a study would thus have to be made of the structure and 
level of existing rates, as well as of the composition of the 
loads hauled by each means of transport and of the distances 
covered. Furthermore, future developments in each form 
of freight transport would have to be projected. In practice, 
this projection would be the key to calculating the rate of 
growth of partial demand. 
In a preliminary study such as this, for the sake of simplicity, 
work must obviously be based on the hypothesis that partial 
demand will grow at the same rate as aggregate demand. 
(See table 104.) 
Table 104. Brazil : Annual rate of growth of transport 
(Percentages) 
Year 1939-52 1946-52 
Projection 
1953-62 
Rail loadsa 2 . 3 0 2 . 0 ) 
Sea freightb 3 . 7 4 4 . 5 [ 6 . 0 
Number o f lorries 10 .15 1 6 . 7 ) 
Sources : Official publications and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
« Ton-kilometres. 
b Tons. 
If this hypothesis is adopted, it must be recognized that the 
rate of expansión of road transport will decrease in coming 
years and that the reverse will occur for the railway and ship-
ping sectors, as shown in table 104. It seems fair to add that 
such an assumption is not entirely improbable in view of the 
conditions under which road transport has developed and the 
changes which are likely to occur during the next ten years. 
One of the main reasons for the expansión of road transport 
was the hmitation óf the effective transport capacity of the 
railway system and of coastal shipping. This stimulus will 
become weaker as the programmes prepared a short time 
ago for re-equipping and improving these two means of 
transport are implemented, a development which will prob-
ably cause a substantial increase in the goods capacity of both 
railways and coastal shipping before 1962. 
An additional possibility is that freight tariffs by road will 
rise in the near future at a relatively higher rate than railway 
charges. Firsdy, the investment planned for the railway 
sector will result in lower real costs or will help to prevent 
an undue rise in monetary costs.15 In the lorry sector this 
phenomenon will not acquire comparable magnitude, even if 
the process of improving and paving Brazilian highways is 
accelerated. 
Secondly, adjustments of the exchange rate since the esta-
blishment of a system for auctioning foreign exchange will 
tend to cause a relative increase in the real unit costs of motor 
transport. The changes which have occured in the past 
few years have been substantial. To cite one example, dollar 
quotations for lorry imports rose from 18.72 to 151.40 cruzeiros 
1 5 This also applies to investment in coastal shipping. 
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between 1952 and December 1954, while those for petrol 
increased from>.18.72 to 88.72. cruzeiros between 1952 and 
March 1955.- The modifications in the exchange rates appli-
cable to various categories of imports which directly influence 
unit costs of road transport probably caused the latter to 
xlouble between 1952 and the beginning of 1955. Cost 
increments in the railway sector arising from the same cause 
cannot have exceeded 25-30 per cent. 
Even if the future growth of railway goods rates were 
assumed to outstrip that of unit costs, in other words, even 
if in the near future the gap observable in the post-war 
period between the former and the latter were tó be bridged, 
the increase in railway rates would still be less than that of 
lorry tariffs, ,to judge by present experience. It is clear that 
i f this prediction comes true, the competitive position of road 
freight transport will become weaker. 
Finally, another element that will contribute to a greater 
expansión of railway freight traffic in .1952-62 is the relative 
increase in the flow of such commodities as raw materials 
for heavy industry, which, given their bulk and low valué, 
can be better transported by rail. 
I I I . PROJECTIONS FOR THE RAILWAY- SECTOR 
1. Demand for railway freight services 
The annual average rate of growth of 6 per cent assumed 
in this study for the demand for railway freight services is 
equivalent to the. average rate of increase of the effective 
volume of freight calculated in partial projections by. the 
Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development Com-
mission. The method of calculation16 differed from that 
used here. 
The average annual rate of increase corresponding to the 
various projects of the Joint Commission was estimated by 
grouping individual projections of the volume of freight 
for ten of the thirteen main railways of Brazil. As the base 
year is not clearly identified in these projects, it was decided 
to make two calculadons; one for 1951-56 and another for 
1952-57. Results were virtually the same in both cases; for 
the first, the relative increase during the five-year period was 
38.5 per cent and for the second, 39.7 per cent. (See table 105.) 
The estimates of the Joint Commission cover effective 
traffic, that is tons of freight transported, and not kilometric 
traffic. None of these studies refers to the average distance 
covered, so that this factor was assumed as constant. Clearly, 
in this case the annual rate of growth estimated by the Joint 
Commission is equally applicable to both forms of transport. 
This justifies the comparison made, since the demand for 
transport, as noted earlier, is related to the volume of kilo-
metric, not effective, traffic. 
1 6 This consisted in making separate calculations of the future volume 
of freight for each railway, on the basis o f a projection o f the tonnages 
available for transport o f the most important freight items carried on 
each line. 
Table 105. Projection of volume of rail freight 
(Thousands o f tons) 
Projection Projection 
•Railways 1951 for 1956 1952 tor 1957 
Cia. Mogiana E . F 1 ,107 1 , 8 0 7 994 1 , 6 9 4 
E . F. Central do Brasil 4 , 5 4 0 6 , 6 4 0 4 , 3 9 6 6 , 4 9 6 
E . F. Noroeste 780 1 , 1 3 0 790 1 , 1 4 0 
E . F. Sorocabana 4 , 1 4 0 5 , 2 8 3 4 , 8 1 3 6 , 1 4 1 
Leopoldina Railway 2 , 0 3 3 2 , 4 1 3 1 ,947 2 , 3 1 7 
Rede Mineira de Via^ao 794 1 ,251 715 1 ,172 
Rede Via^ao Cearense 351 351 308 308 
R . V. Paraná-Sta. Catarina 1 , 9 9 2 3 , 0 7 8 1 ,985 3 , 0 7 1 
V. F. Federal Leste Brasileiro 248 400 215 400 
V. F. R i o Grande do Sul 1 , 5 7 9 1 , 9 7 9 1 , 4 2 0 1 , 8 2 0 
Sources : Various projects prepared and published by the Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission. 
In accordance with the annual rate of increase in demand 
estimated in this study, the ton-kilometres of payload trans-
ported by the Brazilian railways will increase from 8.48 mil-
lions in 1952 to 15.20 millions in 1962. The rate of growth 
of ton-kilometre gross weight will probably be less intensive. 
This is because no constant ratio exists between payload and 
gross weight. Modifications occur when there is an increase 
or a decrease in the degree of utilization of the capacity of 
the goods trucks or when die former remains constant and the 
average capacity alters. The history of twelve Brazilian 
railway systems suggests that considerable changes in this 
ratio have taken place in the past. 
In 1939, these twelve railways transported 1.27 ton-kilome-
tres of deadweight per ton-kilometre of payload; by 1951 
this ratio was 1.05 to 1. No precise data are available orí the 
average capacity of goods trucks and their degree of utilization 
over these years. Between 1930 and 1951, however, average 
capacity rose from approximately 21 to more than 27 tons, 
while the degree of utilization was intensified.17 
The average capacity of goods trucks is tending to grow 
in Brazil. According to plans for rolling-stock purchases 
—some of which are already being implemented—this 
capacity will expand to about 33 tons. The effect of the change 
on the deadweight/payload ratio will be considerable, to 
17 In reality, the rate of relative increase was the same for the tonnage 
transported per goods wagón as for average capacity, from which it 
might be inferred that the degree o f utilization was the same in both 
years. The average annual distance travelled by loaded goods truck, 
however, increased from 84,500 to 149,600 kilometres. This was the 
cause of the improvement in the degree o f utilization. 
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judge both from past experience and from the specific example 
provided by one railway. In 1952, the goods trucks on this 
ráilway averaged 31.2 tons capacity and transported only 
0:89 ton-kilometres of deadweight per ton-kilometre of 
payload. 
In the hght of these facts, it seems reasonable to assume that 
by 1962 the ratio of deadweight to payload will drop to about 
0.85 to 1. From this coefficient it can be estimated that the 
goods services of the Brazilian railways will transport 28.1 bil-
lion ton/kilometres of gross weight in 1962. 
2. Demand for railway passenger services 
The projection of goods services must be completed with 
estimates of passenger transport to calcúlate railway traffic 
as a whole with a reasonable degree of accuracy. The problem 
cannot be solved by applying the rate -of growth already 
computed, since the same variables do not affect both types 
of traffic. Passenger traffic must therefore be projected 
separately. 
For reasons which will become evident in the text, it is 
advisable from the outset to distinguish between suburban 
passenger traffic and passenger transport between towns. 
The bulk of suburban traffic is concentrated on the Central 
do Brasil system, or more accurately on. its section. linking 
Rio de Janeiro with surrounding urban districts. This railway 
transported 70 per cent of Brazil's suburban passengers in 1945 
and 65 per cent in 1952. Next in importance are the Leopoldina 
Railway, which also services the city of Rio de Janeiro, and 
the Santos-Jundiaí Railway in Sao Paulo. These three to-
gether absorbed 90.9 of Brazil's aggregate suburban passenger 
traffic in 1945 and 88.8 per cent in 1952. (See table 106.) 
Table 106. Brazil : Passenger suburban traffic on selected railways and other lines 
(Millions) 
Year 
Rio de Janeiro Sao Paulo Rest of Brazil* 
F. Central do Brasil F. Leopoldina Santos-Jundiaí Others 
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 
1945 . . . . 1 4 8 . 6 2 , 8 3 2 . 3 3 1 . 0 2 0 0 . 4 1 3 . 5 1 2 9 . 0 1 9 . 3 2 6 7 . 6 
1946 . . . . 1 5 8 . 7 3 , 1 5 3 . 7 3 0 . 2 3 0 1 . 6 1 2 . 0 114 .6 2 1 . 2 2 8 8 . 5 
1947 . . . . 1 7 2 . 8 3 , 3 6 5 . 7 2 5 . 5 2 5 5 . 4 1 3 . 2 1 2 5 . 9 2 3 . 4 3 2 6 . 6 
1948 . . . . 1 7 9 . 0 3 , 4 8 5 . 8 2 3 . 3 2 3 3 . 1 1 9 . 5 186 .7 2 2 . 7 3 3 0 . 5 
1949 . . . . 194 .4 3 , 7 7 0 . 2 2 5 . 9 2 7 7 . 9 2 1 . 6 2 0 1 . 3 2 3 . 6 3 5 4 . 8 
1950 . . . . 1 8 9 . 5 3 , 6 6 6 . 9 2 8 . 3 3 0 6 . 2 . 2 4 . 1 2 4 3 . 8 2 4 . 3 3 7 0 . 2 
1951 . . . . 177 .1 3 , 4 9 6 . 7 2 9 . 2 3 1 5 . 1 2 6 . 3 2 6 8 . 0 2 5 . 8 3 8 9 . 9 
1952 . . . . 1 6 1 . 5 3 , 1 0 9 . 4 3 0 . 5 3 3 4 . 6 2 8 . 8 2 9 6 . 3 2 8 . 8 4 1 7 . 7 
1953 1 5 7 . 5 3 , 4 0 0 . 1 3 3 . 0 3 6 5 . 3 3 2 . 6 3 6 1 . 4 2 9 . 1 4 4 7 . 2 
Sources : Official publications and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
(A) Passengers; (B) passengers-kilometrés. 
a Includes the Corcovado Railway, which is in -Rio de Janeiro. 
' Projections for the Central do Brasil and the Santos-Jundiaí 
Railways will not be presented at this point, since both will 
be examined later in some detail.18 It is only necessary, 
therefore, to estimate the future volume of suburban traffic 
for the Leopoldina Railway and the other Brazilian railways. 
The data in table 106 show that, after three years of recession 
and four of recovery, the number of suburban passengers 
transported by the Leopoldina Railway was practically the 
same in 1952 as in 1945. Nevertheless, the average distance 
(and therefore the passenger-kilometres) rose appreciably. 
These constant figures for traffic on the Leopoldina Railway 
were registered at a time when alternative means of transport, 
particularly motor vehicles, were expanding rapidly. Both 
in this case and in that of the Central do Brasil, this stagnation 
is attributable to restricted capacity. According to competent 
authorities, the main problem hes in the lack of passenger 
coaches on suburban lines, a difficulty which is being overcome. 
, No data are available on the number of passengers using 
the other means of transport to and from the suburbs served 
by the Leopoldina Railway. Without this basic information 
a reasonable hypothesis on the growth of traffic is all that 
18 See sub-section 7 in the present section, where demand for energy and' 
ltíbricants is.analysed, and, in particular, sub-section 5 in section V of the 
Appendix to this chapter. -
can be furnished. It was assumed that the population of the 
area which the railway serves will increase at the same rate 
as that of Rio de Janeiro between 1940 and 1950 and that 
the number of passengers will increase propórtionately, that 
is, by 3 per cent annually. Thus suburban passenger traffic 
on the Leopoldina Railway will rise to 41.8 million by, 1962; 
Given the same average run as in 1952, a volume of460 million 
passenger-kilometres will result. 
On the other railways, suburban traffic rose from 19.1 to. 
27.3 million passengers during 1945-52, or, in other w;ords, 
at a rate of about 1.1 million passengers annually. As a first 
estimate, it will be assumed that expansión will continué 
during 1952-62 at the same rate as during the early post-war 
years. By the end of the period there will be 38.5 million 
suburban passengers travelling by those railways which were 
not studied separately. These projections, together with the 
calculations made for the Central do Brasil and Santos-
Jundiaí railways, are outlined in table 107. 
The estimated volume of traffic in terms of ton-kilometres 
of gross weight must now be defined. 
In 1939, Brazilian railways transported 9.3 ton-kilometres 
deadweight per 10 passenger-kilometres. Since the average 
weight of a passenger is estimated at 70 kilogrammes, the. 
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Table 107. Brazil : Projection of suburban passenger traffic 
(Millions) 
Projection 1962 a 
1952 Passengerj 
Railways Passengers Passengers kilometres 
Central do Brasilb . 1 6 1 . 5 2 3 1 . 5 4 , 6 3 0 . 0 
Santos-Jundiaí 2 8 . 8 5 5 . 0 6 1 0 . 0 
Leopoldina 3 0 . 5 4 2 . 0 4 6 0 . 0 
Others 2 7 . 3 3 8 . 5 6 8 6 . 0 
TOTAL . . . 2 4 8 . 5 3 5 3 . 5 6 , 3 8 6 . 0 
Sources: Official publications and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
4 The average distance covered in 1962 is assumed to be the same as in 1952. 
b Includes traffic on electrified and non-electrified tracks. 
ratio between ton-kilometre deadweight and ton-kilometre 
payload (for passenger service) was about 13.3 to 1 in that year. 
Some years later (1946) it had dropped to 10.2, largely as a 
result of more efficient utilization of passenger-coach capacity. 
In 1951, it rose again to 12.2. These ratios apply mainly to 
inter-urban passenger traffic, since the calculation excluded 
the Central do Brasil, the railway which carries most suburban 
passenger traffic. The ratio is lower when rail-cars or the 
so-called " electric train units " are used. The combination 
of isolated data made it possible to determine that in 1946 
the ratio was 7 to 1 in the suburban service of the railway 
which employs this type of train.19 
It is very probable that in the course of the next eight years 
all suburban passengers will travel in rail-cars or electric 
trains. If this objective is reached, it will be possible to main-
tain the ratio of deadweight to payload at 7 to 1. In this 
case, it is easy to calcúlate that suburban rail traffic will repre-
sent 3.09 billion ton-kilometres deadweight, which, added 
to the 440 million ton-kilometres of payload, will give a 
total of 3.53 billion ton-kilometres gross weight. 
Table 108. Brazil : Inter-urban and suburban passenger 
railway traffic, 1945-52 a 
(Millions) 






1945 . . . . . 2 1 2 . 4 3 , 4 2 9 . 3 6 8 . 1 5 , 3 1 6 . 1 
1946 . . . . . 222 .1 3 , 8 5 8 . 4 7 3 . 8 5 , 4 6 2 . 2 
1947 . . . . . 2 3 5 . 0 4 , 0 7 3 . 7 7 3 . 2 5 , 5 2 0 . 1 
1948 . . . . . 2 4 4 . 8 4 , 2 3 6 . 1 7 1 . 1 5 , 2 0 0 . 1 
1949 . . . . . 2 8 5 . 5 4 , 6 0 4 . 3 6 8 . 7 5 , 1 6 9 . 3 
1950 . . . 2 6 6 . 2 4 , 5 8 7 . 1 7 1 . 1 5 , 4 7 1 . 0 
1951 . . . . . 2 5 8 . 5 4 , 4 6 9 . 8 7 6 . 6 6 , 0 6 2 . 7 
1952 . . . . . 2 4 8 . 5 4 , 1 5 8 . 2 7 5 . 0 6 , 1 4 8 . 9 
1953 . . . . . 2 5 2 . 2 4 , 5 7 3 . 0 7 6 . 2 6 , 5 1 3 . 5 
Sources : Various statistical publications of the Estradas de Ferro do Brasil, 
the Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Ferro, and the Ministerio de Via?ao 
e obras Públicas. 
a Does not include thirteen railways whose aggregate traffic is insignificant. 
The development of suburban passenger traffic was uneven 
during the post-war years. Although there was a substantial 
increase in the number of passengers during 1945-46, in the 
next four years the figures fell again to the 1945 level. This 
contraction was caused pardy by increased competition from 
motor vehicles and airlines and pardy by shortcomings in 
rail services. The recovery which took place after 1950 may 
be attributed to the fact that certain railways introduced 
modern rolling stock and faster trains; in other words, there 
was a modest attempt at remedying some of the deficiencies, 
It may be assumed that the number of inter-urban passengers 
will increase by 2.5 million annually, a rate which is exactly 
equivalent to that of 1949-52. By 1962, the number of 
passengers will have risen to 100 million and the number 
of passenger-kilometres to 8.2 billion.20 
The deadweight payload ratio will tend to decline as oíd 
passenger coaches are gradually replaced by the modern steel 
type; by 1962, it may even have fallen to 9 to 1. If this 
forecast proves correct, the railway inter-urban passenger 
services will carry 5.740 billion tons of gross weight. 
3. The over-all demand for rail transport 
To complete the projection for railway traffic, it was 
assumed that the volume of luggage transported will increase 
at the same rate as the number of passengers—namely, by 
33.3 per cent—and that the deadweight payload ratio will 
as in 1946 reach 5 to 1, the lowest ever recorded in Brazil.20 
It was further assumed that by 1962 livestock traffic will 
have increased to 4.7 million head,21 the peak level for 1945-52, 
and that for each ton/kilometre of payload carried, 1.8 ton-
kilometres of deadweight will be transported.22 
Table 109. Brazil : Projection of railway traffic, 1952-62 
(Millions o f ton-kilometres) 
Payload Deadweight 
1952 1962 1952 1962 
Goods 8 , 4 8 7 16 ,200 1 7 , 3 9 8 2 8 , 1 0 0 
Passengers : 
Suburban 291 441 . . . 3 , 5 3 0 
Inter-urban 430 574 . . . 5 , 7 4 0 
Luggage 214 285 1 ,515 2 , 0 2 0 
Livestock 498 589 1 ,648 1 , 6 5 0 
TOTAL 9 , 9 2 0 17 ,089 4 1 , 0 4 0 
Source : Official publications. 
Table 109 summarizes the projections for railway traffic. 
If these estimates are to materialize, certain improvements 
will have to be made in fixed installations and in the availability 
of rolling stock and locomotives. Increased traffic will neces-
sitate substantial investment (given existing conditions on 
Brazilian railways), and if this is not forthcoming, it is very; 
probable that road transport will continué to expand at a 
rate comparable to that of 1946-52. 
4. Estimate of locomotive shunting time 
The projection of the number of locomotive shunting 
hours, a pre-requisite for calculating locomotive demand 
1 9 Utilization o f train capacity, reasonable in 1946, afterwards became 
exceptionally high. It should be noted that reference is made to units 
in effective service and not to utilization o f availabilities. 
2 0 It was assumed that the average distance covered will be the same as 
in 1952—namely, 82 kilometres. 
2 1 Average distance run and average weight of livestock remain the 
same. 
2 2 The 1946 ratio o f 1.94 to 1 was the lowest recorded during the period 
1939-52. 
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and fuel consumption, can be based only on very scanty data. 
The solé item of interest is that from 1939 to 1946 locomotive 
shunting increased relatively more than the tons of gross 
weight transported. Although this fact refers specifically 
to the distance covered by locomotives, the same observation 
is applicable to the number of working hours. 
If the ratio indicated in the previous paragraph is not the 
result of mere coincidence, at first glance it might be concluded 
that the number of shunting hours worked by the locomotives 
increases or decreases at the same rate, relatively speaking, 
as the gross kilometric traffic. 
Statistics show that in 1951 ten railway companies spent 
2.4 million hours in shunting operations. The distribution 
by type of locomotive, was as follows : diesel, 128,000 hours; 
electric, 153,000 hours; and steam, 2.2 million hours. The 
volume of traffic on the railways included in the sample 
represents about 65 per cent of the total for the country 
as a whole, a percentage which is assumed to be the same 
for shunting hours. According to this hypothesis, the time 
consumed in the latter operation by all railway locomotives 
amounted in the aggregate to 3.4 million hours. To judge 
from partial data, shunting occupied approximately the same 
amount of time as in 1952. 
Between 1952 and 1962 the number of ton-kilometres 
of gross weight will increase by about 39 per cent.23 On the 
assumption of an equivalent relative increase, total shunting 
hours will rise from 3.4 to 4.7 million. 
5. Distribution of traffic and shunting among 
the different forms of traction 
(a) Electric locomotives 
The volume of traffic which electric locomotives must 
handle grows with the electrification of additional lines, 
and, even when there is no development in this direction, 
the demand for rail services increases in areas where such 
traction is available. The probable effect of the first factor 
can easily be assessed, if electrification plans and the volume 
of traffic on the sections to be electrified are known. An 
evaluation of the influence of the second factor is a more 
complex matter, since the regional demand for transport 
must be projected. 
As this problem cannot be thoroughly investigated, it was 
decided to examine the factors tending to delay or accelerate 
both the growth of traffic on some electrified lines and the 
electrification plans of the various railway companies. 
Section V of the Appendix provides details of the plans 
and analyses the factors influencing an increase in traffic. 
As regards the electrification programme, the best that could 
be postulated would be the electrification of some 916 kilo-
metres in 1954-62, from a planned total of 1,694 kilometres. 
To project the volume of traffic on those lines which are 
already electrified or which it is planned to electrify, although 
this is still uncertain, data are essential on the payload and 
gross weight for both goods and passenger traffic on each line. 
The statistics at present available are far from meeting these 
minimum requirements, as they refer only to gross weight 
kilometric traffic. 
28 The calculation excluded from the totals concerned the ton-kilometres 
of gross weight corresponding to passenger traffic on electric trains. 
Since it is impossible to separate passenger from goods 
traffic, it was decided to apply the rate of growth which, 
in fact, should be used only for goods traffic, to the ton-
kilometres of total gross weight. But, according to forecasts, 
the number of passengers and the gross weight will increase 
less than the volume of goods and the payload, respectively. 
This suggests that the method of projection leads to an over-
estimate of the volume of the transport falling to the share 
of electric locomotives. Section V of the Appendix provides 
a basis for assessing the future traffic on electrified lines in 
Brazil. As will be seen in some cases, it was necessary to use 
indirect and conjectural methods of calculation. The following 
are the conclusions reached for each of the railways concerned. 
On the Santos-Jundiaí Railway it was assumed that the 
volume of goods—excluding petroleum and its derivatives— 
will increase by 3 per cent annually; this percentage was applied 
to the gross weight transported during 1952 on those hnes 
which are already electrified and those which it is planned 
to electrify. The figure of 900 million tons of gross weight 
which served as a basis for the calculation does not include 
gross weight in the transport of petroleum or in suburban 
passenger traffic. The latter will increase by 2.5 million 
passengers each year, reaching 53.8 millions in 1962. If the 
average distances covered remain constant (which is probable), 
the volume of transport will reach 553.6 million passenger-
kilometres. 
As regards the Central do Brasil, if it is recalled that this 
railway has already ordered the electric trains required to 
recover its 1949 capacity, it seems reasonable to assume that 
in 1957 (when these trains will enter service) the number 
of passengers will also regain the 1949 level. During the rest 
of the period—that is, until 1962—the number of passengers 
will increase by 3.4 per cent annually. Goods traffic was 
projected on the basis of somewhat inadequate data, since 
no information is available as to the density of traffic on the 
electrified lines, or on those in process of electrification. 
Nevertheless, a rate of growth of 6 per cent per annum was 
postulated. 
In the case of the Paulista Railway, the annual rates of growth 
on the Jundiaí-Roncao line will not exceed 3 per cent. The 
increment will probably be more intensive on the Itirapina-
Baurú-Mariha line, since it serves an area which is undergoing 
rapid development. The traffic here should reach 1.05 billion 
ton-kilometres of gross weight, and will probably increase 
by 4 per cent annually. 
A far from accurate estimate for the Sorocabana Railway 
suggests that by 1962 the volume of traffic on electrified 
lines will have risen to 3.36 billion ton-kilometres of gross 
weight. 
It was calculated that the volume of gross weight on the 
Leste Brasileiro Railway will reach 135 million ton-kilometres 
in 1962, while a rate of growth of 6 per cent was postulated 
both for the Mineira de Viagao and for the Paraná-Santa 
Catarina network. This assumption takes account of the 
fact that the electrified hnes on these railways run through 
rapidly developing areas where the volume of freight trans-
ported is tending to increase substantially. Thus, it is esti-
mated that the former railway will carry 525 million ton-
kilometres of gross weight and the latter, 135 million. 
To sum up, the estimates for 1962 show that electric loco-
motives will haul a total gross weight of 19.02 billion ton-
kilometres. 
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(b) Steam and diesel locomotives 
Section V of the Appendix presents the method used in 
projecting the volume of transport on steam railways for 
1962. It is éxpected that theré will still be about 515 locomo-
tives which will transport 8.8 billion ton-kilometres of gross 
weight. 
According to estimates, diesel locomotives will have to 
transport 16.455 billion ton-kilometres of gross weight. 
(c) Shunting services 
. It is well known that for this operation diesel engines are 
relatively more efficient than steam locomotives. Henee the 
former will tend to be used more extensively for shunting, 
once ordinary traffic requirements have been met. 
The plans for purchasing new equipment which have been 
published by some companies confirm this supposition; 
it is reasonable to assume that shunting services will be under-
taken on all these lines by diesel engines, except in cases where 
it is planned to use electric locomotives. 
: The gross kilometric traffic handled by these last may well • 
double between 1952 and 1962. On the supposition that 
shunting hours will rise at the same rate towards the end 
of the period, electric units will spend 300,000 hours in shunting 
while diesel locomotives will carry a work-load corresponding 
to 4.4 million hours. Section V of the Appendix deals with 
this topic in greater detail. 
6. Demand for locomotives and rolling stock 
(a) Locomotives 
Research in Brazil on the work of steam locomotives, 
as well as the experience of the railway companies, shows 
that their operating costs are substantially higher than those 
of diesel and electric engines. Everything suggests that during 
the period 1954-62 the Brazilian railways will replace the 
locomotives they have used in the past by diesel or electric 
units, as and when the older engines become obsolete. 
(See section V of the Appendix.) 
Such a hypothesis leads to the conclusión that the demand 
for steam locomotives will tend to disappear. Therefore, 
the probable composition of the locomotive park in 1962 
is determined by the number of worn-out or nearly worn-out 
engines in existence up to that date. On the basis of the 
hypothesis presented in the Appendix, in 1962 die steam 
locomotive park will be made up of those engines at present 
in service which were less than nineteen years oíd in 1950, 
as well as those purchased between 1951 and 1954. The 
approximate total will be 515 units. 
As regards electric locomotives, an estimate of the probable 
Composition of the park in 1962 (see the Appendix) was based 
upon assumptions of replacement needs and of the growth 
of traffic. It was thus calculated that the total demand, during 
the period 1953-62, will be 160 locomotives of different 
strength, of which thirty-four have already been purchased. 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this calculation is valid 
ónly when the useful life of electric locomotives is assumed 
to be forty years. If it is only tliirty years, the number of 
locomotives required will rise to 176, excluding of course, 
the 134 únits already purchased. It should also be noted that 
ño account has been taken of those electric trains for suburban 
passengers which the railway companies already possess or are 
thinking of acquiring. 
: The estimate of diesel locomotive requirements was based 
on the total ton-kilometres of gross weight to be transported 
in 1962. For this purpose, the present annual transport 
capacity of the locomotives was assessed by the method shown 
in the Appendix. Thanks to these basic hypotheses and to 
other assumptions, it was possible to estimate the demand 
for locomotives and the probable composition of the avail-
ability in 1962. It should be emphasized that the results of 
the calculation of demand are very similar to those obtained 
by the Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development 
Commission, varying only as regards shunting units. 
(b) Goods trucks 
According to calculations in section V of the Appendix, 
the railways will have to buy some 10,770 goods trucks 
to meet replacement requirements. Estimates of future 
demand are also given (36,757 trucks); these take account 
of the growth of traffic. The number of units which must 
be replaced and the goods trucks needed to allow traffic 
to increase give some idea of the total. In 1962 it will reach 
47,527 trucks, which implies an annual demand of approxima-
tely 4,750 units. 
7. Demand for energy and lubricants 
In the pre-war period, the energy consumption of the rail-
ways amounted to 802.7 million kWh (1939), and in 1952 
to 1.278 billions. These figures represent 5.4 and 5.2 per cent 
respectively of the national energy total. (See the Appendix.) 
Nevertheless, a distinction should be made between the 
roles of the different sources of energy in this consumption. 
As may be seen in table XXII of the Appendix, in 1939 
hydro-electric energy contributed 10.4 per cent, while coal, 
petroleum and fuelwood supplied the remaining 89.6 per 
cent. At that stage, diesel oil was not yet used in Brazil. The 
same table shows that the composition differed substantially 
in 1952 : electric energy provided 21.2 per cent, diesel oil 
11.3 per cent and other fuels 67.5 per cent. 
During die period 1939-52, considerable changes also took 
place in the sources of energy used for steam traction, since 
the shortage of imported fuels increased dependence upon 
home supplies. In 1943, BraziTs own fuelwood and coal 
contributed as much as 89.2 per cent of the energy consumed 
by steam locomotives, while in 1939 diey had provided 
only 65.2 per cent. The data in the Appendix show that the 
increment took place to the detriment of coal imports. 
The projection of the energy demand is based on the ratio 
apparent for some of BraziTs railways between consumption 
of the various forms of energy on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the volume of transport handled and the shunting 
involved. 
As regards electric energy, in 1962, BraziTs railway system 
should be able to count on 542 million kWh to transport 
15.48 billion ton-kilometres. This total exeludes passenger 
trains, which will represent 3.405 billion ton-kilometres, 
implying consumption of 95 million kWh. If the share 
corresponding to shunting is added, a grand total of 722.5 
million kWh will be required in 1962. 
To project the demand for diesel oil, a method similar 
to that used for electric energy was followed and it was 
calculated that by 1962 oil consumption will probably reach 
245,000 tons, of which 132,000 will be devoted to shunting 
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and the remainder to the transport of passengers and goods. 
{See again section V of the Appendix.) 
It was assumed that the fuel used for steam locomotives 
will be limited to fuelwood and petroleum, and that the 
consumption of fuelwood will increasingly be replaced by 
that of petroleum, the use of the former thus becoming 
-restricted to railways situated in areas where such fuel is 
plentiful. It should be recalled that steam locomotives using 
fuelwood will carry 2.9 billion ton-kilometres of gross weight 
and that engines using petroleum will transport about 5.9 
billions; in addition, the average consumption of petroleum 
per thousand ton-kilometres of gross weight is in Brazil 
about 40 kilogrammes, and that of fuelwood 0.9 cubic metres. 
In 1962, therefore, the consumption of these two fuels will 
be 236,000 tons and 2,610,000 cubic metres respectively. 
(See again section V of Appendix.) 
Demand for lubricants was estimated on the basis of the 
changes in the composition of locomotive availabihty, 
that is, iri the distribution of the volume of traffic among the 
different types of traction, the present coefficients for the 
consumption of lubricants being utilized in each case. The 
total thus obtained for 1962 was 13,300 tons, of which 570 tons 
will be consumed by steam locomotives, 12,400 tons by diesel 
traction and 400 tons by electric engines. (See again the 
relevant section of the Appendix.) 
8. Demand for rails and sleepers 
The rails at present in existence on all lines used for traffic 
weigh approximately 2.2 million tons, excluding points, 
rails for shunting and so on. The projection was based on 
two hypotheses of the average hfe span of rails, and, in 
accordance with expert opinion, thirty and forty years were 
determined as the lowest and highest extremes. The normal 
demand for rails for replacement purposes was thus estimated 
as varying between 70 and 93,000 tons. 
Furthermore, provided that the construction of new hnes 
continúes at the same rate as during the last twenty years, 
the additional demand will be for 13,000 tons. In consequence, 
total rail requirements will range from 83,000 to 106,000 tons 
annually. 
Sleepers in use on the Brazilian railways in 1951 totalled 
64 million units. If their average useful hfe is assumed to 
be eight to twelve years, it may be concluded that not less 
than 5.3 and not more than 8 million units become unser-
viceable each year. As the railway companies have plans for 
lengthening the present average hfe of the sleepers by at least 
50 per cent during the next ten years, replacement needs will 
clearly decrease to a substantial extent. In addition, the railway 
companies aim at raising the number of sleepers per kilometre 
of .permanent way. (See section V of Appendix.) When 
all these factors had been taken into consideration, and on 
the assumption that die lines in use will undergo the same 
degree of expansión as in 1951, it was deduced that the total 
number of sleepers will reach a figure somewhere between 
64 and 71 million units in 1962. 
I V . PROJECTIONS FOR THE ROAD SECTOR 
1. Demand for lorries 
(a) Replacement needs 
. ; For the sake of simplicity, it was felt desirable to estabhsh 
from the outset the following working hypothesis : if the 
transport capacity of the lorry park is to be maintained at 
a given level, the new units added in the course of each year 
must equal in number diose which become obsolete. The 
criteria laid down. for defining the obsolescence (or, alterna-
tively, the useful life) of load-carrying motor vehicles clearly 
constitute the touchstone for calculating replacement needs. 
The inadequacy of the available data precludes any empiric 
method of determining the average duration of a lorry in 
Brazil. Furthermore, expert opinion on this point is far from 
unanimous. There is strong disagreement not only as to the 
total distance which can be covered by load-carrying vehicles 
(or, in other words, their useful hfe in terms of kilometres) 
but also as to the average distance covered in a year. 
Some maintain that " the useful hfe of a lorry in Brazil 
does not exceed five years in the conditions assumed here, 
namely an output of 100,000 ton-kilometres per lorry annually, 
which would require a daily run of 111 kilometres for a 
6-ton lorry with a 50-per-cent tonnage utilization, or, in 
other words, a total run of 166,500 kilometres in the vehicle's 
five years of useful hfe 
Others, while also assuming a useful hfe of five years, 
estimate an annual run of 75,000 kilometres, and 375,000 
kilometres as the total ground covered.25 In the existing 
hterature on the subject under review or on related problems, 
reference is made to intermediate figures. Thus, in one 
case, total and annual runs are assumed to be 180,000 and 
30,000 kilometres respectively,26 while in another the corres-
ponding estimates stand at 20,000 and 50,000 kilometres.27 
It is interesting to note that, in spite of such discrepancies, 
the variations in the useful hfe attributed to lorries (in terms 
of years of service) range between fairly narrow limits, namely, 
four to six years. Thus among the available material only 
one source mentions a longer span (ten years). 
. A somewhat elementary procedure for checking these 
hypotheses consists in comparing the increase in the number 
of lorries in circulation over a given period with the number 
of vehicles purchased during the same lapse of time. Such a 
comparison suggests that in Brazil the average hfe of a lorry is 
longer than five years. 
Between 1947 and 1952,28 the number of lorries in circulation 
rose from 115,997 to 244,941, while the units imported 
2 4 See Estudos Diversos, Commissdo Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos para 
Desenvolvimento Económico (Rio de Janeiro, 1954) pp. 144 and 145. 
25 See Odir Dias da Costa " O Motor Diesel e sua Influencia na Eco-
nomía de Transporte Rodoviario " (The Diesel Engine and its Influence 
on Road Transport Economy), in the Revista do Club de Engenharia do 
Rio de Janeiro, March 1948. 
26 See Candido do Regó Chaves, " Estudo para a Avaüa^ao do Custo 
do Transporte en Caminhoes a curtas distancias " (Assessment of Cost of 
Short-Distance Lorry Transport), in a special issue of the Boletim " DER " 
do Depto. de Estradas de Rodagem de Sao Paulo, special issue, January-March 
1951, p. 62. 
27 See Jorge Moraes, " Custo dos Transportes Rodoviários e Ferroviários 
com Vistas ao Gasto de Divisas Estrangeiras " (Cost of Road and Rail 
Transport from the standpoint of Foreign Exchange Expenditure), in 
Engenharia, a periodical published under the auspices of the Sao Paulo 
Institute of Engineering, Nos. 86 and 88, especially page 171 of No. 88. 
It should be ñoted that the opinions on the length of useful life expressed 
iñ the text are based on hypotheses of the working conditions for lorries, 
which are not entirely uniform. Some of these opinions envisaged only 
the case of vehicles used for fairly long-distance transport. 
28 As from 31 December of the years mentioned. 
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amounted in all to 197,596 during the period 1948-52. I f 
there was an increase in the park of 128,944 units, it is clear 
that rather fewer than 68,652 lorries were for replacement 
purposes. As this figure represents about half the number 
of load-carrying vehicles in existence at the cióse of 1947, 
it might be inferred that the average Hfe of a lorry in Brazil 
is as much as ten years. Unfortunately the validity of this 
test is very limited, one reason—among others no less weighty 
—being that data on the number of lorries in circulation in 
1952 may represent an over-estimate. 
In face of the impossibility of determining the average 
duration of lorries with a reasonable degree of accuracy, 
it was decided to estimate replacement needs on the assumption 
that their useful hfe ranges from eight to ten years. This 
somewhat arbitrary supposition is tantamount to postulating 
that the annual renewal rate fluctuates between 10.0 and 
12.5 per cent of the total in service. 
In accordance with the previous estimate of the average 
mileage covered per year, the possible periods of usefulness 
just defined correspond to a working hfe in terms of distances 
covered ranging from 168,000 to 210,000 kilometres. In the 
United States, 200,000 kilometres29 represent the generally 
accepted estimate of useful hfe, and in Brazil, more than one 
technical expert places somewhere between the limits men-
tioned the figures for the total distance that can be covered 
by a lorry before it is worn out. Finally, it is worth recording 
that one enterprise of long-standing experience in road 
transport calculates that the useful hfe of its vehicles—diesel 
lorries—is consistent with the working hypothesis adopted 
in this text. 
Since lorries in circulation totalled 300,000 in 1954, the 
average annual replacement needs during the period 1953-62, 
on the assumption of a working hfe of ten years and a cumula-
tive annual growth rate of 8.4 per cent for the park, are 
likely to be approximately 40,500 lorries. In accordance 
with the second hypothesis of an 8-year average duration, 
the number should reach 50,600 units. 
The possibility that a smaller number of vehicles may be 
needed for the maintenance of the park must not beoverlooked. 
This is bound to occur if the post-war tendency to purchase 
lorries with a higher transport capacity than those becoming 
obsolete persists. The process of replacing lorries of light 
or médium tonnage by heavier vehicles should be accelerated 
over the nextfewyears as the country's road network improves. 
Meanwhile, it is impossible to calcúlate just how far this 
fact will affect the demand for lorries for replacement pur-
poses, and it is for this reason that it was assumed from the 
outset that each obsolete lorry will be replaced by a new 
vehicle. 
(b) Increased volume of traffic 
The demand for lorries is ultimately a derived demand, 
and the factor which determines it—or which has a decisive 
effect on its level—is the volume of traffic. The projection 
29 There is a widespread impression that the useful life o f a lorry is longer 
in Brazil than in the United States. The point of view expressed here is 
that a lorry continúes in use for a longer time in Brazil than in the United 
States because the distance covered annually in the former country is 
considerably less. The total distance covered must be the same in Brazil, 
o f perhaps less, on account of the technically inferior state of its highways, 
inadequate maintenance of vehicles, etc. 
of this latter is consequendy one of the essential bases on 
which to calcúlate the number of lorries that the country 
will need. 
No projection of the over-all volume of traffic is, however, 
available, ñor are there any means of establishing a well-
grounded hypothesis in its place. It is true that in a previous 
section of this chapter it was assumed that the volume o f 
transport to be met will increase at a cumulative annual rate 
of 6 per cent; but it should be emphasized that this supposition 
was based only on the case of inter-urban load-carrying 
traffic. Lorry transport for short distances or within urban 
areas was disregarded. 
In view of this, the projection given here is based on the 
hypothesis that over the period 1953-62 the total availability 
of lorries will rise at an annual average rate of 8.4 per cent. 
If the trend visible in the last few years is maintained in the 
future, the number of diesel lorries brought into the park 
will increase faster than the park itself. It has therefore been 
calculated that the number of diesel lorries in service will 
reach about 70,000 by 1962. The great majority of these 
vehicles will probably be earmarked for inter-urban transport, 
in view of their suitability for this type of service. 
Table 110. Brazil : Projection of the demand for lorries 
Units to be purchased 
(1963-62) (Annual average) 
Stocks — : For To cover increase 
Type of lorry 1954 1962 replacements in traffic 
Gasoline-
driven . . . . 2 8 5 , 0 0 0 5 0 3 , 0 0 0 
Diesel 15 ,000 7 0 , 0 0 0 
TOTAL . . . 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 5 7 3 , 0 0 0 4 0 , 5 0 0 3 4 , 1 2 5 
(10 years) 
5 0 , 6 0 0 
(8 years) 
Sources : Official publications an.d Economic Commission for Latín America. 
2. Demand for tires 
It would be a simple task to calcúlate the demand for tires 
for lorries if their average length of hfe and the distance 
covered annually were known. But both points are still 
a matter of conjecture, despite the fact that certain experts 
believe tires can last for 20,000 kilometres, while others 
suggest 25,000 or 30,000 to be a more accurate figure. 
Given these discrepancies, it is not surprising that estimates 
of annual tire consumption per lorry differ widely from one 
another, or, in more concrete terms, range from a minimum 
of 5.32 30 to a máximum of 18 tires31 
A comparison of the tire availability with the number of 
lorries suggests that the minimum estimate comes closer to 
the truth. In fact, during the four-year period 1948-52 the 
average annual supply of tires rose to 870,000 units, when 
the average number of load-carrying vehicles in circulation 
8 0 See Commissao Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos, op. cit., p. 145. 
8 1 Average consumption assumed for 10-ton lorries used for relatively 
long-distance transport. See Oclir Dias da Costa, op cit. 
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stood at 219,300.32 The apparent consumption per vehicle 
was approximately four tires.33 
Table 111. Brazil : Availability of tires a and load-carrying 
vehicles b in circulation, 1948-52 
(Thousands) 
Years Tires Vehicles 
1949 5 9 4 . 0 1 7 9 . 6 
1950 7 8 2 . 3 2 0 6 . 2 
1951 1 , 7 3 8 . 0 c 2 2 6 . 4 
1952 1 , 0 5 9 . 7 2 6 4 . 8 
Source : Various numbers of the Boletim de Estatistica e Injormagoes, Commissao 
Executiva da Defesa da Borracha, Rio de Janeiro. 
a Including tires for lorries, oranibuses, station-wagons, tractors, agricultural 
machinery, bulldozers and aeroplanes. Vehicles of the first three types absorb 
more than 90 per cent of the total number of tires. 
b Including lorries, omnibuses and station-wagons. 
« This figure is a partial estimate. 
It is clear that consumption must have been greater if, 
as seems probable, the number of lorries in circulation is 
over-estimated in the existing series. On this hypothesis, 
the average consumption of four tires could be considered 
as an absolute minimum. Nevertheless, it is on this figure 
that the estimate of demand will be based. 
In 1962, the lorries in circulation will total approximately 
573,000. The level of tire consumption per vehicle assumed 
in the foregoing paragraph will give an aggregate consumption 
of 2.29 million units. As motor vehicles in Brazil use one 
inner tube to every 1.6 tires, the consumption of these will 
amount to 1.43 million units. 
3. Demand for fuels and lubricants 
(a) Petrol 
The scanty information published on the fuel consumption 
of lorries suggests that diey use from 0.33 to 0.5 litre of petrol 
per kilometre on long and medium-distance runs. It is, 
however, the data which are less significant—either because 
they refer to a very small number of lorries or because they 
were collected over a short period of observation only—that 
place consumption nearer to the higher limit of half a litre.34 
The more trustworthy information, on the other hand, 
indicates that 0.33 litre is the representative figure.35 
On the basis of this rate of consumption per kilometre and 
the previous estimate of the average distance covered in a year 
by lorries used for inter-urban transport, the average annual 
consumption of petrol per vehicle can be calculated at approxi-
mately 11,300 litres. 
It is a known fact that a lorry uses more fuel per kilometre 
for urban or short-distance than for inter-urban transport.38 
3 2 See notes & and * to table 111. 
a 3 If it is assumed that the lorries at present in existence in Brazil use 
on an average six tires o f which the average duration is 30,000 kilometres, 
it may be concluded that, in accordance with apparent tire consumption, 
the average distance covered by a lorry each year is 20,000 kilometres. 
3 4 In two cases, a consumption of 0.4 litre or more was recorded. One 
o f these cases reflects the experience o f an enterprise owning six lorries 
during one year; the other, that of an organization using fewer lorries 
over an even shorter working period. 
3 5 Consumption calculated by the Cía. Mogiana de Transportes. 
3 6 Consumption is higher still when the average capacity of lorries 
used for short-distance transport is less than that of vehicles used for inter-
urban transport. 
Existing information suggests a consumption of 0.38 litre 
per vehicle per kilometre on service of this kind. The annual 
consumption per vehicle, however, is lower than 11,300 
litres, because the average distance covered in a year by lorries 
used for urban or suburban transport is only a fraction of the 
distance run by vehicles on inter-urban service. 
All available statistics emphasize this fact. A case in point 
is that of the vehicles—more than 200 in number—belonging 
to an enterprise 37 of which the requirements, over the whole 
period 1948-52, involved an average annual run of not more 
than 7,325 kilometres. A further instance worth quoting 
is that of the sixty-nine lorries belonging to another company, 
which during the year 1951 covered on an average 8.734 
kilometres.38 
Doubts may arise as to the valué of these cases as represen-
tative examples, since both enterprises use their vehicles 
primarily for urban transport. It is in fact probable that the 
average distance covered by these lorries is unduly affected 
by transport conditions within the urban zone of large cities. 
It was therefore deemed wiser to assume a higher average 
run of 12,000 kilometres for lorries on urban and suburban 
service. 
If 0.38 litre represent the consumption of petrol per vehicle 
per kilometre, the supplies for this distance involve an average 
annual consumption of 4,560 litres per vehicle. 
Finally, the average annual consumption per registered 
lorry rises to approximately 7,260 litres if the following 
composition of the load-carrying motor vehicle park by types 
of service is assumed; 40 per cent for inter-urban and the 
remainder for urban or suburban transport. 
This rate of average consumption may undergo modification 
in the course of the next few years under the influence of four 
main factors: higher average capacity of the lorries in circu-
lation; longer average distance covered; changes in the pro-
portion of the total number of vehicles used for urban service 
on the one hand and for inter-urban on the other; and, finally, 
technical improvements in the state of the highways, especially 
road-paving services. If the first two materialized they would 
tend to raise consumption, the third would cause an increase 
or a decrease according to the nature of the change, and the 
fourth would have a lowering effect. 
Though any one of them may affect average consumption 
in a substantial degree, it was felt to be wiser to leave them 
out óf consideration in view of the impossibility of forecasting 
their future trends with even approximate accuracy. 
It was previously estabhshed that 153,000 of the 503,000 
units which will constitute the availability of petrol-driven 
lorries in 1962 will be used for inter-urban service. The annual 
fuel consumption of these vehicles will amount to 1,730 
million litres, if a unit consumption of 11,300 litres is assumed. 
By adding to this the 1.6 billion litres consumed by the 
remainder of the lorries, a total of 3.3 billion litres will be 
obtained—that is, 2.9 million tons of petrol. 
(b) Diesel oil 
The best available information suggests that the consumption 
of diesel oil per vehicle per kilometre is in the nature of 0.28 
3 7 Basic statistics o f the Sorocabana Railway lorry service. See the 
Relatorios of this enterprise. 
38 Relatorio do Superintendente, Í95Í. Cia, Mogiana de Transportes. 
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litre for relatively long-distance transport. The 70,000 diesel 
lorries which it is presumed will be in circulation by 1962 
will consume 595 million litres of this fuel annually. 
(c) Lubricants 
The average consumption of lubricants for each 100 kilo-
metres covered on any type of service ranges from 0.8 to 
1.0 htre. According to the calculations here, the average 
annual distance run by lorries amounts to 21,000 kilometres. 
The average annual consumption of lubricants per vehicle 
should therefore be between 170 and 210 litres, in round 
figures. 
If the average of these two figures is taken as the most 
representative valué of the consumption of petrol-driven 
vehicles—and it is assumed, in default of more accurate data, 
that the average consumption of diesel lorries also stands 
at 190 litres—the aggregate consumption of lubricants will 
represent about 109 million litres in 1962. 
APPENDIX 
I. THE LIMITATION OF TRANSPORT CAPACITY 
1. General considerations 
The nominal transport capacity of a railway line or system is determined 
by the nature of its availabilities of locomotives and rolling stock : number 
of locomotives, traction power, number and capacity of goods trucks, etc. 
The real or effective capacity depends upon the technical characteristics 
—lay-out, rails, etc.—of the lines. When these are unfavourable, as they 
are in Brazil, the efficiency of the equipment is a good deal less in practice 
than in theory. T o the same degree, effective capacity differs from 
nominal capacity. 
Two factors influence the decrease of effective capacity over a period 
of time—inadequate replacement of rolling stock and deficient main-
tenance of the permanent track, 
When the rate o f replacement is unsatisfactory, the average age of the 
machinery and equipment rises, or, more usually, the number of obsolete 
locomotives, coaches and goods trucks increases in relative terms. In 
either case, capacity is lowered, since a growing proportion of the potential 
time for servicing rolling stock must be devoted to repairs. 
Inadequate maintenance of the road-bed and lines affects railway ope-
rations in various ways : for example, the speed o f the trains is reduced. 
There is also a decrease in the volume of goods and the number of 
passengers that can be transported in a given time. 
Lower effective capacity need not necessarily cause a decline in the 
volume of transport. In fact, this would occur only if the capacity were 
being fully utilized at the time when its reduction took place. When 
this is not the case, the volume of transport may increase while effective 
capacity is diminishing.1 
2. Evolution of the capacity and volume of transport 
The Brazilian railway network was affected by some of the phenomena 
described above. During the period 1935-50, an average of forty-one 
locomotives was incorporated into the system each yeár.8 Since there 
were 3,283 locomotives in 1930, it may be deduced that the average 
annual rate of replacement was 1.4 per cent. If this calculation is made 
on the basis of traction power,® a slightly higher rate is obtained, namely, 
1.9 per cent. 
At the latter rate, the whole park could be renewed in fifty-three years, 
an extremely long period if it is compared with the average useful life 
of the locomotives. The most optimistic estimates suggest a máximum 
life for locomotives of forty years, which means a minimum rate of 
replacement of 2.5 per cent annually. 
1 Broadly speaking, the increase is obtained at a higher real cost per 
unit transported—that is, per ton-kilometre or per passenger-kilometre. 
2 Average annual imports of locomotives of all types during this period. 
It was impossible to extend the calculation to 1930-34, because imports 
are shown in kilogrammes. In any case, the inclusión of the data for this 
five-year period would not have caused any radical change in the fmdings 
already presented. 
8 Strictly speaking, the calculation should be limited to traction power» 
since capacity is the important factor and not the total number of loco-
motives in service. c 
It is evident that locomotive capacity decreased because obsolescence 
outstripped the rate of renewal. T o be more accurate, a process o f 
disinvestment took place from the pre-war period until recent years, 
although over-all traction power apparently increased by 18 per cent 
between 1930 and 1950. The increase from 27.5 to 32.5 million kilo-
grammes 4 is in fact only nominal, since the share of obsolete locomotives 
(over thirty years oíd) in total traction power rose from 20 to more than 
50 per cent. 
Maintenance of the permanent way was also far from satisfactory. 
The number of rails and sleepers replaced did not cover minimum require-
ments. The average number of rails renewed every year during the 
five-year period 1925-29, was higher than at any comparable period 
subsequently. The situation as regards sleepers was not so serious. It is 
a fact, however, that the average number of units renewed annually 
during the period 1930-52 was the same as the average for the five-year 
period 1925-29, in spite o f the increase in the length of track mileage 
which was effected in those years.8 
Deterioration of the permanent way reached alarming proportions 
during the post-war period. It is calculated that in 1951 the weight 
o f obsolescent rails, as yet unreplaced, varied between 424,000 and 
462,000 tons, while the corresponding figure for sleepers was 3.1 million 
tons.® The déficit in the first case represented about a quarter of the total 
weight of all the rails in service on Brazilian lines in 1951, and in the 
second, about 5 per cent of all the sleepers in use. 
Inadequate renewal of locomotives and the deterioration of the perma-
nent way undoubtedly reduced the effective transport capacity of Brazil's 
railways. Although the scanty and unreliable data which exist do not 
permit the influence of these factors to be estimated accurately, they do 
suggest that the effective transport capacity declined by some 20-30 per cent. 
This was no obstacle to the relatively vigorous growth of the volume 
of . transport, at any rate up to the end of the war.7 Since there was a 
subsequent stagnation during 1947-49, despite an intensive rise in demand 
and relatively low rail tariffs, it seems clear that the railways reached 
the limit of their effective transport capacity during the years immediately 
following the war. 
Given the rail tariffs in forcé, it is difficult to estimate the additional 
volume of traffic which the railway system might have carried if the 
4 Approximate figures. The 1930 figure is based on data for 3,211 loco-
motives out of a total o f 3,273; that of 1950 was obtained by estimating 
the traction power of some of the diesel and electric locomotives in service 
at that time. 
6 The data which serve as the basis for this statement refer to a sample 
formed by twelve of the thirteen largest railways in the country. T h e 
average number of sleepers laid annually during the five-year period 
1925-29 was 3.7 million. 
6 See Estudos Diversos (Joint Brazil/United States Economic Develop-
ment Commission), page 151, and " O Problema dos Trilhos " (The 
Track Problem), in Boletim 1953 do Instituto Ferroviario de Investigares 
Técnico-Económicas, p. 57. 
7 The kilometric traffic of the railways increased by 66.1 per cent between 
1929 and 1945, and by more than 100 per cent between 1930 and 1945» 
according to the index for the thirteen most important railways. It should 
be noted that in view of this increase the capacity of the railway system • 
must have been considerably under-utilized at the end of the 1920s. 
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capacity had been .available. Nevertheless, it is known that in 1951 some 
companies failed to transport goods whose total weight was 20 to 50 per 
cent o f the freight volume carried by them in that year. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that restricted capacity was not a problem 
common to all the railways of the country. 
II. EVOLUTION OF THE UNIT COST OF LORRY TRANSPORT 
A relatively large proportion of the average cost per ton-kilometre 
o f lorry transport has to be met with foreign exchange, which, according 
to present estimates and to independent information, covers some 15 per 
cent o f the total.8 Thus the rate o f exchange exerts a direct, and not 
inconsiderable, influence upon the unit cost o f goods transport by lorry. 
During the period 1946-52, the rate of exchange remained constant 
and therefore tended to reduce the increase in the unit cost, as will be seen 
below. This stability was accompanied by an unequal rise in internal 
and external prices; in other words, prices of goods imported by Brazil 
rose considerably more there than in their country o f origin. Obviously, 
in these circumstances, the steadiness o f the rate o f exchange tended to 
moderate the increase in cruzeiro prices for imported commodities, 
particülarly those which were almost or entirely unaffected by import 
restrictions. As petrol, lubricants and other cost components belonged 
to this category, the statement that the rate o f exchange influenced the 
cost of road transport can be readily understood. 
Another factor militating against an excessive rise in costs was the 
relative constancy o f the specific taxes on petrol, lubricants, etc. T o give 
an idea of the magnitude of these taxes, it suffices to point out that in 1952 
they constituted no less than 10 per cent of the unit cost o f goods transport 
by road. For the reasons adduced, this cost rose by only 53.5 per cent 
between 1946 and 1952, an increment which contrasts with increases 
o f about 84 per cent in the prices o f agricultural and industrial products,9 
and o f 80 to 85 per cent in the unit cost of rail transport.10 
There are reliable indications that charges for lorry transport kept 
parallel with the unit cost. If railway tariffs had increased at the same 
rate as the unit cost of rail transport, which did not in fact occur,11 the 
competitive position of lorries would have become even stronger between 
1946 and 1952. 
This position was at least maintained,18 even in zones served by railways 
with an unlimited transport capacity, because the increase in road transport 
charges was so moderate. 
8 See table VII in section IV of this Appendix. 
9 Calculations based on the price Índices that can be deduced from the 
real production series and from the income o f the agricultural and indus-
trial sectors. 
10 The unit cost was obtained by dividing the total expenditure o f the 
railways by the ton/kilometres o f payload carried (passenger transport 
included). This is a very rough calculation, since the expenditure accounts 
o f almost all the railway companies exelude depreciation charges, and are 
not confined to goods traffic. 
11 It is very difficult to construct an adequate index o f railway tariffs 
from the available information. The most that could be done was to 
establish weighted Índices o f the kilometre rates (and not o f the tariffs 
actually charged) for ten products. With 1946 as the base year, the increases 
observed in the rates for a 200-kilometre haul were as follows : 
1952 increase 
Product • ••- (percentages) 
Cotton 1 5 . 9 
Coffee 1 7 . 4 
Beans 4 5 . 0 
Wheat flour 4 5 . 5 
Manioc flour 4 6 . 8 
Lumber 4 8 . 2 
Sugar 4 8 . 3 
Jerked beef 116 ,7 
Butter 171 .9 
The average increase in tariffs, to judge by these statistics and by other 
isolated data, was probably from 50 to 60 per cent between 1946 and 1952. 
12 ln recent years, the competitive position o f lorries has, to some 
degree, not been directly conditioned by the relative level of their freight 
tariffs. This does not imply, however, that higher prices, also in relative 
III. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE LOAD VOLUME ÍNDEX 
The weighting factor used was the number of persons employed, 
according to the 1940 Census, in connexion with each o f thé different 
means o f transport included in the index. 
The census figure for employment in road transport was adjusted 
by excluding from the total the number of workers employed in passenger 
transport. For this purpose it was assumed that the ratio existing in 1939 
between load-carrying and passenger vehicles was also valid for the 
number o f persons employed in each o f these two categories o f motor 
transport. 
Similarly, the employment figure for the railways was corrected by 
deducting from the total the number o f workers employed in the main-
tenance of the permanent way and in passenger transport. To make this 
latter adjustment it was assumed that the number o f persons employed 
in passenger and freight traffic was proportionate to the ton-kilometres 
of gross weight transported by each o f these two services in 1939. 
The resultant weighting coefficients were as follows : for railways,' 
47.2 per cent; for road transport, 31.5 per cent; and for coastal shipping, 
21.3 per cent. 
The series reláting to lorries in circulation may contain a considerable 
margin o f error as regards the post-war years. The number of load-
carrying vehicles in circulation is probably over-estimated, as will now 
be demonstrated. 
As from 1946, inter-state trade by road entered upon a phase o f intensive 
expansión. This led to a substantial increase in the number o f lorries 
registered in one state, but also circulating in others. However, load-
carrying vehicles which remain more than a fortnight within the borders 
o f a state where they are not registered are subject to a fine.13 T o evade 
these legal sanctions and other disadvantages, an increasing number o f 
owners decided to register their lorries in more than one state.14 
The available evidence suggests that the duplications resulting from 
this practice were not eüminated when the series relating to lorries in 
circulation was established. If such an error does in fact exist, the index 
will tend to be too high. The lorry series was included for lack of better 
data, although it does not give an entirely faithful picture o f effective 
or kilometric road freight traffic.15 A long-term incréase or decrease— 
particülarly the former—in the load volume transported by road should 
be reflected in parallel, though not necessarily commensurate, changes 
in the number of lorries in circulation. T o assume the contrary would 
be to admit the possibility that the lorry park is being under-utilized 
during lengthy periods.1® Over the short term, however, there is no 
reason why there should be a cióse correlation between the volume 
o f freight transported and the number of vehicles; the former may, for 
example, drop abruptly from one year to the next, without there being 
any variation in the number of lorries in service. Alternatively the vehicle 
park may for a short period increase more intensively than the load 
volume. Ñor should it be overlooked that in certain circumstances there 
may be a rise in the number o f lorries and their degree o f utilization. 
A good many lorries are used for short hauls. The series employed 
in calculating the over-all index should exelude these vehicles, because 
Footnote 12 (continued) 
terms, for this type o f transport would not have helped to neutralize some 
of its real or apparent advantages over the railways. It is clear that the 
relative tariff levels played an important role as a determining factor in 
traffic distribution only in areas where full use was not made o f the railway 
system. 
13 The fine is also applicable to lorries which remain for forty-eight 
hours within the boundaries of towns in such states. 
1 4 The additional outlay involved in double registration is very low. 
15 This remark is valid irrespective o f the possible error in the series 
itself. 
18 In abnormal conditions, like those o f the 1940-45 period, phenomena 
such as those mentioned in the text may very well occur. In less adversé 
conditions, the under-utilization o f equipment in an under-developed 
country, which is growing with some intensity, is not a usual occurrence; 
over-utilization is more frequent. In most cases, and particülarly when 
the useful life o f the equipment is limited, over-utilization for a relatively 
long period is impossible. 
11 i 
The Economic Development of Brazil 
the type of service they render differs to some extent from that provided 
by other lorries, railways or coastal shipping. But for the time being the 
absence o f statistics on the break-down o f the number o f lorries by types 
o f service (during the period 1939-52) has made it impossible to introduce 
the proper corrections into the series. 
Finally, it should be noted that the air freight index has been excluded 
from the aggregate index because its relative share of the total is still very 
small, despite the spectacular development of this type of transport during 
the post-war period. Obviously, had it been included, the over-all 
transport index would have shown a still more marked upward trend. 
IV. ESTÍMATE OF THE AVERAGE ANNUAL VOLUMB 
OF INTER-URBAN LORRY TRANSPORT 
1. Annual average volume of transport 
In order to estimate the volume of inter-urban lorry transport, the 
number of lorries used for this traffic and the ton-kilometres of goods 
transported on an average by each vehicle must be known. The latter 
information depends in turn upon a knowledge of the following factors : 
the average annual run and the average capacity of the lorries on inter-
urban service, as well as the degree o f utilization of this capacity. 
2. Average capacity 
In mid-1953, 34.7 per cent o f the 269,402 lorries in circulation in Brazil 
had a máximum capacity of 2 tons; 50.6 per cent had a capacity of between 
2 and 5 tons, while the remainder could carry more than 5 tons. 
The general impression is that most of the light lorries are used in urban 
or suburban traffic and the médium and heavy lorries for inter-urban 
service. Statistics o f the daily traffic on twelve highways in Sao Paulo 
State to some extent confirm this assumption. 
Table I. Brazil : Daily traffic according to size of lorry 
on 12 highways in the State of Sao Paulo 
Lorries Percentage of total 
Year Light Médium Heavy Light Médium Heavy 
1949 . . . . 443 3 , 9 9 8 277 9 . 4 8 4 . 7 5 . 9 
1950 . . . . 746 4 , 6 4 7 238 1 3 . 2 8 2 . 6 4 . 2 
1951 . . . . 908 5 , 4 2 8 262 1 3 . 7 8 2 . 3 4 . 0 
1952 . . . . 
1953 1 ,328 6 , 8 7 7 295 1 5 . 6 8 0 . 9 3 . 5 
Source: Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem, Secretaria de Via?ao e Obras 
Públicas, Sao Paulo. 
As may be seen from table I, not less than 81 per cent o f the lorries 
in circulation in this State during 1949-53 were medium-capacity vehicles. 
This type of lorry is used to a more marked'extent than might be assumed 
from its relative share in the park. It is very likely, although not abso-
lutely certain, that the phenomenon observed in Sao Paulo is fairly repre-
sentative of conditions prevailing elsewhere in Brazil. According to 
expert opinion, most of the medium-sized lorries have a capacity of 5 tons. 
The average capacity of the lorries used for inter-urban freight services 
therefore probably varíes between 4.5 and 4.8 tons. 
3. Degree of utilization 
A survey made in Sao Paulo state during 1953 17 revealed that of the 
35,568 lorries passing through check points on fourteen State highways, 
some 41 per cent, or 14,434 units, were empty. The remainder, according 
to another survey,18 were transporting an average load o f 5.1 tons. 
1 7 Survey made by the Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem, Secre-
taria de Via9ao e Obras Publicas, under the direction o f Mr. Valdo Silveira. 
A sampling procedure was used to estimate the number of loaded and 
empty lorries which circuíate on state highways. The findings of this 
survey had not yet been published in 1955. 
1 8 This survey, also made by the Departamento de Estradas de Rodagem, 
covered the following points : number of loaded lorries passing through 
check points during certain days o f the year; the distance covered; the 
volume and kind o f merchandise transported, and, lastly, the traffic routes. 
The findings o f this survey were also still unpublished in mid-1955. 
B y combining these data with figures for average capacity, a utilization 
coefficient o f about 65 per cent is obtained for the state of Sao Paulo. 
The national average is probably not so high, as will be explained below. 
The ratio between empty and loaded vehicles reflects at least in part 
the degree o f disequilibrium existing between thevolumés of traffic flowing 
in opposite directions. As a general principie, subject to various reser-
vations, it can be assumed that the proportion of empty vehicles is lower 
in those areas where there is less disequilibrium. 
This is so in the state of Sao Paulo, where a better balance is maintained. 
In the other states of Brazil the number of empty vehicles in circulation 
will therefore be relatively higher and the coefficient o f utilization less 
than 65 per cent. There is, however, no empirical basis on which to 
estimate the percentage of empty lorries in highway traffic, except in the 
state o f Sao Paulo. It is therefore impossible to calcúlate the national 
coefficient o f utilization with any degree of accuracy. It will be assumed, 
however, as a mere hypothesis subject to revisión, that this coefficient 
is 55 per cent. 
4. Annual average run 
As will later be seen, different estimates of the average annual run of 
lorries diverge widely from a minimum of 30,000 kilometres annually 
to a máximum of 74,000. In the practical experience of two transport 
companies, the average fluctuates around 20,000 and 25,000 kilometres 
respectively. 
In actual fact, the final elucidation o f this problem depends strictly 
upon the accumulation of empirical data. Speculation can at best lead 
to the establishment o f more or less probable limits for the average run. 
The following considerations should be interpreted only as an initial 
attempt to define these limits. 
Perhaps the best approach to the problem would be to consider the 
lorries* average hourly speed and period of effective service during the 
year. As to the former, it is a fact that the hourly speed on most Brazilian 
highways is still very low. According to information from companies 
operating on the highway linking R i o de Janeiro with Sao Paulo—one 
o f the best routes—the average speed on such roads does not exceed 
40 kilometres an hour. On others, for example, the Curitiba-Sao Paulo 
and Curitiba-Joinville roads, where technical conditions are more typical, 
hourly speed, which in 1949 was 20 kilometres, does not exceed 22 at 
present.19 Finally, information supplied by a company operating with 
a limited number of lorries on the Gatiara-Patos de Minas road in Minas 
Gerais, indicates that on this stretch of road the average speed is less than 
20 kilometres per hour. In view o f the scanty data available, it was 
thought advisable to assume that the average hourly speed o f lorries 
in inter-urban traffic does not exceed 22 kilometres. 
The máximum annual period o f service attributed to lorries was 300 days, 
and the commonest 260 days, that is, a 5-day week with, according to 
estimates, a six-hour working day.20 
Six hours of effective service on each o f 3 0 0 days give a total of 1,800 hours 
annually; if the average speed is 22 kilometres per hour, this means that 
Table II. Brazil : Estimates of the average volume 
of lorry freight (on inter-urban services) 
Estimate I Estímate II 
Average capacity of lorries on inter-urban 
service (tons) 4 . 5 4 . 8 
Annual average run per lorry (kilometres). 3 4 , 0 0 0 4 0 , 0 0 0 
Coefficient of utilization o f capacity (per-
centage) 5 5 . 0 5 5 . 0 
Ton/kilo metres capacity per lorry 153 ,000 1 9 2 , 0 0 0 
Ton/kilo metres transported per lorry 8 4 , 0 0 0 106 ,000 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
1 9 See the section on road transport in the Relatorio da Rede de Viagao 
Paraná-Santa Catarina. 
20 Six hours o f effective work are equivalent to about eight hours* use, 
including the time when the lorry remains stationary. 
Part Two—Chapter III. Transport 119 
the average distance covered annually is about 40,000 kilometres. The 
distance covered in 260 days, given the same number o f hours o f daily 
operation, is therefore 34,320 kilometres. 
A combination of these varying hypotheses gives the average volume 
o f freight for inter-urban lorry transport. The first estimate is probably 
closer to reality. (See table II.) 
The calculation of a realistic estimate o f the number o f lorries used 
on inter-urban freight transport is hampered by lack o f basic information. 
It was therefore decided to assume that this service absorbs about 40 to 
50 per cent o f the park, and that all the light and 40 to 50 per cent of the 
medium-weight lorries are used only for inter-urban transport or for 
short hauls.21 
5. Estimate of unit costs for long-distance transport 
More than one study is extant on the unit cost of lorry transport and 
on its share in direct foreign exchange expenditure. Such research is based 
on assumptions of the average distance covered, useful life, etc., which 
differ, sometimes appreciably, from those used in this report or from its 
findings. It was thus necessary to make adjustments based on a third 
series o f estimates. The calculation below is simply an attempt to reach 
this objective. 
Material from other sources was used liberally in all cases where more 
adequate information was lacking or when the data that were available 
were unsatisfactory. The figures are expressed in 1952 prices and the 
coefficients which were used to calcúlate the share of foreign exchange 
in unit costs are valid only for the period 1945^53. 
Tables III to VIII provide a detailed list of the hypotheses and data on 
which the estimates were based.22 
Table III. Brazil : Assumptions on which estimates 
of unit costs of inter-urban lorry transport are based 
Type of lorry Gasoline-driven 
Capacity (tons) 4 . 5 
Average useful life (kilometres) 187 ,000 
Annual run (kilometres) 3 4 , 0 0 0 
Degree o f utilization (per cent) 0 . 5 5 
Annual volume o f transport (kilometres) 8 4 , 0 0 0 
Average duration of a tire (kilometres) 2 8 , 0 0 0 
Fuel consumption per 100 kilometres (litres) 33 
Consumption of lubricants per 100 km (litres) 0 . 9 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
NOTES.—Useful life. The span of useful life postulated in this chapter is equi-
valent, as will be seen later on, to a total run fluctuating between 168,000 and 
210,000 kilometres. For the estimating of costs, the average—189,000 kilometres— 
was used, reduced to 187,000 kilometres, in order to simplify calculations. 
The other assumptions are not discussed here, as they are examined in detail 
in other sections. 
Table IV. Brazil : Proportion of final sales price 
represented by foreign exchange expenditure 
Ratio 
Products (percentage of sales price) 
Lorry 42 
Spare parts 42 
Petrol 38 
Lubricants 29 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for Latín America. 
NOTES.— These ratios broadly reflect the situation prevailing in Brazil from 1946 
to 1952. All percentages, with the exception of the first, were taken from an 
article by Eduardo Celestino Rodríguez in the Boletim do Departamento de Estradas 
de Rodagem, Secretaria de Via^ao e Obras Públicas, Sao Paulo, December 1949. 
They were compared with data for later years before being used in this calculation. 
The 42-per-cent ratio adopted for lorries was obtained by comparing the average 
c.i.f. price of these vehicles with the price paid by some transport companies which 
purchased 5-ton petrol units in 1951 or 1952. 
Table V. Brazil : Prices used in the calculation a 
Price 
Specification (cruzeiros) 
Lorry Unit 110 ,000 
Petrol Litre 1 . 9 0 
Lubricants Litre 6 . 6 5 
Tire Unit 2 , 1 2 8 
Inner tubes Unit 158 
Insurance Annual rate 2 , 7 5 0 
Licence Annual fee 1 , 3 3 2 
Garage Annual charges 3 , 2 6 0 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
B For 1951. 
NOTES.—Lorry : Price estimated on the basis of valué assigned at the end of 1951 
to 5-ton petrol-driven lorries purchased by one company—Cia. Mogiana de Trans-
portes—during that year. 
Petrol and lubricants : Prices paid by one company {see Cia. Mogiana de Trans-
portes, Relatorio do Superintendente, 1951). The price of gasoline was checked 
and confirmed by the data appearing in the Relatorio of the Conselho Nacional 
do Petroleo, 1951. 
Tires and inner tubes : Unit price of tires for freight vehicles according to 
statistics published in the Boletim da Commissao Executiva da Defesa da Borracha, 
year IV, Nr. 5, 1952. 
Licence: Fees charged in the Federal District for renewal of licences. 
Garage: Annual expenditure per lorry in one enterprise. (See Joint Brazil/ 
United States Economic Development Commission, Estudos Diversos, 1954, p. 144. 
Insurance: Estímate. 
Table VI. Brazil : Estimate of annual cost, per lorry 






Depreciation 1 8 , 0 0 0 
Fuels 2 1 , 3 1 8 
Lubricants 2 , 0 3 5 
Tires and inner tubes 16 ,261 
Repairs j L a b o u r 1 3 ' 2 0 0 
( Spare parts 1 1 , 0 0 0 
Drivers 4 4 , 6 4 8 
Garage, insurance, etc 7 , 3 4 2 
TOTAL . . . 133 ,804 
Incidental expenses 1 3 , 3 8 0 
GRAND TOTAL . . . 147 ,184 
0 , 2 1 4 
0 , 2 5 4 
0 , 0 2 4 
0 , 1 9 4 
0 , 1 5 7 
0 ,131 
0 , 5 3 2 
0 , 0 8 7 
1 , 5 9 3 
0 , 1 5 9 
1 ,752 
2 1 The second statement rests on the mid-1953 classification o f lorries 
as light-, médium- and heavy-weight vehicles. 
22 These assumptions aim at reflecting the characteristics and conditions 
of inter-urban lorry transport service, that is, on médium and long hauls. 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for Iyatin America. 
NOTES.—Depreciation : The calculation of this item is based on the assumption 
that the withdrawal valué of a truck is equal to 10 per cent of its original price. 
Repairs : I t was assumed, firstly, that annual expenditure amounts to 22 per cent 
of the price of a lorry and, secondly, that 10 per cent represents the outlay for 
spare parts and 12 per cent for labour costs. This hypothesis on the amount 
and distribution of maintenance costs was taken from the survey made by Jorge 
Moraes, " Custo do Transportes Rodoviários e Ferroviários " . {Cost of Road and 
Rail Transport), Revista Engenharia, Sao Paulo, December 1949. The author 
based this hypothesis on the experience of a single road transport company. 
Drivers : According to the only reliable information to hand, expenditure on 
this item rose to 66,972 cruzeiros in 1951 per lorry manned by a driver and one 
assistant; but as many freight vehicles operate with a driver only, such expenditure 
was assumed to amount to 66 per cent of the above figure in 1951. 
Incidental expenses : These were assumed to constitute 10 per cent of expendi-
ture as given in the table. 
Table VII. Brazil : Estimated foreign exchange expenditure 
per ton/kilometre, 1951 
(Cruzeiros) 
Depreciation 0 , 0 9 0 
Fuels 0 , 0 9 6 
Lubricants 0 , 0 0 7 
Repairs (spare parts) 0 , 0 5 5 
Incidental expenses 0 , 0 1 6 
TOTAL . . . 0 , 2 6 4 
Sources : Tables I I and IV of this annex. 
<0 
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Table VIH. Brazil : Index of the average cost of transport per ton-kilometre, 1946-52 
(1951 = 100) 
Price Índices 
Index of average 
Year Tires Petrol Lubricants Spare parts Wages cost per tonjkilometre 
1946 6 3 . 2 8 3 . 4 7 9 . 9 6 0 . 7 6 2 . 2 7 1 . 4 
1947 6 3 . 2 8 7 . 3 9 3 . 0 6 5 . 9 6 9 . 1 7 5 . 9 
1948 6 9 . 5 9 3 . 9 1 0 2 . 3 6 7 . 6 7 2 . 7 7 9 . 7 
1949 7 5 . 1 101 .1 9 8 . 7 8 0 . 0 8 7 . 1 8 9 . 3 
1950 7 8 . 1 9 9 . 4 8 5 . 0 8 7 . 3 92 .1 9 2 . 1 
1951 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1952 1 1 2 . 2 1 0 7 . 2 109 .8 1 0 8 . 2 113 .1 109 .6 
1953 1 2 7 . 9 133 .7 9 4 . 4 1 2 2 . 0 1 3 7 . 6 1 2 8 . 3 
Sources : Tires : Series of tire prices for freight vehicles published in the Boletim da Commissáo Executiva de Defesa da Borracha 
Ano IV, Nr. 5, 1952, page 30. 
Petrol: Average retail price in the Federal District. The annual price was calculated by weighting the different quotations for 
each year by the number of days they were operative. Basic data are to be found in the Relatorios of the Conselho Nacional de Petróleo. 
Lubricants and spare parts : Average import price. Original data from Comercio Exterior do Brasil, Ministerio da Fazenda. 
Wages : Average wage paid by the railways. This series coincides in general with the wages paid in industry according to Conjun-
tura Económica, publication of the Funda^ao Getúüo Vargas, Rio de Janeiro. 
NOTES.—The index was prepared using the percentage of each item iñ the 1951 unit transport cost as a weighting factor. Data 
appearing in the second column of table VI were used for the calculation of these percentages. 
It was assumed that the wage index reflects the increase in expenditure on both drivers' and maintenance workers' wages; and, 
finally, that the amount of depreciation remained constant during the whole period. 
The index does not include such items as garage, insurance, etc., since the relevaut series were not available. 
V. PROJECTIONS FOR THE RAILWAY SECTOR 
1. Breakdown of demand for rail services 
(a) Electric traction 
Transport by electric locomotive will increase if the electric sections 
are extended. But even if no more lines are electrified, the demand for 
railway services will still rise in areas where this type o f transport is avail-
able. The probable increase in volume is not difficult to assess, once the 
electrification plans of the railway companies and the present volume 
o f traffic on the lines to be electrified are ascertained. However, the 
expansión o f demand, in the second instance, is more difficult to evalúate, 
since a projection of the demand in the areas concerned is required. 
As this problem cannot be properly investigated, it was decided to cast 
a superficial glance at certain circumstances that tend to retard or accelerate 
the increase of traffic on some electrified lines. The discussion in question 
is preceded by a short survey o f the railway companies* electrification plans. 
In 1951, the electrified section o f the Brazilian railway network covered 
1,305 kilometres,23 most o f the lines (70.5 per cent) being in the State 
of Sao Paulo. Between 1952 and 1954 a further 7 5 0 kilometres were 
electrified, so that the total now reaches 2,055 kilometres.24 
As may be seen in table IX, it is planned to electrify a further 1,694 kilo-
metres. This would imply a rate o f electrification almost three times 
greater than that o f the period 1938-54, when the annual increase was 
some 90 kilometres only. It is unlikely that the whole o f the 1,694 kilo-
metres will be electrified in less than ten years, as some o f the projects 
do not enjoy a high priority in the investment plans o f the railways con-
cerned. This is true of the Paraná-Santa Catarina Railway, and thé 
R i o Grande do Sul network. In both cases, more recent programmes, 
prepared by the Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development 
Commission, have suggested other solutions to the traction problem. 
Attention should be drawn to the limited availability of electric energy» 
which hampers the speedy execution o f certain projects. In reality, more 
than one of the projects can be carried out only if substantial prior invest-
ment is made in the energy sector. 
This total includes 104 kilometres belonging to small railway companies, 
some o f which carry passenger traffic only. 
24 This total includes lines where electrification has been completed 
but which are not yet in operation. 
Table IX. Brazil : Rail electrificaron until 1951, 










E. F. Central do Brasil 192 48 125 
Cia. Paulista de E. F 451 — 127 
E . F. Sorocabana 311 173 310 • 
E. F. Santos-Jundiaí 66 21 22 . 
Rede Mineira de Via£ao 181 156 221 
Rede Paraná-Santa Catarina . — 110 139 
R . F. Leste Brasileiro . . . . . . . — 242 — . 
R . V. R i o Grande do Sul — — 700 
104 — — 
TOTAL. . . 1 , 3 0 5 750 1 , 6 9 4 
Sources : Official publications and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
For these reasons, it is thought that at the most 916 kilometres o f the 
planned total will in fact be electrified between 1954 and 1962. In other 
words, the present calculation is based upon the assumption that the plans 
o f the two railways mentioned do not materialize. 
Projects already under way are in very different stages o f execution, 
as table X shows. 
T o project even approximately the traffic volume on lines that are 
or will be electrified, data on the payload and gross weight goods and 
passenger traffic o f each are an essential pre-requisite. The figures obtained 
are far from satisfying these minimum requirements, as they all refer 
to gross weight kilometric traffic. (See table XI . ) 
Since passenger traffic could not be separated from goods traffic, it was 
decided to attribute to the ton-kilometres o f total gross weight the rates 
o f growth which should actually be applied to goods traffic. But, as 
already pointed out, forecasts suggest that the number o f passengers and 
the gross weight will not increase as much as the volume o f goods and the 
payload, respectively. Henee the procedure used for the projection 
probably involves over-estimation o f the volume of transport to be handled 
by electric locomotives. 
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Table X . Brazil : Status of electrification work on railways 
Distance Status o/ the projects 
Railways Section (km.) in mid-1954 
Central do Brasil . . . Mogi das Cruzes Roosevelt 3 6 Construction well advanced 
Barra do Praí-Tres Rios 89 Construction not yet begun but funds 
available 
Santos-Jundiaí Mauá-Paranapiacaba 22 Construction work will probably be 
completed in the second half of 1955 
Paulista Bauru-Marília 127 Preliminary work finished 
Rede Mineira Barra Mansa-Angra dos Reis 108 A hydroelectric power plant is being 
built to furnish energy for this and 
other branches 
Minduri-Ribeirao Vermelho 113 Being studied. The hydroelectric plant 
to provide energy is being built 
Sorocabana Bernardino de Campos-Assis-Presidente 
Prudente 336 The power station is in process o f 
construction 
W o r k continúes in the direction o f 
Assis 
A hydroelectric plant is being built 
and two others are planned 
P. Altino-Evangelista de Souza Santos 111 Electrification work has not yet begun: 
Source : Official publications and the Economic Commission for l^atin America. 
Table XI. Brazil : Traffic volume on electric lines and lines 
to be electrified, 1952 




1 3 7 . 4 
Electrified4 To be electrified b 
Railways Passengers Goods Passengers Goods 
Central do Brasil . . . . 220 c 1 , 2 5 0 d — 
Santos-Jundiaí 1 , 4 0 0 e 
Paulista 1 ,497 1 , 9 4 2 . 6 . — 
Rede Mineira 1 4 . 5 9 2 . 6 4 8 . 8 
Sorocabana 336 1 , 3 2 0 . 5 — — 
Paraná-Santa Catarina . 7 5 — — — 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
a Includes only lines already electrified by 1951. 
b Includes Unes electrified between 1952-54 and lines to be electrified. 
c Estimate, excluding suburban passenger traffic. 
• d Provisional estimate. 
9 Estimate based on incomplete data. 
The calculations of future traffic on electrified lines in Brazil were based 
on the data given in the following pages. For most o f these estimates 
indirect or conjectural methods had to be used. 
Santos-Jundiaí Railway. The first outstanding feature o f the statistical 
series of this company is that during the post-war period, only in 1951 
was the goods volume larger than in 1939. Further, i f petroleum and 
its by-products are excluded from the series, more goods were transported 
in 1939 than during any year after the war. It is true that in the period 
under review considerable changes in the composition of the freight took 
place; among these should be mentioned the higher proportion of the 
aggregate represented by those goods whose transport is most lucrative. 
This phenomenon, which is of particular importance in another sector, 
has no great significance in relation to the problem dealt with here. The 
point to be emphasized at this stage is that- thé volume o f solid goods 
transported has not expanded in recent years, and that if the total volume 
has risen, this has been mainly on account o f liquid fuels. However, the 
transport o f such products was transferred to the company's pipeline 
in 1952, and the railway thus lost those components o f its goods traffic 
which had increased most rapidly during the last ten years and by 1951 
had already represented a quarter o f the aggregate tonnage transported 
by rail. In addition, the Santos-Jundiaí Railway was handicapped by a 
number of obstacles which tended to hamper the expansión o f its goods 
traffic. T h é most patent of these is keener competition from another 
line; and this situation will become still more acute when the Sorocabana 
Railway opens a loop-line route which is at present in the final stages 
o f construction, and which will shorten the stretch between Santos and 
Sao Paulo from 223 to about 125 kilometres. Although this new line 
will be longer than the traditional route followed by the Santos-Jundiaí 
Railway, it has the advantage o f being an adherence railway with a máxi-
mum gradient o f 2 in 100. One 10-kilometre section o f the Santos-
Jundiaí line has an average gradient o f 8 in 100, which necessitates relatively 
slow traction, so that the time taken to cover it is about the same as that 
required for a 50-kilometre stretch on an adherence railway. 
Another obstacle.to a greater volume of goods traffic is the keen com-
petition of road transport, which will become more intensive as manu-
factured goods dispatched by sea from Sao Paulo to other parts o f Brazil 
play an increasingly important part in the flow of trade between that city 
and the port o f Santos. Henee the rate o f growth of goods traffic on the 
Santos-Jundiaí Railway will probably be lower than the average for the 
railway network as a whole. 
It was therefore assumed that the volume o f freight—excluding petro-
leum and its derivatives—will increase by 3 per cent annually. This 
percentage was applied during 1952 to the gross traffic on the lines already 
electrified or to be electrified shortly. The estimated figure of 900 million 
tons o f gross weight, which served as a basis for the calculation, exeludes 
both petroleum8 5 and suburban passenger traffic.26 
The growth o f passenger traffic to the suburbs will undoubtedly be very 
rapid. According to the company's own estimates, the number of passen-
gers will increase by 2.5 million annually. Since this traffic represented 
28.8 million passengers in 1952, by 1962, if the projection is confirmed, 
the total will reach 53.6 million. Providing that the average run does not 
change (as is probable), the volume o f transport will stand at 553.6 million 
passenger-kilo metres. 
26 In calculaíing the ton-kilometres o f gross weight represented by 
liquid fuels the same average length of haul was assumed for these products 
as for total freight—i.e., 65 kilometres—and it was also taken into account 
that part o f this run—30 kilometres—was over a section which is not 
to be electrified. 
28 This calculation was based on the ratio o f 12 to 1 between deadweight 
and payload, recorded for inter-urban and suburban passenger traffic 
on this railway during 1951. It should also be borne in mind that all this 
traffic was concentrated on the lines which have been or will be electrified. 
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Lasdy, it should be noted that this railway is planning to use special 
trains for suburban services. The ratio of deadweight to payload on this 
type of vehicle is 7 to 1, when capacity is reasonably well utilized. It is 
assumed that this will be the case on the Santos-Jundiaí Railway. 
Central do Brasil Railway. For five years, it has been impossible to 
check the steady decline of suburban passenger traffic on this railway. 
Over this period, the number of passengers decreased at an average annual 
rate of 5.9 per cent. 
The reasons for this decline have been frequently and carefully studied, 
and require no further discussion. For the moment it need only be empha-
sized that the loss of traffic is due to a reduction of the rolling stock on 
this service, in some cases through damage, on others because it is out 
of date or has not been duly replaced. According to expert opinion, 
this is the only possible cause, since the railway is the swiftest and cheapest 
of the various forms of suburban transport in Rio de Janeiro. Omnibus 
and other motor-vehicle fares are three to five times higher than those 
charged on the railway. 
It is therefore clear that once the main cause of the decrease in traffic 
is removed, expansión is bound to take place. In other words, the number 
of suburban passengers carried on the Central do Brasil will substantially 
increase when more and better rolling stock is available, even if fares 
are raised considerably. 
As this railway has already ordered the electric trains required to restore 
its capacity to the 1949 level, it is reasonable to suppose that, when this 
occurs in 1957, the same number of passengers will be carried as in 1949.27 
Similarly, it was assumed that during the remainder of the period the 
number of passengers will increase by 3.4 per cent annually. It should 
be stressed that between 1945 and 1951 this was the annual rate of growth 
for the number of suburban passengers in Rio de Janeiro carried by every 
means of locomotion —that is to say, by train, tram and ómnibus.28 
A small share o f the suburban traffic uses a non-electrified line, and 
for this section the hypothesis was adopted that in 1957 the volume will 
reach the 1949 level of 13 million passengers annually. Henee it was 
assumed that after 1957 the volume will grow at a rate of 1 per cent per 
annum.2 9 
Goods traffic was projected with very unsatisfactory data, since even 
its density on those lines at present electrified or in process of electrification 
is unknown. Such lines, however, are on routes where the volume 
of traffic will inevitably increase very rapidly. It is sufficient to point 
out that the Dom Pedro II-Barra do Piraí section is on the main line 
linking Rio de Janeiro with Sao Paulo and Belo Horizonte and that the 
section Barro do Piraí-Saudade is a continuation of the Sao Paulo branch 
line, while the Barra do Piral-Tres Rios section is a prolongátion of the 
first-named, on the trunk line to Belo Horizonte. Finally, the Roosevelt-
Mogi das Cruzes line connects Sao Paulo with neighbouring towns. 
In the preliminary study on the demand for transport of certain industries 
in the Paraíba valley80—an area which is served by all the lines on the 
central railway already electrified or to be electrified in the future—it was 
shown that the expansión programmes at present under way will require 
additional transport facilities for 2.1 to 5 million tons. If the entire increase 
27 In 1949, almost 185 million passengers travelled in the suburban 
electric trains, and 18 million of these travelled free of charge. Although 
the projection refers to aggregate traffic, the rate of growth was applied 
only to the number of fare-paying passengers, since the number travelling 
free of charge will presumably remain constant. It was assumed that 
the average run would remain equal to the average for the period 1949-52 
(19.3 kilometres) for all suburban passenger traffic. The statistics used 
in the calculation differ from those appearing in the text. The original 
aggregate figure was broken down. 
28 Not including passengers transported in small omnibuses, whose 
numbers probably increased at a more rapid rate than 3.4 per cent per 
annum. 
29 Rate of growth of population in the area served by the suburban 
lines of the Central do Brasil Railway during the period 1940-50. 
3 0 See Project No. 3 (Central do Brasil Railway) of the Joint Brazil/ 
United States Economic Development Commission. 
in the demand of these industries is met by the Central do Brasil Railway,31 
its railway traffic will perhaps exceed the 1950 level before 1958. 
It is probable that goods traffic on these lines will increase during 1952-62 
at a rate higher than the national average. In contrast, it is unlikely that 
passenger traffic will attain such a rapid rate o f growth. As the relative 
influence of neither factor can be accurately determined, the hypothesis 
established was that total traffic (and in this case the gross weight) will 
increase by 6 per cent annually. 
Companhia Paulista de Estradas de Ferro. Like the Santos-Jundiaí Railway, 
this enterprise is facing serious competition from road transport, particu-
larly on its main line. Given the rapid improvement of roads in Sao Paulo 
State, such competition is bound to be increasingly severe. In addition, 
the railway will lose the transport of liquid fuels when the pipeline which 
at present runs between Santos and Sao Paulo reaches the towns in the 
interior. Finally, production of certain commodities which make up a 
large proportion of the freight carried—coffee, for example—is remaining 
stationary in the agricultural area through which part of the end o f this 
line runs. The immediate prospects of an increase in such production 
are not very promising. 
Presumably, therefore, the rate of growth of traffic on the Jundiaí-
Rin9ao section will not exceed 3 per cent_per annum. On this same 
line, the Campinas-Itirapina branch showed a rate of growth of only 
3.18 per cent over the period 1934-51. 
Traffic will probably increase faster on the Itirapina-Baurú-Marília line, 
which crosses an area in full process of development. The 4.5 per cent 
rate of growth postulated for traffic on this line represents, according to 
the present preliminary estimate, about 1.05 billion ton-kilometres of gross 
weight. 
Sorocabana Railway. Available data is too scanty to permit an inde-
pendent calculation of future traffic on this company's electrified lines. 
Use will therefore be made of a method based on the number of electric 
locomotives which the management plans to add to current stock before 
1963. The proposal is to acquire forty-six new locomotives, as well as 
forty-four others of more than 2,200 h.p. If, in 1962, utilization o f the 
locomotive park is the same as in 1951,32 out of a total of ninety, fifty-six 
will be used for goods and passenger transport and sixteen for shunting, 
while eighteen will be idle. 
In 1951, each locomotive providing effective goods and passenger 
transport hauled about 60 million ton-kilometres of gross weight. With 
the help of previous data, the volume of traffic on the electrified lines in 
1962 can be estimated at 3.36 billion kilometres of gross weight. 
A projection of the traffic on the electrified system of the Leste Brasileiro 
Railway was established in the same manner. 
Rede Mineira de Via$ao and Rede Paraná-Santa Catarina. In both these 
cases it was assumed that the rate of growth will be 6 per cent annually, 
because the electrified sections of these two railways run through areas 
which are developing rapidly and where the volume of freight is tending 
to increase very quickly. The lines which have been or are being elec-
trified on the Rede Mineira link the Volta Redonda iron and steel mili 
with the Port of Angra dos Reis, as well as with a number of towns and 
effective or potential sources of raw materials in the state of Minas Gerais. 
The Paranaguá-Curitiba Section, on the Paraná-Santa Catarina Railway, 
connects the most important port in Paraná State with the interior. Traffic 
will probably increase intensively when construction of the Central do 
Paraná Railway, which will join up the north-east of this state with the 
port of Paranaguá by a much shorter route, is completed. 
Conclusions. The preceding calculations suggest that the volume of 
traffic will, within eight years, reach 19.02 billion ton-kilometres of gross 
weight, representing 43 per cent of the estimated traffic volume on all 
the Brazilian railways. According to this projection (see table XII), the 
other types of traction will transport 25.255 billion ton-kilometres of gross 
weight in 1962. 
3 1 The increase will be confined to those types of freight (minerals, 
cement, etc.) for which railway transport is more suitable. 
32 In 1951, nine locomotives were idle, eight were used for shunting 
and twenty-nine for goods and passenger transport. 
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Table XII. Brazil : Projection of volume 
of electric traction transport 
(Millions o f ton-kilometres of grossweight) 
Railways 1962 
Santos-Jundiaía 1 , 5 1 0 
Central do Brasil» -8 ,145 
Paulista 5 , 2 2 0 
Sorocabana 3 , 3 5 0 
Rede Mineira 525 
Paraná-Santa Catarina 135 
Leste Brasileiro 135 
TOTAL . . . 1 9 , 0 2 0 
Sources : Official publications and the Economic Commission for Latin America. 
a Data for the Santos-Jundiaí and Central do Brasil Railways include 310 and 
3,095 million tons of suburban passenger traffic respectively. 
(b) Steam traction 
In 1962, according to the projection, the Brazilian railways will have 
about 515 steam locomotives in service. It is forecast that the charac-
teristics of these locomotives (age, horse-power, etc.) will be very different 
from those o f the engines at present in use.33 For this reason it is not 
advisable to assess the average capacity of the units which will be in service 
in eight years* time on the basis o f the average efficiency o f BraziTs loco-
motives during any post-war year. The best means o f determining this 
capacity is by using the data available on the steam locomotives o f the 
Sorocabana Railway, which possesses a relatively large number of heavy 
engines that are in good condition and are utilized intensively.34 
It is a common practice for railways to use certain locomotives for 
shunting and others for hauling loads. The problem is to ascertain how 
many are used for each activity. The conclusión was reached that 122 loco-
motives, which probably included the company's most up-to-date and 
powerful engines, are assigned to the transport o f passengers and freight. 
These locomotives hauled 2,357 billion ton-kilometres o f gross weight, 
that is 19.3 millions per unit actually in service and 15.4 millions per 
existing unit.35 On this basis it was assumed that the average transport 
capacity of the available locomotives in 1962 will be 17 million tons o f 
gross weight.36 Consequently, within the eight years envisaged, a total 
o f 515 locomotives will be able to haul about 8.8 billion ton-kilometres 
o f gross weight. 
(c) Diesel traction 
It is expected that diesel locomotives will be responsible for 16,455 bil-
lion ton-kilometres o f gross weight in 1962. This figure was obtained 
by subtracting the share o f electric and steam locomotives from the total 
volume o f traffic. 
T o sum up, at the end o f the period, that is, in 1962, railway traffic 
will be distributed by type o f traction as follows : 
Ton ¡kilometres 
Type of traction (billions) 
Electric 19 .02 
Steam 8 . 8 
Diesel 16 .455 
2. Breakdown of shunting services by types of traction 
Diesel locomotives are relatively more efficient than steam locomotives, 
especially for shunting. According to experience on railways in the 
United States,37 one ton of diesel oil used for shunting in 1947 was equi-
valent to 18.8 tons o f coal or to 11.6 tons o f fuel oil used on the same 
service. For goods traffic, the corresponding proportions stood at 1 to 
10.1 and to 5.9. Finally, for passenger traffic, one ton o f diesel oil was 
equivalent to 9.9 tons of coal and 5.3 tons of fuel oil. 
A similar comparison between diesel and electric traction shows that 
one ton o f diesel oil represented 5,578 k W h for goods traffic, 4,717 k W h 
for passenger traffic, and 5,964 k W h for shunting. These results partially 
confirm the preceding figures. 
The greater relative efficiency of diesel locomotives for shunting ser-
vices leads to the conclusión that they will be used to a far greater extent 
for this work once the immediate traction needs for goods and passengers 
have been met. Programmes for the purchase o f new locomotives 
published by some of the companies support this opinion, since they all 
envisage the almost exclusive use of diesel traction for shunting. Moreover, 
in one specific case this policy is even extended to the electrified sections 
o f the railway concerned, where shunting is at present done by steam 
locomotives. 
It is thus reasonable to assume that shunting will be carried out by diesel 
locomotives on all railways, except those that plan to use electric loco-
motives for this service. 
The kilometric traffic of the electric engines will double between 1952 
and 1962. As noted earlier, if shunting hours increase at the same rate, 
electric units will account for 300,000 hours of shunting time at the end 
of the period; in this case diesel locomotives will carry a work-load o f 
4.4 million hours.38 
3. Composition of the park in 1962 
(a) Steam locomotives 
Research in Brazil and the rail companies* own experience show that 
operation costs are considerably lower for diesel and electric than for steam 
locomotives. In some cases, the amount spent per unit transported by 
steam locomotives is twice as great as if diesel or electric locomotives 
had been used.39 
It is true that the advantages obtained by using electric and diesel loco-
motives are not so great as the comparison o f operation costs might suggest. 
But this does not imply that as regards total expenditure the disparity 
between steam traction on the one hand, and diesel or electric traction 
on the other, is insignificant.40 
These facts suggest that in the period 1954-62, the Brazilian railways 
will replace steam by diesel or electric locomotives as and when the former 
become obsolete. This has been the policy adopted by a number o f 
railways during the last five years. 
If, then, it is assumed that the demand for steam locomotives will decline 
to zero, during the next eight years the decrease in the number o f such 
locomotives will coincide with the degree of obsolescence o f the units 
at present in service. 
According to this hypothesis, the problem of the size and probable 
composition o f the locomotive park in 1962 is confined to assessing the 
number of engines at present obsolete and o f those which will become 
obsolete before the end o f the period. This is no easy task, because more 
3 3 For example, in 1962 the locomotives will have a minimum average 
traction power o f 15,000 kilogrammes, as compared with an approximate 
average o f 9,700 kilogrammes in 1951. 
3 4 The Sorocabana Railway at present owns twenty-one locomotives 
between ten and twenty years of age, and 109 units between twenty and 
thirty years o f age; their average traction power is 14,792 kilogrammes. 
3 5 It is reckoned that about 20 per cent of the locomotive park remains 
idle during the year. The calculation was based on this assumption. 
3 6 This average traction capacity was attributed to the locomotives in 
question, since it was thought that they will have higher horse-power 
and traction capacity than those o f the Sorocabana Railway. 
37 See Harold J . BARNETT, Energy Uses and Supplies 1937, 1947, 1965, 
a study published as Information Circular No. 7582 (October 1950) by 
the Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, Washington, D . C . 
3 8 The data on which this calculation was based excluded passenger 
transport services on electric trains. 
3 0 See Project 33 in the Annex to the Report of the Joint Brazil/United 
States Economic Development Commission. It should be noted that 
estimates o f operation costs are based on 1951 prices for fuels, material 
and labour. 
4 0 Such expenditure includes amortization and payment o f interest 
on the investment required for each type o f traction. 
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than one criterion exists for appraising the obsolescence o f steam loco-
motives. 
The usual solution consists in establishing, on a more or less arbitrary 
basis, a certain period of useful life for the locomotives, In other words, 
the common practice is to show that a steam locomotive becomes obsolete 
after working for a given number o f years. The difficulty lies in the fact 
that expert opinion on the length of useful life is not unanimous, although 
in the case of steam locomotives there is a fairly widespread belief that 4 1 
it does not exceed thirty and only in exceptional instances reaches 
forty years. 
If the 1950 park is studied from this point o f view, it will be seen that 
more than half o f the units in service were already out o f date at that time. 
Thus, o f a total of 3,644 locomotives, about 908 were of twenty to thirty 
years of age and 447 had been running twenty years or less.48 The units 
included in these age groups represented less than 40 per cent o f the. total 
(37.5 per cent, to be accurate). More detailed information for 1949 shows 
that there were then 1,899 locomotives o f more than forty years o f age, 
while only 1,438 locomotives had been in service less than thirty-one years. 
If the usual age limit o f thirty years is adopted, the units aged between 
twenty-one and thirty years in 1952 will be obsolete before 1962, so that 
o f the locomotives in the 1950 park, only some 380 units will still be fit 
for service by the end of the period.43 Some experts maintain that the 
criterion of age as a measure o f obsolescence has serious defects and may 
lead to fairly substantial errors. The Brazilian authority already cited 
asserts that this method o f determining whether the locomotives are out 
o f date is effective in a country where all the engines are o f domestic 
production and the technical standard is uniform throughout, since loco-
motives built in the same year generally display similar technical charac-
teristics. 
According to the same source, " in countries where no uniform standard 
o f technique exists, and especially in those where purchases o f engines are 
almost always determined by considerations other than that o f the best 
current techniques (as, for example, the unit cost, the form o f payment, 
the time o f delivery etc.) age alone is not a sufficient guide to the degree 
o f obsolescence. This is because between 1900 and 1939, the Iargest and 
oldest producers o f locomotives—i.e., Germany, the United Kingdom 
and the United States—used a great many different techniques " . 4 4 
This study proposes a series o f guiding principies, mainly o f a technical 
nature, to replace the traditional criterion. According to the authors, 
the following should be considered obsolete : (1) locomotives whose 
boilers cannot withstand a pressure of 160 pounds per square inch; (2) loco-
motives o f less than 250 h.p. for goods and passenger trains on 1-metre-
gauge track; those o f 400 h.p. or less for transport services on 1.60-metre-
gauge track; and, for shunting on both gauges, those of less than 150 and 
250 h.p. respectively; and (3) locomotives o f the 2-4-0, 2-4-2, 2 -6 -0 and 
4-4-0 types, when they are used for goods, not passenger transport, or 
when they are more than fifty years oíd.45 
The application o f such standards to the Brazilian railways produces 
very different results from those obtained by the conventional method. 
The research undertaken by the Railway Institute shows that of a total 
o f 3,614 steam locomotives, 712 should be taken out o f service. The 
remaining engines can be improved and modernized at a cost lower than 
that of the fuel which will be saved when the suggested technical impro-
vements are introduced. 
41 Nevertheless, it should be noted that in the Annex to the Proceedings 
of the Ninth Plenary Meeting o f the Instituto Ferroviario de Investigares 
Técnico-Económicas (1950), the possible span o f useful life is defined 
as forty years. 
4 2 Data taken from " Rejuvenescimento e Melhoría das Locomotivas 
a Vapor " (Modernization and Improvement o f Steam Locomotives), 
Boletim do Instituto Ferroviário de Investigares Técnico-Económicas, Vol. IV, 
No . 3 , 1 9 5 1 . 
43 This figure was obtained by excluding from the total mentioned in 
the text, those locomotives that were nineteen to twenty years oíd in 1950. 
44 Boletim do Instituto Ferroviário de Investigares Técnico-Económicas, 
op. cit., pp. 5 and 6. 
45 IbidVol. IV, No. 2, 1952, minutes 32 and 34, pp. 11 et seq. 
These two cases do not exhaust the list o f criteria proposed for deter-
mining obsolescence, but they suffice to explain, without further illustra-
tion, the very different results obtained by applying such standards to the 
specific case of the steam locomotive park in Brazil. 
Moreover, the forinulation or selection o f the best principies whereby 
to establish the degree o f obsolescence o f the type o f locomotive considered 
here, would require very detailed research on the technical and economic 
factors involved in the problem. 
As the primary object o f this study is not to solve difficulties but to 
present them, and to provide examples o f a method for projections, it 
will be assumed—without any implication of preconceived ideas on the 
subject—that the degree o f obsolescence is assessed in terms o f age and 
that the span o f useful life is not longer than thirty years.48 
In accordance with these assumptions the steam locomotive park in 1962 
will consist o f those engines at present in service which were less than 
nineteen years oíd in 1950 or which were purchased between 1951 and 
1954, namely, an approximate total o f 515 units.47 
(b) Electric locomotives 
The use of electric traction on Brazilian railways is a recent development 
except that two companies, thé Paulista and the Rede Mineira de Via^ao, 
introduced it on some of their lines during the 'twenties. Many electric 
locomotives, therefore, are either nearly new or have been in service for 
only a few years. According to available data on the 1951 park, 122 units 
out o f a total of 194 had been less than ten years in service, nine had been 
operating from eleven to twenty years, and the remainder for more than 
twenty years. (See table XIII for relevant details.) 
Table XIII. Brazil : Distribution by age and power 
of electric locomotives more than 20 years oíd 
Horse-power 
Years of service 
in 1951 Locomotives Continuous Per horse-power hour 
21 9 2 , 2 1 0 2 , 5 0 0 
22 1 2 , 5 2 0 3 , 1 8 0 
23 22 3 , 8 8 0 4 , 2 8 0 
C 2 1 ,245 1 ,645 
2 4 a ¡ 8 . 1 , 3 9 0 1 , 6 7 0 
25 1 1 , 9 5 0 2 , 1 6 5 
5 580 660 
29 4 1 , 4 8 0 1 , 6 8 0 
3 b 1,660 2,220 
30 8 1 , 4 8 0 1 , 6 6 5 
Sources : Official publicatioas and data supplied by the companies. 
a An unspecified number of the locomotives in this age group are more than 
twenty-four years oíd. 
b One or two of these locomotives are twenty-five years oíd. 
Thanks to the homogeneity o f the technical characteristics o f those 
locomotives with the same number o f years o f service in Brazil, the age 
criterion can be used as a measure o f obsolescence without the risk o f error 
noted earlier in the text. Here again there is no conclusive information 
on the average useful life o f electric locomotives, although there is some 
indication that it is about forty years.48 Despite these indirect proofs, it was 
4 6 It was decided to accept only one hypothesis on useful life, to avoid 
unnecessary complications in the text and for the later calculations. 
47 Twenty-two steam locomotives were bought in 1951; 106 in 1952; 
five in 1953, and none at all during the first half o f 1954. 
4 8 In the publication o f the Instituto Ferroviário de Investigares Técnico-
Económicas which has already been mentioned, there is a table showing 
that the " possible length of life " o f an electric locomotive is forty years. 
Again, of the plans published by the railway which owns most o f the 
oldest engines in Brazil, not one envisages the replacement o f the electric 
units. On the contrary, available information suggests that the company 
intends to continué using all the engines at present in service, among 
which forty-eight were twenty-five years oíd, or more, in 1954. This is 
a sign that, in the opinion of the company's experts, the average useful 
life exceeds thirty years. 
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thought best to adopt two working hypotheses ón the average duratlons 
of electric units : one o f thirty years and another o f forty. 
If the latter is the age limit, the locomotives more than twenty-eight 
years oíd included in table XIII—that is, thirteen or fourteen units—will 
have become obsolete before 1962. If the limit does nót exceed thirty 
years, then sixty-three engines enumerated in the table will have to be 
withdrawn from service between 1954 and 1962. 
In the absence of technical information, it is recommended that under 
either o f the two hypotheses every obsolete unit should be replaced by a 
new locomotive of similar characteristics. It must be admitted, however, 
that this is the merest simplification, since a correct estimate o f locomotive 
requirements can be made on the basis only o f the work done by the 
obsolete engines, and not o f their number. 
Some o f the figures shown in table X I V are copied from the estimates 
o f locomotive requirements published in the railway companies* own 
electrification programmes. This is true o f the data for the Sorocabana, 
Leste Brasileiro and Paraná-Santa Catarina railways. 




E. F. Central do Brasil 41 4 , 4 7 0 
14 1 ,240 
Cia. Paulista de E. F 8 3 , 0 0 0 . 
1 1 , 660 
12 1 ,480 
E . F. Santos-Jundiaí 6 3 , 0 0 0 
E . F. Sorocabana 44 2 , 2 0 0 
E . F. Leste Brasileiro 1 0 a 
Rede Mineira de Viasao 1 0 a 900 
Rede Paraná-Santa Catarina 14 a 
TOTAL . . 160 
Source : Data supplied by the railway companies. 
0 These locomotives have already been purchased and are in the possession 
of the railways concerned. 
Other projections in this table were completed by introducing into the 
companies' calculations the changes required by traffic estimates. For 
example, the available information on the Rede Mineira's traction material 
needs relates only to the lines already electrified in 1954. 
Finally, the Central do Brasil, Paulista and Santos-Jundiaí Railways 
form a special category, since the projections for these were calculated 
in accordance with the method and premises outlined at a later stage. 
The latter as well as some o f the former, corrections are o f very limited 
valué, because only one determinant o f the demand for locomotives was 
considered—the volume o f traffic. In a thorough study on traction 
requirements the influence o f other factors, such as the gauge, length and 
radius o f curves of the tracks where the locomotives are to operate, the 
type o f brakes installed on rolling stock, and the daily flow of traffic, 
would have to be taken into account. 
Electric locomotives haul only some o f the inter-urban freight and 
passenger trains which circuíate on the electrified lines o f the Central do 
Brasil. Requirements, however, were calculated on the assumption that 
electric engines will haul all the traffic on these lines and on the tracks 
to be electrified during the period under discussion. 
It has already been pointed out that by 1962 traffic on these lines will 
rise to about 5.05 billion tons gross weight, that is, rather more than four 
times the volume hauled by the electric locomotives available in 1952 4 9 
(fifteen engines o f 4,470 h.p. and five o f 1,240 h.p.). 
At first glance it seems reasonable to assume that the number o f loco-
motives will increase in proportion to the expansión in the volume o f 
49 They included one locomotive of 700 h.p., probably used for shunting. 
traffic.50 There is, however, strong reason to believe that this hypothesis 
is unrealistic. That section o f the Central do Brasil system which is yet 
to be electrified is technically superior to the lines already electrified. 
And it is well known that the characteristics o f the track on which the 
locomotive runs are a decisive determinant of its effective transport capacity. 
The technical advantages o f the section in question will enable locomo-
tives to transport a volume at least one-third greater than on the track, 
now electrified. In other words, the same number o f locomotives as at 
present will be able to haul about 1.6 billion ton-kilometres gross weight 
on the lines in process o f electrification. Since the estimated volume o f 
traffic on these latter will amount to about 2.4 billion ton-kilometres gross 
weight by 1962, the railway will have to possess thirty locomotives— 
twenty-three of 4,470 h.p. and eight of 1,240 h.p.—to cope with this 
service.51 T o these must be added the engines required by the railway 
to meet growing traction demands on that section o f the main line which 
is already electrified. B y 1962, traffic will have risen to 2,631 billion ton-
kilometres o f gross weight in contrast with 1.2 billion in 1952.52 If loco-
motive efficiency is assumed to be constant, then the Central do Brasil 
will have to maintain forty-four electric locomotives on this stretch o f the 
line, or twenty-four more than in 1952. According to the present hypo-
theses, eighteen will be o f 4,470 h.p. and the remainder of 1,240 h.p. 
The sum o f the two partial results indicates that the Central do Brasil 
will have to enlarge its park by forty-two locomotives of 4,470 h.p. and 
fourteen o f 1,240 h.p. 
The estimate for the Paulista Railway was made on the basis o f two 
facts : the first, that a 3,000 h.p. electric locomotive hauls about 73 million 
ton-kilometres gross weight annually,53 and the second, that the increase 
in the traffic on the electrified sectionswill be 1.7433 billion ton-kilometres 
o f gross weight in absolute terms. 
In actual fact, the transport capacity attributed to the 3,000 h.p. units 
is an over-estimate in the present condition o f the track on 130 kilometres 
o f the Paulista Railway trunk line; 5 4 but as this part o f the permanent way 
is to be relaid shortly, it was calculated that capacity will rise to the 
level indicated. 
Technical improvements on a section of the main line will also affect 
locomotive requirements, since they will mean an increase—estimated at 
32 per cent—in the capacity of the units at present in service. This implies 
that once the line is relaid, the Paulista Railway will be able to transport 
about 4.6 billion ton-kilometres o f gross weight with the same number 
o f locomotives, instead o f 3.4767 billion as in 1952. W i t h more locomo-
tive capacity available, the traffic volume to be hauled by new units will 
decline to 620 million ton-kilometres o f gross weight, a', work load with 
which 3,000 h.p. locomotives can deal. 
The projection for the Santos-Jundiaí Railway was made in a similar 
way. The volume o f traffic estimated for its electrified sections will rise 
to 1.51 billion ton-kilometres by 1962, while the locomotives at present 
in service will be abJe to haul, working at full capacity, about 1.1 billion 
80 This assumption can be justified only on the premise that the loco-
motives in service at present are operating at full capacity. Information 
is not available on this and other subjects to disprove or confirm such a 
statement. 
5 1 Obviously, the number and power of the locomotives to be purchased 
cannot be determined by so simple a method. The solution to this problem 
must be based on a thorough study o f a series of technical factors. This 
projection, therefore, should be interpreted only as a general indication 
o f the size o f the demand. 
5 2 This was not in fact the volume of traffic on this line but the transport 
effected by electric locomotives. 
53 On the Santos-Jundiaí Railway, fifteen locomotives o f 3,000 h.p. 
transported an average o f 72.4 million ton-kilometres o f gross weight 
in 1953. 
5 4 In 1951, the locomotives at present in service on the Paulista line 
hauled an average of 69.2 million ton-kilometres of gross weight, and 
it is estimated that they will be able to transport much more when the track 
is re-laid. The average motive power o f the twenty-five locomotives 
exceeds 3,000 h.p. by an ampie margin. 
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ton-kilometres gross weight.55 The balance to be transported with new 
engines will therefore be 410 million—that is, the volume that six 3 ,000 h.p. 
units can haul. 
In brief, the railways will have to incorpórate into their park all the 
locomotives listed in table XIV, except, o f course, the thirty-four already 
purchased. It should be stressed that the estimate is valid only on the 
assumption that the average life o f electric traction units is forty years. 
Under the hypothesis that the average useful life is only thirty years, 
176 locomotives would have to be purchased, as against only 126 when 
a life o f forty years is postulated. 
The composition o f the 1962 locomotive park is shown in table X V . 
This table exeludes the electric suburban passenger trains which the railways 
at present own or propose to acquire. O f the 156 units whose purchase 
had been programmed in recent years, 100 have already been bought. 
Table XV. Brazil : Probable composition of the electric 
locomotive park in 1962 
Horse-power (continuous) Locomotives 
More than 4 , 0 0 0 61 
3 , 5 0 0 to 3 , 9 9 9 22 
3 , 0 0 0 to 3 , 4 9 9 29 
2 , 5 0 0 to 2 , 9 9 9 91 
2 , 0 0 0 to 2 , 4 9 9 9 
1 , 5 0 0 to 1 , 9 9 9 4 
1 , 0 0 0 to 1 , 4 9 9 41 
Less than 1 , 0 0 0 65 
Unknown 1 9 a 
Sources ; Official publications and Economic Commission for I*atin America. 
a Includes seven locomotives with a gauge of less than 1 metre and twelve 
engines belonging to small companies. 
(c) Diesel locomotives 
It was previously stated that by 1962 diesel locomotives will have to 
haul traffic representing about 16.5 million ton-kilometres gross weight. 
The problem, therefore, is to calcúlate the number of engines required 
for this work-load. In fact, all that is needed in order to estimate, albeit 
approximately, the traction material requirements, is information on the 
average transport capacity o f diesel locomotives o f a given horse-power. 
Data on the capacity o f diesel locomotives are not very plentiful, because, 
until recently, Brazilian railways had relatively few of these engines 
in service. Table X V I summarizes the most significant data that could, 
be assembled on this subject. Statistics for the first three railways refer 
to transport by diesel locomotives during 1952; the remainder indicate 
the transport capacity attributed by the companies* experts to the engines 
o f the hotse-power given which they suggest the railways should acquire. 
These figures suggest that the effective and estimated transport capacity 
rise considerably from one instance to another, partly on account o f 
differing lay-out and general condition o f the permanent way on the 
several railways and partly because o f disparities in the power o f the 
engines in service or whose purchase is recommended. 
Despite the wide range o f examples, however, the general conclusión 
can be drawn that an average transport capacity o f 40 million ton-kilo-
metres of gross weight, per available locomotive o f 1,000 h.p. or more, 
represents a reasonable estimate. This figure shows that 410 diesel engines 
will be required for goods and passenger transport. 
In order to calcúlate the total 1962 park, the locomotives needed for 
shunting must be added. Unfortunately, lack o f adequate information 
on the annual hours of service of the diesel locomotives at present used 
for shunting prevents any accurate calculation of the number of locomotives 
that will be required by the end of the period. It can be assumed, however, 
that each unit in effective service will work 6,120 hours, that is, eighteen 
55 In 1953, the volume transported amounted to 1.086 billion tons. 
Table XVI. Brazil : Effective diesel locomotive capacity 
(ton-kilometres gross weight) and estimated capacity 
of locomotives recommended for purchase a 
Annual haulage 
Horse- capacity per 
Railways Locomotives power locomotive 







R i o Grande do Sul ^ 
Sorocabana : . . . . 
Weighted average 
Sources : Railway publications, direct information and projects of the Joint 
Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission. 
a Basic data appear in the projects prepared by the Joint/Brazil United States/ 
Economic Development Commission. But the problem considered in these projects 
differs from that examined here. The Commission's experts were faced with 
determining the number and type of locomotive required to transport a given 
volume of freight and passengers over a specific distance. 
b Annual capacity is the effective transport by diesel locomotive in service 
in 1952. 
c The horse-power of these locomotives is unknown, but data on engines under 
repair seem to indicate that twelve were of 1,200 h.p. and twenty-five of 600 h.p. 
á Estímate. 
* The haulage capacity of the locomotives whose purchase is recommended 
refers to the total number of machines and not to those in service. 
hours daily for 340 days in the year.5® In support o f this hypothesis it 
should be noted that in 1952 the average working time o f sixty diesel 
locomotives on the Sorocabana Railway was 6,188 hours; to judge from 
incomplete data, the figure was even higher for the ten engines o f the 
Santos-Jundiaí Railway in 1953.57 
The break-down o f shunting time by types of traction showed that 
diesel locomotives will have to account for 4.4 million hours o f such 
service. Under the hypothesis in the preceding paragraph, 719 engines 
would be sufficient to carry out this shunting work. In practice, however, 
more locomotives will be needed, because the railways must always keep 
some units in reserve to ensure the efficient operation of the park. 
It is estimated that under the most favourable circumstances, not less 
than 5 per cent o f the available locomotives—that is, thirty-eight units— 
should be out of service. 
Consequently, by 1962 the Brazilian railways will need a minimum of 
757 diesel shunting engines. 
The co-ordination o f this projection with that outlined in the preceding 
pages justifies the statement that by 1962 the diesel engine park will 
comprise 1,167 locomotives. U p to the end o f 1954, a relatively high 
number o f diesel locomotives (412 to be exact) had been purchased.58 
The balance represents the equivalent o f 755 units,59 most o f them for 
shunting services, as will be seen on page 127. 
5 6 In the annex to Project 36 of the Joint Brazil/United States Economic 
Development Commission, a greater degree of utilization was assumed 
for a specific case than that suggested in the text (see page 34 o f the mimeo-
graphed versión o f the document in question. Clearly, if the work-load 
assumed for shunting engines is under-estimated, for the same reason 
and to the same degree requirements will have been o ver-estima ted. 
57 These locomotives were not used for shunting, and only some of 
the diesel engines on the Sorocabana Railway were turned to this purpose. 
5 8 The total includes engines which have been purchased but which 
may not have been delivered as yet to the railways. 
59 The balance should be calculated after deducting from the park 
locomotives which will become obsolete during the selected period. 
This correction was not made because there were very few diesel engines 
Locomotives in service 5 
10 1 , 6 0 0 3 6 . 9 
12 1 , 0 0 0 4 8 . 0 
37 . . . 2 9 . 8 
— . 1 , 3 0 0 4 3 . 0 
Locomotives whose purchase is recommended ® 
26 1 , 7 5 0 3 2 . 0 
20 1 , 4 0 0 2 8 . 8 
13 1 , 6 0 0 5 3 . 1 
4 600 2 3 . 5 
21 1 , 6 0 0 6 6 . 8 
— 1 , 5 0 0 4 2 . 8 
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Table XVII. Brazil ; Power of diesel locomotives purchased 
or planned to be purchased 
(Units) 
Purchased or brought 
Number in into service, Purchase 
Horse-power December 1951 1952-54 recommended a 
2 , 2 5 0 3 7 
1 , 9 0 0 — 13 — 
1 , 6 0 0 12 153 94 
1 , 5 0 0 12 — — 
1 ,400 — — 32 
1 , 2 0 0 15 — 9 
1 , 0 0 0 48 — 22 
750 — — 31 
660 70 . 12 — 
480 or less 27 40 6 
Unknown 7 — — 
TOTAL . 191 221 201 
Sources : Official publications and projects of the Joint Brazil/United States 
Economic Development Commission. 
a By the Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission. 
Within certain limits, the sphere of utilization of a diesel engine is not 
defuied by its power. It is even more evident that engines o f a given 
horse-power (for example 660 h.p.) can be used, under certain circum-
stances, as efficiently for shunting as for other types of haulage. Broadly 
speaking, units up to 750 h.p. can be considered as suitable for shunting 
and the remainder for goods or passenger transport. 
According to this principie, 156 units 6 0 o f the 412 locomotive engines 
included in the park belong to the first group and 256 to the second, 
as the former have a máximum o f 660 h.p. and the latter a minimum o f 
1,000 h.p. 
It has already been pointed out that by 1962 the Brazilian railways 
will need in all 757 locomotives for shunting, and as at present they 
have only 156, the implication is that these railways must purchase 599 
additional locomotives in the course of the eight years under consideration. 
Similarly, it can be deduced that the freight and passenger engines to be 
purchased number 154 units. 
It is interesting to note that this figure differs by only ten units from the 
recommendation of the Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development 
Commission for the purchase o f engines of 1,000 or more h.p. 
The similarity between the estimate in the present report and that o f 
the Commission justifies the use of the latter as the basis for a more detailed 
Footnote 59 (continued) 
over ten years oíd in 1952. According to data available for that year, 
there were twelve nine-year oíd, four eleven-year oíd and three thirteen-
year oíd locomotives. 
60 Includes seven engines o f unknown horse-power. 
projection o f the demand for locomotives and the composition o f the 
park in 1962. In fact, the only important change introduced into the 
Commission's estimate refers to shunting units. The results obtained 
by combining both projections are summarized in table XVIII. 
Table XVIII. Brazil : Demand for diesel locomotives 
in 1955-62 and probable composition of the park in 1962 
Demand for locomotives Probable composition 
Horse-power in 1955-62 of the park in 1962 
2 , 2 5 0 7 10 
1 , 9 0 0 — 13 
1 , 6 0 0 94 259 
1 , 5 0 0 — 12 
1 , 4 0 0 32 32 
1 ,200 9 24 
1 , 0 0 0 22 7 0 
750 31 31 
660 and less 570 726 
TOTAL 765 1 ,177 
Sources : Economic Commission for l^atin America and Projects of the Joint 
Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission. 
(d) Goods trucks 
On 1 January 1950 the Brazilian railways possessed 59,829 goods trucks 
with an aggregate capacity o f 1,573,034 tons.61 T w o years later there 
were 58,167 goods trucks in circulation,62 whose aggregate capacity is 
not known. It was also impossible to determine the distribution o f the 
units by the type of materials used in their construction. According 
to a sample covering 65 per cent o f the park, more than one-third (or to 
be accurate, 35.5 per cent) o f the trucks were made o f wood, a similar 
percentage of steel and the remainder o f both materials. (See table X I X . ) 
If this sample is representative, it may be assumed that in 1951 the 
railways owned some 20,650 wooden trucks with a capacity of387,665 tons. 
According to expert opinion,63 trucks made o f this material should be 
classified, except for a few cases, as obsolete equipment. They will, 
therefore, have to be replaced by new trucks. 
The average capacity of the rolling stock to be replaced is 18.7 tons. 
The new units will almost certainly have a higher capacity, probably 
of about 36 tons.64 It may therefore be assumed that each new truck will 
replace 1.9 obsolete units. According to this coefficient, the railways 
will have to purchase about 10,770 wagons to meet replacement needs. 
61 Information from Inquéritos Especiáis — Via$ao Férrea, Recenseamento 
Geral de 1950. 
62 See Commissao Mixta Brasil-Estados Unidos, Estudos Diversos, p. 53. 
63 See Commissao Mixta Brasil-Estados Unidos, op. cit.y p. 54. 
6 4 Most o f the goods trucks whose purchase was recommended by the 
experts o f the above-mentioned Commission have this capacity. 
Table XIX. Brazil : Number and capacity of trucks on eleven railways a 
classified by type and construction materials, 1951 
Number of trucks Capacity (tons) 
Steel Steel 
Wood infrastructure Steel Wood infrastructure Steel 
Bocars 4 , 4 9 1 5 , 1 0 8 7 , 5 3 6 8 4 , 9 1 9 131,385 272 ,096 
Góndolas 3 , 0 5 1 2 , 1 3 9 4 , 1 6 4 6 5 , 6 0 5 5 6 , 9 9 8 153,161 
Flatcars 2 , 1 8 3 1 ,941 1 ,102 4 6 , 9 7 3 52 ,207 39 ,361 
Stockcars 2 , 2 1 3 998 255 4 1 , 6 6 6 2 7 , 1 0 5 7 , 3 5 5 
Other types 1 ,522 1 , 0 1 6 158 13 ,552 18 ,013 3 , 8 7 3 
TOTAL... 1 3 , 4 6 0 11 ,202 13 ,215 252 ,715 285 ,708 4 7 5 , 8 4 6 
Sources : Official publications. 
a The eleven railways included are: Leopoldina, Mogiana, Rede Mineira, Araraquara, Central do Brasil, Via^ao Férrea do R.G, 
do Sul, Noroeste do Brasil, Santos-Jundiaí, Paulista, Sao I»uiz-Terezina and Central do Piauí. 
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The volume o f goods—including livestock—will increase from 8,985 
billion ton-kilometres in 1952 to 15,785 billion in 1962. In absolute 
terms, the increment in goods traffic between these years will be about 
6.8 billion ton-kilometres. The problem is now to calcúlate the number 
o f railway trucks required to deal with the additional volume o f transport. 
In 1951, average truck capacity stood at 26.3 tons, while the payload 
transported amounted to 576 tons per truck. The payload carried per 
average ton o f capacity was therefore 21.9 tons. In 1930, the only year 
for which it was possible to obtain data, the ratio between payload trans-
ported and tons o f capacity was practically the same : 22.5 to 1. 
It has already been stated that the average capacity o f the new trucks 
will be 36 tons. On the assumption that the ratio will remain constant 
at a level o f 22 to 1, the average weight transported annually by each new 
truck will be 792 tons. If by 1962 the average distance that this volume 
is transported is the same as in 1952, namely 233 kilometres, each truck 
will average volume of transport equal to 185,000 ton-kilometres.65 
In order to transport 6.8 billion additional ton-kilometres, it would be 
necessary to enlarge the park by 36,757 new trucks. These units plus 
those required for replacement represent total truck requirements o f 
47,527 units, the annual demand being approximately 4,750 trucks. 
4. Energy consumption on the railways 
The calculation o f energy consumption on the railways raises the problem 
of selecting the rates o f efficiency which must be applied in order to reduce 
the calorific valué of the various fuels to kilowatt-hours. 
, Firstly, it should be stressed that it is inadvisable to apply the energy 
rates utilized in the chapter on energy when this type o f consumption 
is to be measured, because they do not represent the thermic efficiency 
o f the various types o f railway locomotives. In reality, by utilizing for 
conversión into k W h the two rates proposed in the chapter cited, the 
energy which could be obtained by the alternative use of electricity and 
the fuels consumed by the railways would be estimated,66 not the energy 
actually consumed in the railway sector. 
In order to calcúlate this figure, other coefficients must be applied. 
On the basis o f the data available, it was considered that the following 
are the most satisfactory : fuelwood, 2.8 per cent; domestic coal, 3 per cent; 
imported coal, 3.4 per cent; fuel oil, 4.5 per cent; diesel oil, 28 per cent, 
and electric energy, 65 per cent. 
The consumption o f energy by the railways, according to these rates, 
amounted to 802.7 million k W h in the pre-war period (1939), and to 
1,277.9 millions in 1952. These figures represented 5.4 and 5.2 per cent 
of the national total, respectively. 
The importance o f the railways as consumers of certain fuels was greater 
than their share in total energy consumption would indicate. Indeed, 
in 1939 the railway sector absorbed more than half o f the domestic and 
imported coal used in Brazil and 10.1 per cent o f the fuelwood. But the 
Table X X . Brazil : Share of railways 
in national fuel consumption 
(Percentages) 
1939 1952 
— 4 . 4 
1 . 8 1 3 . 5 
5 3 . 2 7 2 . 0 
5 4 . 6 2 0 . 6 
1 0 . 1 1 4 . 0 
5 . 4 5 . 8 
Sources : Joint ECIyA/BNDE Group, and data published by the Departamento 
Nacional de Estradas de Ferro. 
6 5 In 1951 the figure registered was 134,327 ton-kilometres and in 1930, 
84,454 ton-kilometres. 
6 8 The various fuels and the electric energy used for traction were equi-
valent (at the rate of 5 per cent for fuelwood, 20 per cent for other fuels 
and 100 per cent for electric energy) to 2.9 billion k W h in 1939 and 3.8 
billion in 1952. 
railways accounted for only an insignificant share of aggregate liquid fuel 
consumption. In the course o f time, the proportion of the various fuels 
and electric energy used by the railways gradually increased, except in 
the case of imported coal. (See table X X . ) 
(a) Development of energy consumption 
A comparison between the index o f the energy consumed by twelve 
railways and the fare-paying kilometric goods and passenger traffic on 
these lines 67 indicates that from 1940 to 1942 the unit consumption of 
energy was consistently higher than in 1939, except in two specific years. 
If the comparison is extended to thirteen railways (the twelve mentioned 
above plus the Central do Brasil), the results are no longer the same because 
the last-named railway (which substantially affects the aggregate unit 
consumption) remained considerably below the 1939 level throughout 
this period. This may not accurately reflect the facts; it is possibly a 
consequence o f the valúes assigned to the conversión coefficients utilized 
for calculations.88 
In any case, a comparison o f the aggregate consumption o f energy series 
with that o f ton-kilometres o f payload might, under certain circumstances, 
be misleading, because the payload is only a part—the smallest, in fact— 
o f the total hauled by the locomotives; in addition, the deadweight trans-
ported does not always increase at the same rate as the payload. 
T o obtain a precise idea o f the development o f energy consumption 
it is necessary to compare the aggregate consumption series with another 
for ton-kilometres o f gross weight, taking care to exelude from the former 
the consumption which represents shunting. Another solution would be 
to convert shunting time to its equivalent in ton-kilometres o f gross weight, 
so as to provide a homogeneous series representative o f the over-all work 
o f the locomotives, and therefore comparable with that o f aggregate 
energy consumption. 
Neither o f these two adjustments can be made, for lack o f sufficient data. 
Moreover, they cover only twelve railways. Although figures on unit 
consumption o f energy based on uncorrected series have only a limited 
valué, they are presented here as being not wholly devoid of interest. 
(See table X X I . ) 
Table XXI . Brazil : Energy consumption per thousand 
ton-kilometres of gross weight on twelve railways 
Year kWh 
1939 3 9 . 3 
1943 4 2 . 7 
1946 4 8 . 0 
1951 4 4 . 1 
Source: Official publications and data supplied by the railway companies. 
According to the above data, energy consumption per thousand ton-
kilometres o f gross weight rose between 1939 and 1951 from 39.3 to 
44.1 k W h , that is, by 12.2 per cent, or somewhat more than was indicated 
by a comparison with the payload for kilometric traffic.69 It is impossible to 
67 Both this index and that o f the thirteen railways are shown in table G 
of the Statistical Annex. The comparison could also be made by taking 
as a point o f reference a payload index constructed by reducing the various 
components o f railway traffic to ton-kilometres. In the specific case under 
review, the index thus prepared does not differ to any great extent from 
that used in the text. 
6 8 For example, if the conversión coefficient o f imported coal had been 
over-or that of fuelwood under-estimated, or both, a substantial drop in 
the consumption of the former, concurrent with an increase in the latter, 
would obviously make the total consumption of energy appear less than 
it would have been in reality. This was precisely what happened in the 
thirteen railways included in the sample, particularly the Central do Brasil : 
consumption of imported coal dropped sharply, while that o f fuelwood 
increased. 
69 The deadweight, and consequently, the gross weight increased less 
than the payload. 
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determine with accuracy what would be the effect o f including the Central 
do Brasil Railway in the sample. 
In any case, it may safely be asserted that unit consumption o f energy 
in 1951 was substantially the same as in 1939. Moreover, available data 
show that in the post-war period such consumption was slightly higher 
than in the years preceding the Second World War . 
T w o factors probably favoured the maintenance o f a higher consumption 
level than in 1939 : 7 0 the continued use of most o f the locomotives which, 
at the beginning o f the war, were already obsolete; and the relative increase 
in the volume o f passenger traffic.71 Until 1952, the addition o f new 
locomotives to the park had been carried out on a very modest scale, 
so that the favourable irnpact o f this process upon the unit consumption 
o f energy had not yet offset the influence o f negative factors. 
It is quite likely that in 1954 energy consumption per ton-kilometre 
o f gross weight may have stood at a lower level than in 1939, as a conse-
quence o f the addition o f diesel and electric engines to the patk. 
(b) Contribution of the various sources of energy 
In the railway sector it is advisable to distinguish between the substitution 
process which occurs among the different sources of energy for steam 
transport (to be called the direct substitution process) and that which takes 
place when one type o f traction is replaced by another—for example, 
steam by diesel, or the latter by electric traction, etc.72 
Both processes affected Brazilian railways in 1939-52. In the first stage, 
direct substitution was more important, while in the second phase, although 
the original process did not cease, indirect substitution predominated. 
In 1939, not less than 10.4 per cent o f the energy consumed by the 
railways was of hydraulic origin. The remainder represented the sources 
used by steam traction, particülarly fuelwood and coal.73 Four years later, 
the share o f hydroelectric power in total consumption was practically 
unchanged, as was also that of the other sources taken as a whole. (See 
table XXII . ) 
Table XXII. Brazil : Share of the various sources of energy 
in aggregate consumption of thirteen railways 
(Percentages) 
Table XXIII. Brazil : Share of fuels used for steam traction 




energy Diesel oil 
Coal a, fuel oil 
and fuelwood 
1939 1 0 . 4 — 8 9 . 6 
1943 1 1 . 5 — 8 8 . 5 
1945 1 4 . 3 1 . 2 8 4 . 5 
1946 1 4 . 2 4 . 0 8 1 . 8 
1951 2 0 . 6 9 . 8 6 9 . 6 
1952 2 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 6 7 . 5 
Source: Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
a Domestic and imported. 
Among these latter, substitution became intensive, since the scarcity 
o f imported fuels increased the dependence o f steam transport on domestic 
sources. Thus in 1943, fuelwood and domestic coal accounted for 89.2 per 
cent of the energy consumed by steam locomotives, while in 1939 they 
had not contributed more than 65.2 per cent. The progress made by these 
t w o sources was at the expense o f imported coal. (See table XXIII . ) 
70 Fluctuations in the amount of shunting may also have exerted some 
influence, but no definite pronouncement can be made on this subject 
on the basis of available information. 
71 Consumption per ton-kilometre o f gross weight is greater—to judge 
from incomplete data—in passenger than in goods services. 
7 3 One o f the characteristics distinguishing one process from the other 
is that the former requires only modest investment to enter operation, 
while the latter (in most cases) requires substantial initial investment in 
special material and expert personnel. 
7 3 The energy consumed by these thirteen railways in 1939 and 1952 
accounted for 95.2 and 90.1 per cent respectively of aggregate consumption 
in the railway sector. 
Year Fuelwood 
Domestic Imported 
(Percentages) Fuel oil 
Total for group 
( Millions 
of kWh) 
1939 . . . 5 4 . 3 1 0 . 9 3 3 . 9 0 . 9 6 8 5 . 3 
1943 . . . 7 1 . 0 1 8 . 0 1 0 . 8 0 . 2 7 5 4 . 5 
1946 . . . 6 5 . 5 1 2 . 6 1 9 . 3 2 . 6 8 2 2 . 7 
1950 . . . 5 7 . 5 1 9 . 2 1 3 . 3 1 0 . 0 7 7 2 . 2 
1951 . . . 5 6 . 7 1 9 . 7 11 .7 1 1 . 9 791 .6 
1952 . . . 5 4 . 1 2 3 . 3 6 . 6 16 .1 777.8 
Sources: Official publications and the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento 
Económico. 
During 1944-45, imported coal consumption recovered slightly, but 
its respective group continued to lose ground to other sources, such as 
diesel oil and hydroelectric energy. This process began in 1946, as shown 
by the fact that between 1946 and 1952 the ccmtribution o f hydroelectric 
and diesel energy rose from 183 to 374 million kWh, while that o f fuelwood, 
coal and fuel oil fell from 883 to 778 million kWh. The share o f the two 
former sources in the aggregate energy consumption o f the railways 
therefore expanded from 10.4 to 32.5 per cent, while that of the remainder 
dropped from 89.6 to 67.5 per cent. Among the types o f fuel used by 
steam locomotives, however, an increase in the energy obtained from 
fuel oil and domestic coal was more than offset by a decrease in the share 
o f fuelwood and imported coal. 
The changes that occurréd during the period 1939-52, taken as a whole, 
can be summarized under the three following heads : first, the substantial 
increase—both in absolute and relative terms—in the contribution o f 
hydroelectric energy and diesel oil, as a result o f the more widespread use 
o f locomotives dependent on these forms of energy; secondly, the decrease 
in the relative share of aggregate consumption represented by the sources 
of energy for steam traction; and lastly, the almost complete replacement 
of imported coal by its domestic counterpart and to a still greater extent, 
by fuel oil. 
The reasons for this third development should be examined. The 
ousting of imported coal is not a recent phenomenon, since incomplete 
data available for the thirties show that it lost ground to fuelwood when 
the devaluation o f the cruzeiro made coal relatively more expensive. B y 
the end o f that decade the cost o f the energy provided by imported coal 
was already higher than that o f energy from other sources. In 1939, the 
cost o f 100 k W h from various sources was as follows : from imported 
coal, 56.7 cruzeiros; from domestic coal, 44.6; from petroleum, 28.0 
and from fuelwood, 22.1 cruzeiros.74 
After the outbreak o f the war, prices o f domestic fuels tended on the 
whole to rise more rapidly than those of imported fuels. In twelve years 
(1939-51), the average cost o f fuelwood increased four-fold and that o f 
domestic coal to an even greater extent, in comparison with increments 
o f 208.7 and 143 per cent in the price o f imported coal and fuel oil.75 As 
a result o f these changes, fuel oil became the cheapest source o f energy 
for steam traction and domestic coal the most expensive, followed very 
closely by imported coal. 
The fluctuations of these four fuels suffice to explain the partial replace-
ment of foreign coal by fuel oil, but not the shift from the former to 
domestic coal. If relative prices had been the only determining factor 
7 4 As regards petroleum, the c.i.f. price was taken as a basis for estimate, 
since the price from railway statistics was hardly representative, becausé 
the companies consumed only a small volume o f fuel oil in 1939. T o 
standardize the data, whenever necessary, the c.i.f. price was used. As 
additional expenditure must be added to this price to calcúlate the price 
actually paid by the railways, the cost o f fuel oil was in fact greater than 
indicated. For fuelwood the position is somewhat similar, since the price 
mentioned by the railways does not include carriage over their own lines. 
7 5 These statements would undergo no radical modification if the correc-
tions strictly required were introduced. According to railway statistics, 
for instance, the drop in the relative price o f fuel oil was greater than that 
shown in the text. 
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in the distribution o f consumption among the different sources of energy, 
the railways would probably have ceased to burn coal. Its more intensive 
use was in fact due to the Government's policy of encouraging domestic 
coal production. 
It is interesting to note that the changes described above meant that 
the railway section became less dependent upon foreign energy sources. 
"While in 1939, 31.2 per cent of the energy consumed by the railways 
was supplied by imported fuels, in 1952 foreign sources accounted for 
only 26.6 per cent. 
5. Future demand for energy 
The projection of the demand for electric energy, diesel oil and other 
fuels is based on the ratio noted on some Brazilian railways between the 
consumption of these types of fuel and the volume of transport and shunt-
ing. The other basis for the projection is the estimated work-load for 
each type of locomotive. 
The solution suggested for this problem is not the only one, ñor necessa-
rily the most accurate, but it is the simplest and the most consistent with 
available data. At all events, probable sources of error should be explained. 
Some of the factors on which energy consumption per unit of transport 
depends are purely local, that is, not typical of the railway system as a 
whole. Any generalization on the consumption of energy is therefore 
hazardous if it is deduced from the experience of a few companies only. 
The estimates given here are based on the meagre data available for two 
railways, some of whose characteristics are rather exceptional, and whose 
incidence upon total energy consumption cannot be assessed. 
(a) Projection of demand for electric energy 
The consumption of electric energy per thousand ton-kilometres of 
gross weight on goods trains varies between 30.5 and 31.0 kWh, according 
to statistics for 1951 and 1952 published by the Sorocabana Railway. 
This same company's consumption for an equal volume of transport on 
passenger trains amounted to 43.0 kWh. Data for the Santos-Jundiaí 
Railway confirm the preceding figures; during the same two years, 
average consumption per thousand ton-kilometres of gross weight trans-
ported on goods, passenger and mixed traffic trains varied between 33.7 
and 36.2 kWh. 
To judge from the experience of these two companies, about 35 kWh 
are required for freight and passenger trains to haul one thousand ton-
kilometres. A simple calculation shows that the Brazilian railways will 
need 542 million k W h by 1962 to transport the 15.48 billion ton-kilometres 
that will represent the aggregate load for all types of trains, with the 
exclusión of suburban passenger traffic.76 This last would have to trans-
port 3.405 billion ton-kilometres of gross weight, or their equivalent, i.e., 
4.76 billion passenger-kilometres. On the basis of somewhat inadequate 
data, it was calculated that energy consumption per thousand passenger-
kilometres on trains of this type is about 20 kWh, so that total energy 
consumption for suburban passenger transport will be about 95 million kWh. 
It is difficult to assess the consumption of the shunting services because 
no statistics are available on consumption per hour of work of electric 
shunting locomotives. The only available data show that consumption 
per locomotive hour on the Sorocabana Railway amounts to approximately 
285 kWh. But the engines used by that company are unusually high-
powered, and their hourly consumption does not therefore provide a 
satisfactory point of reference. With this reservation, and in default of 
more adequate information, an hourly consumption of 285 k W h for shunt-
ing was assumed.77 
The 300,000 hours of shunting carried out by electric locomotives 
in 1962 would raise consumption to 85.5 million kWh, which, together 
with the figures resulting from other partial projections, gives an aggregate 
consumption of 722.5 million kWh. This energy will be entirely of 
hydroelectric origin, since the only line which will draw on a different 
source—the Leste Brasileiro Railway—was excluded from the estimate. 
76 Transport on the Leste Brasileiro Railway was also excluded from 
the total. 
77 The calculation would be easier if the average power o f shunting 
locomotives and their probable degree o f utilization were known. 
Some railway companies, however, among them the Rede Mineira de 
Viacao and the Rede Paraná-Santa Catarina, plan to use groups of diesel 
generators as reserve plants. 
(b) Projection of demand for diesel oil 
By a procedure similar to that outlined above, it was estimated that by 
1962 diesel oil consumption will amount to 247,000 tons, of which 132,000 
will be used for shunting and the remainder for freight and passenger 
transport. 
It was possible to base partial projections on the calculation that diesel 
oil consumption is about 7 kilogrammes per thousand ton-kilometres 
o f gross weight transported and about 30 kilogrammes per shunting hour. 
But both figures are approximations based on the experience of two 
companies. On one line—the Santos-Jundiaí Railway—the average 
diesel oil consumption per thousand ton-kilometres of gross weight was 
6.8 kilogrammes for the period 1949-52, while on another—the Sorocabana 
Railway—it was 7.5 and 6.2 kilogrammes in 1951 and 1952.78 On this 
latter, consumption per locomotive hour in the same two years was 31.7 
and 30 kilogrammes respectively.79 
(c) Projection of demand for steam traction fuel 
The high degree of substitution possible among fuels for steam traction 
converts the relative costs of the energy generated from fuelwood, coal 
and petroleum into a basic determinant of the demand for all these fuels. 
The projection must therefore be based on a forecast of the evolution of 
costs. 
Available information and known methods o f analysis do not permit 
this problem to be solved with a satisfactory degree of accuracy. Conse-
quently, only the most recent fluctuations in the prices of these fuels will 
be examined, together with the general trend characteristic of such prices 
and therefore of the cost of energy from the sources under consideration. 
From 1951 until 1953, the downward trend of imported fuel prices 
became more marked. To judge by foreign trade statistics, the c.i.f. price 
of fuel oil dropped by 9.4 per cent in these two years, while that of coal 
declined 31 per cent. During the same period, the price of domestic 
fuels—fuelwood and coal—continued to rise.80 
The modified exchange rates applied in 1953 to imported fuels ended 
a process which had been particularly pronounced since the end of the war. 
The relative position of domestic fuels improved substantially diiring 1954, 
since the exchange rate for petroleum and imported coal rose from 18.62 
cruzeiros per dollar to 30.72 cruzeiros—that is, by 64.1 per cent.81 Because 
of these adjustments, fuel oil was replaced by fuelwood as the cheapest 
source of energy for steam traction82 and imported coal became the most 
expensive fuel. 
These changes clearly show that exchange policy plays a decisive role 
in the present context. It must therefore be emphasized that the projection 
of demand given here is based on the assumption that the exchange rate 
will be periodically modified to bring it into line with the over-all level 
of domestic prices. In other words, the possibility of the cruzeiro's being 
either over-valued or under-valued during the next eight years was 
discarded. 
78 Excluding consumption on shunting services. 
79 The average horse-power of the diesel locomotives of the Sorocabana 
Railway in 1951 and 1952 was fairly low, but was higher than that o f the 
engines normally used for shunting. 
80 The price at the collieries rose from 185 cruzeiros per ton in 1951 
to 200.6 cruzeiros in 1953, that is, by 8.4 per cent. 
81 During the first half of 1954 a sur charge of 7 cruzeiros per dollar 
was established; this later rose to 10 cruzeiros and during the last quarter 
to 12. 
82 This and other comparisons of the same type disregard the fact that 
the use of fuelwood involves the railways in heavier subsidiary expenses 
per unit of energy than that of other fuels. Such outlay is due, for example, 
to the greater number of halts which the locomotives must make to take 
in fuel supplies. In fact, these subsidiary expenses should be considered 
as part of fuelwood costs, but they were excluded because it was impossible 
to assess their book valué. 
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The behaviour of coal and fuelwood prices was very similar during the 
period 1939-52. Both rose at least as much as the over-all price level. 
In the future, it would not be surprising if the price of fuelwood increased 
more rapidly than that of other fuels, since the forest reserves which lie 
closest to the centres of railway consumption will be exhausted. Prospects 
are more favourable for domestic coal, as the implementation o f the existing 
investment programme in this sector will cause higher productivity 
throughout the coal production processes. The price o f coal will therefore 
probably rise less or decline more than the general price level. 
It has already been pointed out that, by the end o f 1954, energy derived 
from fuelwood cost the railways less than that obtained from domestic 
coal. Meanwhile, it is open to doubt whether higher productivity will 
lower coal prices enough to enable this source o f energy to compete with 
fuelwood for railway use. The difference in the cost o f energy from these 
two types of fuel is so great that it could hardly be eliminated in the course 
o f eight years.83 For a similar reason, it may be assumed that fuel oil will 
maintain its position as the cheapest imported source of energy. 
Should the exchange rate follow the behaviour pattern described, it 
would appear that competition between fuels for steam traction will be 
confined to fuelwood and fuel oil. In fact, the former will even tend to 
lose ground to the latter, if its price rises more than the over-all price level. 
Fuelwood consumption will probably be restricted to railways located 
in áreas where this source of energy is in plentiful supply. 
According to an incomplete estimate, steam locomotives on railways 
consuming fuelwood will transport about one-third of the ton-kilometres 
o f gross weight assigned to this type of engine in the traffic projection. In 
other words, steam locomotives operating on fuelwood will haul about 
2.9 billion ton-kilometres of gross weight, while locomotives running 
on fuel oil will haul about 5.9 billions. 
Since the average consumption of fuel oil per thousand ton-kilometres 
of gross weight in Brazil is about 40 kilogrammes, it may be assumed that 
consumption by the railways will amount to about 236,000 tons by 1962. 
Similarly, an aggregate fuelwood consumption o f 2.61 million cubic 
metres may be calculated on the assumption o f an average o f 0.9 cubic 
metre per thousand ton-kilometres. 
(a) Rails 
In 1951, the existing rails on 90.6 per cent o f the lines used for traffic, 
i.e., 33,387 kilometres, weighed two million tons. (See table X X V ) . 
Since no precise information is available as to the remainder of the track 
—2,439 kilometres o f 1-metre gauge line and 1,019 kilometres o f still 
narrower gauges—it was decided to assume an average weight of 24.6 
kilogrammes per metre for rails on the 1-metre-gauge and of 17 kilo-
grammes for those on the 0.76 and 0.60-metre-gauge lines.84 
Table XXV. Brazil : Length of the lines of 25 railways 
and total weight according to type, 1951 
Type of track Length Total weight 
(kg per metre) (kilometres) (thousands of tons) 
2 0 , 0 0 0 . . . 4 , 6 2 8 1 9 0 . 4 
2 4 , 6 5 4 . . . 12 ,655 6 2 4 . 9 
32 ,045 . . . 8 , 6 1 9 5 4 2 . 8 
3 7 , 1 0 5 . . . 4 , 6 9 8 3 5 0 . 0 
44 ,645 . . . 1 ,416 1 3 4 . 5 
5 0 , 3 4 9 . . . 1 , 2 7 3 112 .4 
5 5 , 7 5 6 , . 639 7 1 . 2 
TOTAL . . . 33 ,928 2 , 0 2 6 . 2 
Source : Original data from the Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Ferro 
and the railway companies. 
NOTES.—The various types of rails were grouped in the categories which appear 
in the table. When the type of rail did not exactly correspond to one of these 
groups, it was included in the category which it most closely resembled. The 
estimate of total weight was made on the basis of original data. The data refer to 
twenty-five railways, the rails of which could all be classified into the different 
types used on main and branch lines, except in the case of the Rede Mineira de 
Viacao, for which only 2,577 kilometres out of a total of 3,990 could be so clas-
sified. Total length of lines used for traffic during 1951 amounted to 33,387 
kilometres, including only 2,577 kilometres of the Rede Mineira. The difference 
between this total and that of the table is because the figures for lines used for 
traffic only count double-track lines once. 
(d) Conclusiott 
Table X X I V sums up the results of the partial projections o f the railways* 
demand for energy. These calculations do not include the demand arising 
from traffic carried free o f charge on the railways. 
Table XXIV. Brazil : Projecáons of railway demand 
for fuels and hydraulic energy 
Sources of energy Unit 1952 
Projection 
for 1962 
Fuelwood . . . 1 . 0 0 0 m 3 10 ,942 2 , 6 1 0 
Domestic coal . , . Ton 1 , 0 7 9 , 7 8 9 — 
Imported coal 197 ,097 — 
Fuel oil 273 ,605 236 ,000 
Natural gas . . . 1 . 0 0 0 m 3 — 
Diesel oil . . . Ton 3 8 , 7 6 9 2 4 7 , 0 0 0 
Hydraulic energy 1 , 0 0 0 k W h 375 ,287 722 ,500 
Source : Official publications and ECI^A. 
6. Demand for rails and sleepers 
The objective here is to determine the annual demand for rails and 
sleepers to meet normal renewal requirements. The problem o f exceptional 
needs arising from insufficient replacement during the last twenty years 
is therefore outside the scope o f this analysis. The calculation of the demand 
for replacement depends on two fundamental factors : the number of 
rails and sleepers at present in use; and the estimated useful life of such 
material. As no authoritative information exists on the latter point, 
it was considered advisable to base the projection on more than one 
hypothesis of the average life o f rails and sleepers. 
The data given in table X X V indicate that the rails on all tracks under 
traffic in Brazil weighed 2,026,000 tons, or, by rounding, 2 millions. 
The above figures do not include the weight o f rails on sidings, shunting 
lines, etc. This omission is insignificant because such rails are often those 
discarded from main and branch lines. 
The average useful life o f the rails on any section is a function of three 
variables, among others :85 the type o f rail, the density of traffic and the 
number, length and radius o f the curves. A calculation o f the average 
duration must therefore be based on detailed information on the three 
factors mentioned above. Since adequate data are not available, it was 
decided to omit these estimates and to project rail requirements on the 
basis of two hypotheses o f their average useful life. The age limits— 
thirty and forty years—were estabüshed in accordance with the opinion 
o f railway experts. 
If the type of rail in use does not change, about 55,000 to 73,000 tons 
will be required to cover normal replacement needs. For various reasons 
—for instance, the increased use o f heavier locomotives—some or all o f 
the obsolete rails will probably have to be replaced annually by others 
of a more robust type. It is difficult to forecast the effect o f this factor 
upon annual rail requirements, but it may be considerable, as will be seen 
below. 
In 1951, the average weight o f existing rails stood at 29.1 kilogrammes 
per metre. It would not be surprising if, at the end of a complete replace-
ment cycle,this average should rise to 37 kilogrammes per metre. On this 
assumption, the annual average demand for renewal will vary between 
70,000 and 93,000 tons of rails. If construction of new lines proceeds at 
83 Energy obtained from domestic coal costs about 30 per cent more. 
8 4 This is the weight o f rails on the 1-metre gauge lines with least traffic, 
on which least data were available. 
85 Other factors o f certain importance affect average duration, such 
as the lubrication of rails on curves. It is estimated, however, that the 
variables mentioned in the text are, broadly speaking, the most important. 
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the same pace as during the last twenty years—that is, at a rate o f 175 
kilometres annually—additional demand will rise to about 13,000 tons, 
always assuming that the average weight of the rails will remain at 37 
kilogrammes. Aggregate rail requirements will therefore vary from 
83,000 to 106,000 tons annually.86 
(b) Sleepers 
It is generally assumed that in 1951 the average number o f sleepers 
per kilometre of track on the Brazilian railways ranged from 1,400 to 
1,700 units. More definite data' on 25,729 kilometres o f line8 7 show 
that the average per kilometre amounted to 1,539 sleepers. (See table 
X X V I . ) If this average is applied to the 2,888 kilometres of branch line 
and the 13,604 kilometres o f main line for which information is not 
available, the conclusión is reached that the sleepers in use on Brazilian 
railways totalled 64 million units. 






A ver age 
(per kilometre) 
E . F. Central do Brasil 6 , 2 0 1 1 , 5 8 2 
E . F. Leste Brasileiro 4 , 0 4 5 1 , 5 8 2 
R . F. do Nordeste 2 , 7 2 4 1 , 4 8 2 
Rede Mineira 6 , 7 7 0 1 ,593 
V. F. R . Grande do Sul 5 , 8 4 8 1 , 6 3 2 
E . F. Sorocabana 4 , 2 7 8 1 , 5 3 6 
E. F. Nordeste 3 , 0 1 3 1 , 6 3 9 
C . Mogiana de E . F 3 , 5 0 6 1 ,571 
R . V. Cearense 2 , 3 9 3 1 , 4 9 9 
E . F. Goiás 820 1 , 6 1 4 
TOTAL . 3 9 , 5 9 8 1 ,539 
Sources : Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Ferro and Joint Brazil/United 
States Economic Development Commission. 
a These railways included a total of 25,729 kilometres, of which 23,426 were 
main lines and 1,592 branch lines. 
the total number in use in Brazil will also be higher.88 The effect o f this 
measure on replacement requirements will be the opposite o f that produced 
by increasing the average duration, though of a less pronounced nature. 
7. Consumption of lubricants 
A diesel locomotive's consumption o f lubricant per ton-kilometre o f 
gross weight or per shunting hour is six or seven times greater than that 
o f a steam locomotive, which in tura far exceeds that o f electric locomotives. 
The probable replacement o f steam locomotives by diesel and electric 
units will tend, on the one hand, to bring about a relatively greater increase 
in the consumption o f lubricants than in traffic, and, on the other, to 
produce the opposite effect. The present aim is in fact to determine the 
net effect upon the consumption of lubricants of the changes in the compo^ 
sition of the locomotive park, or rather, in the distribution of the traffic 
volume among the various methods o f traction. 
In 1951, steam locomotives o f the Sorocabana Railway used an average 
o f 0.064 kilogramme o f lubricant per thousand ton-kilometres o f gross 
weight transported. Consumption was slightly higher in 1950, standing 
at 0.068 kilogramme. On the basis o f these data, it was considered 
reasonable to estimate the consumption of lubricants by steam locomotives 
at 0.065 kilogramme per thousand ton-kilometres.89 
It was calculated that, for the same amount o f work, diesel locomotives 
use an average o f 0.42 kilogramme o f lubricants.90 Experts maintain that 
for shunting, the hourly consumption o f these engines is about 1.25 
kilogrammes. The corresponding figures for electric traction are 0.02 
and 0.08 kilogramme respectively.91 
Table XXVII. Brazil : Projection of the demand 
for lubricants, 1962 
(Tons) 
Type of traction Demand 
Steam 570 
Diesel 1 2 , 4 0 0 
Electric 400 
TOTAL . . . 1 3 , 3 7 0 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
The present average duration o f the sleepers is in practice short. Three 
contributory causes are : the increasing use o f sleepers made o f inferior 
wood; the lack o f stone ballast on half the lines under traffic; and, finally, 
the widespread use o f sleepers which were not treated before being laid. 
Projected measures to remedy these defects will probably be applied 
in the course o f the next ten years. According to expert opinion, one 
effect of such programmes will be to prolong the average life o f the sleepers 
by at least 50 per cent. Thus, renewal requirements will decrease appre-
ciably. As the railways also intend to raise the average number of sleepers 
on main lines, and even on some branch lines, to 1,800 per kilometre, 
8 6 This estimate exeludes requirements arising from lack o f replacements 
during the last twenty years. According to the Joint Brazil/United States 
Economic Development Commission, the rails needed to meet this déficit 
amount to 579,884 tons. 
87 This total represents both main and branch lines. The latter were 
included because the replacement requirements for sleepers on these lines 
cannot be met with material discarded from the main lines. 
8 8 The average number of sleepers per kilometre o f track will probably 
rise from 1,539 to 1,700. The total will therefore increase from 64 to about 
71 million sleepers on an aggregate length o f track—including branch 
lines—equivalent to the lines under traffic in 1951. 
89 Consumption was calculated as follows : in 1951, steam locomotives 
worked 532,754 hours out o f a total of 963,325 hours for all traction ser-
vices. The aggregate consumption o f lubricants rose to 304,490 litres, 
that is, 3.16 decilitres per hour. On this basis is may be inferred that 
consumption on such services was 168,350 litres, or about 151,515 kilo-
grammes. B y dividing this figure by the ton-kilometres of gross weight 
hauled by steam locomotives, the consumption given in the text was 
obtained. According to another source, consumption stood at 0 .06 kilo-
gramme. See Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development C o m -
mission Projects, Vol. V, Annex 1 {Viafio Ferrea do Rio Grande do Sul). 
90 Joint Brazil/United States Economic Development Commission, 
op. cit. It should be noted that the consumption on one Brazilian railway 
was double that shown above; but the importance o f this figure is slight, 
as it refers to only a few locomotives during their first few months o f ser-
vice. 
91 Approximate estimate. 
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STATISTICAL ANNEX 
Table A. Brazil : Indices of payload traffic 
on 13 principal railways 
(1939 = 100) 
Table B. Brazil : Indices of payload 
on 12 principal railways 
(1939 = 100) 
traffic 
Year Passengers Livestock Goods and luggage Total Goods and 
1995 63 1 11 1 72 0 70 0 
Years Passengers Livestock Luggage Total 
1926 6 5 . 1 7 8 . 8 7 2 . 8 7 1 . 1 1925 6 8 . 1 6 4 . 4 6 9 . 4 6 9 . 0 
1927 6 9 . 9 8 4 . 8 7 7 . 6 7 5 . 9 1926 7 0 . 9 6 9 . 5 7 2 . 4 7 2 . 0 " 
1928 7 9 . 7 9 1 . 6 7 6 . 0 7 7 . 4 1927 7 2 . 7 7 4 . 1 7 6 . 1 7 5 . 3 
1929 8 3 . 2 8 5 . 9 8 2 . 1 8 2 . 5 1928 7 7 . 2 8 2 . 7 7 4 . 0 7 4 . 9 • 
1930 7 8 . 4 6 8 . 2 6 6 . 1 6 9 . 2 1929 8 3 . 2 7 9 . 7 8 0 . 7 8 1 . 1 
1931 7 4 . 8 8 2 . 0 6 4 . 1 6 7 . 3 1930 7 7 . 1 6 1 . 3 6 4 . 8 6 7 . 2 
1932 7 3 . 8 7 5 . 6 6 3 . 2 6 6 . 2 1931 7 2 . 1 7 8 . 1 6 3 . 4 6 5 . 7 
1933 8 1 . 5 7 9 . 9 6 8 . 2 7 1 . 9 1932 7 0 . 9 7 6 . 1 6 3 . 9 6 5 . 7 
1934 8 4 . 3 8 8 . 9 6 9 . 4 7 3 . 7 1933 7 5 . 4 7 9 . 7 6 9 . 6 7 1 . 1 
1935 8 9 . 2 9 4 . 3 7 9 . 7 8 2 . 5 1934 8 1 . 3 8 9 . 6 7 1 . 8 7 4 . 4 
1936 8 8 . 3 9 9 . 4 8 9 . 4 8 9 . 4 1935 9 0 . 6 1 0 0 . 1 8 1 . 6 8 4 . 0 
1937 8 8 . 9 9 9 . 4 9 5 . 8 9 4 . 2 1936 8 9 . 2 9 9 . 8 9 0 . 0 9 0 . 2 
1938 9 1 . 8 9 5 . 0 1 0 1 . 6 9 9 . 0 1937 9 1 . 1 9 6 . 5 9 2 . 9 9 2 : 6 
1939 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1938 9 5 . 0 8 9 . 8 9 7 . 9 9 7 . 1 
1940 1 0 2 . 5 1 0 8 . 5 1 0 3 . 8 1 0 3 . 6 1939 . . . . 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1941 1 1 2 . 6 1 1 0 . 2 1 0 4 . 5 1 0 6 . 7 1940 . . . . 1 0 2 . 6 1 0 7 . 9 1 0 0 . 5 1 0 1 . 1 
1942 1 1 7 . 6 1 2 0 . 5 1 0 5 . 8 1 0 9 . 2 1941 . . . . 1 0 7 . 2 1 1 0 . 7 1 0 4 . 9 1 0 5 . 6 
1943 1 3 3 . 7 1 1 3 . 8 1 1 2 . 1 1 1 7 . 5 1942 . . . . 1 0 9 . 2 1 2 2 . 8 1 0 5 . 5 1 0 6 . 8 
1944 1 4 4 . 6 1 0 3 . 0 1 1 7 . 7 1 2 3 . 8 1943 . . . . 1 2 3 . 8 1 1 5 . 4 1 1 1 . 5 1 1 4 . 3 
1945 1 5 0 . 0 1 1 8 . 9 1 1 3 . 7 1 2 2 . 8 1944 . . . . 1 4 1 . 6 1 0 2 . 6 1 1 8 . 2 1 2 2 . 4 
1946 1 5 7 . 7 1 2 3 . 4 1 1 2 . 0 1 2 3 . 6 1945 . . . . 1 4 8 . 1 1 1 8 . 4 1 1 3 . 5 1 2 0 . 9 
1947 1 6 4 . 4 1 1 8 . 0 1 0 9 . 6 1 2 3 . 4 1946 . . . . 1 5 1 . 2 1 2 2 . 7 1 1 1 . 5 1 2 0 . 1 
1948 1 6 8 . 5 1 0 9 . 2 1 0 8 . 7 1 2 3 . 5 1947 . . . . 1 4 6 . 0 1 1 8 . 3 1 0 6 . 3 1 1 5 . 2 
1949 1 7 8 . 9 1 1 1 . 5 1 0 7 . 2 1 2 5 . 0 1948 . . . . 1 4 8 . 5 1 0 8 . 4 1 0 5 . 3 1 1 4 . 8 
1950 1 8 0 . 5 1 1 7 . 8 1 0 8 . 9 1 2 6 . 8 1949 . . . . 1 5 4 . 0 1 0 9 . 5 1 0 4 . 5 1 1 5 . 0 
1951 1 7 9 . 1 1 1 6 . 9 1 1 9 . 2 1 3 3 . 9 1950 . . . . 1 6 4 . 2 1 1 7 . 1 1 0 6 . 2 1 1 8 . 7 
1952 1 7 1 . 8 1 0 4 . 4 1 2 0 . 4 1 3 2 . 6 1951 . . . . 1 7 7 . 8 1 1 5 . 9 1 1 7 . 9 1 3 0 . 3 
1952 . . . . 1 8 2 . 4 1 0 2 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 1 3 2 . 3 
Source: Official publications and Economic Commission for Latín America. 
NOTES.—1. The thirteen railways included in the Índices are: Rede Mineira 
de Via^ao, V.F. do Rio Grande do Sul, E .F . Central do Brasil, E .F . Sorocabana, 
Rede de Via^ao Paraná-S. Catarina, Companhía Mogiana de Estradas de Ferro, 
Rede de Via^ao Federal Leste Brasileiro, Companhia Paulista de Estradas de 
Ferro, E .F . Santos a Jundiaf, E .F . Noroeste do Brasil, Rede Ferroviaria do 
Nordeste, E .F . Leopoldina e a Rede de Via^ao Cearense. Indices for twelve rail-
ways exelude the E.F . do Central Brasil. 
2. In preparing the índices, the criterion was adopted of weighting the per-
centage share of each item in total traffic expenditure in the base year (1939). 
In the calculations for the thirteen railways, the weighting was as follows: 
passengers, 24.65 per cent; livestock, 3.26 per cent; goods and luggage, 72.09 per 
cent. 
3. Effective traffic of the thirteen railways, in absolute terms, during the base 
year was as follows; passengers, 78.2 million, livestock, 3,582,100 head; goods 
and luggage, 26,645,400 tons. 
Source : See table A. 
NOTES.—1. See note 1 and 2 to table A. 
2. The weighting in this case was as follows : passengers, 20.8 per cent; live-
stock, 3.4 per cent; goods and luggage, 75.8 per cent. 
3. Effective traffic of the twelve railways, in absolute terms, during the base 
year was as follows: passengers, 72.1 million; livestock, 3,182,300 head; goods 
and luggage, 22,771,300 tons. 
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Table C. Brazil : Indices of payload/kilometric traffic 
on 13 principal railways 
(1939 - 100) 
Year Passengers Livestock Goods and luggage Total 
1925 7 0 . 5 5 9 . 8 6 0 . 7 6 3 . 1 
1926 7 0 . 6 5 4 . 2 8 0 . 0 6 2 . 4 
1927 7 2 . 3 5 5 . 6 6 8 . 6 6 9 . 1 
1928 8 1 . 1 6 2 . 7 7 2 . 9 7 4 . 6 
1929 8 3 . 2 5 7 . 9 7 6 . 2 7 7 . 3 
1930 7 4 . 7 4 5 . 3 6 0 . 8 6 3 . 7 
1931 6 8 . 5 5 9 . 5 5 9 . 3 6 1 . 6 
1932 6 6 . 5 6 2 . 3 5 5 . 3 5 8 . 3 
1933 7 1 . 4 6 6 . 1 5 9 . 2 6 2 . 4 
1934 7 3 . 1 7 4 . 5 6 2 . 3 6 5 . 4 
1935 7 8 . 8 8 0 . 2 7 1 . 6 7 3 . 6 
1936 8 3 . 0 8 4 . 7 8 3 . 4 8 3 . 3 
1937 8 7 . 9 9 4 . 5 9 3 . 8 9 2 . 3 
1938 9 3 . 6 9 4 . 6 102 .4 1 0 0 . 0 
1939 . . . . . . 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1940 1 1 0 . 2 1 0 8 . 7 103 .6 1 0 5 . 4 
1941 120 .5 1 0 8 . 2 109 .4 112 .1 
1942 114 .8 - 119 .7 108 .4 110 .3 
1943 133 .7 1 1 0 . 6 115 .8 1 2 0 . 0 
1944 1 4 9 . 8 1 0 8 . 9 119 .6 126 .7 
1945 1 5 5 . 9 1 2 7 . 0 119.1 1 2 8 . 4 
1946 1 6 5 . 6 1 4 0 . 3 119 .9 131 .8 
1947 170 .1 138 .1 120 .6 1 3 3 . 4 
1948 1 6 9 . 0 1 2 7 . 9 124 .4 1 3 5 . 5 
1949 172 .7 132 .4 124 .8 1 3 6 . 9 
1950 177 .5 1 4 4 . 0 1 2 9 . 0 141 .4 
1951 185 .5 1 4 9 . 9 142 .2 153 .1 
1952 1 8 0 . 9 1 3 3 . 6 140 .2 1 5 0 . 0 
Source: See table A. 
NOTES.—See notes 1 and 2 to table A. 
Kilometre/traffic, in absolute terms, during the base year was as follows : 
5,409.4 million passengers/km; 1,020.7 million animals/km; and 5,342.8 million 
tons/km, of goods and luggage. 
. Table D. Brazil : Indices of payload/kilometre traffic 
on 12 principal railways 
(1939 = 100) 
Years Passengers Livestock 
Goods and 
luggaee Total 
1925 7 3 . 3 5 0 . 9 5 6 . 8 5 9 . 8 
1926 7 2 . 7 4 9 . 8 5 7 . 2 6 0 . 1 
1927 7 2 . 4 5 4 . 3 6 4 . 8 6 6 . 1 
1928 7 9 . 6 6 2 . 2 6 8 . 9 7 0 . 0 
1929 8 4 . 5 5 7 . 2 7 0 . 9 7 3 . 3 
1930 7 3 . 6 4 1 . 5 5 6 . 8 5 9 . 7 
1931 6 3 . 8 5 9 . 5 5 6 . 6 5 8 . 3 
1932 6 0 . 0 6 1 . 2 5 7 . 8 5 8 . 4 
1933 6 2 . 0 6 8 . 9 6 1 . 5 6 1 . 9 
1934 6 5 . 9 7 6 . 7 6 7 . 2 6 7 . 2 
1935 7 6 . 5 8 6 . 4 7 4 . 0 7 5 . 0 
1936 8 4 . 3 8 5 . 5 8 4 . 0 8 4 . 0 
1937 9 2 . 6 8 9 . 6 8 9 . 4 9 0 . 1 
1938 9 5 . 0 8 5 . 7 9 6 . 8 9 6 . 0 
1939 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 1 0 0 . 0 
1940 100 .7 1 0 6 . 9 100 .4 1 0 0 . 7 
1941 1 0 3 . 5 1 0 8 . 8 1 0 5 . 9 1 0 5 . 4 
1942 1 0 8 . 3 124 .5 1 0 5 . 6 1 0 6 . 8 
1943 128 .8 112 .8 1 1 2 . 0 1 1 5 . 6 
1944 1 5 3 . 5 1 0 8 . 2 118 .1 125 .1 
1945 163 .7 1 2 8 . 9 117 .5 127 .4 
1946 165 .1 1 3 9 . 3 1 1 7 . 3 1 2 8 . 0 
1947 1 5 7 . 4 139 .1 115 .8 1 3 5 . 2 
1948 1 5 6 . 6 1 2 7 . 2 122 .1 129 .5 
1949 1 5 5 . 2 1 2 9 . 2 122 .9 1 2 9 . 8 
1950 1 6 5 . 6 144 .7 1 2 9 . 2 1 3 7 . 3 
1951 1 8 6 . 9 151 .2 1 4 4 . 0 1 5 3 . 2 
1952 1 9 2 . 0 131 .9 1 4 2 . 6 1 5 2 . 4 
Source : See table A. 
NOTES.—See notes 1 and 2 to table A and note 2 to table B. 
Kilometre/traffic, in absolute terms, during the base year was as follows: 
2,831.1 million passengers km; 834.4 million animals/km; and 4,267.8 million 
tons/km of luggage and goods. 
Table E. Brazil : Railway fuel consumption according to type of fuel, 1939-52 
Solid fuels Liquid fuels 
Year Fuelwood Domestic coal Imported coal Diesel oil Othersa Electric energy 
(million m*) (thousand tons) (thousand tons) (million kWh) 
Thirteen railways 
1939 8 . 3 4 2 5 . 7 7 4 9 . 1 — 1 1 . 8 121 .7 
1940 8 . 7 4 6 3 . 2 6 2 5 . 0 — 5 . 0 1 2 2 . 4 
1941 9 . 4 4 9 9 . 2 4 9 5 . 1 — 3 . 7 131 .7 
1942 1 0 . 8 7 0 4 . 9 2 7 9 . 7 — 2 . 3 1 4 9 . 6 
1943 1 1 . 9 7 7 6 . 5 2 6 2 . 1 — 3 . 0 1 5 0 . 5 
1944 1 1 . 9 8 4 1 . 4 3 8 4 . 8 1 . 4 3 . 7 1 6 3 . 6 
1945 1 2 . 2 7 5 1 . 5 5 0 0 . 9 3 . 6 9 . 7 2 1 8 . 3 
1946 1 2 . 0 5 9 3 . 6 5 1 2 . 8 1 1 . 7 3 8 . 0 2 1 9 . 5 
1947 1 1 . 5 5 9 2 . 3 5 8 4 . 0 14 .7 7 9 . 6 2 4 2 . 3 
1948 1 0 . 4 7 7 1 . 1 4 4 4 . 1 2 1 . 3 7 7 . 0 2 7 7 . 6 
1949 9 . 7 8 2 1 . 0 3 8 2 . 5 2 7 . 6 8 5 . 1 3 0 6 . 9 
1950 9 . 9 8 4 5 . 2 3 3 1 . 0 3 2 . 7 141 .1 3 3 0 . 2 
1951 1 0 . 0 8 9 1 . 6 2 9 8 . 2 3 2 . 6 1 7 1 . 0 3 6 1 . 6 
1952 . . . . . . . 9 . 4 1 , 0 3 3 . 8 164 .6 3 7 . 9 2 2 7 . 4 3 7 5 . 3 
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Table E. Brazil : Railway fuel consumption according to type of fuel, 1939-52 (continued) 
Solid fuels Liquid fuels 
Year Fuelwood Domestic coal Imported coal Diesel oil Others a Electric energy 
(million m3) (thousand tons) (thousand tons) (million Kwh) 
Twelve railways 
1939 8 . 2 3 2 9 . 9 2 2 5 . 4 — 4 . 2 7 7 . 8 
1940 8 . 5 3 5 1 . 7 194 .6 — 4 . 6 8 0 . 2 
1941 9 . 1 3 4 0 . 3 126 .5 — 3 . 4 8 8 . 0 
1942 9 . 8 4 6 3 . 9 8 3 . 3 — 2 . 0 103 .0 
1943 1 0 . 7 5 3 8 . 2 5 1 . 3 — 1 . 6 9 9 . 6 
1944 1 1 . 2 560 .7 152 .1 — 3 . 7 110.1 
1945 1 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 9 153 .8 1 . 0 4 . 9 159.7 
1946 1 1 . 6 5 0 8 . 3 2 0 5 . 6 1 . 0 1 1 . 4 153 .9 
1947 11 .1 4 9 9 . 5 2 8 0 . 6 3 . 7 4 0 . 6 171 .9 
1948 1 0 . 0 598 .7 2 0 9 . 3 9 . 2 3 8 . 6 184 .8 
1949 9 . 3 5 9 4 . 6 1 9 0 . 9 12 .1 4 1 . 4 - 203 .1 
1950 9 . 5 5 9 1 . 2 176 .8 16 .7 6 4 . 9 2 1 7 . 2 
1951 9 . 4 580 .1 178 .6 18 .5 117 .5 2 5 5 . 3 
Sources : Departamento Nacional de Estradas de Ferro and annual reports of the railways. 
a Mainly fuel oil. 
Table F. Brazil : Railway fuel consumption according to type of fuel, 1939-52 
(Millions o f kWh) a 
Solid fuels Liquid fuels 
Domestic Imported Diesel Electric General 
Year Fuelwood coal coal oil Others b energy total 
Thirteen railways 
1939 3 7 2 . 1 7 4 . 5 2 3 2 . 2 — 6 . 5 7 9 . 1 7 6 4 . 4 
1940 3 9 3 . 2 8 1 . 1 193 .7 — 2 . 8 7 9 . 6 7 5 0 . 3 
1941 4 2 4 . 1 8 7 . 4 1 5 3 . 5 — 2 . 0 8 5 . 6 7 5 2 . 6 
1942 4 8 7 . 8 123 .4 8 6 . 7 — 1 . 3 9 7 . 2 7 9 6 . 4 
1943 5 3 5 . 7 135 .9 8 1 . 3 — 1 . 7 9 7 . 8 8 5 2 . 3 
1944 5 3 7 . 0 147 .3 119 .3 4 . 7 2 . 0 1 0 6 . 4 916 .7 
1945 5 4 8 . 9 1 3 1 . 5 155 .3 1 2 . 2 5 . 3 1 4 1 . 9 995 .1 
1946 . . . . . 5 3 8 . 9 103 .9 1 5 9 . 0 4 0 . 3 2 0 . 9 142 .7 1 , 0 0 5 . 6 
1947 516 .7 103 .7 1 8 1 . 0 50 .5 4 3 . 8 1 5 7 . 5 1 , 0 5 3 . 1 
1948 468 .6 1 3 4 . 9 137 .7 7 3 . 4 4 2 . 3 1 8 0 . 4 1 , 0 3 7 . 4 
1949 4 3 5 . 2 143 .7 118 .6 9 5 . 0 4 6 . 8 1 9 9 . 5 1 , 0 3 8 . 7 
1950 444 .1 147 .9 102 .6 1 1 2 . 5 7 7 . 6 2 1 4 . 6 1 , 0 9 9 . 4 
1951 449 .1 1 5 6 . 0 9 2 . 4 112 .1 9 4 . 0 2 3 5 . 0 1 , 1 3 8 . 7 
1952 4 2 0 . 8 1 8 0 . 9 5 1 . 0 130.1 125 .1 2 4 3 . 9 1 , 1 5 1 . 8 
Twelve railways 
1939 3 7 1 . 0 6 7 . 7 6 9 . 9 — 2 . 3 5 0 . 6 5 5 1 . 5 
1940 3 8 3 . 2 6 1 . 6 6 0 . 3 — 2 . 6 5 2 . 1 559 .7 
1941 4 1 1 . 0 5 9 . 6 3 9 . 2 — 1 . 9 5 7 . 2 5 6 8 . 9 
1942 4 4 2 . 9 8 1 . 2 2 5 . 8 — 1 . 1 6 6 . 9 6 1 8 . 0 
1943 4 8 1 . 4 9 4 . 2 1 5 . 9 — 0 . 9 6 4 . 7 657 .1 
1944 5 0 3 . 0 9 8 . 1 4 7 . 1 — 2 . 0 7 1 . 5 7 2 1 . 8 
1945 5 2 5 . 3 101 .8 4 7 . 7 3 . 3 2 . 7 1 0 3 . 8 784 .6 
1946 . . . . . 521 .3 8 8 . 9 6 3 . 8 3 . 3 6 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 7 8 3 . 6 
1947 499 .3 8 7 . 4 8 7 . 0 12 .8 2 2 . 3 111 .7 820 .7 
1948 4 5 2 . 0 104 .8 6 4 . 9 3 1 . 5 2 1 . 2 120 .1 7 9 4 . 4 
1949 420 .4 104 .1 5 9 . 2 4 1 . 5 2 2 . 8 1 3 2 . 0 7 7 9 . 9 
1950 4 2 6 . 8 103 .5 5 4 . 8 5 7 . 6 3 5 . 7 1 4 1 . 2 8 1 9 . 5 
1951 4 2 4 . 4 101 .5 5 5 . 4 6 3 . 7 6 4 . 6 1 6 6 . 0 8 7 5 . 5 
Sources : See table E. 
a Conversión bases into kWh were as follows : 
Fuelwood (1 cubic metric) = 45 kWh 
Domestic coal (1 ton) = 175 " 
Imported coal (1 ton) = 315 " 
Diesel oü (1 ton) = 3450 kWh 
Fuel oÜ (1 ton) = 555 " 
Electric energy (1 kWh) = 65 per cent efficiency 
b Mainly fuel oil. 
<0 
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Table G. Brazil : Indices of payload/kilometre traffic and energy consumprion 
on twelve and thirteen railways 
(1939 = 100) 
Year 
Twelve railways Thirteen railways 
Traffic Energy Ratio Traffic Energy Ratio 
1940 100 .7 101 .5 1 0 0 . 8 105 .4 9 8 . 2 9 3 . 2 
1941 1 0 5 . 4 1 0 3 . 2 9 7 . 9 112 .1 9 8 . 5 8 7 . 9 
1942 1 0 6 . 8 1 1 2 . 1 1 0 5 . 0 1 1 0 . 3 1 0 4 . 2 9 4 . 4 
1943 1 1 5 . 6 119 .1 1 0 3 . 0 1 2 0 . 0 1 1 1 . 5 9 2 . 9 
1944 125 .1 1 3 0 . 9 9 5 . 6 1 2 6 . 7 1 1 9 . 9 9 4 . 6 
1945 127 .4 1 4 2 . 3 111 .7 128 .4 1 3 0 . 2 1 0 1 . 4 
1946 1 2 8 . 0 142 .1 1 1 1 . 0 . 131 .8 131 .6 9 9 . 8 
1947 1 2 5 . 2 1 4 8 . 8 1 1 8 . 8 1 3 3 . 4 1 3 7 . 8 1 0 3 . 3 
1948 129 .5 1 4 4 . 0 1 1 1 . 2 135 .5 135 .7 1 0 0 . 1 
1949 1 2 9 . 8 1 4 1 . 4 1 0 8 . 9 1 3 6 . 9 1 3 5 . 9 9 9 . 3 
1950 1 3 7 . 3 1 4 8 . 6 1 0 8 . 2 1 4 1 . 4 1 4 3 . 8 101 .7 
1951 1 5 3 . 2 158 .7 1 0 3 . 6 153 .1 1 4 9 . 0 9 7 . 3 
1952 152 .4 163 .8 1 0 7 . 5 1 5 0 . 0 150 .7 1 0 0 . 5 
Source : See table A. 
NOTE.—See tables C, D and F. 
Table H. Brazil: Traction power of steam locomotives according to age 
(Tons) 
Age 
More Age Total tractic 
Railways Up to 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 than 50 unknown power 
R . F. Nordeste 27 _ 179 164 589 95 _ 1 , 0 5 4 
V. F. F. Leste Brasileiro 222 57 147 — 246 548 94 85 10 1 , 2 0 9 
E . F. Vitória a Minas — — 358 — 107 73 84 — — 622 
E. F. Leopoldina 463 230 124 33 573 448 280 462 6 2 , 6 1 9 
E . F. Central do Brasil — 17 230 43 1 , 4 6 0 2 , 7 9 6 817 1 , 0 3 8 220 6 , 6 2 1 
R . Mineira de Via^ao — 16 31 — 916 202 52 245 254 1 , 7 1 6 
E . F. Santos Jundiaí — — 157 313 352 330 488 268 — 1 , 9 0 8 
Cia. Paulista de E . de Ferro — — 92 — 464 510 132 764 40 2 , 0 0 2 
E. F. Sorocabana — 101 253 — 1 , 7 9 3 4 9 0 389 154 — 3 , 1 8 0 
E . F. Araraquara — _ 75 — 241 169 14 — — 499 
E . F. Noroeste do Brasil 210 — 3 5 9 — 548 164 158 17 — 1 , 4 5 6 
R . V. Paraná-Santa Catarina 347 149 88 5 511 456 143 134 — 1 , 8 3 3 
V. F. Río Grande do Sul . . . . . . . . . — — 134 28 954 446 573 206 15 2 , 3 5 6 
Cía. Mogiana de E. de Ferro 198 — 117 — 256 606 143 477 53 1 , 8 5 0 
SUB-TOTAL . . . 1 , 2 4 0 597 2 , 1 6 5 422 8 , 6 0 0 7 , 4 0 2 3 , 9 5 6 3 , 9 4 5 598 2 8 , 9 2 5 
Rede V. Cearense 51 136 27 304 104 6 24 4 656 
E . F. Sampaio Correia — 18 — — 10 59 34 2 — 123 
E . F. Nazaré ; — — — — 101 47 — — 48 196 
E . F. Goiás — 3 4 4 0 45 76 — — — — 195 
E . F. D. Tereza Cristina — 4 6 65 39 33 — — 9 — 192 
SÜB-TOTAL . . . — 149 241 111 524 210 40 36 52 1 , 3 6 2 
Others _ 3 4 102 37 227 231 190 58 347 1 , 2 2 6 
TOTAL» . . . 1 , 2 4 0 780 2 , 5 0 8 570 9 , 3 5 1 7 , 8 4 3 4 , 1 8 6 4 , 0 3 8 997 3 1 , 5 1 3 
Source : See table E. 
NOTE.—The total exeludes the tractor power of the following locomotives : 
21-30 years : 2 More than 50 years : 17 
31-40 years : 5 Age unknown : 84 
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UP to 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 than 60 unknown Total 
R . F. Nordeste 3 _ _ 20 22 83 19 __ 147 
V. F. F. Leste Brasileiro 2 8 12 — 35 69 12 13 4 155 
E . F. Vitória a Minas — — 27 — 16 10 15 — — 68 
E . F. Leopoldina 39 27 9 4 71 55 43 78 77- 327 A 
E . F. Central do Brasil — 2 9 3 127 220 68 161 40 687 
R . Mineira de Via<jao — 2 3 — 110 36 11 60 — 262 
E . F. Santos-Jundiaí — — 10 26 20 21 50 36 7 163 
Cia. Paulista de E . de Ferro — 4 — — 36 61 12 90 — 210 
E . F. Sorocabana — 5 2 0 — 132 41 48 27 .— 273 
E . F. Araraquara — — 3 — 19 21 2 — — 45 
E . F. Noroeste do Brasil 12 — 25 — 56 23 28 5 — 149 
R . V. Paraná-Santa Catarina 25 14 7 2 54 48 24 . 22 — • 196 
V. R . R í o Grande do Sul 42 — . 10 2 81 47 91 43 3 319 
Cia. Mogiana de F. Ferro 12 — 8 — 24 7 0 21 75 4 214 
SUB-TOTAL . . . 132 65 143 37 801 744 508 629 136 3 , 1 9 5 
Rede V. Cearense 6 13 4 44 16 1 5 1 90 
E . F. Sampaio Correia — 2 — — 2 11 7 1 — 23 
E . F. Nazaré — — — — 13 6 — 4 23 
E . F. Goiás — 3 3 7 11 • — — ' 2 26 
E . F. D. Tereza Cristina — 5 6 3 6 5 — 2 2 29 
SUB-TOTAI . . . — 16 2 2 14 76 38 8 8 9 191 
Others — 4 10 4 31 40 35 13 91 228 
TOTAL . . . 132 85 175 55 908 822 551 650 236 3 , 6 1 4 
Source : Rejuvenescimento e melhorias das locomotivas a vapor, Boletim do Instituto Ferroviário de Pesquisas Técnico-Economicas Vol. IV, Nr. 3, 1952. 
* Includes twenty-one fixed site locomotives. 
Chapter IV 
PROJECTION OF THE DEMAND FOR ENERGY 
I . INTRODUCTION 
This chapter contains as complete an inventory as possible 
of the energy consumed in Brazil during the period from 1939 
to 1954. It outlines the relative importance of the different 
means for producing energy, emphasizes the share of imports 
in the total and analyses the supply of the principal sources 
of energy, special attention being paid to the possibility 
of their expansión. 
An attempt will then be made to project the demand, 
taking into account the probable growth of the different 
consumer groups. A comparison of the projected demand 
with the potentialities of the various sources is the departure 
point for the establishment of an investment pohcy in this 
sector and also acts as a basis for a preliminary estimate of 
those imports which serve to provide energy. 
A study of the energy sector reveáis many problems con-
nected with units of measurement and efficiency coefficients. 
Various solutions are possible, depending upon the targets 
it is hoped to attain. This chapter includes all energy sources 
of any significance and the only items excluded are those 
elements of animal, human and hydraulic energy which are 
not transformed into electricity. 
The question of how to measure the energy used by the 
economy leads to a series of difficulties which, in view of 
statistical limitations, cannot always be overcome. On the 
initial assumption that energy is the capacity to produce 
work, it is clear that the ideal method of measuring the 
energy used in any economic system is to express it in terms 
of its final utilization. Technical progress is introducing 
growing efficiency into final utilization, and is enabling a 
constandy greater volume of products to be obtained per 
unit of energy consumed. Nevertheless, the obstacles- to this 
method of measuring energy in its final stage are insuperable 
in practice and they become almost insoluble in under-
developed countries, characterized as they are by a hetero-
geneity of equipment and the co-existence of machinery 
representing different stages óf technical progress. 
Another way of measuring energy consumed is to assess 
the amount reaching the final consumer, in other words 
excluding that used in production by the energy sources them-
selves and in other operations which take place before final 
dehvery to the consumer. In short, the idea is to measure 
net as distinct from gross energy consumption, a concept 
which is also useful in general economic analysis. 
In order to render the various types of energy homogeneous 
and to reduce them to kWh, an average efficiency co-efficient 
of 0.2 is assumed for all fuels. As is well known, fuels used 
in the production of heat give much higher yields (between 
50 and 70 per cent); on the other hand, others have lower 
average yields,—for example, 2 per cent in the case of loco-
motives driven by fuelwood, 5 per cent in the case of coal-fired 
locomotives and 18 per cent in motor-cars. 
Special consideration was given to fuelwood in this inventory 
because for many years it was the principal source of energy 
in Brazil. In contrast to most countries, where it is used 
almost exclusively as a source of heat, fuelwood is widely 
employed in Brazil for the production of motive power and 
electricity. While in many countries it represents a residual 
source of no commercial importance, in Brazil it competes 
with other fuels and is submitted to a permanent substitution 
process. When it is considered that fuelwood has only 
minimum efficiency as a source of motive power and electri-
city—either because technological adaptation to the use of 
this source is lacking or because the equipment utilizing it is 
generally the oldest and most worn-out—it will be seen that 
its replacement by other fuels will contribute to an increase 
in the real consumption of energy. 
This problem is of prime importance to a study of the 
development of energy consumption during the period under 
consideration. During its first phase—the war years—there 
was both an absolute and a relative increase in fuelwood 
consumption, which rose from 88.4 to 137.0 million cubic 
metres. In the second phase the opposite was true, the use 
of fuelwood falling in 1954 to levels lower than those of 
pre-war days, while the consumption of liquid fuels rose 
almost sixfold. This large-scale replacement of wood is 
an indication of fundamental changes in the efficiency rate 
corresponding to the employment of fuels, since the fuelwood 
for which other sources are being substituted is mainly that 
which is used in the production of motive power and electri-
city. In this connexion it is sufficient to observe that one 
calorific unit of diesel fuel used in locomotives has an efficiency 
almost nine times greater than one unit of fuelwood. 
In the hght of the foregoing considerations, an efficiency 
coefficient of 0.05 has been used for fuelwood. If the coefficient 
applied to the remaining fuels had been employed in calcula-
tions on fuelwood, the per capita consumption of energy in 
Brazil today would be lower than during the war years. 
The application of this different coefficient ultimately 
represents an attempt at a partial approximation in the measure-
ment of energy at its final stage, i.e., as energy actually 
utilized. Notwithstanding the limitations inherent in this 
method, such an attempt renders the statistical data more 
appropriate for economic analysis. 
I I . GROWTH OF AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION 
Total energy consumption expanded from 18,405 million 
kWh in 1939 to 42,295 millions in 1954. The increase was 
thus 130 per cent, representing an annual rate of 5.7 per cent 
(3.2 per capita). The rate of growth was much more rapid 
during the most recent period. (See table 112.) 
The growth of energy consumption is mainly determined 
by higher real incomes and by changes in the structure of 
production. Much of the energy absorbed by a community 
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Table 112. Brazil : Increase in energy consumption 
(Percentages) 
A bsolute Annual rale Per capita 
Periocl tncrease of growth rate of growth 
1940-54 130 5 . 7 3 . 2 
1940-46 18 2 . 8 0 . 5 
1947-54 91 8 . 4 5 . 9 
Source : Tables 125,126 and 127. 
reaches the end consumer directly and must therefore be 
considered as a consumer product. Such is the case of the 
electric energy used in households, petrol consumed by private 
cars, etc. Another considerable share is absorbed by produc-
tion, processing and the transport of goods. Lasdy, there is 
the energy consumed in the production of such services as 
communal transport, entertainments, etc. 
Chart I compares the index of the growth of energy con-
sumption with Índices of the gross product and the total 
expenditure on consumption. These three Índices show a 
very similar development, despite the fact that in recent years 
(since 1950) some disparity can be observed. It is expected 
that, over the long term, energy consumption will expand 
less than the gross product, given the greater output of useful 
work per unit of energy consumed which results from 
technological progress. In reality, one of the forms taken 
by the latter is increased efficiency in energy utilization. 
Such a phenomenon becomes evident in the economy as a 
whole through a persistent decline in the consumption of 
energy per unit of production. However, there are certain 
special aspects which vary in accordance with the stage of 
development and the consequent structural modifications. 
A preliminary general observation must be made on the 
substitution of inanimate for animate energy. The mechaniza-
tion of transport and agriculture, attendant upon the initial 
and intermediate stages of development, results in an apparent 
increase in energy consumption per unit of product. This 
phenomenon could be observed in the United States between 
1880 and the end of the 'twenties. After the stage of substituting 
inanimate for animate energy was passed, it was noted that a 
persistent reduction in energy consumption per unit of product 
took place, owing to the greater efficiency resulting from 
technical progress. 
There are also other factors which influence the relationship 
between energy consumption and the gross product. In 
Brazil, one of them is the weakness of the export sector and 
industrialization. Exports fundamentally consist of a wide 
range of agricultural products. The corresponding energy 
consumption per unit of product is thus very low, even more 
so because the principal type of energy consumed by agri-
culture, solar energy, is not computed. This means that 
a reduction in the contribution of the agricultural sector 
to an economic system entails a rise in energy consumption 
per unit of product. 
In the present development stage of the Brazilian economy, 
several factors are simultaneously tending to increase, and 
others to diminish, the consumption of energy per unit of 
product. On the one hand, there is the substitution of 
inanimate for animate energy, the weakness of the export 
sector and industrialization; on the other, technical progress 
exists, which raises efficiency in the utilization of energy. 
The change observed from 1950 onwards is possibly due to 
an increase in the energy directly consumed by the population, 
a phenomenon linked with the considerable rise in consumer 
expenditure, and in particular with the substantial increase 
in the number of passenger cars. As mentioned elsewhere 
in this study,1 the exceptional upswing in the number of 
motor-cars in Brazil during the last five yeats was a conse-
quence of the exchange policy in forcé at that time. One 
of the resultant distortions in the economic system was the 
increase in energy consumption per unit of income. Never-
theless, this situation may persist during coming years, 
since development will impose structural modifications on the 
Brazilian economy which will tend to increase energy con-
sumption per unit of product. 
I I I . RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS 
SOURCES 
From the viewpoint of sources utilized, there have been 
fundamental changes between 1939 and recent years. Of the 
18,405 million kWh consumed in 1939, 70.5 per cent carne 
from solid fuels and 17.1 per cent from liquid fuels, while 
the remaining 12.4 per cent were of hydraulic origin. Of the 
12,984 million kWh resulting from the use of solid fuels, 
72.6 per cent were derived from fuelwood, lignite and sugar-
cane bagasse. These three sources of energy thus contributed 
rather more than half the total supply. The situation was 
unchanged during the war years, these sources contributíng 
51.4 per cent of the total, as compared with 51.2 in 1939. 
From 1946 onwards there was a great change in the structure 
of supply. As early as 1947 the share of these three sources 
fell to 36.4 per cent, dropping even further to 27.6 in 1954. 
Of the three solid fuels mentioned, the greatest reduction 
was that of fuelwood, the consumption of which fell to 14 
per cent between 1939 and 1954, its share in the total being 
reduced from 40 to 15 per cent. Lignite also lost ground, 
since its consumption increased by only 83 per cent, while 
the rise in total consumption was 130 per cent. But sugar-
cane bagasse improved its share since consumption rose by 
160 per cent. 
If solid fuels are considered as a whole, it will be seen that 
the growth between 1939 and 1954 was only 17 per cent, 
a little less, therefore, than that of all the three previously 
mentioned sources, which amounted to 24 per cent. This 
was caused by the small increase in coal consumption, which 
reached only 15 per cent. 
Whereas the consumption of solid fuels remained practically 
stationary over the entire period from 1939 to 1954, that of 
liquid fuels increased sixfold, rising from 3,157 to 18,817 mil-
lion kWh. The share in total consumption grew from 
17.1 to 44.4 per cent, while that of hydroelectric energy 
increased from 12.4 to 19.6 per cent, which implies an increase 
or 267 per cent in consumption. 
The most significant fact is the large-scale substitution of 
liquid for solid fuels. This phenomenon is linked with tech-
nical progress and is also more clearly evident in the United 
States. But it is not only a matter of technological orientation, 
since relative prices are largely the cause of this substitution. 
Fuels, liquid and solid, are mainly used to drive static and 
mobile machinery. In the latter case the advantage of liquid 
1 See chapter 111 of Part Two. 
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fuels, which are used in internal combustión engines, consti-
tutes a technologically proven fact : it is not possible to utilize 
solid fuels in aircraft and motor-cars. But as regards static 
machinery of large dimensions, the cost factor or some other 
element of an economic character predominates. Thus it is 
that the competition of fuel oil and diesel oil with solid fuels 
is in many ways a different phenomenon from the competition 
of petrol. While it is true that the consumption of this latter 
grew less than that of fuel and diesel oil, it is also true that it 
increased four and a half times more than that of solid fuels. 
Relative prices are largely the cause of this substitution of 
petrol for solid fuels. 
Moreover technological development is constantly permit-
ting greater reductions in the production costs of liquid fuels 
and thus increasing their competitive capacity. This, however, 
was not thé most important factor in determining relative 
prices, which were the result of the exchange policy. As 
imported products, liquid fuels benefited considerably by 
the stabilization of the exchange rate from 1939 onwards. 
Although the price of fuelwood rose between 1939 and 1951 
by 325 per cent2 and that of domestically produced coal 
by 225 per cent, the average price of imported liquid fuels 
increased by only 64 per cent. This fact in itself will largely 
explain the degree of substitution which took place.3 
The extent to which energy sources can be replaced from 
domestic production is a question of major significance to 
a development programme. As first presented, the problem 
is purely technical, for example, not all the sources of energy 
can be equally easily transported and electric energy can be 
transmitted only within certain limits. In addition, liquid 
fuels may be used to produce mechanical energy through 
the heating of boilers—in die same way as solid fuels—and 
to drive internal combustión engines. 
Once the technical limits of the substitution process are 
defined, the problem of energy supply is then presented in 
economic terms which are not always easy to define; some 
energy sources are imported while others are available in 
Brazil, so that the respective costs may develop differently 
and are not always comparable from every aspect. Another 
factor hampering cost comparisons is the volume of initial 
investment. A hydroelectric plant demands much greater 
initial investment per kW than a thermoelectric plant. How-
ever, the terms of the problem are different if consideration 
is given to the economy as a whole, to the investment required 
for the production and transport of the fuel, and to the 
expansión of die exportable production with which it is 
intended to pay for imported fuel. If increased purchases 
of fuel abroad lead to a reduction of other imports, the 
investment required to raise domestic production as a means 
of offsetting the reduced imports must not be overlooked. 
It is clear that a comparison of the aggregate investment 
for two power plants, one based on thermal energy and the 
other on hydroelectric sources, is no simple matter. Let it 
be assumed that, once the two calculations have been made, 
the conclusión is reached that the hydroelectric plant is 
cheaper, but requires greater initial investment. In this case, 
the problem of the shortage of capital must be borne in mind. 
2 According to the price paid by the railways. 
3 Reform of the exchange system at the end of 1953, and the readjustment 
of the exchange rate at the beginning of 1955 in particular, had the effect 
of partially correcting this distortion. 
Finally it remains to be seen what part of the operating costs 
must be covered by foreign exchange, since the proportion 
may be high in the case of the thermal plant. 
In Brazil, given the prospects of a relative decline in the 
capacity to import, it is usual to lay the main emphasis on the 
need for intensified utilization of hydraulic resources. Al-
though there is wide recognition of this need, experience 
during the last ten years shows that hydroelectric energy has 
largely been replaced by liquid fuels. This substitution is 
obvious in the case of urban transport in cities such as Rio 
de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, where electric tramways have given 
way to motor buses. The trolleybus, which is probably the 
appropriate vehicle to replace out-of-date tramways, is used 
in small numbers in Sao Paulo, and more recendy in Niteroi 
and Belo Horizonte. The phenomenon is not restricted to 
urban transport. As already stated, the substitution of thermal 
for hydroelectric energy is often taking place irrationally, 
mainly because of the inadequate supply from the latter source. 
The internal or external origin of the energy consumed 
is the next problem. In 1939 energy from imported sources 
amounted to 5,593 million kWh, or 30.4 per cent of total 
consumption. During the war years this share declined, 
falling to 18.7 per cent in 1944. From 1946 onwards, owing 
to greater substitution, the share of imported energy gradually 
increased, reaching 47.9 per cent in 1954. Thus dependence 
on imports rose significantly during this period. During 
the Second World War it was found possible to replace 
imported coal by lower-quality domestic coal and by fuelwood. 
On the other hand, the importance of motor buses in urban 
transport was relatively slight and a similar situation prevailed 
in the case of inter-urban lorry transport. At present the 
situation is very different, since for those railways possessing 
diesel engines the conversión process is not feasible, while 
urban transport is mainly based on internal combustión 
engines; in addition, inter-city highway transport already 
outstrips rail transport so far as load volume is concerned.4 
A fresh fall in petroleum imports—such as that which occurréd 
in 1941 and 1942—would entail consequences whose gravity 
can hardly be assessed. 
I V . PROJECTIONS OF DEMAND 
In view of the many substitution possibilities for sources 
of energy, forecasts of demand are almost inseparable from a 
study of supply potentialities. In this sector, more than in any 
other, the policy as regards supply is the basic factor governing 
development. The price of energy is not a dominant factor 
in die formation of industrial costs, particülarly when the 
profit margin is high. This can easily be confirmed by the 
present stage of BraziTs industrial development, because factories 
in one and the same branch utilize forms of energy whose 
prices vary between 1 and 5. 
Although the price is not a decisive aspect of the problem, 
the availability of energy is fundamental. Where a factory 
produces energy for its own consumption there is an enormous 
increase in capital requirements. While this is justifiable to 
some extent in the case of a large enterprise, the same is not 
true of small and medium-scale companies. It is the essential 
reason why the supply of energy is a dynamic factor in the 
development process, that is to say one of the elements govern-
ing the real demand for energy. 
4 See chapter III of Part Two. 
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The Economic Development of Brazil 
The projection of demand for energy must consequendy 
he based on the assumption of an elastic supply. Assuming 
that the supply is not a limiting factor, given a certain hypothesis 
for the growth of the economy, how will the demand for energy 
grow ? This is the first problem to be stated. After a preli-
minary projection of the demand has been made, it will be 
necessary to consider possibihties from the viewpoint of supply. 
Can the latter increase sufEciendy to cover the projected 
demand? What pressure will the increased consumption 
exert on the balance of payments, in terms of imports for 
sources of energy ? What alteration must be made in the 
composition. of supply in order to reduce that pressure or to 
adapt it to the country's own potential energy resources ? 
The starting point for a development pohcy in the energy 
sector must therefore be a projection of demand based on 
a hypothesis of growth for the entire economy. The projection 
then leads to a formulation of supply pohcy, bearing in mind 
the need not only to obtain minimum costs, but also to make 
the best possible use of domestic resources and the prospects 
for the capacity to import. 
In recent years, the general lines of a development pohcy 
for Brazilian energy sources have continued to be traced. 
Certain plans to develop the coal and petroleum sectors are 
being carried out. Electric energy has figured in regional 
development plans and a national electrification programme is 
being studied. 
1. Domestic coal 
The Coal Plan provides for an increase in output of between 
2.0 and 3.7 million tons. After rising from 1 to 2 million 
tons between 1939 and 1943, coal production remained statio-
nary over the next ten years. In 1949 the calorific valué of 
domestically mined coal was 100 per cent more expensive than 
that of fuel oil and 78 per cent more than that of imported 
coal. Under such conditions litde else could be expected than 
the stagnation of domestic production. Bearing in mind 
that the Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional has since 1946 been 
consuming increasing quantities of local coal, it may be deduced 
that consumption in the remaining sectors has been declining. 
Technicians who studied the situation of the Brazilian coal 
industry in order to prepare the Coal Plan were of the opinion 
that, with suitable rationahzation measures and the improve-
ment in techniques consequent upon the planned investment, 
the calorific valué of domestic coal could well compete with 
that of the imported product. Taking account of the funda-
mental alteration of relative prices resulting from the 1953 
exchange reform, domestic coal may still regain its position 
on the market. 
The problem of domestic coal is basically one of price 
competition. The following example is illustrative. The plan 
for the Companhia Nacional do Alcalis includes the possibility 
of using Brazilian coal, provided that it does not raise costs. 
The alternative hes between using 150,000 tons of domestic 
coal or spending $1.7 million on imported petroleum. This 
is a problem of comparative costs for the company, the key to 
which may reside in exchange pohcy, but for Brazil it is a 
question of the balance of payments. The same could be said 
of any heavy consumer of imported fuel, the cement industry, 
for example. The remarkable development of this industry, 
whose production was 1 million tons in 1947 and will probably 
reach 4 million by 1960, has taken place without any consi-
deration of production costs in terms of foreign exchange. 
The Coal Plan is essentially based on the pohcy of raising 
consumption by reducing fuel costs. It is possible, however, 
that some of its proposals cannot be carried out for technical 
reasons. Thus, however much the prices of domestic coal are 
reduced in relation to the imported product, diesel locomotives 
cannot be adapted to burn this fuel. But the use of coal in 
power plants may' considerably exceed forecasts, since the 
National Electricity Plan provides for the installation at Santa 
Catarina of a 200,000 kW plant, which would absorb 1.5 mil-
lion tons of low-grade coal. It may therefore be assumed that 
in 1962 consumption will reach at least 3.7 million tons, the 
minimum figure forecast by the Coal Plan for an earlier date. 
2. Charcoal and bagasse 
The projection of charcoal consumption took as a basis 
the probable growth of the iron and steel industry. Con-
sumption should reach 1,823,000 tons in 1962. Known plans 
for expanding the basic steel industry—excluding Volta 
Redonda—show that there will be growing interest in electric 
furnaces. In addition, the sinterization process makes it possible 
to save increasing quantities of charcoal in blast furnaces. 
For lack of complete information on each plant it may be 
assumed that coal consumption will keep pace with the probable 
growth of the smelting process, excluding coke furnaces. 
Projection of sugar-cane bagasse consumption as a fuel is 
based on the probable growth of sugar production. This is 
a typical example of a by-product. Production of bagasse 
is determined by that of sugar-cane, which in turn depends-on 
that of sugar. When sugar production begins, bagasse accumu-
lates and its use as a fuel for the boilers of thermic plants has 
hitherto been considered as the most economical method. 
Other apphcations may also be found, and at least one mili 
is already using bagasse for pulp manufacture in Brazil. Other 
small pulp-mills consuming bagasse as a raw material are now 
being studied or are already under construction. Their number 
will probably increase as technical improvements to boilers 
reduce the requirements of bagasse as a source of heat and as 
the output of industrial alcohol expands. But for the moment, 
it is unlikely that any substantial proportion of the available 
bagasse will be utilized for purposes other than the production 
of calorific energy, particularly in view of the recent rise in 
the cost of imported fuels. 
3. Petrol 
The demand for normal-octane petrol basically depends 
upon the number of vehicles with internal combustión engines 
in the country and the extent to which they are used. Between 
1946 and 1952 the number of such vehicles in Brazil (excepting 
tractors and motor-cycles) increased by 156 per cent; the 
consumption of petrol rose by 204 per cent during the same 
period, giving an increase in consumption per vehicle of 
18.6 per cent. It is highly probable that the greater consumption 
per vehicle aróse from the relative increase in the number of 
lorries, which expanded by more than 230 per cent.5 
If pre-war figures are compared with those for more recent 
years, a substantial increase in consumption per vehicle is 
evident : about 100 per cent between 1939 and 1952. A major 
reason for the greater consumption, inter alia, hes in the increase 
in the relative numbers of lorries, omnibuses and taxis. All of 
them are today working more hours daily and consume more 
5 Excluding lorries with diesel-type motors. 
Part Two—Chapter IV. Projection of the demand for energy 143 
fuel per kilometre than private passenger cars, although it is 
also probable that a greater use is now being made of this 
latter class of vehicle. As cities grow in size, passenger cars 
cover a greater distance each day. Better highways and the 
creation of entertainment centres outside the cities lead to a 
more extensive week-end utilization of private cars, while 
modern highway systems allow a wider use of all vehicles over 
greater distances and also reduce the time when they are oíf 
the road for repairs. 
Allowing for further road improvements during the coming 
years and for other favourable factors, it has been assumed 
that the annual rate of increase of petrol consumption per 
vehicle for the period 1946-1952 (2.9 per cent) will be main-
tained until 1962. Consumption in the latter year will be 
7,000 litres of petrol per vehicle-year, as compared with 5,290 
in 1952 and 4,460 in 1946. Assuming that all vehicles work 
an average of 300 days annually and consume 0.2 litre per 
kilometre, the aggregate consumption of 7,000 litres gives 
an average of 35 kilometres daily, or between one and two hours' 
work daily per vehicle. 
As regards the number of vehicles, there should not be more 
than 545,000 passenger cars in 1962, according to the hypothesis 
on the increase of consumption6 and allowing for the price 
increments already affecting this type of vehicle. It is possible 
that this is a máximum figure, since a hypothesis of a reduction 
in numbers is equally plausible. 
The number of lorries, which stood at approximately 
300,000 in 1954, is expected to increase between 1954 and 
1962 at the same rate as during the period 1939-1949; it is 
a matter of fact that this rate showed a considerable rise between 
1949 and 1952. But, as studies of this subject show,7 this 
expansión cannot be expected to continué. Substantial improve-
ments in the railway system and the relative price increases 
for lorries and petrol, will entirely alter the competitive 
conditions between the two chief means of transport in Brazil. 
According to the rate of increase mentioned above, there 
should be approximately 573,000 lorries in 1962, or 273,000 
more than in 1952. But the number of diesel motor lorries— 
not more than 10,000 in 1952—may be expected to grow. 
In view of the increasing preference for this type of vehicle, 
which is today more pronounced because of the relative increase 
in petrol prices, it would not be an exaggeration to assume that 
at least one out of every five new lorries will have a diesel 
motor. On this basis, diesel lorries will represent approximately 
70,000 of die total 573,000 lorries estimated for 1962. 
The rise in the number of omnibuses has closely followed 
the increase of lorries; 232 per cent for the former and 228 per 
cent for the latter between 1939 and 1952. In the absence of 
a definite study of the demand for omnibuses and of the 
determining factors, it must be assumed that the increase will 
continué to keep pace with the demand for lorries. In view 
of the high proportion of diesel-engined buses, it will be assumed 
that one-half will use that type of traction in 1962. Table 113 
provides figures for the three principal types of road vehicle. 
Assuming a consumption of 7,000 litres of petrol per vehicle, 
the annual consumption for 1,070,000 petrol-engined vehicles 
would amount to 7,490 million litres, an increase of 129 per 
cent in relation to 1954. 
6 See chapter VI, Part One. 
7 See the study o f the transport situation in chapter III. 
Table 113. Brazil : Projection of road vehicle numbers 
(Thousands o f units) 
Petrol Diesel Total 
1954 1962 1954 1962 1954 1962 
Passenger cars . . . 350 545 — — 350 545 
. 285 503 15 70 300 573 
Omnibuses 12 22 12 .5 22 25 44 
TOTAL . . . 647 1 , 0 7 0 2 7 . 5 92 675 1 , 1 6 2 
Source : Official publications and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
4. Fuel oil 
There was a very pronounced rise in the consumption of 
fuel oil between the pre-war period and more recent years; 
11.6 per cent annually between 1939 and 1954. This rapid 
increase is a reflection of the relative price advantage over 
domestic fuelwood and coal, resulting from the foreign 
exchange policy applied to fuel oil. It is not the only reason, 
however, since technological advances in recent years have 
generally favoured the use of petroleum derivatives as fuel. 
The consumption of fuel oil in 1952 amounted to 2,309,500 
tons; 68.8 per cent by industry, 11.8 by rail transport, 11.3 by 
ocean transport and 8.1 per cent in the production of electric 
energy for public use. A substantial proportion of the oil 
consumed by industry was used to generate energy, a factor 
demonstrating the inadequacy of the public utility companies. 
In the cement industry, for instance, 365,000 tons of fuel oil 
were used in 1952 to produce 1,619,000 tons of cement. Since 
one ton of clinker requires approximately 17 kilogrammes of 
fuel oil, nearly 90,000 tons of fuel were used for purposes other 
than cement manufacture, almost certainly to generate energy. 
It is thus clear that the increase in the industrial consumption 
of fuel oil will to some extent depend upon the availability 
of power from public utility companies. To use the cement 
industry as an example once more, production could exceed 
4 million tons in 1962. If cement factories were to use only 
purchased power, this production would require but 680,000 
tons of oil. If, on the other hand, they must use fuel oil to 
generate the required energy, the consumption would rise 
to 1.72 million tons; the total in practice will undoubtedly 
he between these two extremes. Since there are few projects 
for improving the supply from public utility companies, the 
relation between purchased power and energy generated by 
industry should remain similar to that of 1952. The con-
sumption of the cement industry in 1962 would thus stand 
at 902,000 tons. 
Using similar criteria, and allowing for projected increases 
in other branches, the consumption of fuel oil by the principal 
industries may be calculated in this way. 
Based upon the analysis in chapter III, an annual rate of 
increase of 7 per cent has been assumed for rail transport. 
A hypothesis of 5 per cent was selected for sea transport, using 
a minimum probable rate of growth for coastal shipping. 
The marked trend towards the substitution of fuel oil for coal 
in this latter sector must be recalled, but, since it would also 
involve a reduction in the number of ships, it has been assumed 
that one effect would offset the other. 
It remains to consider the fuel oil consumed by public utility 
companies in generating electric energy, Uncompleted projects 
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in 1952 included the 30,000 kW power station at Carioba, two 
units of 100,000 k W at Piratininga, which entered service in 
1954, and probably other smaller projects. The possible 
construction of hydroelectric generating plants, especially 
Paulo Afonso, will reduce the consumption of fuel oil in some 
areas. The increase in installed capacity of approximately 
230,000 kW will bring the fuel oil consumption of public 
utility power stations to almost 507,000 tons in 1962. 
It should not be overlooked that the plans of the company 
operating the Piratininga plant include the addition of four 
further 100 kW units by 1961; in this case the consumption of 
fuel oil by the public utility sector would rise to 1,130,000 tons. 
However, since the expansión at Piratininga was not foreseen 
in the National Electrification Plan, it is excluded from the 
subsequent projections. (See table 114.) 
Table 114. Brazil : Projection of fuel oil consumption 
(Thousands of tons) 




Industry t,590.0 3,595 126.1 
Cement 3 6 5 . 2 — 902 1 4 7 . 0 
Textiles 2 1 9 . 9 — 387 7 6 . 0 
Metallurgical 147 .9 — 414 1 8 0 . 0 
Foodstuffs 9 7 . 2 — 175 8 0 . 0 
Miscellaneous . . . . 7 5 9 . 8 — 1 ,717 1 2 6 . 0 
Transport 533.0 — 956 79.4 
Rail 2 7 3 . 0 — 535 9 6 . 0 
Sea 2 6 0 . 0 — 421 6 1 . 9 
Public utility services . 186.5 — 507 171.8 
TOTAL . . . 2 , 3 0 9 . 5 3 , 0 3 2 . 8 5 , 0 2 8 1 1 9 . 0 
Source: Economic Commission for I^atiu America. 
The projection in table 114 shows an annual rate of increase 
of 6.6 per cent, considerably lower than that of 1940—54 
(11.6 per cent) and even below that of 1940-49 (9.3 per cent). 
Since competitive conditions for fuel oil in the near future 
will be less advantageous than during the past ten years—for 
instance, the considerable price increase due to foreign exchange 
pohcy reform—the projection in table 114 certainly shows 
the lowest level which may be expected. 
5. Diesel oil 
The consumption of diesel oil has risen even more rapidly 
than that of fuel oil, the annual rate of increase between 1939 
and 1954 being 15.2 per cent, and 12.5 per cent between 1939 
and 1949. From 1949 to 1954 the rate of growth rose to 
20.9 per cent. This exceptional increase is not a true reflection 
of the development of the economy, but rather of the abnormal 
manner in which it developed during that period. The 
shortage of energy generated by public utility companies 
has obhged the different types of consumer to install small 
units for their private use. 
Consumption of diesel oil in 1952 amounted to 871,900 tons. 
Of this total, 221,800 were used by industry, 68,800 by rail 
and sea transport and 58,200 by pubhc utihty services, leaving 
a balance of 523,100 tons. There were not more than 10,000 
diesel motored lorries in 1952. The number of diesel omni-
buses and tractors of all types may be estimated at 20,000, 
or half the total of all such vehicles in the country. Assuming 
that each of these vehicles consumed 10,000 litres of diesel 
oil per annum—which is a high consumption—the total for 
all types of vehicles would be 255,000 tons. A balance of 
268,000 tons, or 30 per cent, would remain. This large 
tonnage gives an indication of the extent to which small 
units are being used to supplement the inadequate pubhc 
energy supply, a costly procedure both for the consumer 
and for the pubhc in general. One of the reports of the 
Joint Brazil-United States Economic Development Com-
mission states, for example, " energy supplied by the Light, 
Power de Traction Company to COBRASMA (a factory 
manufacturing railway materials) costs approximately 0.14 
cruzeiros per kWh, whilst the total cost from their own diesel-
electric plant, including amortization of the equipment, is 
approximately 1.30 cruzeiros per kWh, or almost ten times 
" A more .8 
In principie, it may be accepted that if—as may be antici-
pated from 1955—the pubhc energy supply improves, espe-
cially in Rio Grande do Sul and Minas Gerais where the 
higher consumption of diesel oil was most marked,9 there 
will be a decline in the rate of increase in the consumption of 
this type of fuel. This statement applies only to residual 
consumers; the remaining groups will be examined separately. 
The consumption of diesel oil is more widely distributed 
amongst industries than that of fuel oil; the textile industry, 
which is apparently the heaviest consumer, used less than 
10 per cent of the total in 1952. Because of the dispersed 
utilization and the lack of complete data on all industries, 
it must be assumed that the consumption of diesel oil will 
increase at the same rate as that of industrial production. 
The projected consumption of diesel oil by the railways 
is based on the probable number of diesel locomotives. 
According to existing plans, and bearing in mind certain 
other factors, approximately 750 diesel locomotives will 
be running in 1962. The projection was made on the basis 
of their probable average consumption. 
For road transport, the projection uses the estimate of diesel 
engined vehicles presented earher or 92,000 in 1962, with 
an average annual unit consumption of some 10,000 htres. 
For diesel-powered tractors, a first estimate is that the number 
will increase threefold between 1952 and 1962. 
The projection for sea transport uses the same criterion as 
in the case of fuel oil. 
The consumption of diesel oil by fixed plants generating 
electric energy for pubhc use depends upon a number of factors, 
especially upon the outeome of development plans for hydro-
electric power. In the north-east, for instance, the energy 
from Paulo Afonso will partly replace a widely dispersed 
number of diesel plants; the same applies to Minas Gerais 
and Rio Grande do Sul. It is unlikely, however, that these 
plants will remain unused, since they will perhaps be moved 
to other areas which are not served by the general network. 
On the other hand, plans at present being implemented will 
not cover many important areas in Brazil, where it is probable 
8 Joint Commission Project No. 24. It should be noted that this calcu-
lation was made by using the lower price of fuel before the exchange rate 
was modified. 
9 Between 1945 and 1952 the consumption o f diesel oil increased eight-
fold in Rio Grande do Sul and nine-fold in Minas Gerais, whilst the total 
for the country was five times greater. - - • 
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that the number of small and médium diesel plants will 
increase. For these reasons, a conservative assumption shows 
that the installed potential for diesel units in public service 
will be doubled between 1952 and 1962. Finally, a projection 
has been made of the residual group, taking into account 
the probable average rate of increase of the other groups. 
(See table 115.) 
Table 115. Brazil : Projection of diesel oil consumption 
(Thousands o f tons) 




Industry . 2 2 1 . 8 555 150 
Transport . 323 .8 — 1 ,257 388 — 
R o a d a . 2 5 5 . 0 — 1 ,037 407 — 
Rail . 3 8 . 8 — 170 287 — 
Sea 3 0 . 0 — 50 67 — 
Public services . 5 8 . 2 — 116 100 — 
Miscellaneous 2 6 8 . 1 — 856 319 — 
TOTAL . . . 8 7 1 . 9 1 ,229 2 , 7 8 4 219 127 
Source : Ecouomic Commission for Latín America. 
a Including tractors. 
The annual rate of increase between 1955 and 1962, as shown 
by this projection represents 10.8 per cent, slightly lower 
than the period 1940-49, when it varied around 12.5 per cent. 
6. Kerosene 
Litde information is available on the pattern of kerosene 
consumption, although this fuel is known to represent the 
principal means of lighting in rural areas. A pronounced 
increase has taken place in the number of tractors using 
kerosene,10 while in country districts the number of domestic 
appliances, especially refrigerators, using this fuel has risen. 
Kerosene consumption is thus linked closely to the income 
of the farmer and has, in fact, increased more rapidly during 
the recent years of high agricultural incomes. The rate of 
increase in 1939-52 stood at 8.9 per cent. In 1940-49, when 
agricultural incomes rose more slowly, this rate was only 
6.3 per cent. During the peak period for the growth of this 
type of income, 1948-52, the annual rate of increase in kerosene 
consumption moved up to 12.7 per cent. 
Because it is unlikely that farmers' income during the next 
ten years will be higher than in 1940-52, the working hypothe-
thesis may be accepted that the consumption of kerosene 
will continué to show the same trend as during that period. 
Thus the consumption of539,000 tons in 1954 may be expected 
to rise to 1,014,000 in 1962. 
This projection does not allow for the possible development 
of jet-aircraft, which require much kerosene fuel. In the 
absence of adequate information on the possible expansión 
of military and civil aircraft of this type, no hypothesis will 
be presented on this subject. 
7. Imported coal 
Almost since the First World War, Brazilian coal imports 
have been decreasing. Peak imports—2,262,347 tons—were 
registered in 1913. Since that time, competition from domestic 
coal, petroleum and also fuelwood has prevented an increase 
in the consumption of imported coal, although in 1929 it 
was still over 2 million tons. During the 'thirties, legislation 
providing for tariff protection enabled a substantial increase 
to be achieved in domestic production, which had remained 
almost constant during the previous ten years. Finally, the 
Second World War interrupted supplies from abroad and 
gave a definite stimulus to domestic output. 
As noted in chapter III, the chief reason for the reduction 
in coal imports—at least during the past fifteen years—has 
been the replacement of this fuel on the railways. It suífices 
to quote the reduction from 750,000 tons in 1939 to 165,000 
in 1952. It is highly probable that complete replacement of 
imported coal will be achieved by the railways. 
Sea transport is another sector in which the use of imported 
coal is tending to decline, since it is gradually and entirely 
being replaced by fuel oil and, to a lesser degree, by diesel oil. 
In addition to rail and sea transport, imported coal is 
also used in gas production and by iron and steel plants. 
The Plano Nacional do Carváo predicts the possibility of 
a 30 to 40 per cent substitution of imported coal in the gas 
industry, which consumed 231,000 tons in 1950. It may be 
assumed that this total will expand by at least 60 per cent by 
1962, in view of the increasing population in the cities where 
gas is used. In other words, consumption would then amount 
to 370,000 tons and, allowing 30 per cent for the share of 
domestic production, 260,000 tons of imported coal would 
be required. The metallurgical sector is at present the heaviest 
consumer of imported coal, especially the Volta Redonda 
iron and steel plant. It is thus very likely that the next ten 
years will witness a change in the declining trend of coal 
imports, because of the planned expansión of coke utilization 
in the iron and steel industry. Competent authorities believe 
that between 30 and 40 per cent of all domestic coal mined 
will be used with metallurgical coal in the coke furnaces 
of the steel plants. Assuming that 35 per cent is used, 
approximately 900,000 tons of imported coal will be required 
for a minimum consumption to produce one million tons 
of coke. 
In 1962, therefore, the volume of imports will have risen 
to approximately 1.2 million tons, an increase of 36 per cent 
above 1952. 
8. Aviation petrol 
There has been a very considerable increase in the consump-
tion of high-octane aviation petrol between the pre-war 
period and recent years; it expanded ten-fold between 1939 
and 1949. This period, therefore, does not constitute a satis-
factory basis for a projection11 The rate of increase had in fact 
already begun to decline in 1949, and between 1949 and 1954 
the average rate of growth stood at 11.4 per cent, lower than 
that for the whole group of liquid fuels. In the absence of 
any sounder basis, 11.4 per cent will be used for projection 
purposes, which gives a consumption of 218,000 tons in 1954 
and 517,000 in 1962. 
9. Lubricants 
The increase in the consumption of lubricating oils has 
kept pace with that of liquid fuels; for the projection it has 
1 0 Nevertheless, since the higher fuel prices o f 1955, kerosene tractors 
have become uneconomical as compared with diesel oil and their number 
will probably decline. 
11 The progressive substitution of more modern types o f aircraft will 
result in a considerable saving o f fuel. 
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been assumed that the same relationship will continué in 
coming years. The consumption should therefore reach 
418,000 tons in 1962, or exactly double the volume in 1954. 
10. Aggregate consumption of fuels and lubricants 
Table 116 groups together all the projected consumption 
of the various types of fuels and lubricants. 
Table 116. Brazil Projection of consumption of fuels 
and lubricants 




Petrol (other than aviation) . . . . 2 , 4 0 8 5 , 5 1 4 129 
Fuel oil . . 3 , 0 3 3 5 , 0 5 8 67 
Diesel oil . . 1 , 229 2 , 7 8 4 127 
Kerosene 539 1 ,014 89 
Aviation petrol 218 517 137 
Imported coal 808 1 , 2 0 0 4 9 
Domestic coal . . 2 , 0 1 9 3 , 7 0 0 83 
Lubricants 209 418 100 
Charcoal . . 1 , 3 1 5 1 , 8 2 3 39 
Bagasse . . 5 , 7 0 3 9 , 5 2 4 67 
Table 117. Brazil : Distribution of electric energy 
consumption 
1939 1949 
Total consumption (millions o f kWh) . 2 , 4 8 8 . 7 6 , 2 3 7 . 2 
( Percentages) 
Industry 3 1 . 2 4 7 . 2 
Transport 1 0 . 2 7 . 2 
Railways 3 . 2 5 . 0 
Urban 7 . 0 2 . 2 
Public lighting 6 . 7 6 . 0 
Commerce 1 3 . 9 8 . 6 
Household lighting in capital cities . . . 1 0 . 9 1 5 . 6 
Unspecified® 2 7 . 1 15 .4 
Source : Economic Commission for I<atin America. 
Sources : Industrial Census 1939 and 1949. 
a Including household lighting outside capital cities. 
In order to divide this total among the various industry 
groups, the census data on energy purchased were used. 
Information on the energy produced by individual companies 
for their own consumption, compiled for the 1949 census, 
has not yet been pubhshed; the projection was therefore 
computed by assuming a proportionate increase over the 
figures in the previous census. The results are shown in 
table 118. 
The aggregate consumption of petroleum derivatives is 
thus seen to increase from 7.3 million tons in 1954 to 15.3 mil-
lions in 1962, which represents an average rate of increase 
of 7.2 per cent, compared with 10.7 per cent in 1940-49 
and 12.6 per cent between 1939 and 1954. 
11. Electric energy 
Projection of the demand for electric energy entails a series 
of difficulties caused mainly by the inadequacy of statistical 
data and an additional problem exists which is not encoun-
tered in the case of petroleum derivatives. The consumption 
of electric energy in recent years has been heavily restricted 
through a shortage in the supply. To project the present 
position would therefore be to assume that this abnormal 
situation will continué. The solution to the problem may he in 
preparing an inventory of present shortages, sector by sector. 
Some such attempts have already been made but the results, 
apart from being incomplete, are of doubtful valué. It is 
known that, when enterprises detail their unsatisfied require-
ments the tendency, for various reasons, is to exaggerate them. 
In addition, current unsatisfied needs are usually confused with 
expansión plans for the more or less distant future. The most 
satisfactory solution will probably be to base the projection 
upon the year 1949, when the supply shortage was only just 
beginning to appear. Furthermore, projections based on that 
year enable the data from the census to be used. 
In 1949 consumption of electric energy stood at 6,237.2 
million kWh. Of that total 47.2 per cent was consumed 
by industry, as compared with 31.2 per cent in 1939. The 
major changes in the composition of consumption between 
the two years cited are shown in table 117. 
The composition of energy consumption in 1949, broken 
down into the various industry groups, was calculated on 
the basis of data for the forty largest manufacturing enterprises. 
These data consist of the aggregate energy sold to industry. 
Table 118. Brazil : Breakdown of electric energy 
consumption by manufacturing industries 




Non-metallic minerals . 4 8 . 8 2 5 5 . 6 4 2 3 . 8 
Metallurgy 6 9 . 0 3 8 1 . 3 4 5 2 . 6 
Foodstuffs 148 .1 6 0 0 . 8 3 0 5 . 6 
Textiles 2 6 1 . 1 6 2 9 . 7 1 4 1 . 2 
Chemicals 7 4 . 1 2 8 4 . 5 2 8 3 . 9 
Paper 3 3 . 4 1 3 4 . 0 3 0 1 . 2 
Others 1 4 1 . 3 6 5 6 . 0 3 6 4 . 3 
TOTAL . . . 7 7 5 . 8 2 , 9 4 1 . 9 3 7 9 . 2 
Source : Census statistics and data supplied by the forty largest producing firms. 
The future demand for energy by industries was based on 
the projections of production for each branch of industry 
appearing in Part One. But, to obtain an idea of probable 
energy demand, a hypothesis of production growth in a branch 
of industry is insufficient, because, when industries expand, 
they tend to replace manpower by machinery or to use 
equipment of more advanced technical design. All such 
modifications cause changes in the relationship between the 
volume of production and the consumption of energy. An 
illustration appears in chart II where the growth of connected 
power—that is, installed horse-power—is compared with the 
size of the labour forcé in the principal industry groups. 
As regards manufacturing industries as a whole, the growth 
in installed horse-power was 50 per cent greater than the 
number of workers. But while this difference was only 
12 per cent in the textile industries, in metallurgy it reached 
144 per cent. It is quite possible that utilization of equipment 
during 1949, in relation to 1939, was more intense in one 
branch of industry than in another. In any event, since equip-
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Chart II. Brazil : connected power per worker employed in industry 
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ment utilization was generally more intense in 1949 than in 
1939, the Índices presented here reflect the minimum mechani-
zation which must have taken place. In the textile industry, 
for example, it is known that in 1939 part of the capacity 
remained idle, whereas in 1949 many milis were working 
more than one shift. The difference of 12 per cent thus 
under-estimates mechanization—especially the increase in the 
relative number of automatic looms—which occurred in 
the period under review. 
The present projection assumes that the mechanization 
process, i.e., the dynamic substitution of machines for man-
power, will continué in the near future, or rather until 1962, 
at a rate approximately equal to that shown in the period 
1940-49. This hypothesis is acceptable when it is recalled 
that the growth of heavy industry—metallurgy, mechanical 
and chemical industries—will continué at a more rapid rate 
than in industry as a whole. 
So far as the main industry groups are concerned, chart III 
gives an idea of the increase in labour productivity and of the 
more intensive use of equipment. If the Índices of real pro-
duction are compared with those of employment, it may be 
seen that an appreciable increase in productivity took place. 
The only exception is the paper industry. However, bearing 
in mind the substantial increase in connected power, it may 
be inferred that this is not properly a question of a reduction 
in labour productivity, but of basic alterations in manpower 
structure. In point of fact, the establishment in Brazil of a 
large-scale newsprint and pulp industry altered the structure 
of this branch between 1939 and 1949. The number of unskill-
ed workers must have risen sharply in relative terms, thus 
reducing the comparabihty of the data. 
A more interesting feature than the increment in labour 
productivity is the more than proportionate increase in energy 
consumption as related to connected power. (See again 
chart III.) Electricity consumption grew more heavily than 
connected power in all industry groups. This means that 
the utilization of equipment was more intensive in 1949 
than in 1939. In the foodstuffs industry, intensification in the 
use of machinery appears to be 195, as compared with an 
Índex of 100 in 1939. In the paper industry it reaches 109. 
The remaining industry groups are situated between these 
two extremes. 
The aspects discussed above show that the factors which 
determine the increase in electric energy consumption by 
industries are three in number—(a) growth of industrial 
production, (b) increased mechanization (i.e., increased horse-
power—secondary motors—per worker), and (c) greater 
efficiency in energy utilization. The point of departure for 
each branch of industry in this projection is the hypothesis 
of production growth shown in Part One. It is then assumed 
that the mechanization process will continué at the rate 
observed between 1939 and 1949 and that factor (c) will 
remain constant. The results are given in table 119. 
Table 119. Brazil : Projection of electric energy consumption by industries 
Increased consumption forecast 
for 1949 and 1962, derived from „ , ,, 
. Pro ba ble 
1949 Increased Greater use consumption 
consumption production of machinery in 1962 
Industries (millions. of kWh) (percentajes) Total (millions of kWh) 
Non-metallic minerals 2 5 5 . 6 206 32 238 864 
Metallurgy 3 8 1 . 3 289 206 495 2 , 2 6 9 
Foodstuffs 6 0 0 . 8 82 68 150 1 ,502 
Textiles 6 2 9 . 7 84 12 96 1 ,234 
Chemicals 2 8 4 . 5 194 160 354 1 ,292 
Paper 1 3 4 . 0 167 110 277 506 
Others \ 6 5 6 . 0 158 9 167 1 ,751 
TOTAL . . . 2 , 9 4 1 . 9 — — 220 9 , 4 1 7 
Sources : Table 118 and Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
The total increase in energy consumption by industries 
will thus represent 220 per cent, implying that the annual 
growth rate stands at 9.4 per cent, which may be regarded 
as relatively modest, since it was 14.2 per cent in 1940-49. 
The latter period, as noted earlier, was characterized by great 
intensification in the use of equipment, which largely explains 
the exceptional increase in energy consumption. 
The rise in electric energy consumption in the transport 
sector represents 145.4 per cent, that is to say the annual 
growth rate would be 7.1 per cent, which compares favour-
ably with that of 5.8 per cent for the period 1940-49. It is 
assumed that there will be a recovery in urban electric trans-
port with a substantial expansión in the number of 
trolleybuses. 
Projection of energy consumption in the pubhc lighting 
branch is based on a series of data referring to State capitals 
and the Federal District, which has been available since 1944 
and reflects an annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent. This rate 
was utilized, despite the fact that it is acceptable only in a 
hypothesis of reduced growth, since no allowance is made 
for an increase in the pubhc lighting services through their 
extensión to urban centres without these facilities at present. 
In 1950 about 11 per cent of the municipal districts were in 
this situation. 
The growth of electric energy consumption in commerce 
was projected on the basis of the tendency apparent in several 
cities served by one of the larger power companies. This 
tendency is reflected in an annual growth rate of 9.4 per cent. 
As regards household lighting, similar data exist for capital 
cities in the period starting in 1944, when the annual growth 
rate stood at 13.6 per cent. They were accepted here as a 
preliminary approximation. Household consumption in 
Chart III. Brazil : utilization of capacity and labour productivity 
(1939 = 100) 
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the remaining cities was projected on the same basis. Calcu-
lations for 1949 pre-suppose that per capita consumption 
in the remaining cities is one-third of that in the capitals. 
The group entided " unspecified" was projected on the 
basis of the average for the others. 
Table 120 is a projection for the electric energy sector as 
a whole. 
Aggregate electric energy consumption should grow by 
257.9 per cent, or at an annual rate of 10.3 per cent, which 
is slightly higher than the 9.6 per-cent rate between 1939 
and 1949. Table 121 contains a comparison between the 
projection of energy demand given in this volume, that of 
the National Electrification Plan, and a third extrapolating 
the 1939-49 trend. The projection presented here exceeds 
that of the National Plan by 13 per cent. 
Table 120. Brazil : Projection of electric energy demand 




2 , 9 4 1 . 9 9 , 4 1 7 . 0 220 .1 
4 4 8 . 2 1 , 1 0 0 . 0 1 4 5 . 4 
Railways 3 1 3 . 9 7 2 3 . 0 1 5 4 . 9 
1 3 4 . 3 377 1 2 3 . 4 
Public lighting 3 7 3 . 0 7 1 8 . 8 9 2 . 7 
Commerce 5 6 3 . 3 1 , 7 1 9 . 4 2 2 0 . 6 
Household lighting (capitals) 9 7 3 . 2 5 , 1 0 7 . 4 4 2 4 . 8 
Household lighting (other towns) . . 4 8 2 . 3 2 , 5 3 1 . 1 4 2 4 . 8 
Unspecified 4 8 2 . 3 1 , 7 2 6 . 2 2 5 7 . 9 
TOTAL . . . . 6 , 2 3 7 . 2 2 2 , 3 2 0 . 3 2 5 7 . 5 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
Table 121. Brazil : Comparison between three projections of electric energy demand 
(Millions o f k W h ) 
Percentage A nnual rate 
1949 1962 increase of growth 
Extrapolation o f 1939-1949 tendency 6 , 2 3 7 . 2 2 0 , 5 8 9 . 0 2 3 0 . 1 9 . 6 
National Electrification Plan 6 , 2 3 7 . 2 1 9 , 7 4 0 . 0 2 1 6 . 5 9 . 3 
Hypothesis used in this study 6 , 2 3 7 . 2 2 2 , 3 2 0 . 0 2 5 7 . 9 1 0 . 3 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
To arrive at a projection of total energy consumption, 
certain suppositions will now be made as to the probable 
supply of thermoelectric energy. In addition to the two 
plants which recently entered production—Piratininga and 
Carioba—it is assumed that those proposed in the National 
Electrification Plan will enter operation before 1962. The 
increase in installed capacity of thermal origin would repre-
sent 535,000 kW. (See table 122.) 
Table 122. Brazil : New thermal power stations 
(Kilowatts) 
Piratininga 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Carioba 3 0 , 0 0 0 
Provided for in the Electrification Plan : 
Santa Catarina 200 ,000 
Figueira 5 0 , 0 0 0 
Sao Jerónimo 1 0 , 0 0 0 
Charqueada 4 5 , 0 0 0 
T O T A L . . . 5 3 5 , 0 0 0 
consumed by industry. Allowing for the probable improve-
ment in supply by 1962, it is assumed that the proportion 
will fall to 10 per cent. The increase in this share of energy 
consumption will thus be 494.8 million kWh, as compared 
with 1952. If these two figures are added to total 1952 
consumption, an aggregate of 3,323.2 million kWh is reached, 
which is the probable consumption of thermoelectric energy 
in 1962. Table 123 gives comparative data on the projected 
consumption of electric energy, thermal and hydroelectric 
plants being shown separately. 
Table 123. Brazil : Projection of electric energy consumption 
(Millions o f k W h ) 
1939 1949 1952 1962 
TOTAL 2,488.7 6,237.3 7,607.5 22,320.3 
Sources : Official publications. 
Hydro-electric 2 , 2 6 4 . 1 5 , 5 4 4 . 2 
Thermal 2 2 4 . 6 693 .1 
Percentage o f thermal 
energy to total 9 . 0 11 .1 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
6 , 6 5 8 . 9 
9 4 8 . 6 
1 2 . 5 
1 8 , 9 9 7 . 1 
3 , 3 2 3 . 2 
1 4 . 9 
Since the majority of the power stations mentionned in 
table 122 are of a complementary character—they are part of 
systems mainly consisting of hydroelectric stations—, a mod-
érate utilization factor was assigned to the whole. Assuming 
that the energy dehvered to the consumer would represent 
40 per cent of production capacity, a total of 1,879.8 million 
kWh is obtained. 
Apart from energy generated by the wind, consideration 
must be given to that produced by industrial concerns for 
their own use. According to calculations made here, in 
1949 this source reached 14 per cent of the total energy 
12. Aggregate energy demand 
Table 124 shows that the projection of demand for energy 
from all sources will amount to 77,073 million kWh, always 
assuming that consumption of fuelwood remains more or 
less stationary. The ratio between total energy consumption 
and the gross product should rise from 0.103 to 0.130, 
which clearly indicates that the structural changes imposed 
by the present stage of development on the Brazilian economy 
cause heavy pressure on the energy sector. The funds absorbed 
by this sector must thus necessarily record a relative increase 
in any general development programme. 
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Table 124. Brazil : Projections of the demand for energy 
(Millions o f k W h ) 
Sources 1954 1962 
Liquid fuels 18,817 37,538 
Aviation petrol 553 1 ,311 
Petrol 6 , 0 3 3 13 ,816 
Kerosene 1 , 4 4 3 2 , 7 2 7 
Diesel oil ... 3 , 0 4 8 6 , 9 1 9 
Fuel oil 7 , 6 4 4 12 ,765 
Others 96 — 
Solid fuels 15 MI 20,538 
Coal 4 , 0 9 7 5 , 5 5 4 
Domestic 2 , 5 9 5 4 , 7 4 9 
Imported 1 ,502 2 , 2 3 8 
Fuelwood 6 , 1 6 6 6 , 0 0 0 
Sugar-cane bagasse 2 , 6 2 3 4 , 3 8 0 
Lignite 2 , 2 8 8 3 ,171 
Electric energy 8,307 22,320 
Thermal-electric 3 , 3 2 3 
Hydroelectric — 18 ,997 
Grand total (less thermal electric energy) 
Including fuelwood 42 ,295 7 7 , 0 7 3 
Excluding fuelwood 3 6 , 1 2 9 7 1 , 0 7 3 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
Table 125. Brazil : Consumption of energy, 1939-52 
(Energy : 1939-52) 
Sources of energy Unit 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
A. Liquid fuels 
Aviation petrol . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 1 5 . 6 1 7 . 4 2 3 . 8 6 1 . 2 1 0 9 . 0 5 2 . 6 6 9 . 3 9 4 . 2 
Petrol . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 5 4 3 . 5 5 8 5 . 1 6 1 4 . 9 388.5. 298 .1 3 6 1 . 8 5 3 9 . 9 9 8 2 . 0 
Kerosene . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 1 5 2 . 2 1 4 2 . 5 1 6 5 . 8 9 9 . 3 8 5 . 5 9 3 . 8 1 1 3 . 0 1 6 7 . 7 
Diesel oil 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 4 6 . 6 1 5 6 . 7 1 6 2 . 0 1 2 6 . 9 1 3 3 . 3 1 8 7 . 3 1 7 7 . 4 2 1 8 . 5 
Fuel oil 1 , 0 0 0 t. 5 8 6 . 2 6 9 5 . 0 6 9 6 . 6 6 3 4 . 3 1 , 0 5 4 . 9 6 3 1 . 9 7 6 6 . 6 9 6 2 . 3 
Others : 
Alcohol-gasoline mixture . . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. — — 7 2 . 7 6 0 . 6 1 9 . 4 2 5 . 9 1 1 . 5 1 2 . 2 
Signal-oil t. — — — — — — 3 4 9 . 0 2 0 6 . 0 
Oil for gas production 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 9 . 6 1 6 . 2 12 .1 1 1 . 7 2 3 . 4 2 5 . 7 1 3 . 3 1 5 . 0 
B. Solid fuels 
Coal : 
Domestic 1 , 0 0 0 t. 820 .1 1 , 0 1 4 . 8 1 , 0 3 1 . 9 1 , 2 9 8 . 7 1 , 4 6 1 . 4 1 , 3 1 8 . 1 1 , 4 5 1 . 0 1 , 3 5 5 . 5 
Imported 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 , 3 8 2 . 5 1 , 2 1 0 . 2 1 , 0 5 8 . 3 6 1 6 . 6 5 8 7 . 4 4 9 2 . 1 7 1 5 . 8 ' 1 , 0 7 1 . 0 
Fuelwood a 1 , 0 0 0 m 3 8 8 , 3 5 1 . 0 8 7 , 7 5 9 . 0 9 0 , 4 9 6 . 0 9 3 , 4 4 6 . 0 9 7 , 9 0 3 . 0 1 0 6 , 1 3 7 . 0 1 0 2 , 6 8 8 . 0 8 3 , 4 7 5 . 0 
Sugar-cane bagasse 1 , 0 0 0 t. 2 , 1 8 2 . 3 2 , 5 3 4 . 1 2 , 4 8 2 . 5 2 , 4 3 4 . 5 2 , 3 9 6 . 9 2 , 5 3 1 . 3 2 , 5 0 0 . 5 2 , 9 2 0 . 5 
Lignite 1 , 0 0 0 t. 7 2 0 . 0 7 2 2 . 9 7 4 0 . 4 6 8 1 . 9 9 0 2 . 4 8 9 6 . 6 9 7 8 . 3 5 2 8 . 8 
C. Hydroelectric energy 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 k W h 2 , 2 6 4 . 1 2 , 5 5 5 . 8 2 , 7 8 0 . 1 3 , 0 2 2 . 9 3 , 2 2 3 . 0 3 , 5 4 6 . 6 3 , 7 1 4 . 7 4 , 1 0 2 . 3 
Sources of energy Unit 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
A. Liquid fuels 1 5 . 6 1 7 . 4 2 3 . 8 6 1 . 2 1 0 9 . 0 5 2 . 6 6 9 . 3 9 0 . 2 
Aviation petrol . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 1 4 1 . 9 1 6 3 . 2 1 8 0 . 6 2 0 7 . 0 2 3 4 . 0 2 3 4 . 4 2 3 4 . 1 3 1 7 . 8 
Petrol . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 1 , 1 7 4 . 4 1 , 4 1 3 . 5 1 , 6 9 4 . 8 2 , 0 7 3 . 6 2 , 4 9 1 . 1 2 , 9 8 3 . 5 3 , 1 9 8 . 8 3 , 3 1 4 . 9 
Kerosene . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 187 .1 2 1 5 . 4 2 6 2 . 5 3 2 0 . 8 3 5 9 . 8 4 3 2 . 2 5 5 2 . 4 . 7 2 5 . 1 
Diesel oil 1 , 0 0 0 t. 3 2 1 . 6 4 1 0 . 9 4 7 5 . 2 6 7 6 . 3 6 8 7 . 7 8 7 1 . 9 1 , 0 7 1 . 2 1 , 2 3 4 . 2 
Fuel oil 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 , 1 9 1 . 6 1 , 2 1 7 . 6 1 , 4 3 2 . 1 . 1 , 8 2 4 - 8 2 , 0 4 5 . 5 2 , 3 0 9 . 5 2 , 4 8 6 . 2 3 , 0 9 4 . 8 
Others : 
Alcohol-gasoline mixture , . 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 1. 4 6 . 1 5 9 . 5 6 1 . 2 1 1 . 4 1 9 . 1 6 1 . 3 — — • 
Signal-oil t. 1 8 1 . 0 2 0 7 . 0 1 1 9 . 0 1 9 3 . 0 2 9 4 . 0 2 8 7 . 0 1 8 1 . 2 3 9 0 . 0 
Oil for gas production 1 , 0 0 0 t. 7 . 8 1 0 . 9 1 0 . 1 — 5 . 2 — — — 
B . Solid fuels 
Coal : 
Domestic 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 , 3 5 6 . 2 1 , 4 5 4 . 1 1 , 5 1 4 . 8 1 , 3 4 0 . 7 1 , 3 7 0 . 0 1 , 5 0 0 . 4 2 , 0 2 4 . 9 2 , 0 1 9 . 3 
Imported 1 , 0 0 0 t. 1 , 5 7 2 . 7 1 , 0 8 2 . 9 8 1 4 . 5 1 , 1 5 5 . 6 1 , 0 7 0 . 7 9 5 4 . 9 7 4 5 . 9 8 0 7 . 7 
Fuelwood3 , 1 , 0 0 0 m3 7 9 , 7 1 3 . 0 8 3 , 4 1 4 . 0 8 1 , 2 8 9 . 0 8 2 , 9 3 9 . 0 8 3 , 5 1 1 . 0 7 8 , 3 8 3 . 0 7 6 , 0 3 4 . 7 7 6 , 0 3 4 . 7 
Sugar-cane bagasse 1 , 0 0 0 t. 3 , 7 2 8 . 8 3 , 9 2 0 . 4 3 , 7 8 3 . 0 3 , 6 4 0 . 8 4 , 2 1 3 . 3 4 , 8 0 6 . 2 5 , 3 9 0 . 5 5 , 7 0 2 . 8 
Charcoal 1 , 0 0 0 t. 593 .1 6 3 0 . 2 6 0 4 . 1 7 1 2 . 5 8 6 5 . 5 1 , 0 2 1 . 9 1 , 1 4 0 . 5 l , 3 1 5 . i 
C. Hydroelectric energy 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 k W h 4 , 4 9 8 . 1 5 , 0 0 9 . 8 5 , 5 5 4 . 2 5 , 8 5 0 . 2 6 , 3 0 3 . 5 6 , 6 5 8 . 9 6 , 8 5 8 . 3 8 , 3 0 7 . 2 
Source : Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatistica, National Petroleum Board and Banco a Excluding fuelwood intended for charcoal production. 
fíacipnal do pesenvojvimento ^cotjómico, joint ECLA-JJNDE Working Group, 
Table 126, Brazil : Energy consumption, 1939-1952 
(Millions o f k W h ) 
Sources of energy 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
A. All sources . . . 18 ,405 19 ,097 19 ,490 18 ,625 2 0 , 6 6 8 2 0 , 4 9 6 2 1 , 7 6 9 2 2 , 0 9 3 2 4 , 7 3 9 2 5 , 9 5 8 2 7 , 1 2 5 3 0 , 3 9 8 3 2 , 7 1 7 3 5 , 3 3 1 3 7 , 6 3 7 4 2 , 2 9 5 
B. Liquid fuels 3 , 1 5 7 3 , 5 2 2 3 , 7 1 4 2 , 9 8 2 3 , 9 1 4 3 , 0 5 0 3 , 7 0 4 5 , 2 5 1 6 , 5 6 0 7 , 3 9 5 8 , 7 2 0 10 ,961 1 2 , 4 3 9 14 ,617 1 6 , 1 6 0 1 8 , 8 1 7 
Aviation petrol 27 30 41 106 189 91 120 164 246 283 314 359 406 407 407 553 
Petrol 989 1 ,065 1 , 1 1 9 707 542 658 983 1 , 7 8 7 2 , 1 3 8 2 , 5 7 3 3 , 0 8 5 3 , 7 7 4 4 , 5 3 4 5 , 4 3 0 5 , 8 2 2 6 , 0 3 3 
Kerosene 283 283 330 197 170 187 225 333 372 428 522 638 715 859 1 , 0 9 9 1 , 4 4 3 
Diesel oil 362 387 400 314 329 463 438 540 794 1 , 0 1 5 1 , 1 7 4 1 ,671 1 , 6 9 9 2 , 1 5 4 2 , 6 4 6 3 , 0 4 8 
Fuel oil 1 , 4 4 8 1 ,717 1 ,721 1 , 5 6 7 2 , 6 0 6 1 ,561 1 , 8 9 3 2 , 3 7 7 2 , 9 4 3 3 , 0 0 8 3 , 5 3 7 4 , 5 0 7 5 , 0 5 2 5 , 7 0 4 6 , 1 4 1 7 , 6 4 4 
Others a 48 40 103 91 78 90 45 50 67 88 88 12 33 63 45 96 
C. Solid fuels , . . . 12 ,984 13 ,019 12 ,996 1 2 , 6 2 0 1 3 , 5 2 6 1 3 , 8 9 9 1 4 , 3 5 0 1 2 , 7 4 0 13 ,681 1 3 , 5 5 3 12 ,861 13 ,587 1 3 , 9 7 4 14 ,055 1 4 , 6 1 9 15 ,171 
Coal 3 , 5 5 6 3 , 4 7 2 3 ,221 2 , 7 2 8 2 , 9 0 6 2 , 5 6 0 3 , 1 6 5 3 , 7 0 2 4 , 6 7 1 3 , 8 8 3 3 , 4 7 2 3 , 9 4 0 3 , 7 5 2 3 , 7 0 4 3 , 9 8 9 4 , 0 9 7 
Domestic 985 1 ,221 1 , 2 5 2 1 ,581 1 , 8 1 3 1 , 6 4 5 1 , 8 3 3 1 , 7 1 0 1 , 7 4 6 1 , 8 6 9 1 , 9 5 7 1 ,791 1 ,761 1 , 9 2 8 2 , 6 0 2 2 , 5 9 5 
Imported 2 , 5 7 1 2 ,251 1 , 9 6 9 1 , 1 4 7 1 , 0 9 3 915 1 , 3 3 2 1 , 9 9 2 2 , 9 2 5 2 , 0 1 4 1 , 5 1 5 2 , 1 4 9 1 ,991 1 , 7 7 6 1 , 3 8 7 1 , 5 0 2 
Fuelwoodb 7 , 1 7 1 7 , 1 2 3 7 , 3 4 5 7 , 5 8 5 7 , 9 4 7 8 , 6 1 5 8 , 3 3 3 6 , 7 7 5 6 , 4 7 0 6 , 7 7 0 6 , 5 9 8 6 , 7 3 2 6 , 7 7 8 6 , 3 6 2 6 , 1 6 6 6 , 1 6 6 
Sugar-cane bagasse 1 ,004 1 ,166 1 , 1 4 2 1 , 1 2 0 1 , 1 0 3 1 , 1 6 4 1 , 1 5 0 1 , 3 4 3 1 , 5 0 8 1 , 8 0 3 1 , 7 4 0 1 , 6 7 5 1 , 9 3 8 2 , 2 1 1 2 , 4 8 0 2 , 6 2 3 
Charcoal 1 , 2 5 3 1 ,258 1 , 2 8 8 1 , 1 8 7 1 , 5 7 0 1 , 5 6 0 1 , 7 0 2 920 1 , 0 3 2 1 , 0 9 7 1 , 0 5 1 1 , 2 4 0 1 , 5 0 6 1 , 7 7 8 1 , 9 8 4 2 , 2 8 8 
D. Hydroelectric energy 2 , 2 6 4 2 , 5 5 6 2 , 7 8 0 3 , 0 2 3 3 , 2 2 8 3 , 5 4 7 3 , 7 1 5 4 , 1 0 2 4 , 4 9 8 5 , 0 1 0 5 , 5 4 4 5 , 8 5 0 6 , 3 0 4 6 , 6 5 9 6 , 8 5 8 8 , 3 0 7 
Source : Joint ECLA-BNDE Working Group. 
a Including petroleum for natural gas production, 
b Excluding fuelwood for charcoal productiou. 
Signal oil " and alcohol-gasolene mixture. 
Table 127. Brazil Index of energy consumption, 1939-52 
(1939 = 100) 
Sources of energy 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 
A. All sources 100 104 106 101 112 111 118 120 134 141 147 165 178 192 204 230 
B. Liquid fuels 100 112 118 94 124 97 117 166 208 234 276 347 394 463 512 596 
Aviation petrol 100 111 153 393 700 338 445 605 911 1 , 0 4 8 1 , 1 5 9 1 , 3 2 9 1 , 5 0 2 1 , 5 0 5 1 , 5 0 7 2 , 0 4 8 
Petrol 100 108 113 72 55 67 . 99 181 216 260 312 382 458 549 589 610 
Kerosene 100 100 117 70 6 0 66 79 118 132 151 185 226 253 304 388 510 
Diesel oil 100 107 111 87 91 128 121 149 219 280 324 462 469 595 731 842 
Fuel oil 100 119 119 108 180 108 131 164 203 208 244 311 349 394 424 528 
Others a 100 86 214 187 160 186 94 103 138 182 181 25 68 131 94 200 
C. Solid fuels 100 100 100 97 104 107 111 98 105 104 99 105 108 108 113 117 
Coal 100 98 91 77 82 72 89 104 131 109 98 111 106 104 112 115 
Domestic 100 124 127 161 184 167 186 174 177 190 199 182 179 196 264 263 
Imported 100 88 77 45 42 36 52 77 114 78 59 84 77 69 54 58 
Fuelwoodb 100 99 102 106 111 120 116 94 90 94 92 94 95 89 86 86 
Sugar-cane bagasse 100 116 114 112 110 116 115 134 150 180 173 167 193 220 247 261 
Charcoal 100 100 103 95 125 123 136 73 82 88 84 99 120 142 158 183 
D. Hydroelectric energy 100 113 123 134 143 157 164 181 199 221 245 258 278 294 303 367 
Source : Joint ECIyA-BNDE Working Group. 
ft Including petroleum for gas production, " Signal oil " and alcohol-gasoline mixture. 
b Excluding fuelwood for charcoal production. Ln 
Chapter II 
FISCAL OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
I . INTRODUCTION 
The primary object of this chapter is to present a compre-
hensive description of receipts, expenditure, savings and 
investment of the pubhc sector in Brazil, to be used in the 
calculation and projection of national income. In addition, 
an attempt is made to analyse the role of the pubhc sector 
as reflected in its fiscal operations, from the viewpoint of the 
economy as a whole. Attention is concentrated largely on 
year-to-year changes of major significance, since the period 
covered is too short to shed any light on long-term trends. 
Finally, a brief analysis is devoted to federal budget trans-
actions for the purpose of evaluating their importance in 
relation to the whole pubhc sector. The period studied covers 
the years 1947 to 1953, because more recent data on a com-
parable basis could not be obtained at the time the analysis 
was prepared. However, the classification scheme of 
government transactions adopted herein provides a basic 
framework which can be utilized for the presentation of 
comparable data on future years as they become available. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The introduc-
tion contains a brief description of the various legal forms 
under which governmental activities are carried out and 
of the concept of the pubhc sector employed here. The 
second section analyses pubhc sector transactions, with special 
emphasis on the changes in the relation of income aggre-
gates. This is followed by a review of over-all changes in 
federal budget transactions within the framework of the 
pubhc sector. 
1. Structure of the public sector 
Governmental functions in Brazil are performed at the 
federal, state and municipal levels.1 Operating at the federal 
level, in addition to the central Government, are numerous 
autonomous bodies with social security, industrial, financial 
and regulatory activities. Although these agencies have 
their own separate budgets, they are also dependent in varying 
degrees on the Federal Government for subsidies and grants. 
There are twenty states and a Federal District, which is 
usually classified as a state. Autonomous agencies also exist 
at the state level, but they are relatively few in number and 
their operations are comparatively small. As in the case of 
federal agencies, they are dependent on their respective state 
governments for financial aid to meet any operating losses 
and to undertake investment projects. 
Finally, there are 1,932 municipalities, each having a separate 
budget and functioning as a separate entity. 
1 The term " government " is henceforth used as a synonym for the 
public sector; that is to say it includes the authorities at the federal, state 
and municipal levels. When reference is made to a given administrative 
unit, the term is specified. 
2. Definition of the public sector 
While a nucleus of fiscal operations typified by the trans-
actions recorded in the budget of central governments is 
easily identifiable, there are many autonomous agencies whose 
governmental characteristics are not clearly defined. Thus, 
a problem of identity usually arises. The decisión to exelude 
or include a particular ageney is, in most cases, somewhat 
arbitrary. It is based either on practical grounds or on a 
concept most relevant to the research task at hand. 
The definition of the pubhc sector employed herein is 
somewhat broad. It embraces the fiscal operations of the 
central Government at all levels and of all agencies at the 
federal level, except for those in which the Government 
is only a shareholder. The choice of this definition was 
dictated primarily by the need to present as comprehensive 
a picture as possible of the pubhc sector which could be 
utilized for national income calculations and projections. 
The decisión to exelude autonomous agencies at the state 
level and the transactions of partly owned enterprises, which 
are of importance at the federal level only, was based largely 
on practical grounds. The lack of readily available data was 
the ruling consideration in the case of state autonomous 
agencies. Partly owned enterprises were excluded, mainly 
because they are estabhshed as private corporations under 
Brazilian law. Moreover, although the Federal Government 
is a majority shareholder in all such existing enterprises, it 
wás not possible to ascertain whether, in practice, their 
decisions on current and investment operations were guided 
principally by considerations of government pohcy. It should 
be noted, however, that the capital flow to these various 
enterprises, included by governments in the budget accounts, 
have been shown herein as capital transfers. Moreover, 
dividends transferred to governments by these agencies have 
also been taken into account. 
I I . SIZE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
1. Changes in size of the public sector 
An attempt has been made in table 128 to present an over-
all picture of pubhc sector transactions. The data have been 
broken down into major components of particular relevance 
to national income accounting and so presented as to throw 
hght on the pubhc sector in its dual role of consumer and 
producer. It may be seen that government fiscal operations 
showed a substantial expansión in absolute terms during 
1947-52. Total receipts and expenditure rose by about 144 
per cent and 168 per cent, respectively. It is interesting to 
note, however, that the major components of pubhc sector 
operations did not expand at the same pace over this period. 
Tax revenue advanced by 147 per cent between 1947 and 
1952, as compared with a rise of 122 per cent in non-tax 
receipts. On the expenditure side, capital outlays showed 
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the greatest rise with an increase of 236 per cent from 1947 147 per cent for transfer payments and current outlays on 
to 1952, as compared with increases of 170 per cent and goods and services respectively. 
Table 128. Brazil : Income savings and investment in the public sector 
(Millions o f cruzeiros) 
1947 1948 19Í9 1950 1951 1952 
A. Transfer receipts : 
Tax receipts 2 5 , 2 4 8 . 1 2 9 , 4 0 0 . 6 3 5 , 1 1 3 . 4 4 0 , 8 8 6 . 4 5 5 , 0 1 0 . 7 6 2 , 3 7 0 . 5 
Non-tax receipts 3 , 5 2 7 . 5 4 , 3 7 8 . 0 5 , 3 2 0 . 0 5 , 5 4 0 . 0 7 , 1 1 4 . 5 7 , 8 4 4 . 5 
Sub-total . . . 2 8 , 7 7 5 . 6 3 3 , 7 7 8 . 6 4 0 , 4 3 3 . 4 4 6 , 4 2 6 . 4 6 2 , 1 2 5 . 2 7 0 , 2 1 5 . 0 
B. Transfer payments 6 , 0 7 3 . 7 7 , 0 3 6 . 8 9 , 5 2 7 . 9 1 1 , 3 0 2 . 6 1 3 , 5 1 0 0 1 6 , 5 4 4 . 0 
C. Disposable income (A-B) 2 2 , 7 0 1 . 9 2 6 , 7 4 1 . 8 3 0 , 9 0 5 . 5 3 5 , 1 2 3 . 8 4 8 , 6 1 5 . 2 5 3 , 6 7 1 . 0 
D. Current expenditure on goods and services . 1 5 , 8 0 0 . 9 1 8 , 8 0 4 . 9 2 2 , 7 6 6 3 2 7 , 4 0 9 . 4 3 1 , 8 1 6 . 3 3 9 , 1 5 4 . 2 
E. Savings (C-D) 6 , 9 0 1 . 0 7 , 9 3 6 . 9 8 , 1 3 9 . 2 7 , 7 1 4 . 4 1 6 , 7 9 8 . 9 1 4 , 5 1 6 . 8 
F. Capital formation a 5 , 8 5 3 . 0 8 , 0 6 2 . 6 1 1 , 5 9 7 . 5 1 4 , 2 7 1 . 9 1 5 , 6 0 6 . 6 1 9 , 7 0 2 . 3 
G. Net increase ( + ) or decrease (—) in cash 
and claims + 1 , 0 4 8 . 0 — 1 2 5 . 7 — 3 , 4 5 8 . 3 — 6 , 5 5 7 . 5 + 1 , 1 9 2 . 3 — 5 , 1 8 5 . 5 
Source : Economic Commission for I*atin America. 
NOTE.—Savings and capital formation have been expressed on a gross 
basis, since there were insufficient data to allow for depreciation char-
ges. It should be noted, however, that the net results, or item G, net 
increase ( + ) or decrease (—) in eash and claims would not be affected if 
such a calculation could be carried out. For purposes of analysis of 
current economic trends, the difference between " capital " receipts 
such as inheritance taxes (included under item A), and net purchases 
of existing assets (included under item F) could be deducted from the 
net increase in cash and claims. Since these items are of a relatively 
small order of magnitude, such a calculation would not result in any 
significant changes in " surplus " or " déficits 
a Including net purchases of existiug real assets. 
This considerable increment in the volume of governmental 
transactions may be attributed to several factors. Of major 
importance has been the assumption of greater responsibi-
lities by all governmental authorities from 1947 onwards, 
which in some measure aróse from the relatively broad role 
assigned to government in the new Constitution of 1946, 
particülarly in the fields of development and welfare. Thus 
governments at all levels were required to set aside a fixed 
percentage of tax receipts for the maintenance and expansión 
of educational facilities, for development of the Amazon 
Valley, of the Sao Francisco River and of the north-eastern 
area. 
The growing consciousness of development, accompanied 
by an increased emphasis on the role to be played by govern-
ment in this field as reflected in the Constitution, also exerted 
a powerful influence on the expansión of activities and on 
orienting over-all government policy. Thus, the Federal 
Government in 1949 set up an investment programme (Salte 
Plan) aimed at improving and expanding health, transport 
and electric energy facilities and at increasing agricultural 
production. This was foliowed in 1951 by another develop-
ment plan which concentrated largely on implementing pro-
jects prepared by the Joint Brazil United States Economic 
Development Commission in the field of transport and electric 
energy. State and local authorities pursued, to some extent, 
similar policies of increasing investment outlays, with major 
emphasis on road construction. 
More recently, the Federal Government established two 
new banks, the Bank for National Economic Development 
and the Bank for the North-East. The basic purpose of these 
banks is to help finance both private and public projects 
which would contribute to the further development of the 
national economy. Various other measures taken by the 
Federal Government, and also by governments at all levels, 
would indicate that policy is still basically oriented towards 
encouraging a higher rate of economic development. 
Another factor of major significance during this period 
was the accelerated growth of productivity and income of 
individuáis and enterprises, which raised taxation receipts 
of the government. On the other hand, as a consequence 
of the demographic growth and the shift of the population 
caused by rapid industrialization, governments were faced 
with the need to create new public services and an expansión 
of existing facilities. 
The relatively substantial price, cost and income inflation 
which accompanied this accelerated growth also contributed 
to the rise in mónetary terms of the fiscal operations of the 
public sector, as may be seen in table 128. Government 
wages, salaries, pensions and benefit payments had thus to 
be increased because of the rise in the cost of living. Unfor-
tunately, the data available did not enable a quantitative 
assessment to be made of the impact of the prevailing inflation 
upon government fiscal operations. 
The incorporation of privately owned railways and other 
enterprises, the creation of a new federal ageney for the 
construction of low-cost housing and the broadening of the 
price-support programme for agricultural products also 
contributed to the growth of the public sector. 
The expansión in receipts was evidently a consequence of 
the growth in national income and the inflationary rise in 
prices and income. But an additional factor of some import-
ance was the introduction of rate increases in almost all the 
major taxes. It is interesting to note, however, that no new 
taxes of major importance were introduced during this 
period and that the main increases were introduced largely 
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at the state and federal level. While state governments 
raised the incidence of taxation on sales, the Federal Govern-
ment appears to have introduced only somewhat moderate 
increases in the rates of both direct and indirect taxes. 
This review of factors which accounted for the growth 
of the pubhc sector should not be considered as exhaustive, 
but rather as an attempt to emphasize those which appear 
to have had the greatest influence. Although it is impossible 
to measure, with any degree of accuracy, the impact of each 
of these factors, it would appear that the accelerated rate of 
growth of the economy and the accompanying inflation were 
the two most important contributory elements. 
2. Changes in the major components 
of the operations 
An analysis of the changes in the major components of 
Federal Government taxation, as shown in table 128, should 
throw further hght on the effects of the various factors dis-
cussed above upon fiscal operations in the public sector. 
Disposable government income advanced at almost the same 
pace as transfer receipts, although transfer payments rose 
steadily during the period, reaching in 1952 a level 172 per 
cent higher than in 1947. As a consequence, the ratio of dis-
posable income to transfer receipts remained at about the 
same level throughout this period. This is all the more 
significant in the hght of steadily rising losses in federal public 
undertakings and of the implementation by governments of 
a broader social pohcy. But the relatively small increase in 
interest payments helped to reduce somewhat the level of 
transfer payments.2 
Another feature emphasized by the data in table 128 is 
that although current expenditure on goods and services rose 
by about 150 per cent during this period, the central Govern-
ment was able to achieve steadily rising surpluses on current 
account. These surpluses, however, were not sufEcient to 
cover capital outlays, and as a result déficits were incurred 
in four of the six years. The large capital expenditure 
reflected to a great extent the new direction of government 
pohcy towards accelerating the rate of development of the 
country. Nevertheless, it should be noted that 10 to 15 per 
cent of these capital outlays were made by social security 
institutes for the construction of luxury apartments. 
It is interesting to observe that 1949 was the first year in 
which a heavy over-all déficit appeared, which mainly reflects 
the considerable rise in capital expenditure in relation to pre-
vious years, partly as a result of the apphcation of the Salte Plan. 
The appearance of a surplus in 1951 was the result of an 
unprecedented rise in taxation revenue, as compared with 
the increase in current expenditure and transfer payments. 
Furthermore, capital outlay in 1951 rose only moderately 
above the 1950 level owing to the retrenchment pohcy 
adopted by the Federal Government in its efforts to balance 
the budget. The recurrence of a heavy déficit in 1952 can 
be ascribed largely to the drop in government savings and to 
the extra-budgetary expenditure of 4,400 million cruzeiros 
made by the Federal Government for the purchase of the 
domestic cotton crop which was held in reserve at the end 
of the year. 
2 This may be explained by the decline in foreign indebtedness and the 
absence of any substantial rise is the federal domestic debt. 
With final reference to table 128, it should be pointed out 
that the déficits incurred by the pubhc sector had a far greater 
impact on private savings arid on the whole economy than 
a mere glance at the figures might indicate. The déficits 
were largely fmanced by currency issues of the Federal Govern-
ment owing in part to the lack of a money market and in 
part to the limited interest in government securities as com-
pared with private bonds. This method of déficit financing 
was undoubtedly more inflationary in effect than that of 
government borrowing aimed at absorbing credit funds on 
the market. Currency issues led to increased liquidity of 
the banking system and thus laid the basis for the additional 
expansión of commercia] credit which occured. In the case 
of the largest State, Sao Paulo, however, a certain amount 
of financing was done through issues of short-term bonds, 
which were sold at a high discount rate owing to the ever-
increasing volume floated and to the nature of the market. 
In practice, the déficits of the federal budget, of federal 
autonomous agencies and of state and local authorities were, 
and still are, fmanced by advances from the Banco do Brasil. 
In turn, this bank obtained advances from the Federal Redis-
count Department to meet such credit demands. Finally, 
the Rediscount Department requested the Federal Treasury 
for an issue of currency to replenish its reserves. Although 
the Federal Government had the legal power to curtail 
advances to autonomous agencies and to state and local 
authorities by exercising its control over the credit pohcy 
of the Banco do Brasil, in actual fact, the restriction was 
exercised only to a very limited extent. 
The net result of this type of déficit financing was to generate 
substantial inflationary pressures and thus aggravate the 
existing inflation created by commercial credit expansión 
and by external influences, such as the considerable rise in 
world market coffee prices which occured from 1949 onwards. 
Further discussion of fiscal pohcy will be found in a later 
section.3 
3. Importance of the public sector in relation 
to the national product 
So far, the discussion has been confined to the over-all 
growth of the major components of the pubhc sector trans-
actions and changes in them. It might be appropriate, there-
fore, to ascertain whether these changes have beenof a purely 
nominal character, or whether they reflect changes in real 
terms. The available data, unfortunately, do not lend them-
selves to such precise measurements. It is possible, however, 
to obtain a quantitative picture of the changes in relative 
terms, both in the size and significance of the pubhc sector 
from variations in its share of the national product. An 
attempt has been made in table 129 to present pubhc sector 
transactions in terms of ratios of relevant components of the 
national product. Undoubtedly, these ratios do not reflect 
too accurately the changes in real terms which have occurred, 
but they do give a relatively good indication of the demands 
made by the pubhc sector on the flow of goods and services 
within the economy. 
The almost regular rise in aggregate pubhc sector expendi-
ture and receipts in relation to national product shown in 
table 129 is a fairly clear indication of the growth experienced 
by the pubhc sector throughout this period. Moreover, 
3 See section III of this chapter dealing with the role of the federal budget. 
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Table 129. Brazil : Public sector transactions in relation to national income 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
A. Public sector expenditure to net national 
income at market prices 1 8 . 0 1 9 . 6 • 2 1 . 9 2 2 . 7 2 1 . 5 2 3 . 2 
B. Public sector receipts to net national 
income at market prices 1 8 . 3 1 9 . 3 2 0 . 1 1 9 . 8 2 1 . 8 2 1 . 5 
C. Current purchases of goods and services 
to net national product at market 
prices 1 0 . 0 10 .7 1 1 . 3 1 1 . 7 11 .1 1 2 . 0 
D. Transfer payments a to personal income 3 . 6 3 . 7 4 . 3 4 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 6 
E. Government capital formation to aggre-
gate capital formation 2 2 . 1 3 1 . 7 3 4 . 8 3 9 . 0 2 9 . 6 3 0 . 3 
F. Direct tax receipts to national income . 4 . 6 4 . 7 4 . 8 . 4 . 9 5 . 4 5 . 7 
G. Personal income tax receipts to personal 
income 2 . 7 2 . 4 2 . 6 2 . 7 3 . 1 3 . 1 
H. Indirect tax receipts to net national 
income at market prices 1 2 . 0 1 2 . 6 1 3 . 2 13 .1 1 4 . 6 14 .1 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
a Excluding subsidies to private enterprises, déficits of public enterprises and grants to public undertakings. 
it clearly illustrates the increased participation and growing 
significance of the public sector in the. Brazilian economy. 
The apparent reversal of this trend in public sector expen-
diture relative to national income in 1951 and 1952 may be 
explained in part by the curtailment of federal capital outlays 
mentioned earlier and in part by the fact that the expen-
diture of municipalities is under-estimated owing to the 
use of budget figures. The decline in the ratio of receipts 
from 1951 to 1952 may be largely attributed to the smaller 
rise in the volume of receipts. This, in turn, was mainly 
the result of a fall in absolute terms in the yield of import 
duties, of the taxes on exchange remittances and on 
dividends. Moreover, as in the case of expenditure, receipts 
of municipalities are also under-estimated. 
It is significant that consumption expenditure of the public 
sector showed a moderate but steady rise relative to national 
income. This may be ascribed to a large extent to the expan-
sión of public services required by the growing population 
and increased industrialization. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that wages and salaries amounted to about two-
thirds of total current expenditure on goods and services 
throughout this period. Because almost all government 
wages and salaries appear to have lagged somewhat behind 
the inflationary rise in the price level, the expansión of this 
type of expenditure relative to national income was probably 
greater than would be indicated by the figures. This lag and 
the under-estimate of the expenditure of municipalities 
referred to earlier, tend to explain in part the levelling off 
in 1951 and 1952 of die ratios of the current outlay on goods 
and services as compared with aggregate expenditure. 
The steady advance of transfer payments relative to personal 
income reflects in some measure the application of an official 
policy of providing greater social and educational benefits 
for the community. This rise is all the more striking when 
it is seen that personal income more than doubled between 
1947 and 1952. The growing importance of transfer pay-
ments as an element of personal income clearly illustrates the 
changing and important role played by government in the 
redistribution of income. 
The effect upon the economy of the relative growth in the 
public sector is perhaps more clearly borne out by the changes 
which occured in governmental capital formation in relation 
to aggregate capital formation. Government capital for-
mation rose in absolute terms by 239 per cent between 
1947 and 1952, while capital formation for the economy 
as a whole increased by only 148 per cent over this same 
period. The large relative increase in government invest-
ment from 1947 to 1948 largely aróse from a decline' in 
private capital formation. In 1949 and 1950, the annual 
increases were obtained despite substantial increments in pri-
vate capital formation. The sharp decline in relative terms 
during both 1951 and 1952 was caused by the slower rate 
of increase in the volume of capital outlays, largely a 
result of a reduction in federal expenditure for investment 
and also by a drastic curtailment during 1952 of investments 
by social security institutions. In fact, public investment 
would have shown an even greater drop in 1952 had it not 
been for the heavy federal expenditure on the purchase of 
the domestic cotton crop which was largely held in bond at 
the end of the year. 
It is doubtful whether correction for the under-estimate 
of municipal expenditure from 1951 and 1952, referred to 
earlier, would result in any significant change in the ratios, 
since the amounts involved in such investment would tend 
to be relatively small. 
The salient 'feature is the shift from private to public capital 
formation, particülarly during the period 1947 to 1950. 
Thus, the steady increase of public investment in absolute 
terms acted as a stabilizing influence which offset the sharp 
fluctuations in private investment. 
A striking feature on the receipt side is that the relation 
of direct tax receipts to national income remained at more 
or less the same level for most of the priod. The relatively 
limited expansión shown by direct tax receipts may have 
been caused by two factors : the slow progress of the compre-
hensive income and profits tax structure, notwithstanding 
the changes introduced in 1947 and 1951; and, very wide-
spread taxation evasión—as repeatedly stressed by the Federal 
Table 130. Brazil : Expenditure of public sector 
(Millions o f cruzeiros and percentages) 
Closed Accounls 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 a 1952 s 
Current expenditure on goods and services : 
Compensation to employees : 
Civil agencies 7 , 3 0 3 . 8 2 5 . 8 9 , 2 9 9 . 7 2 7 . 0 1 0 , 8 7 9 . 2 2 4 . 6 1 3 , 0 1 5 . 8 2 4 . 4 1 5 , 4 5 2 . 5 2 5 . 1 2 0 , 0 6 7 . 6 2 6 . 0 
Defence agencies 2 , 8 2 0 . 5 1 0 . 0 3 , 0 0 2 . 6 - 8 . 7 3 , 7 9 8 . 8 8 . 6 3 , 9 4 5 . 0 7 . 4 4 , 9 4 5 . 6 8 . 0 5 , 5 1 8 . 0 7 . 3 
Sub-total . . . 1 0 , 1 2 4 . 3 3 5 . 8 1 2 , 3 0 2 . 3 3 5 . 7 1 4 , 6 7 8 . 0 3 3 . 2 1 6 , 9 6 0 . 8 3 1 . 8 2 0 , 3 9 8 . 1 3 3 . 2 2 5 , 5 8 5 . 6 3 3 . 3 
Other purchases of goods and services : 
4 , 1 5 5 . 9 14 .7 5 , 0 9 2 . 9 1 4 . 8 6 , 5 3 6 . 2 14 .8 8 , 6 4 3 . 3 1 6 . 2 9 , 8 2 5 . 2 1 6 . 0 1 1 , 1 0 3 . 8 1 4 . 6 
Defence agencies : 
Current 1 , 0 5 2 . 3 3 . 7 9 5 5 . 2 2 . 8 9 9 5 . 2 2 . 2 1 , 1 7 9 . 1 2 . 2 1 , 1 5 8 . 9 1 . 9 1 , 3 2 0 . 1 1 . 7 
Capital 4 6 8 . 4 1 . 6 4 5 4 . 5 1 . 3 5 5 6 . 9 1 . 3 6 2 6 . 2 1 . 2 4 3 4 . 1 0 . 7 1 , 1 4 4 . 7 1 . 5 
Sub-total . . . 5 , 6 7 6 . 6 2 0 . 0 6 , 5 0 2 . 6 1 8 . 9 8 , 0 8 8 . 3 1 8 . 3 1 0 , 4 4 8 . 6 1 9 . 6 1 1 , 4 1 8 . 2 1 8 . 6 1 3 , 5 6 8 . 6 1 7 . 9 
Sub-total current expenditure on goods and 
services 1 5 , 8 0 0 . 9 5 5 . 8 1 8 , 8 0 4 . 9 5 4 . 6 2 2 , 7 6 6 . 3 5 1 . 4 2 7 , 4 0 9 . 4 5 1 . 5 3 1 , 8 1 6 . 3 5 1 . 7 3 9 , 1 5 4 . 2 5 1 . 6 
Losses on public undertakings 8 7 3 . 6 3 . 1 1 , 1 3 7 . 0 3 . 3 1 , 7 9 3 . 1 4 . 1 2 , 3 0 9 . 6 4 . 3 2 , 3 7 7 . 4 3 . 9 2 , 9 1 0 . 7 3 . 8 
Gratuities to individuáis 2 , 8 7 0 . 3 1 0 . 1 3 , 3 4 5 . 0 9 . 7 4 , 5 6 6 . 9 1 0 . 3 5 , 5 0 2 . 0 1 0 . 3 7 , 3 3 5 . 0 1 1 . 9 9 , 2 0 7 . 9 1 2 . 1 
Interest 1 , 4 9 5 . 1 5 . 3 1 , 6 0 1 . 7 4 . 7 1 , 7 0 9 . 7 4 . 1 1 , 9 3 9 . 4 3 . 6 2 , 1 4 6 . 9 3 . 5 2 , 3 9 8 . 6 3 . 2 
Other transfers to private sectorb 834 .7 2 . 9 9 5 3 . 1 2 . 8 1 , 3 6 9 . 2 3 . 1 1 , 5 5 1 . 6 2 . 9 1 , 6 5 0 . 7 2 . 6 2 , 0 3 6 . 8 2 . 7 
Sub-total current expenditure 2 1 , 8 7 4 . 6 7 7 . 2 2 5 , 8 4 1 . 7 7 5 . 0 3 2 , 2 9 4 . 2 7 3 . 0 3 8 , 7 1 2 . 0 7 2 . 7 4 5 , 3 2 6 . 3 7 3 . 7 5 5 , 7 0 8 . 2 7 3 . 4 
Capital expenditure : 
Expenditure on new physical assets 5 , 7 7 7 . 6 2 0 . 4 8 , 1 1 8 . 6 2 3 . 6 1 1 , 5 3 6 . 3 2 6 . 1 1 4 , 1 0 1 . 8 2 6 . 5 1 5 , 4 8 2 . 6 2 5 . 2 1 5 , 2 3 9 . 0 2 0 . 1 
Increase ( + ) or decrease (—) in inventories . . — 1 3 . 7 — + 1 0 . 8 — — 1 6 . 3 — + 6 . 3 — + 5 . 7 — + 4 , 4 5 3 . 5 5 . 9 
Purchase of existing physical assets 9 3 . 8 0 . 3 9 2 . 0 0 . 3 1 6 5 . 6 0 . 4 2 1 3 . 1 0 . 4 1 3 9 . 5 0 . 2 1 8 3 . 0 0 . 2 
Sub-total capital expenditure 5 , 8 5 7 . 7 2 0 . 7 8 , 2 2 1 . 4 2 3 . 9 1 1 , 6 8 5 . 6 2 6 . 4 1 4 , 3 2 1 . 2 2 6 . 9 1 5 , 6 2 7 . 8 2 5 . 4 • 1 9 , 8 7 5 . 5 2 6 . 2 
Purchases of ownership rights c 5 8 4 . 9 2 . 1 3 7 3 . 3 1 . 1 2 8 5 . 4 0 . 6 2 0 6 . 7 0 . 4 5 6 5 . 5 0 . 9 2 7 2 . 1 0 . 4 
GRAND TOTAL EXPENDITURE D . . . 2 8 , 3 1 7 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 3 4 , 4 3 6 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 4 4 , 2 6 5 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 5 3 , 2 3 9 . 9 1 0 0 . 0 6 1 , 5 1 9 . 6 1 0 0 . 0 7 5 , 8 5 5 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. c Corresponds to capital grants to semi-public undertakings. 
* Includes budget estimates for municipalities. a Exeludes amortization of public debt and federal government contribution to the International 
b Covers largely subsidies to private educational and health institutions. Bank for Reconstructiou aud Development. 
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Income Tax Office— by both individuáis and enterprises. 
Another factor of secondary importance was the time-lag 
in revising property assessments in face of rapidly rising 
property valúes. A more detailed discussion of this problem 
follows.4 
The increase in the ratio of direct tax receipts to national 
income in 1951 and 1952 largely aróse from a higher yield 
from those taxes. This, in turn, was the result of a combina-
tion of factors : substantial increments in personal mónetary 
incomes and profits over previous years; unprecedented 
dividend distribution during 1951, in anticipation of the 
introduction of higher taxes; increased income and profits 
tax rates effective early in 1952; and an improvement in tax 
collection methods. 
The influence exerted by some of the above-mentioned 
factors on direct tax yields is perhaps more clearly demons-
trated by the behaviour of the relation of personal income 
taxes to personal income. The relative stability of these 
ratios, particülarly during the years 1947-50, can be better 
understood when viewed in the light of changes in the 
patterns of receipts from individual taxes. Thus, the yields 
from the dividend tax and social security contributions 
from employees, which were both levied at fíat rates, rose 
continuously and had increased in 1950 by 73 per cent and 
68 per cent respectively over 1947. In contrast, however, 
the revenue from other individual income taxes, principally 
on wages and salaries, remained at about the same level 
throughout this same period, rising in 1950 only by 18 per 
cent over the level of the three previous years. The slight in-
crease in the ratios for 1951 and 1952 was largely the reflec-
tion of an unprecedented rise in dividend tax receipts in 1951, 
of the maintenance of the same level in 1952, and of the 
considerable annual increments in other individual income 
tax receipts as compared with previous years. 
Table 129 demonstrated that indirect tax revenues in rela-
tion to national income followed a significantly different 
course, rising throughout almost the whole period. Heavy 
rate increases, particülarly in state consumption taxes and a 
greater susceptibility than direct taxes to react to greater 
business activity and to the rising price level, accounted in 
large measure for this behaviour.5 
The absence of any change between the 1949 and 1950 
ratios of indirect tax receipts to national income chiefly reflects 
the fact that the 1950 yield from import duties and from the 
tax on exchange remittances declined slightly from the '1949 
level. It should be noted that the volume of imports in 1950 
rose only slightly above 1949. The major causes for the 
pronounced rise in the 1951 index and the decline during 
1952, mainly he in the fluctuations in die yield of import 
duties and exchange remittances, which accompanied the 
considerable expansión in the volume and valué of 1951 
imports, and the subsequent drop in 1952. 
4. Pattern of public expenditure 
A detailed statement of public sector expenditure classified 
by major economic categories is presented in Table 130 in 
order to ascertain what changes, if any, have occured in the 
over-all expenditure pattern. 
4 See sub-section 5 which deals with the pattern of receipts. 
5 See pp. 161-162 for a fuller discussion of the indirect taxation structure 
and its basic characteristics. 
Table 130 shows that there were significant changes over 
this period. Particülarly striking was the shift in the allo-
cation of resources from current to capital expenditure, the 
former declining from 77.2 per cent of aggregate expendi-
ture in 1947 to 73.4 per cent in 1952 and the latter rising from 
20.7 per cent to 26.2 per cent over the same period. Current 
expenditure on goods and services fell from 55.8 per cent 
in 1947 to 51.6 per cent in 1952, whereas transfer payments, 
excluding interest on the public debt, rose from 16.1 to 
18.7 per cent., The continuous drop in interest payments 
on aggregate expenditure mainly reflects the fact that federal 
interest outlays remained at the same level throughout the 
period, which in turn was chiefly due to the absence of any 
increase in the federal public debt. The Federal Government 
resorted to currency issues in preference to public borrowing 
for the fmancing of its déficits. 
It is also interesting to note that the fall in current outlays 
on goods and services was concentrated largely on expen-
diture for defence. Both current and capital outlays for 
defence in relative terms declined substantially over this 
period. The sudden rise in such defence expenditure during 
1952 occurréd through heavy outlays for modernization of 
the Navy. The absence of any sizeable expansión in the 
military establishment and the time-lag in pay increases in 
relation to the rising cost of living—as evidenced in part by 
the stable level of current purchases of goods and services 
for defence agencies—accounted in large measure for the 
decline in total defence disbursements in relation to aggregate 
expenditure. 
Purchases of ownership rights, consisting mostly of federal 
government subscription to shares in mixed companies, 
such as steel and hydroelectric plants and other industrial 
enterprises, declined in relative terms throughout the period. 
The bulk of these payments were made in the earlier years 
of the period, largely because the majority of these enter-
prises were eidier created just prior to 1947 or were only 
then in a position to obtain equipment and supplies from 
abroad. With operating capital needs covered largely by 
credit granted by the Banco do Brasil under federal govern-
ment guarantee, the' need for capital tended to diminish 
somewhat. The sharp rise in relative terms shown by this 
item in 1951 was due to increased expenditure resulting from 
the purchase of a privately-owned railway by the Federal 
Government. 
The changes in the pattern of expenditure which charac-
terized this period, on the whole, reflected the general orien-
tation of public policy which aimed at promoting a more 
rapid rate of economic and social development in Brazil. 
The change in the trend towards steadily rising capital outlays 
apparent in 1951 and 1952 may be largely attributed to the 
decline of federal government investment expenditure in 
absolute terms. 
5. Pattern of receipts 
There were no outstanding alterations in the composition 
of public sector revenue. (See table 131.) Tax receipts 
rose from 87.7 per cent of total receipts in 1947 to 88.6 per 
cent in 1952, while non-tax revenue declined from 12.3 to 
11.4 per cent over the same period. A similar stable pattern 
prevailed within the category of tax receipts. Direct assess-
ment yields in relation to total receipts rose slightly from 
22.4 per cent in 1947 to 23.2 per cent in 1952, while indirect 
tax receipts remained more or less at the same level throughout. 
Table 131. Brazil : Receipts of the pubhc sector 
(Millions o f cruzeiros and percentages) 
Closed Accounis ft 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
Direct taxes : 
Taxes on income of individuáis13 4 , 8 1 1 . 6 16 .7 5 , 0 2 6 . 6 1 4 . 8 6 , 1 3 9 . 4 1 5 . 1 7 , 4 0 3 . 7 1 5 . 9 9 , 7 3 8 . 4 1 5 . 7 1 1 , 5 6 3 . 1 1 6 . 4 
Taxes on corporations 1 , 6 3 9 . 3 5 . 7 2 , 2 2 0 . 6 6 . 5 2 , 3 1 2 . 2 5 . 7 2 , 6 2 2 . 7 5 . 6 3 , 4 6 7 . 0 5 . 6 4 , 7 8 8 . 3 6 . 8 
Sub-total . . . 6 , 4 5 0 . 9 2 2 . 4 7 , 2 4 7 . 2 2 1 . 3 8 , 4 5 1 . 6 2 0 . 8 1 0 , 0 2 6 . 4 2 1 . 6 1 3 , 2 0 5 . 4 2 1 . 2 1 6 , 3 5 1 . 4 2 3 . 2 
Indirect taxes : 
Taxes on imports, exports and exchange 
remittances 2 , 4 7 2 . 7 8 . 6 3 , 1 0 3 . 7 9 . 1 3 , 3 5 5 . 9 8 . 3 3 , 4 7 2 . 9 7 . 5 5 , 6 1 6 . 0 9 . 0 4 , 8 4 2 . 1 6 . 9 
Consumption, sales and excise 1 6 , 3 2 4 . 5 5 6 . 7 1 9 , 0 4 9 . 7 5 6 . 1 2 3 , 3 0 5 . 9 5 7 . 5 2 7 , 3 8 7 . 1 5 8 . 9 3 6 , 1 8 9 . 3 5 8 . 2 4 1 , 1 7 7 . 0 5 8 . 5 
Sub-total indirect taxes 1 8 , 7 9 7 . 2 6 5 . 3 2 2 , 1 5 3 . 4 6 5 . 3 2 6 , 6 6 1 . 8 6 5 . 8 3 0 , 8 6 0 . 0 6 6 . 4 4 1 , 8 0 5 . 3 6 7 . 3 4 6 , 0 1 9 . 1 . 6 5 . 4 
Sub-total tax receipts 2 5 , 2 4 8 . 1 8 7 . 7 2 9 , 4 0 0 . 6 8 6 . 6 3 5 , 1 1 3 . 4 8 6 . 7 4 0 , 8 8 6 . 4 8 8 . 0 5 5 , 0 1 0 . 7 8 8 . 5 6 2 , 3 7 0 . 5 8 8 . 6 
Non-tax receipts0 3 , 5 3 2 . 2 1 2 . 3 4 , 5 3 6 . 8 1 3 . 4 5 , 4 0 8 . 1 1 3 . 3 5 , 5 8 9 . 3 1 2 . 0 7 , 1 3 5 . 7 1 1 . 5 8 , 0 1 7 . 7 1 1 , 4 
TOTAL RECEIPTS . . . 2 8 , 7 8 0 . 3 1 0 0 . 0 3 3 , 9 3 7 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 4 0 , 5 2 1 . 5 1 0 0 . 0 4 6 , 4 7 5 . 7 1 0 0 . 0 6 2 , 1 4 6 . 4 1 0 0 . 0 7 0 , 3 8 8 . 2 1 0 0 . 0 
Source : Economic Commission for I*atin America. 
a 1951, 1952; budget estimates for municipalities. 
b Including inheritanee and property taxes. 
« Including sales of physical assets which are quantitatively insignificant. 
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A somewhat clearer picture of movements in the over-all 
pattern of tax revenue may be obtained from table 132. 
Table 132. Brazil : distribution of tax receipts 
(Percentages) 
Taxation 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
Direct 
Indirect 
2 5 . 6 
7 4 . 4 
2 4 . 7 
7 5 . 3 
2 4 . 1 
7 5 . 9 
2 4 . 5 
7 5 . 5 
2 4 . 0 
7 6 . 0 
2 6 . 2 
7 3 . 8 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
The failure of direct tax receipts to advance in relative 
terms as shown in table 132 is particülarly striking in the 
light of underlying economic conditions and the rate increases 
on individual income and profits taxes introduced both in 
1947 and in 1951. The apparently limited flexibility of 
direct tax yields may be attributed to the interaction of 
various factors. The relatively mild increase of taxation on 
both individual income and profits was one of the more 
important contributory factors. The individual income tax, 
as revised in 1947, would appear on the surface to have a 
fairly high progression rate. Thus the rate schedule of the 
complementary tax starts at 1 per cent for incomes in excess 
of 24,000 cruzeiros and rises slowly to a máximum of 50 per 
cent for incomes exceeding 3 million cruzeiros annually. 
Prior to the 1947 revisión, the máximum rate was 20 per cent. 
Furthermore, in 1951 the Government imposed an additional 
rate of 15 per cent to be calculated on the tax applicable to 
individuáis whose tax liability exceeded 10,000 cruzeiros.6 
It was estimated that this increase would mainly aífect indivi-
duáis in the middle and upper income brackets. The pro-
gression of the individual income tax was substantially reduced, 
however, by the exemption of income accruing from divi-
dends on bearer bonds which was taxed separately at a fíat 
rate of 15 per cent from 1947 to 1951 and at 20 per cent 
thereafter.7 It is impossible to assess the effects of this exemp-
tion on income tax yields, but it is relevant to note that 
bearer bonds are held largely by upper income groups who 
would be subject to steadily rising progression rates. 
Moreover, this period witnessed a rapid growth of industry, 
and a steady rise in the profits of private enterprises. 
Although agricultural income is subject to income tax, in 
practice it is not taxed, for administrative and political rea-
sons, thus tending to lessen the over-all effect of income tax. 
In view of the predominant role of agriculture in the Brazi-
lian economy, the effects of this blanket exemption on income 
tax yields must be of some quantitative significance. But it 
was offset to some extent by the fact that farmers and expor-
ten of agricultural products were, in effect, taxed during 
this period by means of the exchange rate system. The 
maintenance by the Federal Government until mid-1953 of 
an over-valued rate for the cruzeiro vis-a-vis other currencies, 
resulted in a concealed taxation of exporters. They could 
have obtained higher proceeds for their exports had they 
been allowed, for example, to sell their foreign currency on 
6 It was established, however, that this additional surcharge would be 
in effect only for the period 1952-56 and that the amount paid by the 
taxpayer would be reimbursed by the Government in the form of 6 per cent 
interest-bearing bonds. The receipts from this tax were earmarked for 
financing the newly created Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econó-
mico. 
7 This rate was raised to 25 per cent in 1954. 
the free market. This exchange policy constituted, in effect, 
a form of subsidizing importers and, in particular, of the 
industrial sector of the economy. Importers were thus able 
to buy foreign exchange at a highly favourable rate. 
This tax burden on exporters was lightened to some extent 
in 1953, when the Government awarded a subsidy to expor-
ters which varied with the type of product exported. Con-
currently, a multiple-exchange system was introduced for 
the auction of foreign exchange, thus largely eliminating 
indirect subsidies to importers and industry. 
Thus it can be said that the exemption of agricultural 
income from income tax was to some extent counteracted 
by this levy on exporters. 
The net result of these exemptions was to leave wages and 
salaries as the only important category of income subject 
to the prógressive income tax. As a consequence, the inci-
dence of the individual income tax was considerably reduced, 
since wages and salaries constitute the most important element 
of income for the lower and middle income groups, while 
dividends usually provide most of the revenue for higher-
income brackets. 
The yield of excess-profits taxation showed the largest 
absolute increase as compared with those of other direct 
taxes, almost trebling between 1947 and 1952. This rise is 
not so striking, however, when viewed in the light of the 
doubling of the rates in 1947 and of the more than doubling 
in declared profits over the same period. Such profits rose 
from .16,600 million cruzeiros in 1947 to 34,700 millions 
in 1952.8 The apparently limited flexibility of excess-profits 
taxes may be ascribed to the relatively moderate rates. 
From low levels of 3-4 per cent, the excess-profits tax was 
changed in 1947 to a schedule of three rates, ranging from a 
minimum of 10 per cent to a máximum of 15 per cent, 
applicable to all types of business organizations. In late 1951, 
the Federal Government imposed additional assessments of 
10 per cent to be paid on tax liability and a 3 per cent tax 
on undistributed profits.9 
Tax evasión which, according to federal authorities was 
very widespread, also substantially influenced the level of 
the yield of the profits tax. However, the Federal Govern-
ment has attempted, with some success, to improve the tax 
collection machinery as shown by the substantial rise in the 
yields of this tax during 1951 and 1952. 
The modest advance over this period in the revenue from 
property taxes, levied by states and municipalities in lieu of 
income taxes, was another factor contributing to the minor 
advance in direct tax receipts. Thus the revenue from these 
taxes rose by 136 per cent between 1947 and 1952 as com-
pared with a rise of 156 per cent in the yield of all other 
direct taxes. This is particülarly striking when viewed in 
terms of the real estáte boom and the speculative upswing 
in property valúes which prevailed during this period, espe-
cially in the large urban centres. The time-lag in reassessing 
property in pace with rising valúes largely accounted for the 
comparatively minor increase in the yield of these taxes. 
Indirect tax receipts maintained the same position in rela-
tion to the aggregate throughout this period. (See table 132.) 
8 See Anuarios do Brasil, 1949-53. 
9 As in the case of the individual income tax, this additional tax is in 
effect for the period 1952-56 and is to be reimbursed at the end of this 
period by the Government in the form o f 6 per cent interest-bearing bonds. 
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In part this may be attributed to the failure of direct taxes 
to advance more rapidly, as discussed above. Another major 
influence was the considerable increase shown by the taxation 
on sales of states and municipahties. Thus the yield of the 
sales tax and of its counterpart in die municipal tax structure, 
the industries and the professions tax, more than trebled 
over this period as compared with a doubling in the yield 
of federal consumption taxes and an 80 per cent increase in 
import duty receipts. As a consequence, sales taxes alone 
rose from 22 per cent to 29 per cent of total indirect taxation 
revenue between 1947 and 1952. This substantial increment 
may be accounted for in some measure by the heavy increases 
in rates, ranging from 50 per cent to 100 per cent, imposed 
by states. Another contributing factor was the higher degree 
of sensitivity of the sales tax as compared with other indirect 
taxation, to the growing volume of business activity and the 
rising price level. These sales taxes, which vary from state 
to state and range between 1.5 per cent to 6 per cent, are 
in practice múltiple taxes imposed at every stage of a trans-
action except for the rendering of services. In contrast, 
consumption taxes of the Federal Government, which fell 
from first to second place as a major source of tax revenue, 
are levied only once and on a selected number of goods. 
Moreover, very few rate increases were imposed during this 
period. The taxes on tobacco and beer were the only ones 
to be raised substantially. 
The comparatively smaller rise in the yield of import duties 
between 1947 and 1952 can be accounted for by the fact that 
import duties are largely specific in nature. Thus their 
yield is principally influenced by the quantum of imports, 
which fell after 1947, recovered to a higher level in 1950, 
rose substantially in 1951 and declined again in 1952. Import 
duties were revised upwards in 1948 for the first time since 
1934. In the opinion of the Brazilian authorities, however, 
the specific rates were still somewhat low, especially when 
viewed against the higher prices for imports which could 
be obtained after 1948. Further upward revisión is there-
fore at present being considered by the Federal Government 
in order to bring the rates more into line with prevailing 
import prices. Preliminary action has already been taken 
through the introduction in late 1952 of heavy increases in 
the duties imposed on imports of petrol and fuel oil, which 
represent a sizeable proportion of total imports. 
It should also be noted that in 1948 the Federal Govern-
ment reimposed the tax on exchange remittances at a rate 
of 5 per cent, raising it to 8 per cent in 1951. The imposition 
of this tax provided some correction for the relatively low 
import duties, since it applied to all exchange remittances 
with the exception of those covering payment for imports 
of basic foodstuffs, fuels, newsprint and for dividends and 
interest. 
Export duties, levied only by states as stipulated by the 
Constitution, played an insignificant role in the tax revenue 
pattern, since their yield amounted to less than 1 per cent 
of all tax receipts. This may be explained by the fact that 
coffee, which is the major export product, is produced lar-
gely in the State of Sao Paulo where an export duty is not 
levied. Moreover, no export duties are applied in the Federal 
District and together with the State of Sao Paulo, these two 
areas handle more than 70 per cent of aggregate exports 
from Brazil. The efficacy of the sales taxes in these two 
areas made it unnecessary to levy such a tax. 
6. Distribution of the tax burden 
The basic data required for a thorough analysis of the dis-
tribution of the tax burden are not available. It would 
appear from the figures shown in this Appendix, however, 
that the tax structure was highly regressive. Moreover, 
the taxing of dividends at a relatively low rate and the levying 
of social security contributions at rates ranging from 5 to 
7 per cent on gross wages and salaries of all civil servants 
and non-agricultural workers, both tended to make the 
system even more regressive than the data would indicate. 
This situation was further accentuated by the fairly severe 
inflation prevailing during this period, owing in part to the 
inability of low-income groups to escape indirect taxation 
which had a greater incidence upon them. Furthermore, 
the effect of indirect taxes was becoming more highly regres-
sive as state sales taxes continued to grow in importance 
within the indirect taxation structure. In the case of income 
taxes, however, the Federal Government in 1951 raised family 
exemptions substantially in order to mitígate somewhat the 
burden of such taxes. This measure provided some relief 
principally to the middle-income brackets, since it would 
appear that the bulk of the low-income groups, regardless 
of family size, fell below the exemption limits. On the 
other hand, the growth in the volume of transfer payments 
had the effect of alleviating somewhat the regressive impact 
of the tax system upon the lower income groups. 
Another factor in evaluating the nature of the fiscal struc-
ture was the taxation of export producers through the 
exchange system. Although it is impossible to determine to 
what extent this concealed tax affected the incomes of far-
mers and planters, there is no doubt diat it tended in some 
degree to offset the de facto exemption of agricultural income 
from normal income tax. The introduction of bonuses to 
exporters in 1953 does not appear to have eliminated die 
burden of this type of taxation owing to the continued 
depreciation of the currency both at home and abroad. 
I I I . T H E FEDERAL BUDGET AND THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Since the budget was the basic instrument used to esta-
bhsh fiscal pohcy by the Federal Government, an appraisal 
of its relative importance within the framework of the public 
sector is essential for an evaluation of this policy. 
It is true that the Federal Government could have directly 
influenced the pohcy of a much larger section of the pubhc 
sector through the exercise of its legal powers over the acti-
vities of the social security institutions of the many other 
autonomous agencies and of the Banco do Brasil, the latter 
representing an important source of credit for state and local 
authorities.10 In practice, however, the autonomy possessed 
by the various agencies and the very complexity and size 
of their operations made it extremely difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the Ministry of Finance to exercise any effective 
co-ordinating role. 
Table 133 presents federal budget expenditure, classified 
by major economic categories and as a percentage of aggre-
gate pubhc expenditure. The most striking feature of this 
table is the steady decline of federal budget outlays in relation 
to total expenditure of the public sector. This may largely 
10 A semi-offícial bank which has some attributes of a central bank 
and acts as a fiscal agent for the Federal Government, which is the largest 
shareholder. 
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have arisen from the relatively more rapid rate of growth 
of the activities of states, municipalities, and social security 
institutions. Thus, current expenditure of these authorities 
trebled in volume between 1947 and 1952, as compared 
with a two-fold increase in similar outlays of the Federal 
Government. This gap in the rate of increase in operating 
expenditure was offset until 1950 by the constantly rising 
proportion of investment outlay effected by the Federal 
Government. However, with the retrenchment policy 
adopted during 1951 in respect to investment expenditure, 
the decline in the relative position of the federal budget 
became even more pronounced. 
Table 133. Brazil : Federal budget expenditure in relation to aggregate public expenditure 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 51 1952 
Current expenditure on goods and services : 
Payments to employees : 
Civil 6 . 9 8 . 3 6 . 5 6 . 7 6 . 2 5 . 8 
Military 
Other purchases of goods and services : 
Civil 
Military 
Sub-total current expenditures on goods and 
services 
Gratuities to individuáis 
Interest 
Other transfers to private sector 
Capital expenditure : 
Expenditure on new physical assets 
Purchase of existing physical assets 
Purchase of ownership rights 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE . . . 4 1 . 6 4 0 . 3 4 0 . 5 3 8 . 2 3 5 . 4 3 2 . 4 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
1 0 . 0 8 . 7 8 . 6 7 . 4 8 . 0 7 . 3 
4 . 1 4 . 0 4 . 4 3 . 7 3 . 6 3 . 4 
5 . 4 4 . 1 3 . 5 3 . 4 2 . 6 3 . 2 
2 6 . 4 25.'1 2 3 . 0 2 1 . 2 2 0 . 4 19 .7 
3 . 1 2 . 8 3 . 8 3 . 0 3 . 5 3 . 5 
3 . 5 2 . 9 2 . 4 1 . 9 1 . 6 1 . 2 
1 . 9 2 . 1 2 . 3 2 . 4 2 . 4 2 . 2 
3 4 . 9 3 2 . 9 3 1 . 5 2 8 . 5 2 7 . 9 2 6 . 6 
4 . 7 6 . 4 8 . 3 9 . 1 6 . 6 5 . 5 
— — 0 . 1 0 . 2 — — 
2 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 6 0 . 4 0 . 9 0 . 3 
This divergence in the rate of expansión between the 
federal budget and the other headings of the public sector 
may be ascribed to several factors; In part, the growth of 
industrialization and urbanization had a greater impact by 
generating and increasing demand for the services of states, 
municipalities and social security institutions. The improve-
ment in the revenue structure of the states and local autho-
rities, following the reforms introduced in the Constitution 
of 1946, also provided a certain stimulus for an expansión of 
activities. Finally, unlike the Federal Government, the 
Table 134. Brazil : Federal budget and public sector expenditure in relation to net national income 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
A. Federal budget expenditure in relation to net 
national income at market prices 7.7 7 . 8 8 . 7 8 . 5 7 . 5 7 . 1 
B. Public sector expenditure in relation to net 
national income at market prices 1 8 . 0 1 9 . 6 2 1 . 9 22 .7 2 1 . 5 2 3 . 2 
C. Federal budget current expenditure on goods 
and services in relation to net national income 
at market prices 2 . 6 2 . 6 2 . 5 2 . 4 2 . 2 2 . 3 
D. Public sector current expenditure on goods 
and services in relation to net national income 
at market prices 1 0 . 0 10 .7 1 1 . 3 11 .7 1 1 . 0 1 2 . 0 
E. Federal budget transfer payments a in relation 
to personal income 1 . 5 1 . 4 1 . 8 1 . 6 1 . 5 1 . 4 
R Public sector transfer payments a in relation to 
personal income 3 . 6 3 . 7 4 . 3 4 . 4 4 . 5 4 . 6 
G. Federal budget capital formation in relation to 
gross capital formation 5 . 1 8 . 6 1 0 . 5 13 .1 7 . 9 6 . 3 
H. Public sector capital formation in relation to 
gross capital formation 2 2 . 1 3 1 . 7 3 4 . 8 3 9 . 0 2 9 . 6 3 0 . 3 
Source : Economic Commission fór Latin America. 
11 Excluding subsidies to private enterprises, déficits of public undertakings and grants to public enterprises. 
11 i 
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other authorities were not faced, with the task of pursuing 
an anti-inflationary fiscal pohcy. Thus, ever-increasing 
déficits did not prove in practice to be too great a 
deterrent to a further expansión of expenditure, particularly 
at the state level. This may partly be explained by the 
fact that states and municipalities could and did have 
recourse to advances from the Banco do Brasil in periods 
of emergency. 
It is interesting to note diat the decline of federal budget 
expenditure in relation. to total expenditure was brought 
about principally by a sharp drop in current expenditure. 
Both transfer payments and capital outlays grew, in relative 
terms, in accordance with the federal government pohcy 
of concentrating on activities which promoted a more rapid 
rate of economic growth and an improvement in the social 
welfare standards of Brazil. 
Table 134 attempts to provide more data on the changing 
role of federal budget expenditure. The sahent fact to be 
observed is that such expenditure rose at a much slower 
pace than pubhc sector expenditure in relation to the national 
income. Another significant feature, to which reference was 
made earlier, is the steady decline in current total expendi-
ture in relation to national income, as contrasted with the 
increase in corresponding outlays of the pubhc sector as a 
whole. It would thus appear that the shift from consumption 
expenditure to transfer payments and capital outlays was 
more marked in the federal budget than in the public sector 
as a whole. 
It is also interesting to note that as regards aggregate capital 
formation, federal budget ouday grew at a faster rate than 
that of the pubhc sector until 1950. This is in striking con-
trast to the other categories of expenditure and essentially 
reflects the pronounced change in the allocation of resources 
by the Federal Government from current to capital outlay. 
Although the change would not appear to have been so 
pronounced as in the case of expenditure, federal budget 
receipts also declined in relative importance. (See table 135.) 
This situation aróse from the peculiar structure of the federal 
system with its heavier reliance on direct taxes and, as indi-
cated earher, the relatively limited sensitivity to rising prices 
and monetary incomes. Thus direct federal taxes accounted 
for shghtly over 30 per cent of all federal tax revenue over 
this period, as compared with about 8-9 per cent in the case 
of the states. Moreover, while federal budget tax receipts 
declined from 45.9 per cent to 41.8 per cent of aggregate 
pubhc tax revenue, between 1947 and 1952, the tax receipts 
of the states rose from 26 per cent to 31 per cent over the 
same period. 
Table 135. Brazil : Federal budget receipts in relation to pubhc revenue 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952-
Direct taxation : 
Taxes on income o f individuáis 7 . 8 
Taxes on corporation profits 5 . 7 
Sub-total direct taxes . . . 13 .5 
Indirect taxation : 
Taxes on foreign trade transactions 7 . 5 
Taxes on consumption 2 2 . 3 
Sub-total indirect t a x e s . . . 2 9 . 8 
Non-tax receipts 2 . 6 
TOTAL . . . 4 5 . 9 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
6.0 
6 . 5 
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7 . 8 
2 0 . 3 
2 8 . 1 
3 . 8 
4 4 . 4 
6.1 
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11.8 
7 3 
1 9 . 0 
2 6 . 3 
3 . 7 
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6 . 4 
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6 . 3 
1 8 , 8 
2 5 . 1 
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A comparison of the taxes producing most revenue in 
both the federal and state systems illustrates even more clearly 
this growing disparity in the rates of increase of tax receipts. 
State sales tax receipts thus trebled over this period as com-
pared with a doubling in the yield of federal consumption 
taxes. 
Further evidence of the comparatively low degree of 
flexibility of the federal tax system is provided in table 136 
which presents the relation of the major categories of tax 
receipts to the components of the national income. No 
further comment is required here, since the earher discussion 
of the changes in similar ratios of the major categories of 
tax receipts for the whole pubhc sector is fully apphcable. 
But it should be emphasized that the steady decline (excluding 
1951) on indirect tax receipts shown in table 138 mainly 
aróse from the quasi-stationary level of the revenue from 
import and stamp duties. This, in turn, was largely a conse-
quence of the fact that the import volume and related trans-
actions declined from 1947 until 1950, when it rose to above 
the 1947 level. The substantial increment in the ratio of 
indirect tax receipts in 1951 was due to the unprecedented 
upswing of imports during that year, reflecting die advance 
purchases which followed the outbreak of the Korean con-
flict. The fall in the ratio in 1952 followed die reduced 
imports of 1952 as a result of official restrictions. 
Further evidence of the role played by the federal budget 
within the pubhc sector may be obtained from table 137 
which shows surpluses and déficits for the various compo-
nents of the pubhc sector. 
It is clear that the Federal Government was committed 
throughout this period to an anti-inflationary fiscal pohcy, 
particularly through a budget surplus. Although these mea-
sures appear to have succeeded in obtaining a budget surplus 
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Table 136. Brazil : Federal budget and public sector receipts in relation to net national income 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
1. Federal budget receipts in relation to net natio-
nal income at market prices 8 . 3 8 . 4 8 . 2 7 . 7 9 . 1 8 . 6 
2. Public sector receipts in relation to net national 
income at market prices 18 .1 1 8 . 9 19 .7 1 9 . 5 2 1 . 5 2 0 . 6 
3. Federal budget direct tax receipts in relation to 
national income 2 . 7 2 . 7 2 . 7 2 . 7 3 . 2 3 . 3 
4. Public sector direct tax receipts in relation to 
national income 4 . 6 4 . 6 4 . 7 4 . 8 5 . 3 5 . 5 
5. Federal budget indirect tax receipts in relation 
to net national income at market prices . . . 5 . 4 5 . 3 5 . 2 4 . 9 5 . 9 5 . 2 
6 . Public sector indirect tax receipts in relation to 
net national income at market prices 1 1 . 8 1 2 . 4 1 3 . 0 1 2 . 9 14 .4 1 3 . 5 
Source : Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
Table 137. Brazil : Surplus and déficit of public sector components 
(Millions of cruzeiros) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 
Federal budget 1 , 9 3 1 . 3 1 , 5 2 5 . 3 — 7 8 5 . 1 — 1 , 7 8 1 . 3 4 , 8 4 4 . 0 5 , 0 7 5 . 3 
Social security institutes . . 1 , 0 0 0 . 5 630 .7 659 .7 4 6 6 . 3 126 .4 1 , 9 6 0 . 3 
States — 1 , 1 7 0 . 0 — 1 , 1 0 9 . 4 — 6 9 2 . 6 — 1 , 9 0 1 . 3 — 1 , 2 2 2 . 3 — 4 , 8 9 4 . 6 
Municipalities — 1 2 7 . 5 — 3 9 1 . 1 — 8 3 4 . 0 — 1 , 0 4 1 . 4 — 8 2 1 . 4 — 1 , 3 0 6 . 4 
Other federal agencies . . . — 5 8 6 . 3 — 7 8 1 . 2 — 1 , 8 0 6 . 3 — 2 , 2 9 9 . 8 — 1 , 7 3 4 . 4 — 6 , 0 2 0 . 1 
Total surplus or déficit (—) 
of the public sector . . . 1 , 0 4 8 . 0 — 1 2 5 . 7 — 3 , 4 5 8 . 3 — 6 , 5 5 7 . 5 1 , 1 9 2 . 3 — 5 , 1 8 5 . 5 
Source: Economic Commission for I^atin America. 
NOTE.—The totals of surplus or déficit shown herein correspond to those in table 128. Amortization and purchases of ownership 
rights have thus not been taken into account in calculating the net results. 
during four of the six years, they failed from the aspect of 
the public sector as a whole. Particülarly noteworthy is the 
heavy federal budget surplus of 1952, which was offset by 
a large déficit for the whole public sector as a result of déficits 
among the other entities and of the extra-budgetary expen-
diture by the Federal Government of 4.5 billion cruzeiros for 
the purchase of the cotton crop. In 1953, the federal budget 
showed a déficit of 3.2 billion cruzeiros. The most important 
fact appearing from these data is that the federal budget is 
severely limited as an effective instrument of fiscal policy. 
An examination of the federal tax structure appears to 
indicate that, as in the case of budgetary policy, federal tax 
policy is relatively limited in both its scope and effectiveness. 
(See table 138.) The percentages for the distribution of 
federal tax receipts show that the federal structure was much 
less regressive than the tax pattern of the states and munici-
palities. But the attempts of the Federal Government to 
implement tax policies aimed at a reduction in the over-all 
regression of the tax system largely failed because of the 
policies adopted by the states. It was noted earlier in this 
document that the over-all tax structure of the public sector 
appeared to be growing more regressive rather than correct-
ing this trend. (See again table 132.) 
During this period, most of the increases in the tax rates 
introduced by the Federal Government were concentrated 
Table 138. Brazil : Distribution of federal tax receipts 
(Percentages) 
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Direct 
Indirect . . 
3 1 . 2 
. 6 8 . 8 
3 0 . 8 
6 9 . 2 
3 1 . 0 
6 9 . 0 
3 2 . 0 
6 8 . 0 
3 2 . 3 
6 7 . 7 
"36.1 
6 3 . 9 
3 7 . 2 
6 2 . 8 
Source : Economic Commission for Latin America. 
on direct taxation. The changes in income and excess-profits 
taxes were clearly aimed at raising their progression. In 
contrast, the states mainly increased the rates of indirect 
taxation, in particular of the sales tax. The heavy reliance 
of states and of municipalities on indirect taxation was partly 
due to constitutional provisions which assign income and Cor-
poration profits taxes to the Federal Government and partly 
to the relative ease with which such taxes are collected. Thus 
the heavy increases in the rates of indirect taxation of the 
states and their growing importance to over-all tax revenues 
counteracted federal government measures to make the tax 
system more progressive. 
In conclusión, there can be litde doubt that the efficacy 
of federal fiscal policy in the future will depend to an increas-
ing degree upon the control and co-ordination which the 
Ministry of Finance can exercise over the fiscal operations of 
the states and the federal agencies. 
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